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Abstract	
This	thesis	is	a	Science	and	Technology	Studies	(STS)	inspired	exploration	of	the	design	
practices	that	brought	London’s	City	Hall	(1997-2002)	into	being.	The	minister	responsible	
for	finding	a	suitable	building	for	the	Greater	London	Authority	(GLA)	ambitiously	declared	
it	to	be	an	exemplar	project	of	“environmentally	progressive	objectives,	the	principles	of	
sustainability”.	Since	there	is	much	contestation	about	how	to	enact	such	an	ambitious	
agenda,	I	as	a	form	of	theory	in	practice	retrospectively	follow	architects,	engineers,	
clients	and	others	through	the	complexities	of	design	process	to	investigate	how	the	
concept	of	sustainability	and	environmental	problems	were	interpreted	from	the	outset	
and	then	transformed	into	environmental	(and	other)	design	challenges	and	targets	in	
order	to	guide	and	align	the	diverse	practitioners	who	worked	towards	materialising	City	
Hall.		
In	order	to	develop	a	better	understanding	of	how	environmental	challenges	were	
addressed	during	City	Hall’s	contingent	and	unpredictable	practices,	I	draw	on	the	concept	
of	translation	to	analyse	how	design	problems	were	defined	in	the	joint	action	plan	to	
house	the	GLA,	how	design	practices	expanded	through	the	concurrent	production	of	
design	knowledge	and	association	of	additional	heterogeneous	elements,	and	how	City	
Hall	increasingly	took	shape	through	negotiations,	choices,	conflicts,	transformations	and	
adaptations.	Through	many	translations	the	design	briefing,	building	forms,	landmark	
building	requests,	technological	devices,	specific	interests,	environmental	performance	
targets,	facade	specifications	and	many	other	issues	became	reciprocally	modified,	
reordered	and	stabilised.			
I	then	use	post-occupancy	data	to	explore	City	Hall	in	operation	(2002	to	2011)	to	develop	
an	understanding	of	how	its	facility	management	produced	knowledge	about	the	
headquarters’	environmental	operations.	Thus	I	develop	an	account	to	what	extent	
environmental	performance	targets	were	translated	from	the	world	of	the	design	studio	to	
the	world	of	actual	building	operations.		
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1.1 Framing	and	translating	the	‘environmental	problem’	
More	than	three	decades	ago	the	‘environmental	crisis’	began	to	occupy	important	places	
in	architectural	debates	and	practices	(cf.	Hajer,	1995).	The	crisis	has	been	increasingly	
addressed	in	association	with	‘sustainability’	since	the	late	1980s	-	a	“term	[that]	has	come	
to	stand	for	everything	and	nothing”	(Crysler,	Cairns,	&	Heynen,	2012b,	p.	27).	Architects,	
engineers,	clients,	politicians	and	others	at	least	seem	to	agree	that	this	crisis	must	be	
faced.	However,	behind	this	apparent	consensus	many	ambiguities,	contradictions	and	
open	questions	emerge,	while	the	environmental	problematic	seems	to	grow	even	more	
acute.	There	are	still	many	uncertainties	regarding	how	to	understand	and	conceptualise	
the	role	of	buildings	in	relation	to	‘environmental	crisis’	and	‘sustainability’.	Nevertheless,	
buildings	can	be	understood	as	major	environmentally	destructive	forces.	It	is	through	
buildings	that	humans	to	a	large	extent	impact	on	the	planet	and	on	the	vital	conditions	of	
human	existence.	Through	construction,	operation	and	demolition,	the	impact	of	buildings	
on	the	environment	is	multifaceted	in	scope	and	includes	a	far-reaching	geography	of	
resource	extraction,	processing	and	related	environmental	damage.		
Opinions	largely	vary	on	how	to	understand	the	problem	of	the	environment	‘out	there’,	
on	how	to	define	the	environmental	challenge	that	architectural	design	is	to	respond	to,	
on	how	to	align	the	(diverse	interests	of)	various	stakeholders	involved,	as	well	as	on	how	
to	transform	these	questions	into	design	strategies,	spatial	configurations	and	
materialisation.	These	practices	cannot	just	be	confined	to	technological	problem-solving	
as	they	essentially	mesh	a	range	of	cognitive,	cultural	and	material	elements.	The	concept	
of	translation	presents	a	valuable	analytical	frame	with	which	to	understand	the	
composition	and	continuously	transforming	architectural	design	challenges	in	response	to	
particular	interpretations	of	the	‘environmental	crisis’.	Rather	than	limiting	the	scope	to	
rigid	analysis,	instrumental	debates	or	concentrating	on	best-practice	guidelines	only,	I	
follow	Simon	Guy	and	Steven	A.	Moore	in	exploring	what	architects,	engineers,	clients	and	
others	“actually	do	in	the	everyday	context	of	the	studio	and	on	site”	(Guy	&	Moore,	2007,	
p.	16).	
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1.2 Case	study:	London	City	Hall	
I	use	London	City	Hall	to	explore	how	architectural	design	practices	gave	meaning	to	the	
concept	of	sustainability	and	a	declared	ambitious	environmental	agenda.	City	Hall’s	
architects	describe	this	project	unambiguously:	
One	of	the	capital’s	most	symbolically	important	new	projects,	City	Hall	[…	is]	
expressing	the	transparency	and	accessibility	of	the	democratic	process	and	
demonstrating	the	potential	for	a	sustainable,	virtually	non-polluting	public	
building	(Foster+Partners,	2014).	
City	Hall	was	designed	collectively	by	Foster+Partners	architects,	Arup	engineers,	More	
London	developers,	the	Government	Office	for	London	(GOL)	and	others	between	1997	
and	2002.	Nick	Raynsford,	the	minister	responsible	for	finding	a	suitable	building	for	the	
Greater	London	Authority	(GLA),	declared:		
I	was	very	conscious	of	the	importance	of	the	new	building	to	be	a	statement	about	
the	new	authority	including	its	commitment	to	environmentally	progressive	
objectives,	the	principles	of	sustainability.	[…]	And	it	was	important	therefore	that	
the	building	that	the	authority	occupied	should	be	compatible	with	that	(Interview	
Raynsford,	2010).		
The	project’s	design	practices	are	a	unique	object	of	research	for	a	number	of	reasons.	In	
the	first	instance,	City	Hall	is	the	headquarters	of	the	GLA,	the	regional	government	
administrative	body	for	Greater	London	that	was	established	in	2000.	This	authority	has	a	
constitutional	responsibility	to	promote	the	concept	of	sustainable	development	(UK	
Government,	1999,	pp.	35-36).	Secondly,	Raynsford	was	not	only	the	minister	responsible	
for	finding	a	suitable	building	for	the	GLA;	he	was	at	once	Minister	of	State	of	the	
Department	for	Environment,	Transport	and	the	Regions	(DETR)	between	1999-2001	and	
in	charge	of	the	UK’s	Building	Regulations,	including	Part	L	(conservation	of	fuel	and	
power).	The	case	study	at	hand	is	therefore	of	additional	value	to	explore	Raysnford’s	role	
and	activities	in	exemplifying	and	enacting	a	supposedly	ambitious	environmental	agenda	
through	City	Hall’s	design	practices.	Third,	City	Hall	was	designed	by	(amongst	others)	
Foster+Partners	architects,	a	prominent	international	practice	that	is	attempting	to	brand	
itself	as	a	credible	leader	in	environmental	design	(see	quote	above).	City	Hall	is	one	
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opportunity	to	explore	this	claim	through	the	analysis	of	Foster+Partners’	specific	design	
activities	during	that	building’s	making.	In	addition,	City	Hall’s	unique	building	form	was	
given	a	key	argumentative	role	within	their	environmental	design	strategy,	an	interesting	
claim	that	requires	interrogation.	Fourth,	City	Hall’s	design	was	celebrated	in	several	
magazines	and	books.	But	it	was	also	controversially	discussed	between	architectural	
design	critics,	newspapers	and	laymen.	It	thus	presents	a	contested	project	of	that	is	of	
wide	interest.	Fifth,	although	City	Hall	is	not	a	large	or	tall	building,	many	might	perceive	it	
to	be	one	important	landmark	of	London.	And	finally,	the	availability	of	post-occupancy	
data	allows	for	analysis	of	the	GOL’s	and	design	team’s	ambitious	environmental	agenda	
since	completion	of	City	Hall	in	2002.		
City	Hall	was	designed	between	1997	and	2002.	The	latest	update	to	the	Building	
Regulations	Part	L	(Conservation	of	fuel	and	power	–	introduced	in	1985)	in	1995	focused	
largely	on	energy	efficiency.	James	Thonger,	Arup’s	Engineering	Project	Manager	of	City	
Hall,	stated	that	a	step	change	was	only	introduced	later	in	2002	(Interview	Thonger,	2011),	
which	shifted	attention	to	building-related	CO2	emissions.	At	the	beginning	of	City	Hall’s	
design	practices,	the	Building	Research	Establishment	Environmental	Assessment	Method	
(BREEAM)	had	not	yet	been	widely	established	(Interview	Spring,	2010)	and	was	
significantly	modified	with	the	then	new	BREEAM	98	for	offices.	And	since	the	Brundtland	
Report	“multiple	versions	of	sustainability”	were	brought	forward	in	policymaking	and,	
particularly	in	the	1990s,	the	“simplistic	managerialism	of	many	initiatives	[…]	left	much	to	
be	desired”	(Leach,	Scoones,	&	Stirling,	2010,	p.	39).	
From	the	outset,	the	building	was	expected	to	lead	by	example.	This	implied	a	form	of	
autonomy,	since	City	Hall	was	set	to	outdo	then	standards	in	environmental	building	code	
requirements.	The	design	collective	was	required	to	set	in	motion	innovative	practices	and	
to	define	the	problems	of	the	environment	and	in	turn	translate	these	into	design	goals	
and	strategies.	Exemplar	projects	present	important	targets	of	research;	John	Law	
conceived	them	as	particular	”lessons	on	how	to	see	and	understand	the	world”	(Law,	
2004,	p.	43).	Susannah	Hagan	suggested	that	architectural	exemplars	“have	a	potential	
value	out	of	all	proportion	to	their	numbers.	It	is	for	this	reason	one	might	be	justified	in	
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devoting	attention	to	them:	architectural	production	can	influence	the	rest	of	the	building	
industry”	(Hagan,	2001,	p.	xi).	
In	Chapter	7	I	explore	City	Hall	in	its	operation	from	2002-03	to	2010-11.	I	analyse	how	the	
GLA	facility	management	team	produced	knowledge	about	City	Hall’s	environmental	
operation	through	recorded	results,	and	how	they	attempted	to	evaluate	to	what	extent	
environmental	predictions	that	were	defined	during	design	development	were	translated	
in	City	Hall’s	actual	operations	and	performance.	
1.3 Approaching	the	pragmatics	of	City	Hall’s	design	practices	
In	this	section	I	introduce	the	theoretical	framework	and	methods	through	which	I	explore	
how	City	Hall	was	assembled	in	its	specific	design	practices	(see	Chapter	2	and	3	for	in-
depth	explanation).		
My	research	builds	on	a	broad	conception	of	architecture.	In	my	understanding,	
architecture	organises	forms,	volumes,	materials,	signs	and	symbols	and	thus	engages	in	
processes	of	function,	perception	and	communication.	Architecture	creates	insides	and	
outsides,	directs	material	flows	and	suggests	blueprints	of	occupation	(Hauser,	
Kamleithner,	&	Meyer,	2011,	p.	9).	Architectural	design	brings	together	various	forms	of	
knowledge,	diverse	vocational	actors	and	multiple	spatial	and	temporal	scales.	These	
fluctuating	worlds	do	not	emerge	through	the	strict	application	of	simple	rules	and	
guidelines,	but	through	conceptions,	initiatives,	interpretations,	negotiations	and	choices.	I	
therefore	explore	City	Hall’s	design	process	as	forms	of	heterogeneous	assemblages.	These	
explicitly	reject	a	mode	of	thinking	that	rests	on	separately	layered	realities	(e.g.	the	
technical,	the	social,	the	material),	including	assumptions	about	the	sole/autocratic	
influence	of	creative	masterminds,	and	instead	welcomes	and	encompasses	the	idea	of	
heterogeneous	characters	and	relational	associations	co-shaping	each	other.	These	
elements	are	drawn	together	in	the	design	practice	through	many	translations.	
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Figure	1.2		Foster+Partners’	Riverside	Studio	in	2002	(Photograph:	Nigel	Young	and	Foster+Partners,	2002)	
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To	explore	City	Hall	as	freeze-framed	through	the	glossy	photographs	of	design	magazines,	
through	representations	of	Euclidean	space	(plans,	section,	elevations)	or	through	the	
accounts	of	design	processes	by	outsiders	would	be	to	ignore	all	the	struggles,	
negotiations	and	compromises	involved	in	bringing	it	into	being.	Instead,	I	consider	City	
Hall	as	a	“moving	project”,	which	emerges	through	“a	series	of	transformations”	(Latour	&	
Yaneva,	2008,	p.	80).	
In	order	to	develop	an	understanding	of	how	the	heterogeneous	elements	in	City	Hall’s	
design	process	were	assembled,	I	take	a	pragmatic	approach	and	examine	what	architects,	
engineers	and	the	wider	design	collective	actually	did	in	the	daily	context	of	their	design	
studios,	offices	and	on	site	(Guy	&	Moore,	2005;	Yaneva,	2009).	This	allows	me	to	question	
the	hype	and	hyperbole	surrounding	this	development	and	show	it	to	be	the	heterodox	
production	of	an	assemblage	of	different	forces.	
By	moving	in	time	and	space,	I	open	the	black	box	of	City	Hall’s	design	process	and	
retrospectively	follow	architects,	engineers,	clients	at	work	as	I	enter	their	several	
construction	sites	of	facts,	forms,	strategies	and	technologies.	Foster+Partners’	Riverside	
Studio	(Figure	1.2)	was	the	architectural	laboratory	at	centre	in	which	City	Hall	was,	in	
contingent	and	unpredictable	processes,	gradually	assembled	through	diverse	
experiments.	Through	interviews	with	the	practitioners	involved	and	through	design	
documents	(plan	sets,	diagrams,	charts,	and	presentation	material),	I	examine	the	design	
process	of	City	Hall	along	selected	key	design	presentations	and	stages	of	the	building	
design	and	construction	process.	The	approach	taken	in	retracing	the	design	practices	was	
to	be	as	open	as	possible	to	any	unexpected	actors,	elements	and	sites	that	might	become	
drawn	into	the	process.	
My	focus	of	attention	is	on	design	practices.	I	draw	on	selected	ideas	brought	forward	in	
the	field	of	Science	and	Technology	Studies	(STS)	as	a	way	of	exploring	how	City	Hall	
became	constructed	through	particular	design	knowledges,	methods,	classifications,	
interests,	materialities	and	(non-textual)	visual	representations.	In	order	to	better	
understand	the	transformations	actually	occurring	during	the	design	process,	I	use	an	
adaptation	of	the	concept	of	“translation”	(Callon,	1986)	as	my	central	analytical	frame.	
Through	translation,	I	can	conceive	how	shared	design	goals	(e.g.	the	concept	of	
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sustainability)	were	defined,	human	beings	and	devices	enrolled,	interests	and	roles	(re-)	
aligned,	transformed	and	reordered.	Translations	are	not	neutral:	the	concept	of	
translation	is	a	way	to	examine	how	power	is	located	within	the	design	process	(Callon,	
1986),	to	foreground	“the	struggle	between	the	objectives	and	strategies	of	human	actors	
and	the	performance	of	technical	and	natural	actors”	(Beveridge	&	Guy,	2009,	p.	72),	and	
to	trace	how	“settlement	on	the	often	conflicting	priorities	of	a	variety	of	actors”	(p.	73)	
was	generated.	The	concept	of	translation	further	allows	a	retracing	of	the	ways	in	which	
the	world,	as	it	is	imagined	and	anticipated	by	designers,	relates	to	the	world	of	the	actual	
design	object	and	its	operation	(Akrich,	1992).		
Translation	allows	the	foregrounding	of	the	concept	of	sustainability	as	interpreted	for	City	
Hall’s	design	practices	–	how	it	was	given	meaning,	how	in	a	complex	and	dynamic	process	
the	concept	became	associated	with	other	design	requirements	and	thus	was	increasingly	
co-shaped	by	a	heterogeneous	set	of	parameters	(a	budget,	time	constraints,	etc.).	The	
transformations	and	displacements	of	the	concept	must	be	explored	in	relation	to	these	
other	parameters.	
1.4 Aims,	research	questions	and	limitations	
In	my	investigation	I	give	a	detailed	description	of	how	London’s	City	Hall	developed	
through	its	design	practices	(1997	to	2002).	Then	I	explore	City	Hall	in	operation,	2002-03	
to	2010-11.	My	thesis	intends	to	address	a	readership	that	is	interested	in	questions	of	
architectural	design	practices,	design	research,	politics	of	design	and	the	interrelationships	
between	technology,	society	and	environment.		
My	thesis	does	not	explore	how	outsiders	who	were	not	directly	involved	in	the	design	
process	–	for	instance	architectural	journalists,	politicians	and	citizens	–	perceived	and	
interpreted	City	Hall	once	it	was	a	materialised	artefact.	I	do	not	attempt	to	provide	a	
universal	definition	of	what	“sustainable	architecture”	might	entail.	I	avoid	assigning	the	
adjective	“sustainable”	to	specific	assemblages,	for	instance	design	strategies,	
technologies,	materials	or	buildings.	Instead,	I	suggest	to	step	back	and	enter	a	more	
careful	mode	of	reflection	–	I	argue	for	the	importance	of	shifting	attention	to	the	ways	
the	concept	becomes	transformed	and	displaced	(that	is,	translation)	within	specific	
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practices	targeted	towards	materialisation.	Following	the	political	scientists	Maarten	Hajer	
and	Frank	Fischer,	I	crucially	understand	sustainability	to	be	a	concept	that	in	City	Hall’s	
design	practices	needed	to	be	interpreted	by	giving	meaning	to	it	(cf.	Hajer	&	Fischer,	
1999).	In	other	words,	as	just	a	concept	sustainability	could	not	be	built	-	it	essentially	
requires	translation	into	contextualised	definitions,	strategies	and	more,	since	City	Hall’s	
design	practices	are	specific	and	localised.		
The	scope	of	my	thesis	is	defined	by	three	research	questions.	Starting	from	the	
presumption	that	environmental	design	processes	“critically	depend	on	the	specific	social	
construction	of	environmental	problems”	(Hajer,	1995,	p.	2)1	and	that	the	client	
commissioning	City	Hall	needed	to	devise	design	challenges	that	could	be	addressed	by	
the	design	team,	I	ask:		
1. At	the	outset	of	the	project,	how	were	environmental	problems	constructed	as	an	
issue	for	design,	and	how	were	these	transformed	into	particular	targets	and	goals	to	
instruct	and	align	the	architects,	engineers	and	developers	in	making	their	design	
proposals?	(Chapter	4)	
	
This	first	question	aims	to	capture	an	early	moment	in	the	translation	process	in	which	a	
shared	problem	for	the	design	team	is	constructed	as	collective	departure	point	and	action	
plan.	These	problem	formulations	are	constructed	in	response	to	particular	
understandings	of	the	‘environmental	crisis’	and	its	relation	to	City	Hall’s	design	practices.	
My	second	question	focuses	on	how	the	design	team	interpreted	and	gave	meaning	to	
these	design	targets	and	goals	and	how	design	knowledge	was	produced	and	additional	
heterogeneous	elements	were	associated	within	the	design	activities	in	order	to	progress	
the	design	development.	To	understand	the	many	transformations	and	displacements,	
negotiations,	choices,	conflicts	and	adaptations	through	which	City	Hall	increasingly	took	
shape,	my	second	question	is:	
																																								 																
1	I	adapt	this	argument	from	Hajer	who	develops	it	for	environmental	politics.	
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2. How	did	the	design	team	translate	the	environmental	challenges	and	targets	defined	
in	the	design	briefings	into	design	strategies,	building	technologies	and	the	
materialising	building?	(Chapters	5	and	6)	
	
Following	the	completion	and	handover	to	the	GLA,	my	third	research	question	(set	of	
questions)	aims	to	explore	City	Hall’s	occupation	process	from	2002-03	to	2010-11.	In	May	
2002	the	GOL’s	initial	plan	to	find,	design	and	accommodate	the	GLA,	which	was	
associated	with	a	proclaimed	ambitious	environmental	design	agenda,	had	been	
completed.	The	design	team	had	in	principle	fulfilled	their	tasks,	and	initially	about	500	
GLA	members	assumed	work	in	the	new	headquarters.	The	evolving	design	briefings	were	
translated	into	hypotheses,	design	strategies,	building	forms,	technological	choices	and	
materialisations	through	transformation	processes.	These	translations	were	then	put	on	
trial	in	actual	operation.	Crucially,	predicting	environmental	performances	during	design	
development	was	risky,	since	actual	performance	depended	on	a	variety	of	rather	
unpredictable	elements,	for	instance	forms	of	occupancy,	management	and	methods	of	
measurement.		
Finally,	my	third	(set	of)	question(s)	is/are:	
3. How	did	City	Hall’s	building	infrastructure	management	conceive	its	main	role	and	how	
did	they	attempt	to	create	knowledge	about	the	headquarters	environmental	impact	
of	actual	operation?		
	
What	were	the	key	results	recorded?	
	
Based	on	these	recordings,	in	how	far	did	City	Hall’s	completed	design	in	actual	
operation	achieve	the	projected	environmental	performance	targets	that	were	defined	
during	design	development	to	guide	and	align	the	multifarious	translation	processes	
targeted	towards	design	materialisation?	(Chapter	7)	
1.5 Chapter	outline	
In	Chapter	2	I	expand	and	discuss	my	research	approach	to	explore	the	design	practices	of	
City	Hall.	This	chapter	consists	of	three	interrelated	sections	that	inform	my	research.	The	
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first	part,	“Architectural	practices	and	the	‘environmental	crisis’”,	highlights	how	within	
architectural	design	practices	there	seem	to	be	widespread	disagreements	about	how	to	
define	environmental	problems	to	be	tackled,	which	pathways	to	take,	and	how	to	
assemble	and	materialise	buildings	in	response.	The	second	part,	“Framing	the	
‘environmental	crisis’”,	lays	out	my	approach	to	a	conception	of	the	environment	and	
forms	of	environmental	degradation	as	a	prerequisite	for	my	explorations.	The	
environmental	problematic	is	hardly	ever	debated	in	its	entirety	and	discourses	tend	to	
prioritise	particular	conflicts	over	others.	I	discuss	different	concepts	of	environmental	
crises	by	focusing	on	the	emblematic	concepts	of	climate	change	and	sustainability.	The	
third	part,	“Exploring	architectural	design	practices”,	introduces	the	Science	and	
Technology	Studies	(STS)	inspired	theoretical	framework	through	which	I	retrospectively	
follow	practitioners	and	elements	through	the	heterogeneous	and	contingent	design	
practices	of	City	Hall.	I	begin	situating	this	approach	by	briefly	introducing	STS	origins	and	
central	ideas	and	by	introducing	two	key	thinkers	–	Bruno	Latour	and	John	Law.	I	then	
discuss	how	STS	approaches	have	been	transported	to	architectural	studies,	mainly	
through	the	work	of	Albena	Yaneva.	Finally,	building	on	selected	elements	of	Yaneva’s	
work,	I	explain	the	STS-inspired	theoretical	framework	I	have	chosen,	and	how	I	use	
Michael	Callon’s	(1986)	concept	of	“translation”	as	my	main	analytical	frame	of	
investigation.	
While	Chapter	2	outlines	my	investigations	through	a	selection	of	specific	perspectives	and	
approaches,	in	Chapter	3	I	describe	how	I	gathered,	analysed	and	represented	the	
heterogeneous	information	I	collected	during	my	fieldwork.	The	two	chapters	are	closely	
interlinked	and	inform	each	other.	Within	the	STS-inspired	approach,	I	combine	a	set	of	
methods	comprising	case	studies,	semi-structured	interviews	and	informal	conversations,	
visual	methodology	and	the	production	of	graphical	mappings.	This	set	of	methods	
demonstrates	the	choices	and	decisions	I	made	as	I	carried	out	my	fieldwork	and	data	
analysis,	and	as	I	wrote	up	my	findings.	The	particular	knowledge	that	I	produced	
depended	on	and	was	created	through	these	choices.		
Chapters	4	to	8	present	my	research	findings.	In	Chapter	4	I	begin	to	open	the	black	box	of	
City	Hall’s	design	process.	I	start	to	retrace	the	origins	of	City	Hall	before	the	architects	and	
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engineers	entered	the	design	process.	I	begin	my	exploration	around	1997	by	introducing	
Minister	Nick	Raynsford	as	a	key	actor	who	was	responsible	for	establishing	and	housing	
the	future	GLA.	Then	I	retrace	how	the	associations	around	him	expanded:	how	new	
actors	joined	his	team	and	how	they	set	up	a	unique	type	of	procurement	process	for	the	
GLA	headquarters	in	which	they	drafted	several	design	briefs	in	August	1998	to	inform	and	
align	the	design	teams,	then	to	come,	in	their	activities.		
Chapters	5	and	6	continue	to	retrace	the	emergence	of	City	Hall.	In	them	I	explain	how	the	
design	team,	through	the	production	of	design	knowledge	and	the	construction	of	
associations,	developed	design	strategies	and	building	technologies	in	response	to	the	
initial	design	briefing.	In	Chapter	5	I	describe	how	many	new	actors	and	elements	became	
involved	to	develop	architectural	design	proposals	for	the	future	GLA	headquarters.	In	late	
August	1998	the	design	team	started	their	work,	shaping	their	proposals	in	order	to	win	
the	competition	to	find	a	suitable	property	for	the	GLA	headquarters.	Those	involved	
comprehended	the	design	development	as	a	series	of	transformations	in	which	four	
transitory	key	schemes	could	be	identified.	This	chapter	explores	the	first	two	key	schemes	
presented	to	Nick	Raynsford	for	developing	City	Hall,	the	first	in	September	1998,	the	
second	in	November	1998.	The	principles	of	City	Hall’s	environmental	design	strategy	were	
largely	stabilised	with	the	later	scheme.	I	focus	on	the	debates	and	controversies	involved	
in	the	development	of	City	Hall’s	unique	building	form,	orientation	and	envelope.	These	
design	elements	were	given	a	pivotal	role	within	the	environmental	design	strategy	for	the	
building.	This	chapter	ends	with	the	announcement	in	February	1999	that	Raynsford’s	
advisory	team	had	selected	the	More	London,	Foster+Partners	and	Arup	scheme	to	build	
City	Hall.	Following	the	successful	selection	of	the	More	London	scheme,	Chapter	6	
explores	the	continued	design	development	of	City	Hall’s	third	and	fourth	key	design	
schemes,	the	Planning	Application	scheme	(July	1999)	and	the	Schematic	Design	
(November	1999),	which	were	produced	together	with	comprehensive	design	
documentations.	In	this	chapter	I	describe	how	the	building	form	and	orientation	were	
redesigned	and	made	buildable,	and	how	the	facade	design	was	further	expanded.	Finally,	
I	explore	the	BREEAM	98	for	Offices	assessment	that	was	made	mandatory	in	the	initial	
design	briefing	process.		
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Chapter	7	investigates	City	Hall	in	operation.	In	May	2002	roles	and	responsibilities	were	
handed	over	to	the	new	occupants:	most	design	participants	left	the	scene	of	City	Hall’s	
development	process,	some	stayed,	and	a	huge	number	of	GLA	staff	entered	as	occupiers.	
Since	actual	operation	and	environmental	performance	is	contingent	upon	a	number	of	
elements	and	practices,	I	reflect	on	how	the	building	infrastructure	management	
attempted	to	create	knowledge	about	the	headquarters	environmental	impact	and	
explore	recorded	results	for	the	period	from	2002-03	to	2010-11.	I	explore	four	key	
building	updates	that	were	introduced	to	City	Hall	in	this	period	with	the	aim	to	further	
reduce	energy	consumption.	Using	these	recordings	for	the	year	2010-11,	I	then	attempt	
to	evaluate	to	what	extent	City	Hall’s	completed	design	achieved	the	projected	
environmental	performance	targets	that	were	defined	during	design	development	in	
actual	operation.	
In	Chapter	8,	the	closing	chapter	of	this	thesis,	I	first	reflect	on	the	STS-	and	translation-
inspired	theoretical	framework	adopted	in	this	thesis.	Secondly,	I	revisit	central	questions	
and	present	key	findings	from	my	empirical	chapters	in	order	to	draw	out	wider	
contributions	for	architectural	design	research	and	practice.	I	do	this	by	foregrounding	
three	selected	mechanisms	that	are	central	to	translation	processes.		
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Chapter	2 		
Architectural	practices	and	the	‘environmental	
crisis’	(literature	review)	
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2.1 Introduction		
In	this	chapter	I	outline	the	positions	from	which	I	explore	City	Hall’s	architectural	design	
practices,	which	were	set	to	enact	an	ambitious	environmental	design	agenda.	This	
literature	review	is	organised	in	three	interrelated	parts	that	inform	this	research	and	help	
me	to	address	the	questions	set	out	in	the	previous	chapter.	
The	first	part	of	the	chapter,	“Architectural	practices	and	the	‘environmental	crisis’”,	
begins	by	introducing	the	important	role	that	buildings	play	in	relation	to	environmental	
challenges	–	as	major	environmentally	destructive	forces,	but	also	as	practices	that	have	
huge	potential	to	mitigate	the	negative	impact	of	human	activity.	I	point	out	that	within	
architectural	design	practices	there	seems	to	be	widespread	disagreement	on	how	to	
define	environmental	problems	to	be	tackled,	which	pathways	to	take,	and	how	to	
assemble	and	materialise	buildings	in	response.	I	argue	for	the	necessity	to	engage	in	
these	controversies,	rather	than	overlook	the	fact	that	conflicting	interests,	competences	
and	responsibilities	between	differently	involved	actors	are	not	part	of	these	practices.		
The	second	part,	“Framing	the	‘environmental	crisis’”,	lays	out	my	approach	to	a	
conception	of	the	environment	and	forms	of	environmental	degradation	as	the	basis	for	
my	explorations.	The	field	of	environmental	discourse	comprises	diverse,	fragmented	and	
partially	contradictory	approaches	towards	the	environment,	proposed	by	a	wide	range	of	
actors,	including	scientists,	politicians,	entrepreneurs,	campaigners,	journalists	and	laymen.	
Their	debates	contest	what	the	environmental	problem	actually	entails	and	I	attempt	to	
shed	some	light	on	the	political	struggle	around	key	terminologies.	The	environment	‘out	
there’	can	only	be	grasped	and	discussed	through	particular	constructed	understandings	of	
it,	which	essentially	rely	on	symbolic	forms,	discursive	formations	and	media	
representation.	The	full	range	of	the	environmental	problematic	is	hardly	ever	debated,	
and	discourses	tend	to	prioritise	particular	conflicts	over	others.	I	discuss	different	
concepts	of	environmental	crises	by	focusing	on	the	emblematic	concepts	of	climate	
change	and	sustainability.	I	outline	the	development	of	issues	and	concepts	in	the	1980s	in	
order	to	situate	the	design	process	of	City	Hall	in	relation	to	them.	Human-induced	
environmental	change	has	a	degrading	impact	on	the	life	support	systems	provided	by	our	
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planet.	Humans	therefore	increasingly	face	self-imposed	threats	that	require	urgent	acts	
of	mitigation	and	adaptation.		
The	third	part	of	this	chapter,	“Exploring	architectural	design	practices”,	introduces	the	
Science	and	Technology	Studies	(STS)	inspired	theoretical	framework	through	which	I	
retrospectively	follow	practitioners	and	elements	through	the	heterogeneous	and	
contingent	design	practices	of	City	Hall.	I	begin	by	briefly	introducing	the	origins	and	
central	ideas	of	STS	with	reference	to	two	key	thinkers:	Bruno	Latour	and	John	Law.	I	then	
discuss	the	transfer	of	STS	approaches	to	architectural	studies,	mainly	through	the	work	of	
Albena	Yaneva.	Finally,	I	explain	the	STS-inspired	theoretical	framework,	which	builds	on	
selected	elements	of	Yaneva’s	work,	and	on	Michael	Callon’s	(1986)	concept	of	
“translation”.		
2.2 Architectural	practices	and	the	‘environmental	crisis’	
2.2.1 The	role	of	buildings		
It	is	through	buildings	and	the	associated	practices	of	design,	construction,	operation,	
refurbishment	and	demolition	that	humans	largely	impact	on	the	planet	and	the	vital	
conditions	of	human	existence.	This	relationship	is	not	a	new	theme	to	architecture:	
“every	act	of	building	betrays	the	environment,	as	it	requires	the	displacement	of	‘natural’	
relationships”	(Ingersoll,	2012,	p.	574).	I	argue	that,	today,	(the	majority	of)	buildings	can	
be	understood	as	major	environmentally	destructive	forces.2	The	impact	of	building-
related	practices	on	the	environment	and	on	the	conditions	of	human	life	involves	a	
complex	dynamic	that	is	multifaceted	in	scope	and	involves	a	far-reaching	geography	of	
resource	extraction,	material	processing	and	environmental	damage	produced.	Seen	this	
way,	“architecture’s	materiality	acquires	a	new,	ethical	significance	[…]	Materials	have	
returned	to	a	position	of	the	greatest	social	and	cultural	importance”	(Hagan,	2001,	p.	76).		
It	is	argued	that	building	construction	consumes	more	materials	and	produces	more	waste	
than	any	other	industrial	sector	(Hegger,	2008,	p.	7).	As	they	are	constructed,	buildings	
																																								 																
2	I	adopt	this	argument	for	buildings	from	Saskia	Sassen’s	(2004)	related	approach	to	The	Central	Role	of	Cities	in	
our	Environmental	Future.	
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require	huge	amounts	of	building	materials	and	technological	devices	that	(partially)	
emerge	out	of	long	production	process	chains	that	span	continents.	During	the	
manufacturing	process,	these	products	require	large	amounts	of	materials	and	energy	
input.	They	have	therefore	become	associated	with	particular	environmental	conflicts	like	
resource	depletion,	greenhouse	gas	(GHG)	emissions,	contamination	and	toxication.		
With	regard	to	the	operation	of	buildings,	the	International	Energy	Agency	(IEA)	suggests	
that	globally	the	“buildings	sector,	which	uses	energy	for	heating,	cooling,	lighting,	
refrigeration	and	for	powering	electrical	appliances,	is	currently	the	single	largest	final	
end-use	consumer”	(IEA,	2012,	p.	61).	The	energy	used	in	buildings	still	comes	largely	from	
fossil	energy	sources,	which	have	become	increasingly	scarce	and	expensive,	and	are	
considered	to	be	one	of	the	main	causes	of	climate	change	and	other	environmental	
degradation.	In	the	UK	the	operation	of	buildings	is	thought	to	account	for	46%	of	total	
energy	use	and	47%	of	related	carbon	dioxide	(CO2)	emissions	(BRE,	2002).	Studies	on	
London	attribute	the	share	of	CO2	emissions	related	to	building	operations	as	being	67.7%	
(Siemens	&	McKinsey,	2008,	p.	18)	or	even	80%	(GLA,	2004a,	p.	7)	of	London’s	total	CO2	
emissions.	
Furthermore,	the	refurbishment	and	demolition	of	buildings	requires	additional	energy	
inputs	and	often	poses	the	challenge	of	how	to	treat	and	recycle	composites	and	
hazardous	building	elements	(e.g.	asbestos,	formaldehyde).	
In	principle	there	seems	to	be	widespread	agreement	that	buildings	and	their	associated	
practices	play	a	crucial	role	in	the	way	humans	impact	on	the	environment.	But	there	are	a	
lot	of	questions	that	remain	unaddressed	in	attempts	to	conceive	the	interrelationship	
between	buildings	and	the	‘environmental	crisis’.	The	perspectives	described	above	of	
operational	energy	consumption	and	related	CO2	emissions	are	very	important.	Peter	
Droege	argues	that	“[a]tmospheric	CO2	concentrations	exceed	safe	levels	by	more	than	
one	third”	and	that	nothing	less	than	“[n]aked	survival	is	at	stake”	(Droege,	2012,	p.	590).	
Nonetheless,	these	perspectives	must	be	understood	as	the	predominant	ways	of	framing	
the	interrelationship	between	buildings	and	the	‘environmental	crisis’,	which	by	necessity	
suppress	many	other	perspectives.	This	aspect	needs	further	investigation.	The	
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interrelationship	between	buildings	and	environmental	crises	is	extremely	complex	and	
differs	in	and	across	specific	contexts	and	practices.		
While	buildings	can	in	principle	be	conceptualised	as	major	environmentally	destructive	
forces,	they	can	potentially	also	be	understood	as	strategic	practices	helping	to	mitigate	
the	destructive	impacts	of	human	activity.	For	instance,	the	Intergovernmental	Panel	on	
Climate	Change	(IPCC)	suggests	that	the	building	sector	has	a	bigger	potential	than	other	
sectors	to	reduce	GHG	emissions	at	the	lowest	cost	(IPCC,	2007b,	p.	59).	Within	building	
practices	the	design	process	has	huge	potential	to	reduce	practices’	destructive	effect	on	
the	environment	and	human	wellbeing.	
2.2.2 Pluralistic	architectural	design	practices		
More	than	three	decades	ago	the	‘environmental	crisis’	began	to	occupy	important	places	
in	architectural	debates	and	practices	(cf.	Hajer,	1995).	From	the	late	1980s,	
environmental	conflicts	were	increasingly	addressed	from	the	perspective	of	
‘sustainability’.	Architects,	engineers,	clients,	politicians	and	others	seem	to	agree	that	this	
crisis	must	be	faced.	However,	behind	this	apparent	consensus	many	ambiguities,	
contradictions	and	open	questions	have	emerged,	while	the	environmental	problematic	is	
becoming	even	more	acute.		
Since	architectural	discourses	and	practices	began	to	respond	to	the	‘environmental	crisis’	
and	‘sustainability’,	a	vast	range	of	pluralistic	approaches	has	developed.	For	instance,	
some	have	promoted	energy	efficient	high-tech,	low-tech	or	vernacular	strategies;	others	
have	addressed	health,	well-being	and	quality	of	life	issues	(Guy	&	Farmer,	2001);	some	
took	inspiration	from	the	“analogy	to	natural	forms”	(Ingersoll,	2012,	p.	576)	or	from	
processes	in	‘natural’	systems	(Ursprung,	2007,	p.	19);	some	emphasised	“performance	
over	appearance,	and	some	appearance	over	performance”	(Hagan,	2001,	p.	4);	some	
developed	‘intelligent’	and	‘responsive’	materials,	some	renewable,	recyclable	and	
biodegradable	materials	(McDonough	&	Braungart,	2002),	and	some	sensory	perception	
(Sattrup,	2009).	Some	thematised	social	justice	and	design,	participatory	processes	and	
affordable	housing	(Bell	&	Wakeford,	2008),	and	others	ecological	footprinting	and	
consumerist	lifestyles	(Droege,	2012).	Other	actors	discuss	universal	best	practices	
guidelines:	some	argue	we	need	more	technology,	others	think	we	need	less;	some	call	for	
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more	archaic	behaviour	or	to	challenge	comfort	levels;	and	others	suggest	we	should	
“develop	clearer	definitions	or	standardizations”	(Guy	&	Moore,	2005,	pp.	1-2).	Guy	and	
Moore	suggest	that	the	pluralism	of	discourses	and	practices	in	response	to	the	
‘environmental	crises’	and	‘sustainability’	defies	“simple	categorization”	(2007,	p.	15).	
The	multiplicity	of	architectural	practices	has	importantly	led	to	different	interpretations	
of	what	the	actual	challenges	are	that	need	to	be	addressed,	as	well	as	numerous	
discourses	and	engagements,	diverse	actions,	design	and	technological	strategies,	in	order	
reach	particular	theoretical	positions	and	diverse	pathways	of	materialisation.	It	is	
characterised	by	“disagreement	about	design	priorities,	the	role	of	technology,	the	
importance	of	aesthetics,	the	relationship	of	natural	and	built	environment	and	the	degree	
of	optimism	and	pessimism	that	the	current	state	of	sustainable	architectural	practice	
should	invoke”	(Guy,	2012,	p.	561).		
In	order	to	comprehend	how	the	diverse	issues,	aims,	strategies	and	actions	emerge,	Guy	
and	Moore	“encourage	a	deeper	engagement	with	sustainable	architecture,	one	that	
doesn’t	shy	away	from	broader	sociological	or	philosophical	questions	or	merely	indulge	in	
the	narrowly	instrumental	debates	that	characterise	so	much	of	the	green	architecture	
literature”	(2005,	p.	2).	
2.2.3 Stepping	back	
The	attitude	that,	for	instance,	Foster+Partners	present	in	their	attempt	to	brand	City	Hall	
a	”sustainable,	virtually	non-polluting	public	building”	(Foster+Partners,	2014)	can	be	
found	in	the	majority	of	commercial	architectural	practices.	‘Sustainability’	has	become	a	
well-	established	lens	through	which	to	conceptualise	the	environmental	challenges	in	
architectural	design.	Today,	building	practices	as	means	to	reduce	environmental	crises	
present	a	significant	commercial	market,	with	which	critical	engagement	seems	largely	
absent.	Through	confident	project	descriptions	and	expansive	claims,	many	conceal	the	
contestation	and	uncertainty	over	pathways	to	less	destructive	futures.	Sometimes	
attributes	such	as	“sustainable”,	“environmental”,	“energy	efficient”,	etc.	are	deployed	as	
if	they	would	be	identical.	As	a	label,	“‘sustainability’	[…]	has	come	to	stand	for	everything	
and	nothing”	(Crysler,	Cairns,	&	Heynen,	2012a,	p.	27).	While	acknowledging	that	these	
terms	are	difficult	to	frame,	I	argue	that	it	is	important	not	to	pretend	that	related	
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meanings	are	clear,	but	instead	to	engage	with	and	emphasise	the	controversies	and	
interpretations	over	their	meanings.	
In	exploring	City	Hall,	my	conviction	is	to	step	back	in	order	to	reconsider	how	
environmental	problems	and	the	concept	of	sustainability	have	been	given	meaning	within	
City	Hall’s	blackboxed	and	contested	design	practices.		
I	recognise	that	the	environmental	challenges	can	be	approximated	through	different	
concepts	(such	as	sustainability).	I	conceive	sustainability	first	and	foremost	as	a	concept.	
By	necessity,	the	concept	requires	transformation	to	materialisation.	I	avoid	using	the	
adjective	“sustainable”	to	describe	material	artefacts	like	building	technologies,	building	
materials	or	buildings	themselves.	Instead	I	focus	on	how	the	concept	is	interpreted	and	
transformed	in	City	Hall’s	specific	design	practices.		
City	Hall	was	set	to	become	an	exemplar	project	of	the	Greater	London	Authorities’	
“commitment	to	environmentally	progressive	objectives,	the	principles	of	sustainability”	
(Interview	Raynsford,	2010).	This	commitment	presented	an	opportunity	and	necessity	for	
its	design	collective	to	outdo	existing	environmental	Building	Regulations,	which	present	
the	minimum	legal	requirement	regarding	environmental	design	challenges	for	most	
commercial	practices.	The	client	commissioning	City	Hall	had	to	become	autonomous	and	
construct	their	own	environmental	design	challenge.	This	required	reconsidering	
predominant	thinking	on	how	building	practices	relate	to	and	impact	on	‘the	environment’	
-	a	question,	I	argue,	that	is	largely	absent	in	many	practices.	This	would	expand	
architectural	design	knowledge	and	reconnect	architectural	practice	with	particular	
understandings	of	a	wide	range	of	environmental	crises,	rather	than	define	environmental	
design	targets	through	established	guidelines,	assessment	methods	or	Building	
Regulations.	The	next	main	part	of	this	chapter,	I	describe	how	I	approach	the	
‘environmental	crisis’	and	the	concept	of	sustainability.	
2.3 Framing	the	‘environmental	crisis’		
It	can	hardly	be	contested	that	the	‘environmental	crisis’	has	occupied	an	ongoing	place	on	
public	agendas	and	within	architecture	debates	and	practices	in	recent	decades.	In	
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response,	the	architectural	field	has	produced	a	vast	body	of	literature,	diverse	practical	
approaches,	and	has	held	conferences	and	building	fairs.	Nonetheless,	there	are	many	
ambiguities	in	the	struggle	to	understand	the	very	idea	of	environment	and	environmental	
conflict	(cf.	Hajer,	1995,	pp.	1-2).	I	argue	that	the	key	question	for	architectural	practices	is	
essentially	how	environmental	problems	are	defined	as	an	issue	for	design,	and	how	they	
are	translated	into	specific	localised	design	processes.		
In	the	following	I	attempt	to	draw	attention	to	the	confusion	that	surrounds	the	
foundational	concepts	of	environmental	discourses.	The	environment	is	a	vague	concept	
that	resists	any	attempt	to	be	defined	in	an	unambiguous	way	(cf.	Schlosberg,	1999).	
Within	my	explorations	I	conceive	the	environment	to	be	a	transitional	product	that	may	
(amongst	others)	be	the	physical	and	material	environment,	an	environment	conceived	by	
humans,	and	one	transformed	through	human	practices.	During	my	explorations	I	
recognise	-	rather	than	deny	-	this	multifaceted	comprehension	of	environment.	For	the	
purposes	of	this	thesis,	it	is	helpful	to	attempt	to	define	which	environment	is	being	
described	(particular	facets	or	the	sum	of	all	environments,	including	their	facets).	In	the	
following	sections	I	elaborate	on	my	conception	of	the	environment,	as	outlined	above.	
Today,	humans	are	faced	with	a	vast	set	of	environmental	conflicts,	which	need	to	be	
recognised	since	environmental	debates	tend	to	prioritise	particular	conflicts	over	others.		
2.3.1 Understanding	the	environment	‘out	there’		
To	explore	architectural	practices	in	relation	to	environmental	challenges	it	is	necessary	to	
understand	that	the	environment	or	world	‘out	there’	resists	any	accurate	representation	
and	we	might	only	be	able	to	approach	it	through	individual	conceptions.	Hajer	
emphasises	the	difference	between	the	‘thing-in-itself’	and	our	conception	of	the	‘thing-
in-itself’,	or	the	’real’	and	‘reality’.	He	points	out:		
Both	distinctions	are	based	on	the	idea	that	what	we	know	is	being	framed	by	
experiences,	by	languages,	by	images,	or	even	by	human	fantasies	[…]	we	see	all	
our	knowledges	of	nature	(and	indeed,	society)	as	essentially	metaphorical.	
[…]	Reality,	then,	is	always	particular,	it	is	always	dependent	on	subject-specific	
framing	or	time-and-place	specific	discourses	that	guide	our	perceptions	of	what	is	
the	case	(Hajer,	1995,	p.	17).	
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He	argues	that	this	insight	should	not	relativise	the	existence	of	severe	environmental	
problems,	but	that	it	seeks	to	qualify	statements	concerning	the	status	of	the	environment.	
In	a	related	point,	Neil	Evernden	emphasises:	“We	must	bear	in	mind	that	the	current	
understanding	of	pollution	is	just	that:	the	current	understanding”	(Evernden,	1992,	p.	4).	
The	challenges	of	the	environment	‘out	there’	can	only	become	“‘topical’	through	the	
extent	that	they	are	anticipated.	Without	techniques	of	visualization,	without	symbolic	
forms,	without	mass	media	etc.	[they]	are	nothing	at	all”	(Beck,	2011,	p.	12).	
My	explorations	build	on	the	perspective	that	today	humans	are	faced	with	a	vast	set	of	
co-produced	(anthropogenic)	environmental	crises	through	which	humankind	increasingly	
threatens	its	own	conditions	of	existence.	Humans	depend	on	this	planet	and	the	very	life	
support	systems	that	they	increasingly	put	at	risk.	
In	the	last	50	years,	scientific	activities	have	deepened	the	understanding	of	the	earth	
transformed	through	human	action.	Environmental	discourse	has	developed	in	
fragmented	and	contradictory	forms	as		
an	astonishing	collection	of	claims	and	concerns	brought	together	by	a	great	
variety	of	actors.	[…]	Environmental	discourse	is	time-	and	space-specific	and	is	
governed	by	a	specific	modelling	of	nature,	which	reflects	our	past	experience	and	
present	preoccupations	(Hajer,	1995,	p.	17).	
For	my	exploration	of	architectural	practice,	it	is	necessary	to	point	out	that	the	framing	of	
respective	environmental	challenges,	guidelines	or	policies	–	to	which	architecture	needs	
to	respond	–	is	not	value	free.	While	many	actors	might	present	their	arguments	as	truth	
claims	or	undisputed	facts,	Andrew	Jamison	(2001)	urges	us	to	pay	attention	to	the	
Making	of	Green	Knowledge,	which	is	the	particular	composition	and	perspective	of	
knowledge	production:		
There	have	emerged	a	number	of	competing	academic,	or	analytical,	responses	to	
the	new	environmental	challenges	[…]	based	on	different	ideals	of	scientific	
knowledge,	different	‘epistemic’	criteria,	as	well	as	different	varieties	of	scientific	
practice	(in	Guy	&	Moore,	2007,	p.	16).		
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The	framing	of	environmental	challenges	is	closely	related	to	the	particular	conception	of	
the	environment	in	itself.	David	Harvey	argued	that	“the	contemporary	battleground	over	
words	like	‘nature’	and	‘environment’	is	a	leading	edge	of	political	conflict,	precisely	
because	of	the	‘incompletely	explicit	assumptions,	or	more	or	less	unconscious	mental	
habits,’	which	surround	them”	(Harvey,	1996,	p.	118).	Ulrich	Beck	argues	that	the	
“seemingly	self-evident	concepts	of	‘nature’,	‘ecology’	and	‘environment’	[…]	cannot	be	
the	analytic	reference”	for	the	ongoing	crisis,	because	they	have	their	ground	in	a	long-
standing	ideological	distinction	between	nature	and	society,	which	often	leads	to	the	
domination	and	marginalisation	of	nature.	It	is	not	nature	that	has	a	problem	in	itself,	but	
the	produced	challenges	and	dangers	can	only	be	understood	and	approached	as	the	
consequences	of	our	predominant	modes	of	operation,	of	our	societal	activity	(Beck,	1999,	
pp.	19-21).3	
By	way	of	a	response	to	this	predicament,	Bruno	Latour	(1993)	and	Donna	Haraway	(1991)	
proposed	to	drop	the	nature–society	dualism	in	favour	of	a	“sociology	of	artefacts	or	–	as	
they	put	it	–	of	hybrids”	(Beck,	1999,	p.	27),	which	affirms	their	unity	and	
“indistinguishability”.	The	philosopher	Peter	Sloterdijk	argued	that	human	history	is	a	
history	of	changers	of	milieus	(2009).	Since	human	actors	have	arrived	as	distinct	species	
some	100,000	years	ago,	they	have	altered	their	local	environments	as	hunters,	gatherers,	
fire-makers,	farmers	or	city	dwellers.	Consequently,	humans	have	always	had	an	impact	on	
the	environment	in	which	they	are	vitally	embedded	and	which	through	their	activities	
they	constantly	transform.		
2.3.2 Many	environmental	crises	
Paul	Crutzen	argues	that	the	force	with	which	humans	commenced	as	major	actors	on	the	
global	stage	–	a	force	previously	associated	with	the	geotechnical	violence	of	volcanism,	
ice	ages	or	similar	–	is	a	recent	phenomenon.4	He	believes	the	magnitude,	spatial	scale	and	
																																								 																
3	The	terms	“nature”	or	“natural”	immediately	pose	the	question,	what	is	the	cultural	model	of	“nature”?	Ulrich	
Beck	remarks:	“Nature	itself	is	not	nature:	it	is	a	concept,	a	norm,	a	recollection,	a	utopia,	an	alternative	plan.	Today	
more	than	ever.	Nature	is	being	rediscovered,	pampered,	at	a	time	when	it	is	no	longer	there.	[…]	What	is	there,	
and	what	creates	such	a	political	stir,	are	different	forms	of	socialization	and	different	symbolic	mediations	of	
nature	(and	the	destruction	of	nature)”	(Beck,	1999,	p.	21).		
4	Crutzen	is	an	atmospheric	chemist	who	received	the	Nobel	Prize	in	1995	for	his	work	on	atmospheric	chemistry	
and	stratospheric	ozone	depletion.	
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pace	is	unprecedented,	and	has	therefore	proposed	the	term	“’Anthropocene’	–	a	new	
geologic	epoch	in	which	humankind”	has	in	only	a	few	hundred	years	emerged	as	an	
unprecedented	significant	force	capable	of	transforming	the	global	face	of	the	planet	
(Clark,	Crutzen,	&	Schellnhuber,	2004,	p.	1).	He	suggests	that	the	Anthropocene	epoch	
began	in	“the	latter	part	of	the	18th	century,	when	the	global	effects	of	human	activities	
became	clearly	noticeable”	for	the	first	time.	This	date	largely	coincides	with	the	beginning	
of	the	industrial	revolution,	a	time	when	the	human	population	massively	increased	in	
number,	and	(some)	began	entering	modes	of	inhabiting	the	world	in	increasingly	
excessive	ways,	thereby	creating	a	self-imposed	threat	towards	their	conditions	of	
existence	(Crutzen,	2011,	p.	4).	Crutzen	stated:	
Hopefully,	in	the	future,	the	“Anthropocene”	will	not	only	be	characterized	by	
continued	human	plundering	of	the	Earth’s	resources	and	dumping	of	excessive	
amounts	of	waste	products	in	the	environment,	but	also	by	vastly	improved	
technology	and	management,	wise	use	of	the	Earth’s	resources	(Crutzen	in	Brauch	
et	al.,	2011,	pp.	3-4).	
Since	the	early	1970s	these	changes	have	been	framed	within	the	concept	of	Global	
Environmental	Change,	which	was	accompanied	by	a	related	increasing	“multidisciplinary	
scientific	field	of	study”	and	the	“development	of	a	new	major	policy	field	of	international	
(environment)	policy”	(Brauch,	2009,	p.	21).	Global	Environmental	Change	focuses	on	
“human-induced	perturbations	in	the	environment”	which	encompass:	
“a	full	range	of	globally	significant	issues	relating	to	both	natural	and	human	
induced	changes	in	the	Earth’s	environment,	as	well	as	their	socioeconomic	
drivers”	(Munn,	cited	in	Brauch,	2009,	p.	22).		
This	change	in	increasingly	unpredictable	manner	affects	and	puts	at	risk	vital	ecosystem	
services	providing	various	substantial	benefits	for	humans:	
An	ecosystem	is	a	dynamic	complex	of	plant,	animal,	and	microorganism	
communities	and	the	nonliving	environment	interacting	as	a	functional	unit.	[…]	
These	include	provisioning	services	such	as	food,	water,	timber,	and	fiber;	
regulating	services	that	affect	climate,	floods,	disease,	wastes,	and	water	quality;	
cultural	services	that	provide	recreational,	aesthetic,	and	spiritual	benefits;	and	
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supporting	services	such	as	soil	formation,	photosynthesis,	and	nutrient	cycling	
(Millennium	Ecosystem	Assessment,	2005,	p.	v).		
Today,	human-induced	“environmental	deterioration	includes	a	long	and	expanding	list	of	
major	and	multiple	dysfunctions	that	feed	on	each	other”,	triggering	abrupt	and	
potentially	irreversible	changes	(Brauch	et	al.,	2009,	p.	3).	They	affect	every	earth	
component	–	cities,	land,	coastal	zone,	atmosphere	and	oceans	(IGBP	et	al.	2004).	
Humans	are	faced	with	a	vast	range	of	different	environmental	challenges.	Hajer	thus	
argues,	“The	problematique	is	hardly	ever	discussed	in	its	full	complexity	(‘in	the	round’).	
Environmental	discourse	tends	to	be	dominated	by	specific	emblems:	issues	that	dominate	
the	perception	of	the	ecological	dilemma	in	a	specific	period.”	The	last	150	years	brought	
forward	environmental	debates	about,	for	instance,	“deforestation	in	the	nineteenth	
century	[…],	soil	erosion	in	the	1930s,	pesticide	pollution	in	the	early	1960s,	resource	
depletion	in	the	early	1970s,	nuclear	power	in	the	late	1970s,	and	global	issues	like	the	
greenhouse	effect	and	the	diminishing	ozone	layer	in	the	1980s”	(Hajer,	1995,	pp.	19-20).	
Both	Marten	Hajer	and	Andrew	Jamison	consider	the	UN	Brundtland	Report	Our	Common	
Future	(1987)	to	be	a	centrepiece	of	the	environmental	debate	as	it	“laid	the	conceptual	
foundations	for	environmental	politics	in	the	1990s”	(Hajer,	1995,	p.	9).	Jamison	sees	a	
change	from	flagging	particular	problems	and	discussion	on	a	small	scale	to	“integrating	
environmental	concerns	into	all	other	kinds	of	social,	economic,	and	political	
activities”(Jamison,	2001,	p.	176).	As	one	consequence	of	the	“general	endorsement	of	the	
Brundtland	Report	[…]	many	Western	countries	published	comprehensive	documents	
outlining	national	environmental	policy	plans	from	around	1990”	(Hajer,	1995,	p.	9).	While	
before	the	1990s	the	majority	of	debates	focused	on	issues	of	direct	sensory	perception	
(e.g.	exhaust	gases),	later	attention	shifted	“in	terms	of	scale,	time,	and	techniques.	They	
take	what	has	become	known	as	the	‘global	biosphere’	as	their	level	of	analysis,	and	
portray	problems	that	do	not	yet	exist	and	will	not	materialize	for	many	years	from	now”	
(p.	10).	Environmental	knowledge	became	increasingly	compiled	through	complex	
scientific	data	collection	and	modelling,	and	consequently	disseminated	by	small	groups	of	
scientific	experts	(e.g.	the	IPCC)	“who	assess	the	urgency	of	one	problem	vis-à-vis	other	
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possible	problems,	and	who	implicitly	often	conceptualise	the	solutions	to	the	problems	
they	put	forward”	(p.	10).		
2.3.3 The	concept	of	climate	change	
Today,	one	of	the	most	emblematic	manifestations	of	the	diverse	environmental	crises	is	
framed	through	the	concept	of	climate	change.	This	concept	(also	discussed	as	global	
warming)	has	come	to	dominate	many	global	agendas	and	is	contested	from	different	
perspectives.	There	are	people	who	question	whether	the	global	rise	of	temperature	is	
induced	by	human	activity.	This	form	of	climate	change	denial	is	a	potent	political	strategy	
in	many	parts	of	the	world.5	The	IPCC	emerged	as	one	of	the	key	actors	gathering,	
interpreting,	modelling	and	disseminating	climate	science	knowledge.	Besides	climate	
change	deniers,	there	are	also	researchers	who	contest	the	findings	of	the	IPCC	expressing	
“disagreement	with	the	[…]	Fourth	Assessment,	which	they	charge	is	unwarrantedly	
optimistic	in	its	geophysics	and	social	science”	(Davis,	2010,	pp.	31-32).	Today,	people	do	
not	claim	to	be	absolutely	certain	that	their	knowledge	about	the	climate	is	correct,	but	
instead	treat	their	knowledge	on	the	subject	as	relatively	reliable.	The	phenomenon	of	
climate	change	needs	to	be	discursively	constructed,	since	it	largely	eludes	direct	sensory	
perception	of	the	human	body	and	is	projected	to	unfold	full	force	predominantly	in	the	
future.	
Since	its	inception	in	1988	the	IPCC	has	published	four	major	reports	on	climate	change	(in	
1990,	1995,	2001	and	2007)	and	a	fifth	is	being	completed	in	2014	to	disseminate	its	
findings.	The	IPCC	defines	climate	change	as:		
[A]	change	in	the	state	of	the	climate	that	can	be	identified	(e.g.	using	statistical	
tests)	by	changes	in	the	mean	and/or	the	variability	of	its	properties,	and	that	
persists	for	an	extended	period,	typically	decades	or	longer.	It	refers	to	any	change	
in	climate	over	time,	whether	due	to	natural	variability	or	as	a	result	of	human	
activity	(IPCC,	2007b,	p.	30).	
																																								 																
5	In	the	UK	one	of	the	leading	climate	sceptics	is	Nigel	Lawson,	Baron	Lawson	of	Blaby.	In	2009	he	founded	the	
Global	Warming	Policy	Foundation	(GWPF)	as	a	think-tank	claiming	to	“restoring	balance	and	trust	to	the	climate	
debate”	(accessed	28	October	2012	from	http://www.thegwpf.org).	
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This	framing	deviates	from	that	used	by	the	United	Nations	Framework	Convention	on	
Climate	Change	(UNFCCC),	which	treats	climate	change	as	“a	change	of	climate	that	is	
attributed	directly	or	indirectly	to	human	activity”(IPCC,	2007b,	p.	30).	Crucially,	both	
organisations	agree	that	“[e]nough	is	known	about	the	earth’s	climate	system	and	the	
greenhouse	effect	[...]	to	know	that	urgent	action	needs	to	be	taken”	(UNFCCC,	2009).	The	
IPCC	declares:	
Warming	of	the	climate	system	is	unequivocal,	as	is	now	evident	from	observations	
of	increases	in	global	average	air	and	ocean	temperatures,	widespread	melting	of	
snow	and	ice	and	rising	global	average	sea	level.	[...]	Many	natural	systems,	on	all	
continents	and	in	some	oceans,	are	being	affected	by	regional	climate	changes.	
Observed	changes	in	many	physical	and	biological	systems	are	consistent	with	
warming	(IPCC,	2007b,	p.	72).	
It	is	suggested	that	from	1970	to	2004	the	global	total	annual	anthropogenic	GHG	
emissions	grew	by	70%.	In	pre-industrial	times,	GHG	concentrations	in	the	atmosphere	
were	very	likely	285	parts	per	million	(ppm)	CO2e	(carbon	dioxide	equivalent)	and	in	2012	
they	reached	445ppm,	the	highest	level	recorded	over	the	last	650,000	years.6	The	rate	of	
annual	CO2	increase	is	rising,	from	1.5ppm	between	1970	and	2000,	to	2.1ppm	since	2004.	
Nicholas	Stern	claims:	“We	are	adding	at	a	rate	of	over	2.5ppm	per	year	(likely	to	
accelerate	with	little	or	weak	action)”(Stern,	2012).	Different	CO2e	concentrations	are	
projected	to	cause	global	temperature	rises	(compared	with	pre-industrial	levels).	The	
distribution	of	450ppm	CO2e	is	associated	with	an	increase	of	approximately	2oC,	550ppm	
with	3oC,	650ppm	with	4oC	and	750ppm	with	5oC	(Stern,	2012).	Many	analysts	predict	that	
average	temperatures	may	rise	within	a	few	decades	between	3oC	and	6oC,	but	others	
suggest	we	could	even	face	a	staggering	10oC	rise	(Urry,	2011,	p.	9).		
The	IPCC	considers	that	“anthropogenic	warming	over	the	last	three	decades	has	likely	had	
a	discernible	influence	at	the	global	scale	on	observed	changes	in	many	physical	and	
biological	systems”	(IPCC,	2007b,	p.	41).	As	a	consequence	of	climate	change,	humans	are	
likely	to	confront	rapidly	melting	glaciers,	an	increased	risk	of	outburst	floods,	“changes	in	
																																								 																
6	CO2e	(carbon	dioxide	equivalent)	is	the	total	impact	on	the	climate	due	to	various	GHGs:	carbon	dioxide,	methane,	
nitrous	oxide	and	refrigerant	gases.	
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some	Arctic	and	Antarctic”	flora	and	fauna,	changing	seasons,	and	“poleward	and	upward	
shifts	in	plant	and	animal	ranges”	(IPCC,	2007c,	p.	2).	
Ecosystems	on	all	continents	are	being	affected	and	these	systems	become	increasingly	
unpredictable.	Climate	change	manifests	an	uneven	geography	of	causes,	consequences,	
originators	and	sufferers.	While	it	is	widely	acknowledged	that	the	excessive	practices	and	
lifestyles	of	Western	nations	since	the	beginning	of	industrialisation	are,	to	a	large	degree,	
the	main	cause	of	the	environmental	problem,	the	regions	and	populations	most	affected	
are	those	close	to	the	equator	and	in	the	southern	hemisphere.7		
The	Stern	Review	commissioned	by	the	UK	government	states	that	“climate	change	
presents	a	unique	challenge	for	economics:	it	is	the	greatest	and	widest-ranging	market	
failure	ever	seen”	(Stern,	2007).	Despite	much	evidence	suggesting	that	many	humans	and	
regions	are	already	affected	today	(see	above),	Antony	Giddens	argues	that	unlike	the	
political	issues	societies	and	civilisations	have	had	to	confront	in	the	past,	the	key	
challenge	and	difference	now	is	that	climate	change	is	regarded	mainly	as	a	future	risk.	
CO2	emissions	released	today	will	remain	in	the	atmosphere	for	about	100	years.	It	is	very	
hard	for	humans	living	in	cities	in	the	Western	world	to	relate	to	an	apparent	abstract	risk	
in	the	future,	which	right	now	does	not	impinge	on	their	everyday	life.	The	difficulty	is	that	
humans	have	to	take	action	today:	when	emissions	become	visible	and	perceivable,	it	is	
likely	to	be	too	late	(Giddens,	2009).		
2.3.4 The	concept	of	sustainability	
Within	the	last	two	decades	discussions	concerning	“sustainability”	have	become	
mainstream	and	“they	have	also	given	rise	to	a	great	deal	of	confusion	and	fuzziness,	in	
which	easy	rhetorical	use	masks	lack	of	real	change	and	commitment”	(Leach	et	al.,	2010,	
p.	4).	The	term	may	be	interpreted	as	a	proxy	for	a	cohesive	collection	of	actions,	
principles	and	visions,	or	be	deployed	as	an	ideological	shield	to	distract	from	particular	
ideas,	projects	and	practices	that	tend	to	follow	‘business	as	usual’.	
																																								 																
7	For	an	assessment	of	climate	change	impacts	see	Climate	Change	2007:	Impacts,	Adaptation	and	Vulnerability	
(IPCC,	2007a),	and	for	an	assessment	of	the	regions	most	affected	by	climate	change	see	Global	Climate	Risk	Index	
2013	(Harmeling	&	Eckstein,	2012).	
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In	the	late	1980s	the	concept	of	sustainable	development	was	largely	brought	to	public	
attention	through	the	Brundtland	Report	and	this	definition	has	been	cited	many	times:	
Sustainable	development	is	development	that	meets	the	needs	of	the	present	
without	compromising	the	ability	of	future	generations	to	meet	their	own	needs	
(Brundtland,	1987,	p.	41).	
Crucially,	the	Brundtland	Report	reframed	environmental	politics	“by	arguing	explicitly	
that	goals	for	protecting	the	Earth’s	lands	and	wildlife	could	not	be	realised	except	through	
strategies	that	also	addressed	the	improvement	of	human	well-being	in	conservation	areas”	
(Schellnhuber	et	al.	2004,	pp.	2-3).	Hence	sustainable	development	indicates	an	
interrelated	concern	of	diverse	issues	associated	with	protecting	the	environment,	for	
instance:		
promoting	human	welfare;	satisfying	basic	needs;	[…]	considering	the	fate	of	future	
generations;	achieving	equity	between	rich	and	poor;	and	participating	on	a	broad	
basis	in	decision-making	(Lafferty	and	Meadowcroft,	cited	in	Giddens,	2009,	p.	62).		
Seen	this	way	the	concept	of	sustainability	provided	a	facilitating	metaphor	around	which	
heterogeneous	elements	like	social,	economic	and	environmental	issues	could	assemble.	
Hajer	suggests	that	sustainable	development	should	be	experienced	as	a	“story-line”	that:		
shares	a	way	of	talking	about	environmental	matters	but	includes	members	with	
widely	differing	social	and	cognitive	commitments.	The	paradox	is	that	this	
coalition	for	sustainable	development	can	only	be	kept	together	by	virtue	of	its	
rather	vague	story-lines	at	the	same	time	as	it	asks	for	radical	social	change	(1995,	
p.	14).	
Thus	sustainable	development	emerged	as	a	popular	approach	within	which	to	frame	the	
challenge	of	environmental	politics	and	this	popularity	was	largely	based	on	its	all-
embracing	focus.	Despite	calls	to	“break	out	of	past	patterns”	and	“change,	now”	
(Brundtland,	1987,	p.	22)	sustainable	development	has	since	its	emergence	generally	not	
brought	about	the	fundamental	organisational	restructuring	that	it	initially	aimed	for	and	
that	would	appear	to	be	necessary	(Hajer	&	Fischer,	1999,	p.	3).	The	concept	is	especially	
criticised	by	some	for	its	notion	of	development	which	suggests	that	ecological,	social	and	
economic	goals	could	be	reconciled.	Giddens	and	others	have	pointed	out	that	the	two	
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central	notions	of	sustainability	and	development	point	in	conflicting	directions:	the	first	
“implies	continuity	and	balance”,	the	second	“dynamism	and	change”.	The	concept’s	
rather	elusive	nature	has	triggered	further	critical	responses.	One	has	simply	been	“to	
avoid	defining	it	and	instead	to	substitute	a	cluster	of	goals	instead”	(Giddens,	2009,	p.	62).	
Since	the	Brundtland	Report	“multiple	versions	of	sustainability”	were	brought	forward	
and	especially	in	the	1990s	the	“simplistic	managerialism	of	many	initiatives	[…]	left	much	
to	be	desired”	(Leach	et	al.,	2010,	p.	39).	
Yet	Hajer	and	Fischer	also	argue	that	“it	would	be	wrong	only	to	conceive	of	sustainable	
development	as	an	evident	non-starter”	(1999,	p.	2).	Importantly	they	argue	that:	
it	is	not	the	metaphor	of	“sustainable	development”	in	itself	that	leads	
environmental	politics	astray.	Rather,	it	is	with	the	interpretation	of	its	meaning,	in	
particular	the	fact	that	it	does	not	compel	institutions	to	reconsider	the	normative	
and	cultural	assumptions	underpinning	their	operational	practices	(p.	4,	emphasis	
added).	
In	other	words,	the	ways	in	which	design	collectives	put	theory	into	practice	is	of	crucial	
importance	for	architectural	practices.		
On	questions	of	interpretation	and	enactment,	Jan-Peter	Voß	and	Rene	Kemp	(2006)	
suggest	interpreting	sustainability	“as	a	specific	kind	of	problem	framing	that	emphasises	
the	interconnectedness	of	different	problems	and	scales,	as	well	as	the	long-term	and	
indirect	effects	of	actions	that	result	from	it.”	They	point	out	that	the	“multidimensional	
and	dynamic	concept	of	sustainability”	has	fundamental	implications	for	societal	practices	
because	the		
systemic	and	long-term	nature	of	social,	economic	and	ecological	development	
brings	complexity	and	uncertainty	to	the	fore	as	key	issues	for	sustainability.	
Sustainability	cannot	be	translated	into	a	blueprint	or	a	defined	end	state	[…].	
Sustainability	calls	for	new	forms	of	problem	handling	(pp.	3-4,	emphasis	added).		
They	deduce	that	problems	cannot	be	addressed	in	“a	linear	way”	or	through	“rigid	
analysis”.	Rather,	they	suggest	that:	
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sustainable	development	is	more	about	the	organisation	of	processes	than	about	
particular	outcomes.	It	is	about	the	modes	of	problem	treatment	and	the	types	of	
strategies	that	are	applied	to	search	for	solutions	and	bring	about	more	robust	
paths	of	social	and	technological	development	(p.	4).	
Melissa	Leach,	Ian	Scoones	and	Andy	Stirling	(2010)	also	draw	attention	to	the	ways	in	
which	sustainability	is	enacted.	Their	response	to	some	who	have	suggested	abandoning	
“the	term	sustainability	‘altogether’”,	is	to	avoid	treating	“sustainability	in	a	general,	
colloquial	sense,	implying	the	maintenance	of	(unspecified)	features	of	systems	over	
time”(p.	5).	Instead	they	emphasise	the	importance	of	the	concept	of	sustainability	
through	re-casting	it	in	a	“more	explicit	normative	(and	so	overtly	political)”	interpretation:		
Sustainability	refers	to	the	explicit	qualities	of	human	well-being,	social	equity	and	
environmental	integrity,	and	the	particular	system	qualities	that	can	sustain	these.	
All	these	goals	of	sustainability	are	context-specific	and	inevitably	contested.	This	
makes	it	essential	to	recognize	the	roles	of	public	deliberation	and	negotiation	-	
both	of	the	definition	of	what	is	to	be	sustained	and	of	how	to	get	there	(p.	5,	
empahsis	added).	
Leach,	Scoones	and	Stirling	not	only	“make	normative	questions	central”	(p.	171)	but	go	a	
step	further	by	arguing	that	“it	is	useful	to	distinguish	between	different	normative	views	
of	sustainability,	recognizing	that	there	are	multiple	sustainabilities	which	decisively	need	
be	defined	quite	precisely	for	particular	issues	and	groups”(p.	42).	Consequently	they	
highlight	the	importance	“to	specify	clearly,	for	particular	issues	and	settings,	what	is	to	be	
sustained	for	whom,	and	who	will	gain	or	lose	in	the	process”	(p.	171).		
These	debates,	negotiations	and	definitions	“must	be	seen	as	a	highly	political	(rather	than	
technical)	process“(p.	5)	to	suggest	that	“sustainability	must	be	recognized	as	a	contested,	
discursive	resource	[…]	that	facilitates	argument	about	diverse	pathways	to	different	
futures”(p.	42).	Hence	they	infer	that	approaches	to	sustainability	must	be:		
centrally	about	focusing	on	framings	of	systems	and	their	properties	-	recognizing	
divergent	epistemological	(ways	of	knowing)	and	ontological	(ways	of	being)	
positions,	associated	with	different	actors	and	interests.	It	must	also	involve	
negotiating	the	trade-offs	across	diverse	pathways	(actual,	potential	and	imagined)	
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in	relation	to	the	political-normative	positions,	goals	and	values	of	diverse	actors	
(p.	65).	
Following	this	brief	discussion,	and	building	loosely	on	the	perspectives	of	Leach,	Scoones	
and	Stirling	outlined	above,	I	interpret	sustainability	to	be	a	concept	in	which	normative	
implications	are	central:	“to	specify	clearly,	for	particular	issues	and	settings,	what	is	to	be	
sustained	for	whom”	(Leach	et	al.,	2010,	p.	171).	In	the	core	chapters	of	this	thesis,	I	
compare	and	contrast	my	interpretation	with	the	ways	that	City	Hall’s	design	protagonists	
gave	meaning	/	enacted	sustainability	in	practice.	I	interpret	City	Hall’s	design	practices	as	
a	sort	of	positioning	in	respect	to	the	‘environmental	crisis’:	specific	actors	produce	
specific	types	of	knowledge,	emphasise	certain	issues	and	suppress	others,	focus	attention,	
employ	particular	assumptions	and	privilege	particular	pathways	(Wolfgang	Sachs,	in	
Jamison,	2001,	p.	176).		
These	elements	that	are	central	in	the	practices	of	giving	meaning	to	sustainability	lead	on	
to	the	third	and	last	part	of	this	chapter	in	which	I	introduce	the	STS-inspired	theoretical	
framework	and	adaptation	of	“translation”	as	a	particular	analytical	frame	within	which	to	
explore	the	architectural	design	practices	that	I	have	chosen.		
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2.4 Exploring	architectural	design	practices	
	
Figure	2.1		Architects	at	work	assembling	City	Hall	at	Foster+Partners’	studio	(Photograph:	Nigel	Young	and	
Foster+Partners,	2002)	
The	third	main	part	of	this	chapter	outlines	the	Science	and	Technology	Studies	(STS)	
inspired	approach	I	use	to	explore	the	design	(and	operation)	practices	of	City	Hall	in	
which	different	practitioners,	heterogeneous	entities	and	particular	activities	became	
associated	and	continuously	transformed.	Central	to	my	study	of	City	Hall’s	design	
practices	are	the	questions	of	how	environmental	problems	and	design	challenges	were	
constructed,	and	how	design	knowledge,	design	strategies	and	technologies	were	
assembled	and	enacted.	I	thus	developed	my	theoretical	framework	to	draw	on	selected	
ideas	from	STS.	I	begin	by	situating	my	approach	within	existing	literature	through	a	brief	
overview	of	central	ideas	in	the	diverse	field	of	STS	and	by	introducing	two	key	thinkers:	
Bruno	Latour	and	John	Law	(Section	2.4.1).	I	then	discuss	how	STS	approaches	have	been	
transported	to	(urban	and)	architectural	studies,	mainly	through	the	work	of	Albena	
Yaneva	(Section	2.4.2).	I	explain	my	STS-inspired	theoretical	framework	that,	loosely	
interpreted,	builds	on	selected	elements	of	Yaneva’s	work,	and	on	Michael	Callon’s	(1986)	
concept	of	“translation”	as	my	main	analytical	frame	(Section	2.4.3).		
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Based	on	a	broad	conception	of	architecture	(see	Chapter	1),	I	apprehend	City	Hall	to	have	
been	produced	through	series	of	heterogeneous	assemblages.8	The	focus	of	my	
explorations	is	on	the	specific	design	practices	that	brought	City	Hall	into	being.	These	
practices	have	been	unpredictable,	contingent	and	messy.	In	City	Hall’s	design	practice,	
multiple	heterogeneous	elements	became	associated:	Diverse	vocational	practitioners,	
conceptions,	compromises	and	negotiations,	a	London	site,	projected	carbon	emissions,	
computer	models,	a	tight	budget,	a	brief	requiring	a	symbolic	building,	diagrams,	a	
borehole	cooling	system,	a	renewed	model	of	governance,	the	projected	behaviour	of	450	
GLA	members,	30	months	of	development	time,	18,734m2	gross	internal	floor	area,	
13,100m3	of	concrete,	2,100	tonnes	of	structural	steel	and	many	more.	
It	does	not	come	as	a	surprise	that	architectural	design	involves	heterogeneous	elements,	
but	a	challenge	is	to	find	frameworks	that	support	understanding	how	the	heterogeneous	
elements	are	assembled.	Architectural	design	practices	can	be	explored	through	different	
theoretical	perspectives	that	contain	profound	differences	of	how	to	conceptualise	the	
relationships	between	practices,	society,	materiality,	and	agency	(e.g.	Reckwitz,	2003).	A	
theoretical	discussion	of	these	conflicting	perspectives	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	thesis.		
In	order	to	develop	an	understanding	of	how	the	heterogeneous	elements	in	City	Hall’s	
design	process	became	associated	and	transformed,	I	take	a	pragmatic	approach	by	
exploring	what	architects	and	the	wider	design	collective	actually	did	in	(and	around)	the	
everyday	context	of	Foster+Partners’	Riverside	Studio	and	on	the	More	London	site	(cf.	
Guy	&	Moore,	2007,	p.	16).	This	approach	avoids	exploring	City	Hall	through	
interpretations	of	the	materialised	artefact,	instead	shifting	attention	to	“prioritizing	the	
pragmatic	content	of	actions”	of	“architecture	in	the	making”	(Yaneva,	2009,	p.	197).	The	
focus	on	design	practice	is	of	crucial	importance	since	it	is	in	City	Hall’s	practices	that	
problems	get	constructed,	tackled,	things	transformed,	strategies	enacted,	and	
architecture	is	materialised.		
																																								 																
8	I	draw	on	Law	who	describes	assemblage	as	“a	process	of	bundling,	of	assembling,	or	better	of	recursive	self-
assembling	in	which	the	elements	put	together	are	not	fixed	in	shape,	do	not	belong	to	a	larger	pre-given	list	but	
are	constructed	at	least	in	part	as	they	are	entangled	together”	(Law,	2004,	p.	42).		
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2.4.1 Introducing	Science	and	Technology	Studies	(STS)	
STS	can	be	described	as	the	“study	of	science	and	technology	in	a	social	context”.	A	central	
concern	is	that	“scientific	knowledge	and	technology	do	not	evolve	in	a	vacuum”,	but	that	
they	take	part	in	the	social	world,	“being	shaped	by	it,	and	simultaneously	shaping	it”	(Law,	
2004,	p.	12).	In	principle	STS	analyse	how	knowledge	and	things	are	constructed.	Today	
STS	has	developed	into	a	broad	interdisciplinary	field	that	emerged	from	intersecting	
perspectives	of	sociologists,	anthropologists,	philosophers,	historians	and	others.		
2.4.1.1 Origins	
The	origins	of	STS	can	be	traced	to	the	1960s	and	Thomas	Kuhn’s	Structure	of	Scientific	
Revolutions	(1962),	which	signalled	a	radically	new	perspective	towards	the	understanding	
of	science.	Kuhn	makes	his	arguments	through	case	studies.	He	challenges	empiricist	and	
positivist	foundations	of	science	and	rejects	the	belief	in	a	general	standard	of	rationality.	
Scientists	are	rejected	as	neutral	observers	but	come	“with	a	whole	package	which	he	calls	
a	paradigm.	This	includes	law	like	generalisations,	implicit	assumptions,	instrumental	and	
embodied	habits,	working	models,	and	a	general	and	more	or	less	implicit	world-view”	
(Law,	2004,	p.	43).	According	to	Kuhn,	scientific	knowledge	is	dependent	on	these	
paradigms	and	its	generation	involves	a	lot	of	work	that	is	not	achieved	by	systematic	
approaches	but	through	creative,	informal	and	improvised	ways	of	scientific	puzzle	solving.	
Kuhn’s	work	inspired	many	researchers	to	adopt	novel	approaches	in	the	study	of	science	
as	a	practice	and	form	of	culture.		
In	the	1970s	new	directions	emerged.	For	instance,	the	Sociology	of	Scientific	Knowledge	
(SSK),	associated	with	David	Bloor	and	Barry	Barnes	and	their	formulation	of	the	“strong	
program”,	committed	to	investigate	the	causes	and	conditions	of	scientific	knowledge-
making	based	on	a	methodological	rejection	that	treats	false	and	true	knowledge	claims	
asymmetrically	(Sismondo,	2008,	p.	14).	In	the	late	1970s	the	laboratory	ethnographies	(eg.	
Latour	&	Woolgar,	1979)	presented	a	new	approach	exploring	the	cultures	of	scientific	
practices,	by	moving	into	scientific	laboratories	to	follow	scientific	experimentation,	data	
collection,	analysis	and	the	construction	of	claims	through	participant	observation.	Their	
exploration	of	scientific	knowledge	production	had	a	radical	impact	on	the	social	study	of	
science.	These	studies	suggested	that	not	“only	data	but	phenomena	themselves	are	
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constructed	in	laboratories	[…]	and	what	is	found	in	them	is	not	nature	but	rather	the	
product	of	much	human	effort”	(Sismondo,	2008,	p.	15).	Related	to	that	the	constitution	
of	scientific	methods	and	epistemologies	became	another	focus	of	attention.		
The	1980s	saw	increasing	perspectives	on	technology	and	its	artefacts.	With	the	Social	
Construction	of	Technology	(SCOT),	Trevor	Pinch	and	Wiebe	Bijker	transfer	insights	from	
the	“sociology	of	science”	to	the	“sociology	of	technology”	(1987,	p.	17).	They	characterise	
the	latter	as	a	then	still	underdeveloped	field,	suggesting	that	both	fields	can	benefit	each	
other.	Despite	recognising	potential	differences	between	science	and	technology	they	
reject	any	a	priori	distinction	and	propose	to	study	both	through	the	same	“social	
constructivist	view”,	interpreting	the	“science-technology	relationship”	as	interactive,	
reciprocal	and	integrated	(p.	21).	Through	“interpretive	flexibility”	they	emphasise	that	
scientific	and	technological	findings	are	“open	to	more	than	one	interpretation”	by	
different	social	groups,	suggesting	to	follow	the	mechanisms	and	controversies	leading	to	
interpretative	closure	(p.	27).	SCOT	approaches	the	process	of	an	emerging	technological	
artefact	“as	an	alternation	of	variation	and	selection”	that	“results	in	a	‘multidirectional’	
model”	rejecting	linear	models	of	technological	innovation	(p.	28).	
Today,	within	its	loose	boundaries,	STS	has	developed	diverse	streams	of	thought	with	
partially	conflicting	theoretical	and	methodological	positions.	STS	can	no	longer	be	
confined	to	areas	of	science	and	technology	as	it	has	ventured	into	other	empirical	fields,	
for	example	medicine,	markets,	information	technologies	and	gender	studies	(Law,	2008,	p.	
638).	Despite	STS	having	a	programmatic	suspicion	towards	the	validity	of	universal	claims,	
the	“metaphor	of	construction,	in	its	generic	form”	might	be	seen	as	what	ties	together	
different	strands	of	STS	(Sismondo,	2008,	p.	17).		
John	Law	pointed	out	that	things	are	indeed	“constructed”	but	that	the	metaphor	is	
misleading	since	they	are	not	stable,	and	that	the	heterogeneous	relations	have	to	be	
continuously	re-enacted	in	order	to	persist.	He	suggests	instead	to	use	“performance”	or	
“enactment”	(Law,	2008,	p.	635).	Through	an	“integrative	understanding	of	the	origins,	
dynamics,	and	consequences	of	science	and	technology”	STS	also	engages	in	questions	of	
politics	and	social	change.	It	is	argued	that	“the	distinctive	insights	and	sensibilities	of	STS”	
	52	
can	contribute	to	resolving	contemporary	conflicts	and	prompt	societal	transformations	
(Hackett,	Amsterdamska,	Lynch,	&	Wajcman,	2008,	pp.	1-5).		
Before	I	discuss	how	Albena	Yaneva	has	transported	STS	perspectives	to	the	‘laboratories’	
of	architectural	design,	I	briefly	introduce	two	specific	STS	(ANT)	perspectives:	Firstly,	
Bruno	Latour’s	work,	which	is	a	reoccurring	reference	in	Yaneva’s	writings;	secondly,	the	
ideas	of	John	Law	who	developed,	amongst	others,	the	perspective	of	“heterogeneous	
engineering	”.9	
2.4.1.2 Bruno	Latour	
Latour	developed	his	theoretical	approach	through	ethnographic	studies	of	the	scientific	
laboratory.	Laboratory	Life	(1979),	written	with	Steve	Woolgar,	conceives	the	laboratory	as	
an	institution	in	which	scientific	knowledge	is	socially	constructed	through	specific,	
localised	practices.	Their	attention	is	geared	distinctively	towards	the	materialities	of	the	
laboratory,	the	spatial	settings,	physical	organisations,	substances,	its	apparatuses	and	
inscription	devices	that	participate	in	the	production	of	new	scientific	facts.	Findings	are	
manipulated,	translated,	and	turned	into	papers	that	turn	claims	into	facts	which,	in	turn,	
hold	and	become	recognised.	The	divide	between	technical	and	social	elements	is	rejected.		
In	Science	in	Action	(1987)	Latour	expands	his	laboratory	studies	findings	to	a	wider	
methodological	reflection	of	both	Science	and	Technology	through	ethnographic	
approaches	and	reinterpretations	of	historical	cases.	He	develops	a	set	of	“rules	of	method”	
and	“principles”	of	how	to	follow	scientists	and	engineers.	To	follow	scientists	and	
engineers	at	work,	he	suggests	researchers	should	enter	several	construction	sites	of	
“facts	and	machines”.	He	claims	that	“opening	the	black	box	is	made	feasible	[…]	by	
moving	in	time	and	space	until	one	finds	the	controversial	topic	on	which	scientists	and	
engineers	are	busy	at	work”	(p.	4).		
Latour	continued	to	develop	the	Actor-Network	approach	through	the	principle	of	
“generalized	symmetry”	with	Michel	Callon	(cf.	Callon,	1986,	p.	200).	It	extends	David	
Bloor’s	principle	of	symmetry	that	encourages	analysis	of	successful	and	unsuccessful	
																																								 																
9	In	the	following	I	will	use	STS	(ANT)	to	show	that	I	conceive	ANT	as	a	specific	method	of	STS.	
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claims	of	knowledge	in	controversies	in	the	same	way.	In	We	have	never	been	Modern	
(1993),	Latour	launches	a	critique	of	the	modern	conception	of	the	relation	between	
nature	and	society.	His	hypothesis	consists	of	two	different	modern	practices,	one	of	
“translation”	that	multiplies	hybrid	constellations	of	the	human/non-human	and	
nature/culture,	and	the	other	of	“purification”	that	seeks	to	maintain	these	divides	(pp.	
10-12).	This	paradox	embedded	in	modern	constitution	obstructs	understanding	nature	
and	society	symmetrically	(Schäfer,	2013,	p.	259).	In	Reassembling	the	Social	(2005),	
Latour	expands	his	account	of	Actor-Network	Theory	(ANT)	into	an	“alternative	social	
theory”(p.	128).	Based	on	a	radicalised	variable	ontology,	he	rejects	common-sense	
understandings	of	the	social	and	he	instead	conceptualises	the	social	by	a	number	of	
uncertainties.	For	him,	ANT’s	objective	is	to	retrace	the	heterogeneous	associations	of	
actors	and	elements	in	the	form	of	actor	networks.	Latour	defines	the	concept	of	network	
as	a	tool	to	help	describe	and	trace	associations	(p.	131).	Networks	are	not	stable;	they	
have	to	be	sustained	or	rebuilt.	In	order	to	to	retrace	associations,	he	defines	the	following	
analytical	moves:	“Keep	the	Social	Flat”,	“Localizing	the	Global”,	“Redistributing	the	Local”	
and	“Connecting	Sites”(pp.	165-246).	One	central	shift	in	Latour’s	ANT	is	a	radically	
modified	understanding	of	how	agency,	actors	and	the	social	are	constituted.	He	conceives	
agency	as	being	influenced,	hybrid,	distributed,	dislocated,	non-local	and	ephemeral,	
constituted	in	heterogeneous	actor-networks.	For	Latour,	things	and	materialities	play	a	
crucial	role	in	the	efforts	required	to	stabilise	actor-networks.		
2.4.1.3 John	Law	
The	work	of	John	Law	is	based	on	a	“shifting	ground”	that	comes	“first	and	foremost	from	
STS”	(Law,	2004,	p.	12).	He	has	focused	on	questions	of	understanding	the	material	
heterogeneity	of	practices	and	how	to	explore	these	through	research	methods.	Along	
with	Bruno	Latour	and	Michael	Callon,	Law	has	been	central	in	developing	ANT.	
In	the	1980s	Law	studied	15th-century	Portuguese	maritime	expansion	(Law,	1987)	through	
the	gradual	reciprocal	shaping	between	individuals,	innovations	in	the	design	and	
construction	of	vessels,	improved	navigation	strategies,	maritime	conditions,	strategic	
problems	and	more.	He	calls	these	practices	“heterogeneous	engineering”	that	form,	
adapt	and	stabilise	technological	artefacts	as	“a	function	of	the	interaction	of	
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heterogeneous	elements	as	these	are	shaped	and	assimilated	into	a	network”	(p.	113).	
These	elements	might	“range	from	people,	through	skills,	to	artifacts	and	natural	
phenomena”	(p.	128).	Law	defines	technology	as	a	set	of	methods	“for	associating	and	
channelling	other	entities	and	forces,	both	human	and	nonhuman.	It	is	a	method	[…]	for	
the	construction	of	a	relatively	stable	system	of	related	bits	and	pieces	with	emergent	
properties	in	a	hostile	or	indifferent	environment”	(p.	115).	
Law	develops	this	perspective	through	a	reflection	of	two	approaches.	First,	from	the	field	
of	the	sociology	of	science,	he	develops	a	critique	of	“social	constructivism”.	He	rejects	
giving	a	principle	explanatory	privilege	over	“social	groups”	or	“social	interests”	in	the	
construction	processes	of	technological	artefacts,	but	acknowledges	that	their	contingent	
and	constructed	form	is	co-constituted	through	controversies	and	the	closure	of	
negotiations.	Second,	he	draws	on	Thomas	Hughes’	“systems	approach”	from	the	history	
of	technology.	Here,	he	borrows	the	argument	that	the	builders	of	artefacts	are	“system	
builders”	as	they	manoeuvre	multiple	variables	in	the	attempt	to	bring	them	into	a	lasting	
whole.	Thereby	they	cannot	focus	on	artefacts	in	isolation,	but	“must	also	consider	the	
way	in	which	the	artifacts	relate	to	social,	economic,	political,	and	scientific	factors”	(p.	
112).	The	system-builder	perspective	does	not	give	any	element	a	priori	privileged	
explanatory	status;	it	rejects	at	once	social,	technological	or	natural	reductionism.	
Law	-	with	reference	to	Callon	-	brings	in	the	actor-network	term	as	an	adaptation	of	
Hughes’	system-building	perspective.	The	network	approach	differs	by	drawing	attention	
to	the	conflicts	central	in	the	expansion	and	stabilisation	of	network	building	in	
technological	innovation.	Law	explicates	two	methodological	principles	to	study	
heterogeneous	networks.	First,	he	borrows	“generalized	symmetry”	from	Callon	(1986)	to	
analyse	all	elements	in	a	system	in	the	same	way,	whether	they	are	human	or	not.	The	
second	he	calls	“reciprocal	definition”	to	state	that	actors	have	an	effect	on	the	network	
and	that	elements	of	a	network	define	each	other	(pp.	130-132).	Paralleling	work	by	
Latour	and	Callon,	this	study	is	Law’s	early	outline	of	ANT,	developed	in	the	1990s	as	a	
particular	method	within	the	expanding	field	of	STS.		
During	the	course	of	the	1990s,	Law	defended	STS	research	against	criticisms	that	
considered	the	perspective	would	lack	political	relevance	(1991,	p.	2).	In	defence	of	STS,	
	55	
he	developed	three	arguments	to	highlight	the	analytical	contributions	of	20	years	of	the	
field:	first,	he	drew	attention	to	the	“character	of	knowledge	[…]	the	problem	of	
epistemology”	(p.	3).	According	to	Law	this	could	lead	to	“an	important	form	of	intellectual	
caution:	the	sense	that	all	knowledges	are	shaped,	contingent,	and	in	some	other	world	
could	be	otherwise”	(p.	6).	Second,	Law	shifts	attention	to	“the	character	of	society.	Here	
the	problem	has	been	to	characterise	the	stuff	that	binds	society	together	[…]	the	problem	
of	heterogeneity”	(p.	3).	In	contrast	to	subject-	or	discourse-	centred	explanations	of	
society	(p.	7),	Law	emphasises	STS’s	“serious	commitment	to	heterogeneity,	and,	in	
particular,	to	the	heterogeneity	of	the	sociotechnical”	(pp.	15-16).	His	criticism	of	most	
“sociology”,	which	he	sees	as	tending	either	to	technological	determinism	or	social	
reductionism,	is	the	“absence	of	a	method	for	juggling	simultaneously	with	both	the	social	
and	the	technical”	(p.	8).	He	continues	to	argue	that	STS	must	“find	ways	of	exploring	the	
character	of	distributive	strategies	-	of	the	different	kinds	of	discursive	and	non-discursive	
effects	instantiated	and	reproduced	in	the	processes	of	heterogeneous	engineering”	(p.	
15).	For	Law	the	“genius	of	STS”	is	that	it	has	“understood	that	heterogeneous	engineers	
are	[…]	arranging,	ordering,	shaping,	regulating	and	(to	be	sure)	seeking	to	profit	from	
such	overlaps”	and	that	“heterogeneous	engineers	-	agents,	whether	human	or	not	–	are	
constituted	in	the	arrangement	of	these	materials”	(p.	16).	This	argument	leads	him	to	a	
third	opportunity	raised	through	STS:	the	then	emerging	agenda	of	the	“problem	of	
distribution”(p.	3)	that	he	formulates	as	an	“intuitive	feel	for	the	ordering	of	heterogeneity,	
the	construction	and	reconstruction	of	overlaps,	the	constitution	of	agency:	that	is	the	
strength	of	STS”	(p.	16).	Having	laid	out	these	three	sensibilities	of	STS,	Law	rejects	
criticisms	from	“sociology”	regarding	any	lack	of	political	relevance.		
Over	the	years	Law	has	explored	many	empirical	cases,	for	instance,	of	scientific	
laboratories	(1994),	aircraft	developments	(2002),	and	a	significant	part	of	his	work	is	
dedicated	to	exploring	and	advancing	theories	and	methods	in	STS	(2004,	2008,	2009).	For	
him,	the	emergence	of	ANT	as	a	distinct	method	of	STS	occurred	between	1984	and	1994	
(2009,	p.	146).		
Law	describes	ANT	as	a	way	of	analysing	sociotechnical	artefacts	and	practices	“as	enacted	
and	relational	effects,	and	explores	the	configuration	and	reconfiguration	of	those	
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relations.	Its	relationality	means	that	major	ontological	categories	(for	instance,	
‘technology’	and	‘society’,	or	‘human’	and	‘non-human’)	are	treated	as	effects	or	
outcomes,	rather	than	as	explanatory	resources”	(Law,	2004,	p.	157).		
Law’s	recent	work	adds	further	perspectives	to	the	wider	STS	project,	advancing	its	
“analytical	and	(post?)	critical	possibilities”	(2008,	p.	634).	I	briefly	review	three	of	them:	
First,	Law	pointed	out	that	things	are	indeed	“constructed”	but	that	the	metaphor	is	
misleading	since	the	focus	of	STS	is	on	processes	and	not	stability.	In	order	to	persist,	
heterogeneous	relations	have	to	be	continuously	re-enacted.	He	suggests	instead	to	
analyse	the	world	as	“performance”	or	“enactment”	(p.	635).	Second,	a	further	
perspective	is	“multiplicity”,	which	refers	to	the	simultaneous	enactment	of	artefacts	in	
different	practices	that	are	believed	to	be	the	same,	do	not	create	different	perspectives	
on	the	same	artefact,	but	do	create	different	artefacts	and	realities.	(p.	636).	Third,	
through	the	perspective	of	“ontological	politics”,	Law	argues	that	if	realities	are	enacted	
(e.g.	through	a	representation	of	a	reality),	then	they	are	not	singular	but	multiple.	This	
leads	him	to	questions	of	“politics”	and	“	intervention”,	since	decisively	particular	realities	
might	be	more	preferable	than	others	(p.	637).	
In	this	section,	I	have	situated	my	approach	within	existing	literatures	through,	first,	a	brief	
overview	of	the	central	ideas	in	the	diverse	field	of	STS.	A	central	achievement	of	STS	and	
ANT	is	the	integrative	analytical	approach	to	both	the	social	and	technical.	STS	in	principle	
rejects	grand	narratives,	subject-centred	explanations,	models	of	socio-technical	
developments,	social	reductionism	and	technological	determinism.	STS	has	contributed	to	
the	"abiding	concern	for	the	circumstances	of	knowledge	production"	(Hackett	et	al.,	2008,	
p.	4).	Critics	of	STS	“draw	special	attention	to	the	sometimes	overlooked	question	of	who	
has	the	power	to	shape	technology”	(Gieryn,	2002,	p.	68).	ANT,	as	a	special	method	of	STS,	
distinguishes	itself	through	the	symmetrical	treatment	of	human	and	nonhuman	actors	in	
networks	(Sismondo,	2008,	p.	16).	Both	Law’s	and	Latour’s	theoretical	proposals	of	ANT	
sparked	controversial	debates	and	received	vehement	criticism	that	mostly	centred	on	a	
flat	ontology	between	human	and	non-humans	actors	in	analysis.	One	frequent	
misunderstanding	is	that	ANT	does	not	understand	the	role	of	elements	in	networks	as	
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equally	relevant,	but	instead	seeks	to	empirically	develop	the	specificities	of	these	
heterogeneous	associations	(Schäfer,	2013,	p.	305).	
2.4.2 Transporting	STS	(ANT)	approaches	to	architectural	design	practice	
Over	the	last	four	decades	STS	scholars	have	ventured	to	explore	the	most	diverse	
practices	(scientific	laboratories,	technology	transfer,	medical	services,	etc.),	yet	STS	
approaches	to	architectural	design	practices	remain	exceptional.	This	is	somewhat	
surprising	since	the	built	environment	presents	a	significant	co-constitutive	element	of	life.	
Nevertheless,	the	last	decade	brought	an	increased	interest	in	using	and	advancing	STS	
approaches	to	architecture,	as	evidenced	in	various	publications	(Delitz,	2009;	Guy	&	
Moore,	2005,	2007;	Guy	&	Yaneva,	2008;	Latour	&	Yaneva,	2008;	Moore	&	Karvonen,	2008)	
and	conferences	(Gisler	&	Kurath,	2013;	Müller	&	Reichmann,	2013).		
2.4.2.1 STS	(ANT)	in	urbanism		
Cities	and	their	particular	arrangements	have	been	the	empirical	focus	of	a	limited	number	
of	STS	accounts	(e.g.	Aibar	&	Bijker,	1997;	Coutard	&	Guy,	2007;	Hommels,	2005).	Recently	
there	has	been	an	intense	debate	concerning	the	contributions	of	STS	and	ANT	approaches	
tailored	to	urban	studies,	sparked	by	Ignacio	Farías	and	Thomas	Bender’s	(2010)	“Urban	
Assemblages”.	Bender	advocates	scaling	up	the	method	from	the	successful	“micro-
analysis”	of	the	laboratory	and	other	well-defined	situations	to	the	spatial	scale	and	
intensity	of	the	city:	“As	a	method	ANT	is	not	hostile	to	the	notion	of	larger	social	patterns	
of	the	scale	of	a	city	or	beyond”	(p.	311).	He	argues	that	what	
ANT	offers	is	unusually	rich	heuristic	device	rather	than	a	formal	method	for	
studying	cities.	It	is	a	metaphoric	approach	that	encourages	a	highly	developed	
sense	of	urban	complexity,	of	the	unities	and	disunities,	of	the	stabilities	and	
instabilities,	and	especially	the	complex	and	heterogeneous	networks	of	
connection	and	association	out	of	which	the	city	as	asocial	and	as	a	physical	entity	
is	formed	and	sustained	(p.	317).	
The	book	received	harsh	criticism	(Brenner,	Madden,	&	Wachsmuth,	2011;	Tonkiss,	2011).	
Fran	Tonkiss’	critique	of	ANT	approaches	to	urban	studies	refers	to,	inter	alia,	the	flat	
ontology	between	human	and	non-human	actors.	She	considers	ANT	to	lack	significant	
insights	and	to	miss	the	important	role	of	human	agency,	thus	producing	merely	
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descriptive	accounts.	While	I	am	sceptical	of	ANT’s	proclaimed	symmetrical	role	of	human	
and	non-human	actors	to	explain	practices,	I	do	endorse	an	approach	that	includes	
heterogeneous	“relationality”	and	that	calls	into	question	“distinctions	between	global	and	
local,	close	and	far,	inside	and	outside”	(Farías	&	Bender,	2010,	pp.	3-13)	and	thus	
proposes	an	alternative	conception	of	space	and	ontology	of	the	city.	I	position	myself	to	
this	contention	below	in	section	2.4.3	where	I	outline	the	STS-inspired	approach	of	
architectural	practices	that	I	deploy.	
2.4.2.2 STS	(ANT)	in	architecture		
David	Brain	(1994)	was	amongst	the	first	to	develop	the	opportunities	that	STS	
perspectives	can	offer	for	interpreting	architectural	practices.	He	conceives	the	design	of	
architectural	artefacts	as	a	form	of	“society	in	the	making”(p.	193).	He	rejects	theoretical	
models	(of	social	and	cultural	studies)	that	attempt	to	explain	architectural	practices	as	
being	determined	by	“social	structures”	or	“interpretive	accounts	[…	as]	the	distinctive	
vision	of	the	creative	subject	or	the	influence	of	a	common	style”	(pp.	192-193).	Instead	
Brain	infers	that	in	“any	artifact,	there	is	an	apparent	arbitrariness	of	form	that	cannot	be	
reduced	to	external	conditions,	the	demands	of	representation,	or	subjective	motives”(p.	
193).	To	find	out	how	practices	of	"engineer-sociologists	[…]	make	sense	with	things”	he	
emphasises	the	sensibilities	of	STS	to	trace	“what	social	relations,	institutional	practices,	
strategies	of	action,	and	possibilities	for	transformation	are	built	into	cultural	artefacts”	of	
architecture	(Brain	cited	in	Coutard	&	Guy,	2007,	p.	717).		
Thomas	Gieryn	(2002)	argues	that	STS	approaches	can	offer	the	“conceptual	tools	sharp	
enough	for	picking	apart	the	empirical	realities	of	buildings	[…]	as	simultaneously	shaped	
and	shaping”,	and	he	sets	out	three	approaches	to	understand	architectural	design:	
“heterogeneous	design,	black	boxing,	and	interpretative	flexibility”	(p.	41).	With	reference	
to	Andrew	Pickering,	Gieryn	argues:	“Neither	the	social	(power,	interests)	nor	the	material	
(physical,	mechanical)	are	so	stable	that	they	can	serve	as	bedrock	causes	of	design	
trajectories.	As	an	artifact	takes	shape,	designers	transform	the	physical	and	mechanical	
worlds	[…]	and	each	other's	goals	and	interests”	(p.	42).	Surprisingly,	thus	Gieryn’s	
declares	“design	is	heterogeneous”,	his	account	of	architectural	practices	bears	no	traces	
	59	
of	the	influence	of	engineers,	from	the	design	studio	itself	and	from	the	diversity	of	design	
tools	used.		
2.4.2.3 Yaneva	
The	anthropologist	Albena	Yaneva	was	born	in	the	Republic	of	Bulgaria.	In	2001	she	
received	her	PhD	in	Sociology	at	the	Ecole	Nationale	Supérieure	des	mines	de	Paris.	Yaneva	
has	collaborated	with	Latour	on	a	number	of	projects,	for	instance	the	exhibition	Making	
things	public	at	the	Centre	for	Art	and	Media	in	Karlsruhe	in	2005,	and	the	Europe-wide	
research	project	Mapping	Controversies	on	Science	for	Politics.10	Her	work	bridges	the	
interdisciplinary	boundaries	of	political	philosophy,	anthropology	of	art	and	design,	STS	
and	architectural	theory.	Yaneva	has	been	central	in	transporting	methodological	and	
conceptual	achievements	of	STS	to	empirical	explorations	of	architectural	design	practices.	
In	2005	she	claimed	that	“science	and	technology	studies	(STS)	have	closely	followed	
scientists,	engineers	and	physicians	in	and	out	of	their	workplaces;	but	architects	have	not	
been	followed”	(2005,	p.	869).	In	order	to	develop	her	understandings	of	architectural	
practices,	Yaneva	entered	the	architectural	studio	“in	the	same	way	that	Science	and	
Technology	Studies	(STS)	have	approached	the	laboratories	and	the	practices	of	scientists”	
(2009,	p.	4),	referencing	the	laboratory	ethnographies	of	Bruno	Latour	and	Steve	Woolgar	
(1979),	Michael	Lynch	(1993),	and	Karin	Knorr-Cetina	(1999).	
While	one	of	her	earlier	articles	(2005)	builds	on	STS,	two	later	books	(2009,	2012)	draw	
on	“ANT	as	a	method	of	STS”	(2009,	p.	25),	as	well	as	several	other	perspectives	(e.g.	
cognitive	anthropology,	design	studies).	Her	work	engages	with	architectural	design	
practice	through	the	method	of	design	studio	ethnography	(2005,	2009),	and	non-
participatory	approaches	such	as	interviews,	archival,	and	media	research	(2010,	2012).	
In	Yaneva’s	writings	on	STS	approaches	to	architecture	it	is	difficult	to	pin	down	what	it	
means	to	transport	STS	to	architectural	design	practice,	and	whether	or	how	STS	
approaches	need	to	be	adapted	in	order	to	capture	the	specificities	of	“actual	dynamics	of	
architectural	design	process	and	its	material,	cognitive	and	cultural	dimensions”	(2009,	p.	
4).	Although	her	work	hints	at	these	questions,	Yaneva	does	not	systematically	outline	(e.g.	
																																								 																
10see	http://www.mappingcontroversies.net	
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rules	of	method,	principles)	how	her	STS	modus	of	analysis	of	architectural	design	differs	
from	the	laboratory	ethnographies	that	she	refers	to	(see	above).	
Still,	Yaneva	offers	a	research	approach	to	“offer	architects	an	entry	into	a	work	of	theory”	
(2012,	p.	4,	my	emphasis)	and	as	an	approach	“towards”	an	alternative	interpretation	of	
architectural	practices	(2009,	p.	195,	my	emphasis).	Yaneva’s	research	approach	comes	in	
three	different	versions	that	largely	overlap:	“Towards	a	Pragmatist	Approach	to	
Architecture”	(2009),	“The	architectural	as	a	type	of	connector”	(2010,	2012)	and	
“Mapping	Controversies	in	Architecture”	(2012).11	The	latter	is	distinct	in	its	ambition	not	
only	to	trace	and	analyse	the	dynamics	of	“architecture	in	the	making”	(2012,	p.	72),	but	to	
also	map	and	represent	them	visually	through	recent	dynamic	visualisation	computer	
software.	
Resonating	with	many	(contemporary)	STS	perspectives,	Yaneva	rejects	forms	of	inquiry	
that	rely	on	simplistic	cause-and-effect	explanations	(2012,	p.	1),	on	divides	between	
nature	and	culture,	architecture	and	society,	or	technology	and	meaning	(2012,	p.	1).	She	
repudiates	ideas	of	“architecture	and	society	as	static	entities”	(2012,	p.	42),	any	“’social	
explanation’	of	architectural	projects”	(2009,	p.	195),	the	idea	of	a	given	or	fixed	context	
into	which	architecture	is	placed	(2009,	p.	16),	and	neglecting	to	include	materials	and	
building	technologies	(2012,	p.	32).	Instead,	she	emphasises	the	reciprocal	shaping	of	
society	and	architecture	(2012,	pp.	25-46)	and	diverts	attention	to	the	pragmatic	activity	
of	design	practices	to	enter	into	a	modified	interpretation	of	what	acts	to	shape	and	
constitute	architectural	practices.	
Yaneva’s	research	approach	can	be	understood	as	an	architectural	and	simplified	version	
of	Latour’s	ANT	approach	(e.g.	2005),	who	is	continually	referenced	in	Yaneva’s	work.	The	
wider	project	that	she	attempts	to	develop	is	an	alternative	theory	of	architecture.	
																																								 																
11	Yaneva	states	that	the	“Mapping	Controversies”	method	was	initially	developed	by	Latour	as	an	ANT-based	
inquiry	into	diverse	disciplines	(Yaneva,	2012,	p.	68).	
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Yaneva’s	calls	for	a	“pragmatist	approach	to	architecture”	(2009,	p.	195).12	This	approach	
aims	to	describe	the	diverse	elements	and	heterogeneous	associations	that	are	built	
within	architectural	practices.	“It	follows	what	architects,	[…]	developers,	designers,	
engineers,	and	clients	do	in	their	daily	routine	actions,	in	spite	of	their	interests	and	theo-
ries,	thus	constantly	prioritizing	the	pragmatic	content	of	actions“(2009,	p.	197).	She	
argues	that	the	performative	dimension	of	architectural	practices	has	the	capacity	to	
connect	heterogeneous	human	and	non-human	actors.	Architectural	design	is	an	
unpredictable	and	tedious	process	of	continual	transformation	that	is	characterised	by	
negotiations,	controversies	and	trials	that	may	add,	alter	or	abandon	associations.	Yaneva	
conceives	her	approach	as	a	research	method	to	explore	architectural	practices	and	“a	
new	task	for	architectural	theory”	(2009,	p.	202).		
I	draw	on	three	perspectives	that	Yaneva	developed	in	transporting	STS	(ANT)	to	
architectural	practice.	They	are	especially	useful	for	my	explorations	of	City	Hall.	First,	
Yaneva’s	concept	of	a	building	conceives	a	building	as	an	unstable,	interpretable	assembly	
that	entails	many	contradictory	issues:	“a	contested	assemblage,	[…]	a	complex	assembly	
of	contradictory	issues”	(2009,	p.	202).	Yaneva	rejects	assumptions	of	stable	“relationships	
between	signified	and	sign”.	Say	a	building	has	a	symbolic	attribution	of	being,	for	instance,	
‘sustainable’	or	‘green’,	a	spectator	“assumes	a	simplicity	of	essence”	which	excludes	
alternative	ways	a	building	could	be	interpreted.	In	this	symbolic	assignment	“we	presume	
it	to	have	a	stable	form”	(2012,	p.	20).	With	reference	to	Nigel	Thrift	she	argues	there	“is	
no	need	to	fix	categories,	styles	and	essentialist	labels”	(2012,	p.	23).	In	Yaneva’s	view,	a	
building	has	itself	the	capacity	to	act	and	do	things	(e.g	gather	diverse	actors	and	provoke	
disputes).		
Second,	I	outline	Yaneva’s	conception	of	the	design	process:	the	(shifting)	associations	of	
heterogeneous	elements:	
Instead	of	progressing	in	a	linear	fashion	from	a	state	of	zero	information	to	a	
completely	known	and	defined	object,	the	new	building	appears	in	the	
																																								 																
12	Thereby	Yaneva	draws	on	the	“radical	empiricism”	project	by	William	James.	It	implies	a	form	of	empiricism	that	
concentrates	on	“what	is	given	to	experience	and	the	numerous	connections	that	are	revealed	in	it“	(2009,	p.	196).	 
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architectural	office	in	two	presentational	states;	it	always	exists	as	a	little-known,	
abstract	and	fuzzy	entity,	and	at	the	same	time	a	well-known,	concrete,	and	precise	
object,	as	a	bunch	of	elaborated	models	and	a	schematic	diagram	(2009,	p.	21).		
Design	“relies	on	a	cognitive	and	experimental	move	of	going	back,	rethinking	carefully	
and	re-collecting,	re-inventing,	re-interpreting,	re-looking,	re-doing	everything	once	again	
in	a	new	combination	of	conservation	and	innovation”	(2009,	p.	200).	Yaneva	emphasises	
“the	experimental	dimension	of	design”	which	is	built	on	explorations,	discoveries,	
numerous	detours,	mistakes,	and	unpredictable	events	(2010,	p.	143).	In	the	process	a	
building	becomes	more	and	more	known	as	gaining	new	knowledge	follows	the	principles	
of	accumulation	and	addition.	New	data	becomes	incorporated	through	updating	present	
states	of	drawings,	models	and	other	tools	(2009,	p.	128).	Yaneva	uses	the	term	“design	
move,	instead	of	design	decision”	to	indicate	that	the	“design	venture	is	led	by	a	variety	of	
experimental	assumptions,	a	number	of	‘what	if	…‘	queries,	which	configure	a	particular	
repertoire	of	actions	of	the	building	designed”	(2009,	p.	76).	Yaneva	emphasises	the	
importance	of	“negotiations”	referring	to	Louis	Bucciarelli	who	argues	that	the	“design	
venture	is	a	process	of	achieving	a	consensus	among	the	various	participants	with	
different	‘interests’	in	the	design,	which	derive	from	their	technical	expertise,	experience,	
and	responsibilities”	(2009,	p.	154).	Crucial	moments	of	the	design	process	are	
controversies	that	point	“to	the	series	of	uncertainties	that	a	design	project	[…]	undergoes;	
a	situation	of	disagreement	among	different	actors	over	a	design	issue”	(2012,	p.	72).	
Architectural	practices	often	include	an	“option	process”	in	which	“design	moves”	are	
changed,	redefined	and	compared	to	rethink	and	evaluate	the	emerging	design	proposal.	
Yaneva	highlights	that	they	imply	two	steps:	“multiplying	the	scenarios	for	a	building”	that	
are	most	probable	and	reducing	options	following	discussions,	new	inputs	and	feedback.	A	
process	of	elimination	and	stabilisation	through	“small	evaluations,	reductions,	and	
reassessments	that	leads	slowly	to	a	smaller	number	of	good	options,	and	with	time,	trig-
gers	a	better	scenario	for	the	building”	(2012,	pp.	168,	172-173).	
Third,	I	highlight	how	Yaneva	conceives	the	making	of	design	knowledge.	Architecture	
requires	different	forms	of	(sometimes	conflicting)	knowledge,	which	is	in	practice	
interpreted,	synthesised	and	modified	(e.g.	Hauser	et	al.,	2011,	pp.	11-12).	Yaneva	points	
to	Donald	Schön’s	concept	of	“reflection-in-action”	of	designers	which	rejects	a	“scientific,	
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linear	way	of	knowing”	by	focusing	on	the	knowledge	“already	embedded	in	skilful	
practice”	(2012,	p.	68).	She	highlights	two	dominant	framings	of	knowledge:	“explicit	
knowledge”,	for	instance	disseminated	through	academia,	and	“tacit	knowledge”,	
knowledge	that	cannot	be	adequately	communicated	and	which	is	“learnt	by	doing”,	as	
pointed	out	by	Michael	Polanyi	(Yaneva,	2009,	pp.	117-118),	Yaneva	draws	attention	to	
the	knowledge	that	is	gained	in	design	practice	by	architects	through	their	everyday	tools:	
drawing,	scaling,	modelling	and	circulating	plans.	The	extensively	used	visual	and	material	
tools	differ	from	the	tools	in	scientific	laboratories.	Models,	drawings	and	diagrams	“are	
important	tools	for	thinking	about,	imagining	and	designing	a	building	[…]	and	a	crucial	
‘means	of	studying	the	impact	of	design’"	(2009,	p.	119).	Yaneva	argues	that	they	are	not	
only	descriptions,	but	that	they	are	“gestural,	spatial	and	operational	tools	of	
investigation,	which	help	architects	learn	more	about	[…	a	project]	and	interpret	its	
features"	(2009,	pp.	119-120).	For	Yaneva,	different	visual	tools	(sketches,	drawings,	
models,	etc.)	are	interconnected	and	knowledge	is	gained	through	their	examination,	
interpretation	and	translation	from	one	medium	to	another:	“Acting	complementarily	and	
in	cooperation,	the	2D-to-3D	and	3D-to-2D	translations	shape	a	process	of	continuous	
knowledge	transfer,	in	which	the	building	gradually	becomes	known”	(2009,	p.	127).	She	
concludes	that	gaining	knowledge	follows	the	principle	of	accumulation.	In	sequential	
processes	of	assumption	making,	modifying,	testing	and	re-interpretation,	new	
dispositional	knowledge	is	added	that	slowly	leads	to	the	final	design.	The	collaboration	
and	mutual	exchange	between	architects	and	their	consultants	is	another	form	of	gaining	
knowledge	that	she	highlights.	Plans	and	other	forms	of	visual	tools	are	circulated	and	
discussed.	Consultants	"learn	about	the	architectural	assumptions,	and	in	exchange	the	
architects	learn	from	these	[…	consultants],	each	of	which	has	a	different	competence,	
about	the	structural,	mechanical	and	construction	parameters”	(2009,	p.	152).	Shared	
brainstorming	and	discussions	are	processes	of	mutual	learning	“about	the	strength	of	
their	design	schemes	and	makes	more	intelligible	the	project’s	advantages	and	
disadvantages”	(2009,	p.	152).			
In	this	section	I	have	continued	to	situate	the	approach	within	existing	literatures	through	
a	brief	discussion	on	the	transfer	of	STS	approaches	to	(urban	and)	architectural	studies,	
mainly	via	the	work	of	Albena	Yaneva.	An	open	question	remains	in	Yaneva’s	as	to	how	
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and	to	what	extent	STS	and	ANT	approaches	need	to	be	adapted	to	explore	architectural	
design	practices.	Yaneva’s	research	approach	rejects	social	or	subject-centred	explanations	
of	design	practice,	includes	materiality	as	co-constitutive	forces,	to	arrive	at	an	approach	
that	includes	heterogeneous	elements	as	symmetrical	forces	that	explain	action	and	
constitute	architectural	practices.	Yaneva	has	developed	several	accounts	in	this	
developing	field	but	has	not	formulated	a	systematic	modus	of	analysis	adapted	to	
architectural	design	processes.	Her	conception	of	both	cognition	and	knowledge	remains	
simple,	but	to	bring	in	more	elaborate	perspectives	is	beyond	the	possibilities	and	scope	of	
this	thesis.		
2.4.3 Outlining	the	STS-inspired	approach	of	architectural	practices	used	
I	am	fascinated	by	the	contributions	that	the	field	of	STS	can	make	to	the	exploration	of	
architectural	design	practices,	especially	in	the	field	of	environmental	design.	Having	
worked	as	an	architect	for	many	years,	I	am	relatively	new	to	the	world	of	STS	explorations	
and	consider	myself	an	emerging	STS	researcher.	I	therefore	develop	an	approach	that	is	
inspired	by	STS	thinking.	
This	approach	draws	on	Yaneva’s	work	as	outlined	above,	but	with	one	elementary	
difference.	Despite	recognising	that	artefacts,	things	and	materials	have	an	important	co-
constitutive	role	in	architectural	practices,	I	distance	myself	from	the	view	that	they	in	a	
literal	–	and	not	in	a	metaphorical	-	sense	have	the	capacity	to	act	(the	symmetry	of	
human	and	nonhuman	actors).	For	instance,	Yaneva	claims	that	“the	building	makes	the	
controversies”	(Yaneva,	2009,	p.	112).	Instead,	I	follow	Ross	Beveridge	and	Simon	Guy	who	
(drawing	on	Ian	Hacking	and	Jonathan	Murdoch)	argue	that	humans	in	comparison	to	non-
humans	have	the	unique	capacity	of	“communication	and	reflection”	that	“shape	
motivations	for	actions”.	Despite	acknowledging	the	importance	of	heterogeneous	
associations	shaping	design	practices,	it	is	the	distinctive	human	capacity	that	“often	be	
seen	to	act	as	a	‘driver’	for	change	in	the	socio-technical-natural	world”	(Beveridge	&	Guy,	
2009,	p.	72).		
2.4.3.1 Translation	
I	also	expand	Yaneva’s	approach	adopted	above.	In	order	to	develop	a	better	
understanding	of	how	environmental	challenges	were	constructed	as	design	issues	in	City	
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Hall’s	design	practices,	and	how	heterogeneous	elements	became	associated	and	
continuously	transformed,	I	make	selective	(thus	simplified)	use	of	Michel	Callon’s	(1986)	
concept	of	“translation”	as	my	central	analytical	frame.		
The	metaphor	of	translation	was	put	forward	in	the	1970s	as	a	major	theme	in	the	early	
writings	of	the	philosopher	of	science	Michel	Serres,	who	conceived	translation	as	“an	act	
of	invention	brought	about	through	combining	and	mixing	varied	elements”	(Brown,	2002,	
p.	6).	Latour	and	Callon	built	on	Serres’	metaphor	and	developed	it	into	a	central	concept	
of	ANT	(Law,	2009,	p.	144).	The	notion	of	translation	is	distinct	in	the	field	of	STS	(ANT).	It	
has	been	used	to	explore	sociotechnical	innovation	processes	(e.g.	Beveridge	&	Guy,	2009)		
Callon	(1986)	has	articulated	an	elaborated	concept	of	the	mechanisms	of	“translation”	in	
the	“sociology	of	translation”.	In	his	well-known	study	of	harvestings	scallops,	Callon	sets	
out	an	analytical	framework	to	study	the	formation	of	heterogeneous	associations,	
controversies	and	power	relations.		
As	his	starting	point,	Callon	critiques	sociologists’	impartial	approach	to	“scientific	and	
technological	content”	(p.	197),	content	that	he	considers	principally	“uncertain,	
ambiguous,	and	disputable.”	He	claims	that	sociologists	have	taken	an	asymmetrical	
perspective,	since	they	have	not	applied	the	same	openness	to	“society	and	its	
constituents”	(p.	197).	Callon	extends	insights	from	the	sociology	of	science	and	
technology	to	society	in	order	to	consider	both	as	“equally	uncertain,	ambiguous,	and	
disputable”	(p.	199).	This	way	he	rejects	explanations	of	emerging	scientific	and	technical	
practices	by	existing	“social	norms”	or	“social	forces	such	as	classes,	organizations	or	
professions”	(p.	198),	but	as	being	in	principle	uncertain,	shifting	and	shaped	through	
practice.	Callon	deduces	that	“translation	is	the	mechanism	by	which	the	social	and	
natural	worlds	progressively	take	form”	(p.	224).	Callon’s	“sociology	of	translation”	
pointed	towards	a	then	newly	emerging	conception	of	the	social.	This	understanding	
suggests	a	model	of	
society	which	is	considered	to	be	uncertain	and	disputable.	Within	the	
controversies	studied,	the	intervening	actors	develop	contradictory	arguments	and	
points	of	view	which	lead	them	to	propose	different	versions	of	the	social	and	
natural	worlds	(pp.	199-200).	
	66	
Based	on	the	idea	that	society	and	nature	are	not	presupposed,	but	“rendered	as	
uncertain	and	disputable”,	Callon	argues	this	methodological	approach	“reveals	an	
unusual	reality	which	is	accounted	for	quite	faithfully	by	the	vocabulary	of	translation”	(p.	
222).	Latour	contends	Callon’s	study	of	scallops	to	be	one	of	the	foundational	texts	that	
led	to	the	articulation	of	ANT	(Latour,	2005,	p.	10).		
Callon	builds	his	translation	approach	on	three	methodological	principles:	First,	
“agnosticism	(impartiality	between	actors	engaged	in	controversy)”;	second,	“generalized	
symmetry	(the	commitment	to	explain	conflicting	viewpoints	in	the	same	terms)”;	and	
third,	“free	association	(the	abandonment	of	all	a	priori	distinctions	between	the	natural	
and	the	social)”	(pp.	196-201).	
In	a	loose	interpretation	inspired	by	Callon’s	first	principle,	I	attempt	to	impartially	follow	
technological	and	scientific	arguments	used	by	practitioners	and	properties	attributed	to	
entities,	as	well	as	the	descriptions	and	interpretations	of	their	own	and	others’	roles	and	
relationships.	From	the	second	principle,	I	attempt	“not	to	change	registers	when	we	
move	from	the	technical	to	the	social	aspects	of	the	problem	studied”	(p.	200).	Society,	
nature	or	technology	cannot	be	used	to	explain	why	controversies	concerning	protagonists	
or	entities	are	closed,	since	their	association	is	the	outcome	of	practices.	I	acknowledge	
the	important	co-constitutive	role	of	artefacts,	things	and	materials	in	practices,	but	
distance	myself	from	Callon’s	claim	that	“actors	are	all	equally	important”	(p.	222),	
whether	human	or	non-human	(see	my	argumentation	above).	The	inspiration	that	I	draw	
from	the	third	principle	is	the	attempt	to	abandon	any	hypotheses	of	presupposed	definite	
boundaries	that	separate	natural,	technical	or	social	events	(relations).	“These	divisions	
are	considered	to	be	conflictual,	for	they	are	the	result	of	analysis	rather	than	its	point	of	
departure”	(pp.	200-201).	Furthermore,	I	follow	the	protagonists	“in	order	to	identify	the	
manner	in	which	these	define	and	associate	the	different	elements	by	which	they	build	
and	explain	their	world”	(p.	201).	I	consider	roles	and	relationships	as	principally	
unpredictable,	fluctuating,	and	stable	only	for	certain	times	and	locations.	They	take	their	
course	within	practices.	
	67	
2.4.3.2 Mechanisms	 		
Inspired	by	Callon,	I	adopt	the	following	concept	of	translation	to	analyse	how	
environmental	challenges,	targets	and	goals	were	formulated	in	the	design	practices	of	
City	Hall	and	how,	in	an	unpredictable	iterative	process,	they	were	transformed	into	
design	strategies,	building	technologies	and	the	materialised	building	(cf.	research	
questions	posed	in	Chapter	1).	In	a	loose	interpretation	adapted	to	architectural	design	
practices,	I	interpret	translation	to	be	a	fluctuating	unpredictable	process,	through	which	
heterogeneous	entities	(e.g.	architects,	interpretations,	arguments,	world	views,	
materialities)	become	associated	and	forged	into	a	conflictual,	unpredictable	alliance.	
Proceeding	from	the	initial	problem	and	plan	towards	architectural	materialisation	
necessarily	depends	on	the	simultaneous	production	of	new	design	knowledge	and	
additional	association	of	heterogeneous	entities.	Crucially,	this	process	is	not	neutral,	but	
performed	by	two	inseparable	mechanisms	(structuring	power	relations):	on	the	one	hand,	
various	sorts	of	“displacements	and	transformation[s]”;	on	the	other	hand,	controversies,	
choices,	“negotiations,	and	adjustments	that	accompany	them”(p.	224).	During	this	
process	the	initial	problem,	“the	possibility	of	interaction	and	the	margins	of	
manoeuvre“(p.	203),	the	role	of	actors,	the	properties	of	entities,	and	their	relationships	
are	reciprocally	shaped,	modified	and	re-ordered.		
Callon	describes	the	translation	process	through	four	specific	moments	“which	can	in	
reality	overlap”(p.	203)	and	that	mark	a	progression	in	the	ongoing	negotiations	(p.	224).	
First,	“problematization”	in	which	a	group	of	protagonists	(e.g.	clients)	first	defines	a	
problem	and	action	plan.	The	protagonists	then	depend	on	other	practitioners	and	
elements,	attempting	to	invoke	a	set	of	diverse	entities,	and	seek	to	assign	particular	roles	
to	and	relationships	between	them	in	order	to	build	alliances	of	supposedly	shared	
interests.	Particular	movements	and	detours	must	be	accepted	to	avoid	“obstacle-
problems”	(p.	206).	The	initial	problem	thereby	becomes	transformed.	Roles	are	
negotiated	in	the	translation	processes,	they	are	defined	through	the	system	of	“alliances,	
or	associations,	between	entities,	thereby	defining	the	identity	and	what	they	'want'”	(p.	
206).		
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Second,	“interessement“	in	which	the	protagonists	seek	to	stabilise	entities,	roles	and	
relationships	in	the	initial	plan.	By	negotiating	envisaged	associations	they	develop	and	
interpose	several	strategies	and	devices	(e.g.	mathematical	calculations,	diagrams,	
proposed	technologies)	to	enable	practitioners	and	material	entities	to	identify	with	their	
roles.	These	strategies	and	devices	“extend	and	materialize”	previous	hypotheses	made	(p.	
209).	Elements	might	“refuse	the	transaction	by	defining	its	identity,	its	goals,	projects,	
orientations,	motivations,	or	interests	in	another	manner”	(p.	207).		
Third,	“enrolment”	in	which	the	protagonists	seek	to	further	stabilise	relationships	to	
“enable	them	to	succeed”	(p.	211).	The	aim	is	to	transform	hypothetical	assumptions	into	
more	certain	arrangements.	These	envisaged	relationships,	strategies	and	devices	are	
tested,	renegotiated	and	reordered	to	make	them	perform	as	predicted.	This	is	a	
conflictual	process	in	which	it	is	important	to	trace	how	“settlement	on	the	often	
conflicting	priorities	of	a	variety	of	actors”	(Beveridge	&	Guy,	2009,	p.	73)	was	generated.		
Fourth,	“mobilisation”:	As	proposed	strategies	gain	wider	acceptance	and	the	associations	
increasingly	include	absent	(simulated)	entities	(e.g.	occupants,	actual	kilowatt	hours),	a	
crucial	question	becomes	how	representative	particular	assumptions	and	predictions	are.	
Many	absent	(simulated)	entities	become	associated	(e.g.	occupants,	actual	kilowatt	hours)	
and	the	question	is	whether	they	will	actually	perform	(and	be	accepted)	as	represented	in	
previous	predictions.	Analysing	“representation	in	terms	of	translation	[…]	seeks	to	
undermine	the	very	idea	that	there	might	be	such	a	thing	as	fidelity.	Faithful	translation.	
Which	stresses	that	all	representation	also	betrays	its	object”	(Law,	1999,	p.	1).	“A	series	of	
intermediaries	and	equivalences”	are	established	to	render	displacements	easier	(Callon,	
1986,	pp.	216-218),	as	if	the	world	projected	in	the	design	studio	would	be	the	same	as	the	
world	of	actual	operation.	Assumptions	and	strategies	“inscribe”	a	particular	“vision	of	(or	
prediction	about)	the	world”	into	the	emerging	practices	and	artefacts	(Akrich,	1992,	p.	
208).	Sunbeams,	irradiation	and	heat	become	represented	in	the	architectural	studio	
through	graphical	representations	and	computer	analysis	–	they	are	displaced.			
In	summary,	I	adopt	a	concept	of	translation	that	first	emphasises	the	persistence	of	
transformation	and	displacement	(a	flow	of	many	translations)	that	occur	in	architectural	
design	practices:	“displacements	of	goals	and	interests”	(e.g.	concept	of	sustainability),	as	
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well	as	architects,	engineers,	design	strategies,	building	technologies,	sunbeams	and	
inscriptions,	"displacements	[occur]	at	every	stage.	Some	play	a	more	strategic	role	than	
others”	(Callon,	1986,	p.	223).		
The	notion	of	translation	is	well	suited	to	analysing	the	expansion	through	simultaneous	
association	of	new	entities,	construction	of	additional	relationships	and	production	of	
design	knowledge,	which	are	a	precondition	for	the	development	of	the	initial	problem	
and	action	plan.	This	process	constantly	mixes	together	a	variety	of	heterogeneous	entities	
(e.g.	statements,	preferences,	numbers,	materials)	which	co-shape	each	other.	These	
heterogeneous	assemblages	of	architectural	design	are	essentially	built	on	the	
simultaneous	mechanisms	of	“displacements	and	transformation”	and	negotiation	and	
adjustment.	(p.	224).	The	notion	of	translation	foregrounds	the	conflicts	between	
diverging	perspectives,	objectives	and	strategies	of	different	practitioners	and	“the	
performance	of	technical	and	natural”	entities	(Beveridge	&	Guy,	2009,	p.	72).	The	
“vocabulary	of	translation”	allows	us	to	examine	the	two	questions:	“Why	and	in	what	
conditions	do	controversies	occur?	How	are	they	ended?”	(Callon,	1986,	p.	219),	without	
giving	any	a	priori	explanatory	to	status	to	particular	aspects	(e.g.	opinions,	calculations,	
material	properties).		
The	vocabulary	of	translation	as	interpreted	above	highlights	the	complex	processes	that	
constantly	mix	a	diverse	set	of	heterogeneous	entities	(arguments,	symbolic	
interpretations,	material	properties).	Furthermore,	the	many	struggles	and	displacements	
constantly	reorder	the	practice	of	architectural	design.	Initial	design	goals	need	to	be	
translated	into	particular	intermediary	and	mediated	parameters,	strategies	and	
technologies	in	the	complex	materialisation	of	new	buildings.	The	form	that	these	ongoing	
transformations	take	is	crucial.		
I	follow	Callon’s	suggestion	that	the	concept	of	translation	may	offer	“a	better	
understanding	of	the	establishment	and	the	evolution	of	power	relationships	because	all	
the	fluctuations	which	occur	are	preserved”	(p.	201).	I	thereby	build	on	a	simplified	
understanding	of	power	in	two	forms:	first,	power	as	a	precondition	of	action	transiently	
associated	within	the	practices	(a	building	code,	an	agreement);	second,	power	as	the	
result	of	action	(Beveridge	&	Guy,	2009).	Power	relations	then	occur,	for	instance,	through	
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“the	way	in	which	[practitioners	and	entities]	are	defined,	associated	and	simultaneously	
obliged	to	remain	faithful	to	their	alliances”	(Callon,	1986,	p.	224).	They	can	occur	through	
closure	of	controversies,	through	strategies	and	devices	(by	compelling	entities	to	align,	
while	excluding	others),	through	the	control	of	some	entities	by	others,	and	through	the	
ways	in	which	some	are	allowed	to	represent	(or	suggest	equivalences	between)	other	
absent	entities	that	they	have	displaced	during	the	design	activities.	
Within	the	translation	approach	the	role	of	visual	representations	-	one	form	of	inscription	
devices	-	is	important	to	align	the	various	practitioners.	Latour	and	Woolgar	highlight	the	
importance	of	inscription	devices	“as	a	set	of	practices	for	shifting	material	modalities”	
(Law,	2004,	p.	29).	Diagrams	and	drawings	connect	the	“visual	and	material”	(Rose	&	Tolia-
Kelly,	2012,	p.	1).	I	shift	attention	to	the	role	that	these	visual	representations	play	within	
City	Hall’s	design	practices.	I	focus	on	diagrams,	drawings	and	2D	computer	visualisations	-	
all	instrumental	in	the	design	process	of	City	Hall.	In	the	field	of	engineering	design,	
Kathryn	Henderson	argues	that	because	visual	representations	“are	developed	and	used	in	
interactions,	these	[…]	act	as	the	means	for	organising	the	design-to-production	process	an	
serve	as	the	social	glue	both	between	individuals	and	between	groups”	(1999,	p.	6).		
A	few	simple	questions	help	me	to	understand	the	processes	of	translation	in	City	Hall’s	
design	practices:	How	(and	by	whom)	is	the	initial	problem	and	action	plan	formulated?	
How	is	a	set	of	practitioners	and	entities	associated	in	this	plan?	How	is	the	initial	action	
plan	transformed?	Which	additional	elements	are	associated	to	expand	initial	hypotheses	
(e.g.	actors,	entities,	strategies,	devices,	detours	and	problems)?	How	are	they	negotiated	
and	adjusted,	how	reciprocally	displaced	and	transformed?	How	are	design	strategies	
stabilised?	
2.5 Conclusions	
This	chapter	outlines	the	positions	and	theoretical	framework	through	which	I	explore	City	
Hall’s	design	practices	in	order	to	address	my	research	aims.	
The	first	main	part	argued	that	building-related	practices	can	play	an	important	role	in	
mitigating	the	environmentally	destructive	effects	of	human	activity.	I	pointed	out	that	
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architectural	design	practices	are	characterised	by	vast	disagreement	and	divergent	
perspectives	on	how	to	define	environmental	design	challenges	at	the	outset,	which	
pathways	to	follow	in	response,	and	how	to	materialise	projects.	By	stepping	back,	I	
suggest	a	reconsideration	of	how	architectural	design	practices	define	environmental	
problems	and	translate	these	into	materialisation.	Furthermore,	I	argued	that	architectural	
design	practices	be	reconnected	with	particular	understandings	of	a	wide	range	of	
different	environmental	crises,	rather	than	defining	environmental	design	targets	through	
established	guidelines,	assessment	methods	or	Building	Regulations.		
In	the	second	main	part	of	the	chapter,	I	introduced	a	constructivist	perspective	in	order	to	
interpret	the	environment	‘out	there’.	Starting	from	the	presumption	that	the	
achievements	of	environmental	design	“critically	depend	on	the	specific	social	
construction	of	environmental	problems”	(Hajer,	1995,	p.	2),	I	suggested	that	the	
problems	of	the	environment	‘out	there’	cannot	be	understood	in	all	their	complexity,	but	
can	be	approached	through	particular	concepts.	I	argued	against	the	treatment	of	
“sustainability	in	a	general,	colloquial	sense”(Leach	et	al.,	2010,	p.	5)	and	instead	through	a	
normative	understanding	“to	specify	clearly,	for	particular	issues	and	settings,	what	is	to	
be	sustained	for	whom,	and	who	will	gain	or	lose	in	the	process”	(p.	171).		
The	last	main	section	set	out	the	STS-inspired	overarching	framework,	in	which	I	make	
selective	use	of	Yaneva’s	approaches	to	architectural	design	practices	and	Callon’s	concept	
of	translation.	This	framework	guides	my	exploration	of	how	environmental	design	
problems	became	continuously	transformed,	heterogeneous	elements	associated,	diverse	
vocational	practitioners	aligned	and	reordered,	design	hypotheses	negotiated	and	
extended	into	design	strategies,	and	how	these	became	increasingly	stabilised.	Building	on	
this,	I	will	explain	my	choice	of	methods,	how	I	carried	out	the	research	and	gathered	
empirical	material	in	the	next	chapter.		
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Chapter	3 	
Exploring	architectural	design	practices	(methods)	
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3.1 Introduction	
In	the	previous	chapter	I	outlined	my	theoretical	framework	and	specific	analytical	frame	
with	which	I	research	the	design	practices	of	City	Hall.	In	this	chapter	I	describe	the	
methods	I	used	to	gather,	analyse	and	represent	the	heterogeneous	materials	from	my	
fieldwork.	This	chapter	and	the	previous	one	are	closely	interlinked.			
As	explained	in	earlier	chapters,	although	I	began	my	research	with	a	building,	my	research	
interest	was	less	placed	on	the	presence	and	materiality	of	London’s	completed	City	Hall,	
but	more	towards	the	contingent	practices	that	led	to	its	manifestation.	Since	the	
heterogeneous	activities,	struggles,	transformations,	and	back	and	forth	that	brought	the	
building	into	being	are	largely	concealed	in	the	City	Hall	assemblage,	I	approached	the	
different	parties	centrally	at	work	in	its	creation	in	an	attempt	to	speak	to	the	actors	and	
gain	access	to	the	design	documents	involved.	I	took	a	pragmatic	approach	and	tried	to	
retrace	the	design	practices	retrospectively	by	exploring	what	actors	involved	did	within	
the	making	of	architectural	design.	This	way	I	attempted	to	capture	“the	actual	dynamics	
of	architectural	design	and	its	material,	cognitive	and	cultural	dimensions”	(Yaneva,	2009,	
pp.	3-4)	in	order	to	develop	an	understanding	of	the	ways	in	which	City	Hall	had	gradually	
been	assembled.	
My	Science	and	Technology	Studies	(STS)	inspired	approach	that,	in	a	loose	interpretation	
builds	both	on	Yaneva’s	(2009,	2012)	approaches	of	architectural	explorations	and	on	
Callon’s	(1986)	concept	of	translation,	contains	both	theoretical	and	methodological	
aspects;	this	approach	thus	cannot	be	neatly	divided	into	theory	and	method.	For	instance,	
Callon	develops	the	concept	of	translation	as	an	“analytical	framework”	that	builds	on	a	
set	of	“methodological	principles”	(1986,	pp.	197,	200).	The	STS-inspired	approach	allows	
to	abandon	thinking	in	layered	realities	(e.g.	technical,	natural)	and	instead	welcomes	and	
encompasses	hybrid	characters.	It	is	specifically	suited	to	exploring	how	design	issues	are	
constructed,	design	knowledge	produced,	and	design	strategies	assembled.		
I	have	identified	my	adaptation	of	the	concept	of	translation	as	my	key	analytical	frame.	
Thus	I	make	selective	use	of	vocabulary	and	framings	introduced	by	Callon	to	organise	and	
analyse	the	empirical	material	that	I	collected,	for	instance	the	problem	formulation,	the	
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aligning	of	practitioners	and	elements,	necessary	detours,	conflicts,	deployed	devices,	the	
stabilisation	of	design	strategies	and	more.			
The	STS-inspired	approach	taken	in	this	thesis	-	like	many	others	in	the	diverse	field	of	STS	
-	is	routed	in	the	exploration	of	a	particular	case	study.	I	explore	the	design	practices	of	
City	Hall	and	its	heterogeneous	elements	through	a	mixed-method	approach	that	includes	
case	study,	semi-structured	interviews,	visual	methods	and	graphical	mapping.		
My	research	of	City	Hall	as	a	proclaimed	exemplar	of	sustainability	depends	on	a	series	of	
choices	and	decisions	made	during	the	process	of	preparation,	fieldwork,	data	analysis	and	
in	writing	up	my	findings.	Throughout	these	stages	I	had	to	go	back	and	forth	in	order	to	
reflect	on	and	adjust	to	unexpected	events	that	I	encountered.	The	particular	knowledge	
that	I	produce	depends	on	and	is	constructed	through	these	choices.	These	included	a	
broad	set	of	questions:	ontological	ones	about	the	nature	and	existence	of	the	elements	
explored,	epistemological	premises	on	how	I,	as	a	researcher	and	architect,	acquired	
knowledge	through	interaction	with	actors	and	the	data	I	gathered,	and	also	pragmatic	
questions	such	as	accessibility.		
3.2 A	mixed-method	approach	
The	worlds	that	I	explore	in	my	research	are	heterogeneous	and	not	understandable	
through	a	single	frame	of	reference.	During	the	research	process	I	therefore	decided	to	
use	different	methods	that	interlock	and	complement	one	another.	I	understand	my	
exploration	as	a	reflexive	process	of	going	back	and	forth	between	listening	(to	my	
interviewees),	reading	(design	documents,	transcripts),	beholding	(diagrams,	pictures),	
reconnecting,	interpreting,	describing,	mapping	and	writing.	
When	exploring	design	processes	it	is	difficult	to	make	simplistic	divides	between,	say,	
briefing,	designing	and	constructing	since	these	activities	partially	take	place	
simultaneously	and	reciprocally	shape	each	other.	I	explored	City	Hall’s	practices	from	its	
inception	around	1997	until	operation	in	2011,	when	I	stopped	my	fieldwork.	
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3.2.1 Case	study	of	City	Hall’s	design	practices	
		
Figure	3.1		Timeline	of	City	Hall’s	design	and	operation	process	from	1997	to	2011	and	Chapter	structure	of	this	
thesis	(Timeline:	Author,	2014)	
Note:	Black	horizontal	bars	map	the	design	processes,	red	bar	the	operation	(and	updating)	processes	and	grey	
fields	indicate	the	chapters	that	address	parts	of	these	processes.	
As	previously	explained,	my	research	explores	the	case	study	of	London	City	Hall,	which	
was	produced	by	specific	and	localised	practices	(rationale	for	the	case	selection	see	
Chapter	1).	City	Hall	was	designed	mainly	in	collaboration	between	the	Government	Office	
for	London	(GOL),	CIT	developers,	Foster+Partners	architects	and	Arup	engineers	between	
1997	and	2002.	City	Hall	was	handed	over	to	the	Greater	London	Authority	(GLA)	in	2002	
and	I	examine	its	operation	process	until	2011,	when	I	concluded	my	fieldwork	in	order	to	
write	up	my	thesis.	In	Figure	3.1	I	envision	the	timeframe	of	my	explorations	of	City	Hall’s	
design	and	operation	practices	between	1997	and	2011	as	a	temporal	process.	The	
chapter	numbers	in	which	I	explore	and	discuss	parts	of	these	processes	are	indicated	in	
the	grey	fields	in	white	text.	I	attempted	to	organise	my	chapters	around	the	emergence	
or	departure	of	groups	of	actors	(e.g.	designers	and	architects	taking	up	their	work).	
To	develop	a	better	understanding	of	the	design	practices	and	their	achievements	in	
particular,	I	also	explored	City	Hall	in	operation	–	comparing	to	what	extent	City	Hall’s	
completed	design	in	actual	operation	achieved	the	projected	environmental	performance	
targets	that	were	defined	during	design	development	to	guide	and	align	the	translation	
processes	towards	design	materialisation.		
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I	explored	the	operation	practices	in	a	similar	way	to	the	design	practices	–	by	approaching	
key	actors	to	probe	their	expertise	and	activities	in	the	project.	I	focused	on	City	Hall’s	
facility	management	team.	Initially	I	intended	to	explore	the	experiences	of	additional	GLA	
occupiers	besides	the	facility	management	team.	Due	to	time	constraints	in	the	
completion	of	this	thesis,	I	refrained	from	collecting	further	data	on	occupation	despite	
recognising	the	important	role	of	others	in	evaluating	design	activities.		
I	began	to	develop	my	account	of	City	Hall’s	design	and	operation	practices	by	looking	at	
key	events,	for	instance	the	first	draft	design	brief,	the	first	ministerial	presentation,	the	
planning	application	submission	and	others.	Most	of	these	events	were	important	stages	
in	the	architectural	plan	of	work	in	which	the	design	team	members	increasingly	drew	
together	the	diverse	elements	and,	at	least	momentarily,	stabilised	them.	I	wove	
additional	materials	into	this	emerging	account	such	as	interviews	with	project	
stakeholders,	modelling	processes,	pictures,	City	Hall	utility	bills	and	more.	
3.2.2 Semi-structured	interviews	and	informal	conversations	
Unlike	many	STS	ethnographers,	I	was	not	able	to	‘follow	actors’	at	work	through	presence	
and	observation.	Instead,	my	account	of	City	Hall’s	design	practices	crucially	relied	on	the	
experiences,	perspectives	and	retellings	of	the	client,	the	architects	and	the	engineers	that	
were	central	in	the	‘making’	(and	operating)	of	City	Hall.	I	accessed	this	information	
through	semi-structured	interviews	and	informal	conversations.	As	such	I	relied	on	and	
produced	a	selective	account	of	City	Hall.		
Within	the	mixed-method	approach,	semi-structured	interviews	and	informal	
conversations	with	participants	were	crucial	to	retrace	the	design	processes	and	to	collect	
rich	data	about	the	design	development	of	City	Hall.	Between	April	2009	and	October	2012	
I	conducted	16	interviews	in	total.	All	of	my	interviewees	participated	within	the	design	
process	of	City	Hall.	I	spoke	to	most	of	them	once,	to	some	of	them	twice	or	three	times.	
The	range	of	actors	I	interviewed	was	diverse,	coming	from	various	vocational	
backgrounds	and	differently	involved	in	the	project.	They	included	the	Minster	for	London,	
a	project	sponsor,	an	engineering	project	manager,	architects,	a	construction	manager,	a	
building	infrastructure	manager,	and	more	(see	full	Schedule	of	Interviews	in	the	
Appendices).	I	have	minimally	edited	transcripts	(indicated	through	square	brackets)	of	the	
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quoted	parts	of	my	interviews	in	order	to	maintain	actual	spoken	accounts	and	individual	
voices.		
My	questions	sought	to	explore	the	actors’	backgrounds,	their	role	in	the	design	process,	
their	statements,	their	interpretations	of	the	process,	the	diverse	elements	they	
connected,	how	design	knowledge	was	gathered	and	transformed,	how	they	navigated	
through	the	heterogeneous	possibilities	of	environmental	design,	and	their	rationale	for	
the	choices	they	made.	My	interviews	presented	me	with	the	opportunity	to	delve	into	
these	complex	processes.	It	was	sometimes	difficult	for	my	interviewees	to	retell	particular	
events	since	the	design	process	dated	back	approximately	ten	years.	Some	nuances	might	
have	been	lost	with	time	and	particular	actions	may	have	been	transformed	into	storylines	
that	seemed	more	desirable	for	them.	Where	possible	I	attempted	to	match	the	retellings	
between	different	interviewees	(and	other	materials)	in	order	to	avoid	singular	narratives.	
In	addition	to	the	semi-structured	interviews	and	informal	conversations,	I	exchanged	
many	emails	with	the	diverse	design	practitioners,	mainly	to	follow	up	on	questions	that	
only	emerged	after	meetings.		
I	began	interviews	in	August	2009.	I	contacted	Foster+Partners	and	they	arranged	a	
meeting	for	me	with	the	architect	David	Kong,	one	of	the	few	architects	still	at	the	office	
that	participated	in	City	Hall’s	development.	I	had	explained	my	research	project	to	him	by	
email	before	a	personal	meeting	that	lasted	about	two	hours.	Kong	explained	City	Hall’s	
design	process	by	PowerPoint	presentation.	He	later	dug	out	from	Foster+Partners’	
archives	several	design	documents:	a	design	statement,	the	planning	application	scheme	
and	others.	I	received	these	documents	in	hardcopy.	Aside	from	the	information	in	existing	
literature	on	City	Hall,	I	began	to	follow	and	retrace	City	Hall	through	this	initial	meeting	
with	Kong.	He	explained	to	me	who,	from	his	point	of	view,	were	the	key	participants	in	
City	Hall’s	design	processes	and	I	expanded	my	circle	of	interviewees	accordingly.	I	
contacted	the	GOL,	Arup,	More	London	and	others	to	set	up	interviews	to	expand	my	
account.	I	thereby	accumulated	more	and	more	knowledge	of	City	Hall’s	design	practices.	
By	accessing	the	worlds	of	the	architectural	design	process,	I	encountered	particular	
statements,	stories	and	arguments	in	oral,	textual,	pictorial	and	mixed	form.	This	often	led	
me	to	other	practitioners	or	entities,	sometimes	outside	Foster+Partners’	Riverside	Studio,	
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sometimes	further	back	in	history,	and	sometimes	to	matters	of	a	very	different	character	
(e.g.	kilowatt	hours	per	square	metre).	For	me,	then,	“following	the	actors”	meant	not	only	
following	practitioners	(humans),	but	also	to	follow	heterogeneous	materials	and	
understand	their	effects	as	“product	of	a	set	of	alliances”(Law,	1991,	p.	12).	
While	interviews	and	conversations	(and	design	documents)	are	language-based	and	
“discursive	strategies”	play	an	important	role,	it	is	important	to	understand	that	
architectural	design	practices	cannot	be	reduced	to	these	strategies	since	practitioners	
“interact	with	‘things’	around	them,	technologies	and	nature,	that	such	interactions	have	
constitutive	effects	on	both	people	and	things”	(Beveridge	&	Guy,	2009,	p.	72).	In	my	face-
to-face	interviews	and	conversations,	non	language-based	forms	of	communication	played	
a	significant	role	too.	Visual	materials	(e.g.	drawings,	diagrams,	photographs)	were	often	
part	of	conversations,	introduced	either	by	my	interviewees	or	me.	Their	involvement	
posed	a	challenge	for	audio	recording	and	transcribing	since	they	could	hardly	be	captured	
by	these	media	(only	conversations	about	them).	
I	drew	myself	many	different	timelines	in	an	attempt	to	understand	City	Hall’s	design	
practices	in	the	past	(see	also	Section	3.2.4).	These	timelines	depicted	my	understanding	
of	facets	of	the	design	process	as	it	was	then,	and	provided	a	basis	for	discussion	in	the	
interviews.	The	temporal	dimension	of	the	timelines	allowed	me	to	develop	a	better	
understanding	of	what	actually	happened	within	the	design	process.	My	interviewees	then	
commented	on	and	partially	drew	on	these	mappings	to	describe	the	process.	Following	
the	interviews	I	updated	the	diagrams	in	accordance	with	my	interpretation	of	the	
information	received.	These	mappings	accumulated	more	and	more	information	through	
the	increasing	number	of	interviews	I	conducted.	The	timelines	co-developed	in	and	
through	these	conversations	and	helped	to	better	understand	what	happened	when,	since	
my	retrospective	explorations	deprived	me	of	the	possibility	to	perceive	the	flow	of	time	
and	events	myself.		
3.2.3 Visual	methods		
The	architectural	domain	depends	heavily	on	the	production,	appropriation	and	circulation	
of	visual	representations	(drawings,	diagrams,	renderings,	sketches,	photos	on	paper	and	
on	screen).	According	to	Kester	Rattenbury,	they	have	moved	centre	stage	as	key	tools	in	
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decision-making	processes.	She	examined	the	mutual	relationship	of	images	and	pictures	
in	an	architectural	context:	“Architecture’s	relationship	with	its	representations	is	peculiar,	
powerful	and	absolutely	critical”	(2002,	p.	XXII).		
Today,	image	practices	are	“central	to	the	cultural	construction	of	social	life	in	
contemporary	Western	societies”	(Rose,	2007,	p.	2).	In	the	social	sciences	the	key	concern	
for	studying	images	is	not	only	that	they	construct	social	differences,	but	also	that	they	
visualise,	include	and	exclude	social	categories.	In	the	mid-1990s,	W.	J.	T.	Mitchell	(2005)	
argued	there	should	be	a	fundamental	change	in	approaching	the	relationship	of	Western	
societies	to	the	representations,	pictures	and	images	that	they	produce	and	are	
surrounded	by.	Mitchell’s	formulation	of	the	“pictorial	turn”	did	not	simply	seek	to	
endorse	the	cultural	predominance	of	the	visual.13	Rather,	he	sought	a	new	picture	theory	
that	breaks	with	the	ease	with	which	we	bring	forward	our	interpretations	of	images	and	
the	ostensible	ability	with	which	we	decode	the	ideological	agenda	behind	an	image	
narration.	For	him,	visual	representations	are	at	once	autonomous	and	constructed,	found	
and	crafted,	imitations	and	products.	Today,	picture	practices	are	rooted	in	broad	and	
interdisciplinary	contexts.	Tom	Holert	understands	their	role	as	“communication	boosters”,	
“evidence	machines”	and	“switching	devices”.	Cultural,	economic	and	scientific	processes,	
which	would	otherwise	be	incomprehensible,	are	rendered	plausible	through	pictures	
(Holert,	2000,	pp.	32-33).	Architectural	practices	are	confronted	with	the	paradox	of	
pictures	being	appropriated	as	legitimating	tools	and	having	an	independent	life	of	their	
own	beyond	truth	content.		
The	word	“image”	is	notoriously	ambiguous.	Latour	defines	an	image	as	“any	sign,	any	
work	of	art,	inscription,	or	picture	that	interacts	as	a	mediation	to	access	something	else”	
(2002,	p.	16).	An	image	can	denote	both	a	physical	object	(a	printed	photograph	or	a	
painting)	and	a	mental,	imaginary,	psychological	entity.	Mitchell	describes	the	picture	
image	relationship	as	“the	picture	as	a	concretely	embodied	object	or	assemblage,	and	the	
image	as	a	disembodied	motif,	a	phantom	that	circulates	from	one	picture	to	another	and	
																																								 																
13	W.	J.	T.	Mitchell	questions	the	predominant	influence	of	the	‘linguistic	turn’,	under	which	the	arts,	media	and	
other	cultural	forms	are	largely	interpreted	by	linguistic,	semiotic,	rhetoric	and	other	models	of	textuality	(Mitchell,	
1994,	p.	12).	Instead	he	argues	for	the	importance	of	a	‘pictorial	turn’	as	an	independent	picture	theory.	
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across	media”	(p.	72).	Correspondingly,	Wittgenstein	pointed	out	that	“an	image	is	not	a	
picture,	but	a	picture	can	respond	to	it”	(in	Mitchell,	2005,	p.	84).	
Pictures	deployed	in	architectural	design	processes	(e.g.	collages,	renderings)	are	peculiar,	
paradoxical	creatures.	They	are	amalgamations	that	(might)	reflect	specific	myths,	facts	
and	discourses.	To	explore	how	these	pictures	engage	in	perception	processes	and	
produce	meaning,	it	seems	crucial	to	attempt	to	shed	some	light	on	the	mutual	tie	of	the	
picture	itself,	the	picture	producer,	the	beholder,	the	real	thing	that	is	the	built	
environment	and	its	surrounding	discourses.	To	question	the	picture-beholder	relationship	
we	have	to	acknowledge	that	the	image	consists	of	multiple	sites	or	scales.	Gillian	Rose	
emphasises	that	images	have	multiple	sites	and	modalities.	To	explore	visual	images	she	
suggests	that	there	are	(at	least)	three	sites	through	which	the	meaning	of	an	image	is	
coproduced:	“the	site	of	the	production”,	“the	site	of	the	image”	and	“the	site	of	the	
audience”	(Rose,	2007,	pp.	6-13).	
Pictures	are	evocative	formats	and	therefore	have	the	potential	to	evoke	awareness;	the	
visualisations	of	architectural	projects	are	strategic	sites	to	address	and	negotiate	the	
challenges	of	the	‘environmental	crisis’.	In	my	research,	the	function	of	images	is	not	
simply	to	illustrate	what	has	been	said	about	them,	but	to	be	used	as	independent	sources	
of	information.	I	look	at	pictures	not	through	the	interpretative	statements	that	have	been	
made	about	them,	but	rather	I	match	pictures,	documents	(interpretative	statements)	and	
conversations	against	each	other.	The	aim	is	to	examine	statements	and	pictures	in	
relation	to	each	other,	as	well	as	to	understand	how	pictures	are	or	were	produced	
through	many	stages	of	inscription	of	the	design	process.	
3.2.4 	Mapping	facets	of	the	design	process	
In	addition	to	the	drawings,	diagrams	and	pictures	produced	within	the	design	processes	
of	my	case	study,	I	also	produced	drawing	in	an	attempt	to	map	facets	of	the	design	(and	
operation)	process.	Based	on	my	experiences	as	an	architect,	I	am	interested	to	test	
drawing	as	a	tool	for	this	research.	These	mappings	are	partially	conceived	as	timelines	
that	draw	together	multiple	elements	to	explore	temporal	processes,	which	are	
characterised	by	particular	events.	These	include,	for	instance,	the	presence	and	absence	
of	actors	in	the	design	process	and	the	related	potential	to	exercise	power;	other	
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mappings	depict	how	the	building	process	drew	together	different	geographic	scales	
through	associations;	others	map	various	material	flows	(e.g.	gas	consumption).		
The	mappings	helped	me	to	develop	my	understanding	of	the	design	process	and	the	
timelines	were	particularly	crucial	tools	in	the	attempt	to	reconstruct	past	design	practices.	
I	discussed	some	of	them	(especially	timelines)	with	interviewees,	which	significantly	
helped	with	their	development.	My	mappings	also	served	as	alternative	ways	of	
understanding	the	design	and	operation	process.	Generally,	the	pictures	circulated	by	the	
designers	legitimise	and	promote	the	project.	An	architectural	project	is	always	complex,	
and	what	is	missing	from	the	neat	published	representations	is	an	impression	of	the	many	
controversies	and	struggles	that	emerge	during	the	design	process.	Through	juxtaposition	I	
attempted	to	explore	how	my	mappings	differed	from	the	“official”	drawings	produced	by	
my	actors.	They	emerged	as	alternative,	not	necessarily	congruent,	accounts.	I	aimed	to	
open	up	differences	for	discussion,	to	uncover	controversies,	and	to	search	for	potential	
alternative	routes	the	design	process	could	have	taken.	My	approach	of	drawing	processes,	
heterogeneous	elements,	events	and	actors	together	on	a	single	sheet	of	paper	was	one	
way	of	seeking	to	understand	their	entanglements	and	types	of	connection.	
3.3 Experience	of	doing	the	research	
Given	my	personal	experiences	in	architectural	practice,	I	am	familiar	with	particular	
routines,	approaches	and	instruments,	although	they	vary	between	individual	practices.	In	
part,	this	is	an	advantage	in	attempting	to	understand	relationships,	issues	and	processes.	
But	this	familiarity	might	at	some	point	have	hindered	my	exploration	since	I	did	not	
interrogate	associations	that	a	non-architect	perhaps	would	have.	I	found	the	interviews	
with	non-architects	–	especially	engineers	—	most	inspiring	since	they	opened	access	to	an	
alterative	perspective	on	architectural	design	practices.		
I	am	interested	in	questions	of	how	architectural	design	is	associated	with	politics.	This	
relationship	became	in	part	evident	to	me	through	negotiating	fieldwork	access.	I	started	
my	PhD	in	October	2006.	In	October	2008	I	began	my	fieldwork	on	the	case	of	Battersea	
Power	Station	that	set	out	to	become	a	zero-carbon	(re-)development,	initiated	by	
Treasury	Holdings	and	Rafael	Vinoly	Architects.	This	project	promised	to	be	an	interesting	
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case	in	its	environmental	design	ambitions.	I	began	my	explorations	of	this	case	through	a	
six-month	participant-observation	period	in	the	architect’s	office	on	site.	During	this	time	
the	project	encountered	increasing	economic	and	political	difficulties	and	the	initial	
environmental	agenda	was	consequently	dropped.	I	underestimated	the	political	
sensitivity	of	being	involved	in	a	live	project,	especially	regarding	access	to	sensitive	
information	in	meetings	and	design	documents.	I	therefore	lost	the	support	of	the	
developers	in	my	role	as	an	observer	of	the	ongoing	design	process.	I	was	increasingly	seen	
as	an	intruder	and	potential	threat	to	the	multimillion-pound	project.	Access	to	
information	became	more	and	more	restricted	and	the	developer	did	not	want	me	to	
write	about	the	difficulties.	As	I	was	forced	out	of	the	participant	role,	I	gave	up	on	the	
case	after	six	months.	I	learned	a	valuable	lesson	in	confidentiality:	that	it	seemed	easier	
to	gain	access	and	critical	perspectives	when	projects	were	completed	or	actors	were	not	
involved	anymore.	This	experience	also	informed	my	choice	of	City	Hall	as	a	research	case.	
I	started	my	fieldwork	on	London’s	City	Hall	in	May	2009	with	the	aim	of	giving	a	detailed	
description	of	how	environmental	design	approaches	were	conceived,	negotiated	and	
implemented	within	the	actor	networks.	To	retrospectively	trace	the	multiple	narrations	of	
the	design	process	that	brought	London’s	City	Hall	into	being	is	a	difficult	enterprise	since	
the	beginning	of	that	process	dates	back	13	years.	Project	files	were	archived	or	have	
vanished,	and	some	actors	have	left	the	country.	Around	1999,	communications	between	
stakeholders	on	the	project	gradually	switched	from	fax	to	email,	which	made	the	archival	
search	more	difficult	than	it	had	been	on	account	of	the	diverse	formats	of	documents.	
In	January	2011	I	expanded	my	fieldwork	to	include	a	supplementary	case	study	on	the	
recent	PricewaterhouseCoopers	(PwC)	headquarters	next	to	City	Hall	and	part	of	the	same	
More	London	masterplan.	While	City	Hall	was	the	first	building	of	the	More	London	
masterplan,	the	PwC	building	was	the	final	building	developed	between	2007	and	2011.	
PwC	promoted	their	project	as	the	“greenest	building	in	the	capital”	(PwC,	2011,	p.	2)	and	
it	was	the	first	major	office	building	in	the	UK	to	achieve	the	highest	Building	Research	
Establishment	Environmental	Assessment	Method	(BREEAM)	rating	of	“outstanding”.	In	
the	process	of	editing	this	thesis,	I	realised	that	a	lot	of	additional	work	and	(re-)editing	
would	be	necessary	to	develop	my	analysis	of	the	PwC	case	into	an	in-depth	comparison	
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with	the	City	Hall	case.	I	consequently	decided	not	to	use	the	PwC	case	material	gathered	
for	this	thesis.	
3.4 Conclusions	
My	mixed-method	approach	presented	a	series	of	choices.	From	my	research	I	provide	just	
one	possible	representation	of	City	Hall’s	heterogeneous	design	practices	out	of	numerous	
possible	ones.	It	was	impossible	to	develop	a	singular,	neat	and	unequivocal	account	of	
how	City	Hall’s	design	practices	were	produced.	Rather,	the	design	processes	were	
ongoing	and	assembled	through	multiple	actors	and	elements.	I	was	thus	confronted	with	
different	and	not	necessarily	consistent	perspectives	on	City	Hall’s	decision-making	
processes	and	development	trajectories,	depending	on	the	particular	vantage	points	of	
actors	interviewed.	Each	particular	account	brought	to	life	in	my	explorations	and	writing	
necessitated	the	exclusion	of	other	possible	accounts	(Law,	2004).	
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Chapter	4 	
Drafting	design	briefs		
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4.1 Introduction		
In	this	chapter	I	begin	to	open	the	black	box	of	City	Hall’s	design	practices.	I	then	describe	
City	Hall’s	design	process	in	Chapters	5	and	6,	and	in	Chapter	7	I	describe	its	operation	
process.		
I	start	to	retrace	the	practices	that	brought	City	Hall	into	being	before	the	architects,	
Foster+Partners	-	the	actors	‘typically’	called	designers	-	entered	the	design	process.	In	my	
account	City	Hall’s	design	process	began	when	the	Greater	London	Authority	(GLA)	was	
conceived	and	its	functions	outlined.	My	explorations	of	this	process	begin	around	1997	
with	the	introduction	of	Nick	Raynsford	as	one	of	the	key	actors	entrusted	by	government	
with	responsibility	for	establishing	and	housing	the	GLA.		
I	explain	Raynsford’s	task	by	outlining	the	circumstances	that	led	to	the	reintroduction	of	a	
new	form	of	London-wide	government.	The	body	of	this	chapter	retraces	the	contingent	
practices	around	his	establishing	the	GLA,	and	how	an	increasing	number	of	
heterogeneous	elements	became	associated	in	this	mission	–	that	is	to	say,	how	new	
actors	joined	his	team	and	collaborated	in	legislating	for	the	establishment	of	the	GLA,	
then	to	introduce	a	unique	type	of	procurement	process,	and	finally	to	draft	a	number	of	
design	briefs	to	guide	and	align	the	developers,	architects,	engineers	and	others	in	their	
design	proposals.	I	retell	this	process	by	chronologically	examining	the	documents	that	
were	instrumental	in	bringing	the	GLA	and	City	Hall	into	being.	Into	this,	I	weave	material	
from	my	interviews	with	actors	who	took	part	in	this	process.	
The	objective	of	this	chapter	is	to	explore	how	the	environmental	challenge	was	set	out	at	
the	beginning	of	the	project,	and	how	particular	targets	and	goals	were	formulated	to	
instruct	the	architects,	engineers	and	developers	in	making	their	design	proposals.	
This	chapter	finishes	by	retracing	the	design	process	after	the	first	three	design	briefs	were	
drafted	and	several	design	collectives	comprising	developers,	architects	and	engineers	
entered	the	design	stage	to	take	up	their	work.	
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4.2 Envisioning	and	outlining	the	new	Greater	London	Authority	(GLA)	
4.2.1 The	London	power	vacuum,	1986-2000	
Before	Raynsford	began	setting	up	the	GLA,	London	had	been	experienced	a	power	gap	in	
local	authority	governance	for	14	years.	The	first	London-wide	government	was	
established	in	1888	to	deal	with	the	various	challenges	of	a	rapidly	growing	but	socially	
polarised	metropolis	(Gordon	&	Travers,	2010,	p.	50).	This	government	institution	went	
through	several	reforms,	reorganisations	and	renamings,	but	it	existed	for	almost	100	
years.	In	the	1980s,	during	the	economic	recession,	a	newly	radicalised	Greater	London	
Council	(GLC),	led	by	Ken	Livingstone,	directly	challenged	the	economic	liberalism	of	Prime	
Minister	Margaret	Thatcher’s	national	government.	The	two	political	institutions	were	
located	on	opposite	sides	of	the	River	Thames:	on	one	bank,	the	national	Conservative-led	
government	in	the	Houses	of	Parliament	and,	on	the	other,	the	London	Labour-led	
government	in	County	Hall.	This	spatial	divide	between	parliament	and	County	Hall	was	
increasingly	matched	politically	as	there	were	ever	sharper	conflicts	between	the	two	
institutions.	In	Thatcher’s	eyes	the	activities	that	took	place	in	County	Hall	were	a	
challenge	to	parliament	and	national	government.	According	to	Ian	Gordon	and	Tony	
Travers,	it	was	the	GLC’s	political	activism	challenging	central	politics	which	led	the	
Thatcher	government	to	respond	by	abolishing	the	GLC	in	1986	(2010,	p.	51).14	As	a	
consequence,	most	of	the	22,000-strong	workforce	was	made	redundant	and	London	
County	Hall	was	abandoned	as	the	domicile	of	the	former	London-wide	government	
(Figure	4.1).	In	1993	the	Conservative	government	sold	County	Hall	to	a	Japanese	
entertainment	company.	For	the	next	14	years	London	had	no	London-wide	government;	
there	was	a	“power	vacuum	in	the	city”	(Gordon	&	Travers,	2010,	p.	49).	Andy	Thornley	
characterises	these	years	as	a	phase	of	institutional	“fragmentation,	centralisation	and	
weakening	of	local	democracy”	(1998,	p.	163).	
																																								 																
14	Together	with	the	GLC	the	Thatcher	government	abolished	all	its	counterparts	in	other	English	cities.	
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Figure	4.1		Former	London	County	Hall	domicile	of	the	Greater	London	Council	(built	between	1911	and	1939,	
Photograph:	Author,	2010)	
The	roles	and	responsibilities	of	the	abolished	GLC	were	redirected	to	either	the	boroughs	
or	to	central	government,	but	many	required	setting	up	special	ad	hoc	organisations	–	for	
example,	the	London	Planning	Advisory	Committee	and	London	Regional	Transport.15	The	
inadequacy	of	the	interregnum	arrangements	became	more	and	more	obvious	and	there	
was	a	rash	of	new	organisations	in	the	1990s.16	However,	both	government	and	the	
private	sector	seemed	to	realise	that	some	kind	of	London-wide	government	approach	
was	needed	to	coordinate	the	various	agencies	and	actors,	and	to	create	effective	
governance	for	a	competitive	world	city	(Thornley,	1998,	pp.	176-178).		
Bringing	back	the	London-wide	government	consequently	raised	the	question	of	where	
and	how	to	house	the	mayor	and	his	or	her	assembly.	It	was	in	part	because	of	the	London	
power	vacuum	that	a	new	city	hall	needed	to	be	founded.	Raynsford	was	endowed	by	the	
newly-elected	Labour	government	with	responsibility	for	the	introduction	and	
accommodation	of	GLA.		
4.2.2 	Nick	Raynsford:	the	real	‘architect’	
The	real	‘architect’	behind	the	scheme	was	Nick	Raynsford,	the	minister	
responsible	for	the	project.	It	was	his	briefing	and	his	desire	to	create	a	landmark	
building	that	inspired	us	to	produce	a	structure	unlike	any	other	(Shuttleworth	in	
Detail,	2002,	p.	1091).	
																																								 																
15	These	were	either	joint	boards	with	representatives	from	all	the	boroughs	or	organisations	appointed	by	central	
government.	
16	For	instance,	the	Government	Office	for	London	(GOL),	London	First,	London	Pride	Partnership,	etc.		
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Ken	Shuttleworth	was	the	partner	at	Foster+Partners’	design	practice	with	responsibility	
for	developing	the	design	of	the	GLA	building.	He	attributes	much	credit	to	Nick	
Raynsford’s	role	and	I	begin	developing	my	account	of	City	Hall’s	design	practices	by	
exploring	Raynsford’s	role	as	commissioner	of	the	headquarters	for	the	new	GLA.	
Shuttleworth’s	statement	above	endorses	the	point	of	view	that	this	process	starts	before	
architects	actually	enter	the	design	stage.	Crucially,	the	design	briefing	entails	many	
heterogeneous	elements	that	co-shape	architectural	design	in	its	form	and	materialisation	
(e.g.	spatial	requirements,	schedule,	cost	and	appearance).	This	chapter	identifies	key	
elements	that	informed	the	design	briefing	in	order	to	analyse	how	the	briefing	
constructed	the	environmental	challenge	as	an	issue	for	design	at	the	outset,	and	how	it	
formulated	related	goals	and	targets.	I	begin	my	account	by	retracing	what	Raynsford	and	
his	colleagues	did	in	order	to	draw	up	the	design	briefs	for	City	Hall.	(Raynsford	did	not	
develop	the	briefing	detached	from	contexts,	but	was	entangled	in	many	associations	that	
were	continuously	in	motion	and	reshaped	his	activities).	
A	standard	account	of	Raynsford	would	begin	with:	Nick	Raynsford	was	born	in	1945.	He	
received	a	MA	in	history	from	Cambridge	University.	Rather	surprisingly,	for	a	politician,	he	
also	studied	fine	arts	at	Chelsea	School	of	Art	and	Design	between	1968	and	1971	and	
received	a	diploma.	Before	Raynsford	entered	government	he	had	several	roles	in	the	
building	industry	and	public	sector.17	In	1992	he	became	elected	Member	of	Parliament	
for	Greenwich,	and	in	1994	was	appointed	Shadow	Minister	for	Housing	and	Construction.	
He	joined	the	government	when	Labour	came	to	power	in	1997	and	was	appointed	to	the	
Department	of	the	Environment,	Transport	and	the	Regions	(DETR),	first	as	Parliamentary	
Under-Secretary	of	State	(1997-1999)	and	was	later	promoted	to	Minister	of	State	for	
Housing	and	Planning	(1999-2001).	Between	2001	and	2002	he	was	Minister	in	the	newly-
created	Department	for	Transport,	Local	Government	and	the	Regions	(DTLR).18	In	these	
roles	he	had	wide-ranging	responsibilities,	for	instance	in	UK	Building	Regulations,	
																																								 																
17	From	1971	to	1975	Raynsford	served	as	a	councillor	in	the	borough	of	Hammersmith	and	Fulham;	from	1976	to	
1986	he	was	Director	of	SHAC	(the	Shelter	Housing	Aid	Centre);	and	between	1987	and	1992	he	was	Director	of	
Raynsford	&	Morris	Housing	Consultants.	
18	Retrieved	1	July	2014	from	http://www.parliament.uk/biographies/commons/mr-nick-raynsford/171	
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including	Part	L	on	the	conservation	of	fuel	and	power.	While	the	above	information	helps	
to	give	context	to	Raynsford	I	shift	attention	to	the	pragmatic	content	of	his	actions.	
I	met	Nick	Raynsford	in	September	2010	in	his	office	at	Portcullis	House	next	to	the	Palace	
of	Westminster.	I	asked	him	to	explain	to	me	the	process	that	brought	the	GLA	and	its	
domicile	into	being,	and	his	role	in	it.	He	answered:	
I	was	appointed	Minister	for	London	in	May	1997	when	Labour	came	into	
government	and	we	had	an	electoral	commitment,	a	manifesto	commitment,	to	
restore	city-wide	government	to	London.	Prime	Minister	Tony	Blair	was	very	keen	
that	this	should	involve	the	creation	of	a	directly-elected	mayor	and	that	was	the	
brief	that	I	was	given	to	oversee	the	introduction	of	the	new	arrangements	
(Interview	Raynsford,	2010).	
Having	won	the	election	in	May	1997,	the	Labour	government	was	determined	to	enter	
the	new	millennium	with	a	renewed	and	innovative	London-wide	government	structure,	
which	had	been	one	of	their	central	election	pledges,	and	which	came	along	with	the	
pledge	to	put	“concern	for	the	environment	at	the	heart	of	policy-making”	(Labour	Party,	
1996,	p.	4).	Appointed	Minister	for	London,	Nick	Raynsford	was	tasked	with	the	
establishment	of	the	GLA.	As	part	of	this	process,	before	Raynsford	and	his	team	were	able	
to	draft	the	design	briefing	for	the	headquarters	to	come,	he	had	to	outline,	consult	and	
pass	(stabilise)	the	functioning,	responsibilities	and	housing	of	the	new	authority,	as	well	
as	set	up	legislation	to	bring	the	GLA	into	being.	Not	much	was	known	at	that	time	about	
the	anticipated	new	building:	“a	little-known,	abstract	and	fuzzy	entity”	that	began	to	
accumulate	more	and	more	well-known	characteristics	(Yaneva,	2009,	p.	21).		
Architecture’s	being	is	necessarily	heterogeneous,	and	this	process	began	to	increasingly	
draw	together	a	vast	set	of	heterogeneous	elements.	From	early	on	Raynsford	seemed	to	
be	keen	that	the	project	would	become	seen	“by	posterity	as	a	symbol	of	what	we	tried	to	
achieve	around	that	period,	the	early	years	of	the	labour	government”	(Interview	
Raynsford,	2010).	It	was	his	role	to	mobilise	these	heterogeneities	–	Raynsford	was	a	key	
translator.	The	headquarters	to	come	was	also,	in	turn,	intended	to	exemplify	an	
ambitious	environmental	agenda:	
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I	was	very	conscious	of	the	importance	of	the	new	building	to	be	a	statement	about	
the	new	authority	including	its	commitment	to	environmentally	progressive	
objectives,	the	principles	of	sustainability	(Interview	Raynsford,	2010).	
Consequently,	the	definition	of	the	GLA’s	environmental	responsibilities,	the	setup	process	
of	the	GLA,	and	the	(later)	design	briefing	to	instruct	developers,	architects,	and	engineers	
of	the	new	headquarters,	required	a	form	of	alignment	despite	these	elements	having	
different	forms	and	playing	different	roles	in	the	emergence	of	the	GLA	building.	
These	activities	were	not	started	in	a	vacuum;	rather,	Raynsford’s	practices	were	
embedded	and	shaped	through	specific	contexts.	In	Figure	4.2,	in	an	attempt	to	
understand	the	many	heterogeneous	actors,	activities	and	events	that	were	central	in	
bringing	City	Hall	into	being,	I	have	created	a	series	of	timelines	in	which	I	map	selected	
elements	in	temporal	sequence	from	1985	to	2012	in	relation	to	City	Hall’s	design	
practices	(1997	to	2002).	This	allowed	me	to	develop	an	understanding	of	the	timing	of	
particular	activities,	and	to	inquire	whether	they	could	have	impacted	on	subsequent	
practices.	These	diverse	elements	included	environmental	conferences	(e.g.	the	1992	UN	
Earth	Summit,	the	founding	of	key	influential	policy	institutions	(e.g.1988	the	IPCC),	the	
release	of	key	environmental	reports	(e.g.	1987	Our	Common	Future	by	the	Brundtland	
commission),	international	treaties	(e.g.	1997	the	Kyoto	Protocol),	UK	governments	in	
power	(e.g.	1997	Labour	Government),	the	release	and	update	of	national	Building	
Regulations	(e.g.	1995	Part	L),	the	introduction	and	updates	of	BREEAM	(e.g.	1998	
BREEAM	for	offices),	government	announcements	(e.g.	1997	plan	to	bring	back	elected	
major	and	assembly),	the	emergence	and	abolition	of	London-wide	Governments,	their	
related	domiciles	and	others.	These	timelines	served	as	the	basis	for	discussion	and	
communication	tools	during	my	interviews	and	conversations.	
Five	years	before	Raynsford	was	tasked	with	the	development	of	the	GLA,	and	on	a	
supranational	scale,	the	1992	Earth	Summit	(UN	Conference	on	Environment	and	
Development,	UNCED)	in	Rio	de	Janeiro	was	a	key	event	“to	reshape	the	thematic	
landscape	around	the	planet”	(Beck,	1999,	p.	25).	In	many	studies	on	environmental	
politics	it	has	been	recognised	as	the	marking	“moment	in	which	the	awareness	of	global	
dimension	of	the	ecological	crises	was	‘finally’	accepted	and	confronted	politically	around	
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the	world”	(Hajer	&	Fischer,	1999,	p.	1).	The	conference’s	Rio	Declaration	on	Environment	
and	Development	set	out	27	principles	of	sustainable	development.	
In	response	to	the	call	made	at	Earth	Summit,	the	UK	Conservative	government	under	
John	Major	became	one	of	the	first	countries	to	produce	a	national	sustainable	
development	strategy	document	(DOE,	1994).	It	declares	the	government’s	commitment	
to	the	goals	of	sustainable	development	and	attempts	to	define	a	future	agenda	related	to	
it.	In	the	foreword,	then	Prime	Minister	Major	stated,	“Sustainable	development	is	hard	to	
define.	But	the	goal	of	sustainable	development	can	guide	future	policy.	Making	the	
choices	necessary	to	deliver	sustainable	development	requires	a	national	and	international	
debate.	This	strategy	is	the	starting	point	for	that	debate”	(DOE,	1994).	
At	about	the	time	when	Raynsford	prepared	to	set	up	the	GLA,	numerous	global	
representatives	met	in	New	York	City	for	the	Rio+5	conference	in	June	1997.	As	the	
Parliamentary	Under-Secretary	of	state	responsible	for	environment,	Raynsford	
presumably	took	notice	of	this	conference	and	its	central	messages.	The	conference	was	
intended	to	check	the	progress	that	had	been	made	since	the	commitments	made	at	the	
initial	Earth	Summit	in	1992.	Above	all,	the	Rio+5	conference	was	a	“wake	up	call.	It	
offered	a	very	disturbing	finding	–	none	of	the	important	commitments	made	in	Rio	were	
kept”	(Hajer	&	Fischer,	1999,	p.	1).	Of	potential	significance	to	Raynsford,	the	Rio+5	
conference	was	a	warning	that	the	enactment	of	concepts	presents	a	massive	challenge.		
These	perspectives	above	have	helped	me	to	gain	knowledge	of	environmental	
policymaking	around	1997,	but	to	in	order	to	develop	my	account	of	City	Hall’s	design	
practices	I	have	chosen	to	‘follow’	my	interviewees	and	the	design	documents	central	to	
that	development	process.	I	shift	attention	to	“prioritizing	the	pragmatic	content	of	
actions”	(Yaneva,	2009,	p.	197).	I	thereby	consider	the	practices	that	shape	the	design	
briefing	as	a	form	of	design,	as	the	practices	of	architects,	engineers	and	others.	My	aim	
was	to	let	my	design	protagonists	and	key	documents	to	bring	in	heterogeneous	elements	
and	construct	associations.	During	the	course	of	my	fieldwork	and	analysis,	I	then	
attempted	to	examine	the	role	of	these	associations	in	more	detail.	
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Figure	4.2		Timeline	from	1985	to	2012	of	key	events	on	supranational,	EU,	UK,	London	and	building	scale	around	
the	design	practices	of	City	Hall	(1997-2002)	(Timeline:	Author,	2014)	
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In	order	to	emphasise	and	draw	attention	to	these	different	approaches	in	constructing	
‘contexts’	and	associations,	I	mapped	in	black	and	white	elements	that	I	brought	into	the	
‘storyline’	of	my	timeline	(Figure	4.2)	and	which	were	not	associated	via	the	actors	I	
‘followed’.	Some	of	these	elements	were,	for	instance,	the	release	of	the	Brundtland	
report	(1987)	and	the	Second	Assessment	Report	(1995)	on	climate	change	by	the	IPCC,	
both	of	which	I	consider	to	be	important	events	in	environmental	politics.	I	did	not	
develop	my	account	through	these	(un-associated)	elements.	Nevertheless	I	mapped	them	
in	black	and	white	as	‘alternative	possible	constructions’	of	histories.	
In	Figure	4.2	the	heterogeneous	elements	that	Raynsford,	other	key	actors	or	key	
documents	associated	with	City	Hall’s	development	are	mapped	in	red.	For	instance,	
Raynsford	mentioned	the	Labour	Party’s	election	manifesto	(1996),	the	election	of	the	
Labour	Party	in	May	1997,	the	former	London	City	Hall	(sold	1993)	and	two	government	
papers	(DETR,	1997,	1998b)	that	were	central	to	outline	the	role,	function	and	
accommodation	of	then	emerging	Greater	London	Authority.	I	mapped	these	elements	in	
the	timeline	that	spans	from	1985	and	2012	(left	to	right).19	
4.2.3 Outlining	the	design	requirements	of	the	GLA	headquarters		
4.2.3.1 Green	Paper:	New	Leadership	for	London	(Jul	1997)		
In	July	1997	Minister	Nick	Raynsford	and	his	colleagues	at	the	DETR	started	a	consultation	
(green)	paper	entitled	New	Leadership	for	London	(DETR,	1997)	to	set	out	the	fundamental	
thinking	on	how	the	new	authority	would	work	(Interview	Raynsford,	2010).	This	paper	
was	one	of	the	central	documents	in	the	process	of	design	knowledge	accumulation	that	
led	Raynsford	and	his	team	to	the	first	design	briefing	documents	of	the	GLA	headquarters’	
requirements	in	August	1998.		
																																								 																
19	Vertically	the	timeline	draws	together	a	mix	of	different	political	and	spatial	scales	represented	through	six	
horizontal	fields:	the	black	on	top	indicates	the	environment	‘out	there’	(which	in	itself	is	not	accurately	
representable,	see	Chapter	2).	Below	are	the	supranational,	European,	UK	and	London	scales	for	key	environmental	
policies,	treaties,	conferences	and	events.	The	horizontal	field	towards	the	bottom	shows	the	buildings	of	the	
London-wide	Governments	at	the	present	time.	This	graphical	representation	does	not	suggest	to	understand	the	
world	as	layered	in	different	scales.	It	was	a	particular	choice	of	representation,	convenient	to	develop	my	account	
during	my	fieldwork.			
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The	purpose	of	this	Green	Paper	was	to	“discuss	the	roles	of	the	mayor	and	assembly	and	
explain	the	relationship	between	them”,	to	“look	at	alternative	electoral	arrangements,	
the	functions	of	the	new	authority	and	how	it	can	be	financed”	(DETR,	1997,	p.	3).	With	
regard	to	particular	proposals,	the	paper	explicitly	set	out	specific	questions	and	invited	
comments	as	part	of	the	consultation	process.		
The	key	proposals	were	that	there	should	be	a	small	streamlined	authority	with	a	directly-
elected	mayor	and	a	small	assembly	of	24	to	32	members	for	overview	and	scrutiny,	both	
elected	by	proportional	representation	in	all	the	London	boroughs.	The	mayor	would	be	
the	executive,	whose	power	would	be	concentrated	on	strategic	matters	that	needed	to	
be	dealt	with	on	a	London-wide	level.	The	paper	set	out	ten	key	criteria	to	define	the	
terms	of	the	debate	and	to	frame	responses.	The	GLA	should	be:	strategic,	democratic,	
inclusive,	effective,	small,	audible,	consensual,	clear	about	its	role,	efficient	and	influential	
(1997,	p.	3).	
The	Green	Paper	did	not	directly	address	the	question	of	how	to	house	the	new	authority,	
but	proposed	a	set	of	heterogeneous	elements	that	began	to	shape	the	anticipated	design	
process	of	the	GLA	headquarters.	Four	elements	are	important.	Firstly,	the	paper	began	to	
determine	the	financial	budget	available	for	bringing	the	GLA	into	being:	
The	Government’s	overriding	priority	is	the	control	of	public	expenditure	within	the	
planned	totals.	The	arrangements	for	the	GLA	will	need	to	support	this	priority.	[…]	
Any	additional	spending	in	setting	up	the	GLA	would	need	to	be	offset	by	savings	
(p.	39).		
The	proposal	of	restricted	expenditure	had	significant	consequences	for	the	later	
procurement	process	in	search	of	GLA	accommodation.	Secondly,	the	paper	began	to	
outline	the	spatial	requirements	by	considering	the	number	of	expected	occupants.	The	
numbers	remained	vague:	the	mayor,	an	assembly	of	24	to	32	members	and	a	small	but	
unspecified	number	of	staff.	Third,	the	paper	attempted	to	assign	some	powerful	
characteristics	to	the	new	authority:	“We	wish	to	create	a	new	model	of	government,	
appropriate	to	a	great	capital	city	in	the	new	Millennium”	(p.	2).	Fourth,	the	paper	
assigned	a	wide	range	of	functional	responsibilities	to	the	GLA.	The	overarching	function	
was	unequivocally	defined	as	such:		
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The	functions	we	are	proposing	to	give	the	GLA	all	come	under	the	general	heading	
of	sustainable	development	–	giving	all	Londoners	an	improved	and	lasting	quality	
of	life,	combining	environmental,	economic	and	social	goals	(p.	17).	
Raynsford,	and	probably	others	in	the	Labour	government,	were	keen	to	have	the	
anticipated	headquarters	represent	both	the	“new	model	of	government”	(p.	2)	and	“its	
commitment	to	environmentally	progressive	objectives,	the	principles	of	sustainability”.	
The	emerging	GLA	headquarters	was	intended	to	be	perceived	as	an	architectural	“symbol”	
and	“statement”	(Interview	Raynsford,	2010).	These	characteristics	that	were	later	
ascribed	had	to	be	translated	into	the	design	briefing	and	building	design.	The	Green	Paper	
touches	on	the	question	of	representation,	without	further	elaborating	what	
consequences	it	could	have	for	the	GLA	home	to	come.	
The	four	elements	described	above	associated	heterogeneous	elements:	they	pointed	
towards	a	specific	model	of	financing	(public-private	partnership),	towards	an	emerging	
space	allocation	plan	(square	metres	and	functions),	and	towards	particular	desired	forms	
of	anticipated	perceptions	of	the	building.	
Raynsford	intention	was	to	use	the	headquarters	as	a	device	to	represent	the	
achievements	of	the	government.	This	was	as	old	as	the	emergence	of	government	
buildings	and	city	halls	as	distinct	building	types;	they	usually	had	the	function	of	
communicating	by	architectural	means	particular	world	views	and	characteristics	of	the	
organisations	that	commissioned	them	(Pevsner,	1976,	pp.	27-62).	It	later	became	the	task	
of	the	More	London	design	team	to	translate	the	idea	of	being	a	small,	dynamic,	and	
“sustainable”	institution	into	a	building	design	that	reflects	and	communicates	these	
activities.	The	question	of	how	this	emerging	agenda	be	translated	into	physical	
appearance	was	a	highly	contested	activity,	which	I	will	return	to	in	Chapters	5	and	6.		
The	Green	Paper	also	set	out	the	next	steps	to	follow.	After	the	end	of	the	consultation	
period	in	October	1997,	views	were	drawn	together	to	prepare	a	White	Paper,	which	set	
out	detailed	arrangements	for	the	new	authority.	Londoners	were	given	the	opportunity	in	
a	referendum	on	7	May	1998	to	decide	whether	they	wanted	a	GLA,	following	the	Greater	
London	(Referendum)	Authority	Act	1998	(Houses	of	Parliament,	1998).	
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4.2.3.2 Commissioning	a	building	on	behalf	of	the	new	authority	
Meanwhile	Raynsford	and	his	colleagues	at	the	DETR	had	to	decide	whether	they	would	
take	steps	in	government	to	provide	a	new	building	for	the	new	authority	or	whether,	as	in	
Scotland	and	Wales,	that	decision	should	be	left	to	the	new	body	when	it	was	created.	
Because	the	GLA	was	a	small	and	strategic	authority,	they	concluded	that	it	would	not	be	
an	appropriate	burden	for	the	emerging	GLA	to	commission	and	procure	a	new	
headquarters	building,	which	would	be	a	very	time-consuming	responsibility,	and	that	it	
would	probably	be	sensible	for	the	UK	government	to	commission	a	building	on	behalf	of	
the	new	authority	(Interview	Raynsford,	2010).	
Raynsford	explained	three	other	factors	that	informed	the	decision	to	search	for	a	new	
domicile	for	the	GLA:	
First,	County	Hall,	the	old	GLC	headquarters,	was	no	longer	available;	some	people	
suggested	that	the	government	ought	to	reacquire	the	building,	but	this	was	not	a	feasible	
option	for	financial	reasons.	In	addition,	County	Hall	was	much	larger	(the	GLC	had	
approximately	10,000	employees)	than	it	was	needed	for	the	GLA.		
The	second	argument	concerned	the	perception	of	the	anticipated	new	headquarters.	
Raynsford	emphasised		
the	importance	of	the	new	building	to	be	a	statement	about	the	new	authority	
including	its	commitment	to	environmentally	progressive	objectives,	the	principles	
of	sustainability	(Interview	Raynsford,	2010).	
To	perceive	London	County	Hall	(Figure	4.1)	as	the	home	of	a	radical	and	innovative	new	
authority	embarking	on	the	challenges	of	the	new	millennium	seemed	difficult.	The	central	
part	of	the	six-storey	County	Hall	was	designed	and	built	between	1911	and	1922	under	
the	sovereignty	of	King	George	V.	The	north	and	south	wings	were	added	between	1936	
and	1939.	The	building	has	been	described	as	being	of	Edwardian	Baroque	style.	Its	solid	
punched	window	facade	is	cladded	in	Portland	stone.	The	building	does	not	evoke	
interpretations	of	radicalness,	innovation,	a	new	form	of	government,	and	the	concept	of	
sustainability.		
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The	third	reason	Raynsford	put	forward	was	the	importance	of	the	location	of	the	GLA	in	
relation	to	what	he	called	the	“changing	geography	of	London”.	Traditionally	the	centre	of	
London	has	tended	to	lie	to	the	west	of	the	city,	and	certainly	Westminster	became	a	
major	focus.	County	Hall	was	created	on	the	south	bank,	but	very	near	Westminster.	But	
east	London	was	becoming	more	important	with	the	regeneration	of	the	docks	and	the	
Thames	Gateway	venture.		
Raynsford	and	his	team	thus	tended	to	search	for	a	building	that	would	not	recall	the	
architectural	classical	tradition	(order,	symmetry,	closeness,	weight,	stone),	as	at	County	
Hall,	but	would	be	a	contemporary	statement	at	the	turn	of	the	millennium.	
4.2.3.3 White	Paper:	A	mayor	and	assembly	for	London	(March	1998)	
Eight	months	after	publishing	the	Green	Paper,	five	months	after	the	closure	of	its	
consultation	period	and	two	months	before	the	referendum,	Raynsford	and	his	team	
published	the	White	Paper	A	Mayor	and	Assembly	for	London	–	The	Government’s	
Proposals	for	Modernising	the	Governance	of	London	(DETR,	1998b).		
The	Green	Paper	set	out	the	government’s	view	on	the	GLA,	raised	specific	questions	and	
invited	comments.	Raynsford’s	office	received	over	1200	responses	from	individuals	and	
organisations	all	over	London	(DETR,	1998b,	pp.	85-87).	The	purpose	of	the	White	Paper	
was	to	outline	how	the	government	developed	its	proposals	for	the	GLA	arrangements	in	
detail.	It	further	served	as	the	basis	on	which	Londoners	were	to	vote	in	the	referendum	in	
May	1998.	The	White	Paper	expanded	the	content	and	structure	of	the	Green	Paper,	
thereby	producing	and	accumulating	more	knowledge	that	shaped	the	design	briefing	
issued	five	months	later.	Crucially	the	White	Paper	began	the	discussion	on	how	to	house	
the	GLA	and	how	to	find	an	appropriate	building	for	it.	
Raynsford’s	superior	at	the	DETR,	then	Deputy	Prime	Minister	John	Prescott,	declared	in	
the	foreword	of	the	White	Paper:	
When	this	government	was	elected	less	than	a	year	ago,	we	embarked	on	a	
programme	of	democratic	renewal	in	Britain.	An	essential	part	of	this	is	
modernising	government	in	London	to	equip	our	capital	city	to	meet	the	challenges	
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of	the	next	Millennium.	[…]	Our	plans	for	London	are	radical	and	innovative	(1998b,	
p.	5).	
Prescott	aimed	to	establish	the	constitution	of	the	GLA	as	a	radical	and	groundbreaking	
political	manoeuvre,	which	was	intended	to	be	read	as	a	marker	of	the	Labour	party’s	
political	achievements.	Raynsford	made	clear	that	the	new	headquarters	was	given	a	
crucial	role	in	this	strategy	through	its	physical	form,	materiality	and	design.	This	ambition	
was	later	translated	into	one	of	the	design	briefs.		
The	White	Paper	accumulated	further	information	and	many	decisions	taken.	It	set	out	
how	the	mayor	and	the	assembly	would	work,	how	they	would	be	elected,	how	the	GLA	
would	be	funded,	and	concluded	by	laying	out	the	work	needed	to	prepare	for	its	
establishment.	The	GLA	proposal	thus	became	increasingly	refined.	Consequently	also	at	
the	emerging	building	design	brief	further	took	shape.	Six	aspects	were	significant	in	the	
continued	accumulation	of	design	knowledge	that	co-shaped	the	path	of	procurement	and	
design	briefing	content.	
First,	since	Raynsford	declared	that	the	new	headquarters	of	the	GLA	was	required	to	
“exemplify	[…]	the	ideals	behind	the	new	authority”	through	its	design,	I	emphasise	how	
the	functions	of	the	GLA	were	composed	in	relation	to	the	‘environmental	crisis’.	The	main	
functions	of	the	GLA	were	defined	under	the	headline	of	an	“Integrated	and	Sustainable	
Approach”(DETR,	1998b,	p.	36)	that	brings	together	responsibilities	for	transport,	strategic	
planning,	economic	development,	environment,	metropolitan	police,	fire	and	emergency	
planning,	culture,	media	and	sport,	and	health:		
The	Mayor	will	have	a	major	role	to	play	in	improving	the	economic,	social	and	
environmental	well-being	of	Londoners	and	will	be	expected	to	do	this	by	
integrating	key	activities.	Sustainable	development	is	about	ensuring	a	better	
quality	of	life	for	everyone,	now	and	for	generations	to	come,	and	encompasses	
environmental,	social	and	economic	goals	(p.	36).		
The	White	Paper	declared	that	the	new	government	would	begin	a	consultation	exercise	
to	develop	a	new	national	sustainable	development	strategy	to	be	published	by	the	end	of	
1998:		
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This	will	provide	a	practical	framework	for	sustainable	development	and	a	
backcloth	against	the	Mayor	and	the	Assembly	[…]	will	be	expected	to	act.	[…]	
The	Mayor	will	be	placed	under	a	statutory	duty	to	promote	sustainable	
development	in	London	(p.	36).		
The	Labour	government	only	published	the	national	sustainable	development	strategy	in	
May	1999,	titled	A	better	quality	of	life	(DETR,	1999).	It	was	not	in	place	when	the	first	
design	briefs	were	finalised	as	it	was	a	parallel	development	within	DETR.	The	strategy	
later	set	out	the	government’s	vision	of	how	to	simultaneously	deliver	economic,	social	
and	environmental	outcomes	and	how	to	measure	them	through	a	series	of	headline	
indicators.	The	White	Paper	hinted	at	the	challenge	of	translating	the	concept	of	
sustainability	into	specific	localised	“strategies	and	priorities”	(DETR,	1998b,	p.	36).	
Under	the	umbrella	of	“sustainable	development”,	the	White	Paper	constructs	the	GLA’s	
environmental	responsibility	through	selected	environmental	crises	that	need	strategic	
action:	“climate	change”,	London-wide	air	pollution,	noise	pollution	in	relation	to	ground-	
and	air-traffic,	waste	generation	and	“other	issues”	predominantly	framed	as	the	loss	of	
biodiversity.	The	paper	links	the	GLA’s	environmental	objectives	to	activities,	agreements	
and	documents	on	supranational	and	UK	level	(see	‘red’	elements	in	Figure	4.2).	These	
include	the	promotion	of	sustainable	development	through	the	“Local	Agenda	21”,	which	
was	one	of	the	corner	stones	introduced	at	the	1992	Earth	Summit	in	Rio	de	Janeiro.	
“Climate	change”	and	the	reduction	of	greenhouse	gas	emissions	are	associated	with	the	
UK	government’s	December	1997	ratification	of	the	Kyoto	Protocol.20	The	paper	stresses	
that	“there	are	strong	links”	between	climate	change	and	greenhouse	gas	emissions	and	
areas	where	the	GLA	“will	have	a	role”	(1998b,	p.	59).	The	GLA	would	have	to	make	
contributions	towards	both	the	national	climate	change	programme	and	the	government’s	
commitment	to	reduce	GHG	greenhouse	gas	emissions	under	the	UN	Framework	
Convention	on	Climate	Change	(UNFCCC)	introduced	1992.	
																																								 																
20	“The	UK’s	legally	binding	target	under	the	Kyoto	Protocol	to	reduce	its	greenhouse	gas	emissions	to	12.5%	below	
1990	levels	by	2008-2012”	(DETR,	2000,	p.	5).	
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The	second	element,	newly	accumulated	to	shape	the	procurement	process	and	design	
briefing,	was	that	the	financial	allowance	to	establish	the	GLA	was	limited	to	“up	to	£20m”	
(p.	83)	if	Londoners	voted	yes	and	the	parliament	approved	legislation	to	establish	the	GLA.	
The	Green	Paper	had	already	stated	that	the	government	committed	to	work	within	the	
planned	budget.	The	GLA	property	procurement	process	lay	within	the	£20m	allocation	
and	was	put	on	a	specific	procurement	path	that	did	not	allow	the	GLA	to	own	their	
headquarters	due	to	a	limited	budget.21	The	GLA	headquarters	needed	to	be	rented	or	
leased	in	cooperation	with	a	private	developer.	Raynsford’s	ambition	to	have	the	new	
headquarters	to	showcase	the	GLA’s	“environmentally	progressive	objectives,	the	
principles	of	sustainability”	(Interview	Raynsford,	2010)	became	more	difficult	to	reach,	
since	this	interest	had	to	be	aligned	in	a	partnership	with	the	interests	of	a	private	building	
developer	through	a	set	of	compromises	and	conflict	of	aims.		
Third,	the	White	Paper’s	section	“A	home	for	the	GLA”	began	to	address	how	to	
accommodate	the	GLA.	It	set	out	a	tight	timeframe	to	provide	the	new	accommodation,	
temporarily	if	necessary,	to	have	the	GLA	operational	as	soon	as	possible	after	the	first	
elections:	
The	other	major	task	in	preparing	for	the	GLA	will	be	identifying	and	acquiring	a	
suitable	building.	[…]	We	believe	the	Mayor,	Assembly	and	the	GLA’s	core	staff	will	
need	to	be	located	together	in	a	single	building	(p.	84).		
The	paper	determined	that	a	single	building	was	required	(in	principle	the	GLA	could	have	
been	accommodated	within	different	existing	government	offices.)	Fourth,	the	space	
allocation	plan	was	further	developed:	“The	building	will	need	to	house	the	Mayor’s	office,	
an	Assembly	chamber	and	committee	rooms,	to	which	the	public	must	have	access,	and	
briefing	rooms	and	space	for	key	staff.”	The	number	of	GLA	members	to	house	would	be	
approximately	275	(pp.	26,	84).Fifth,	the	paper	hinted	at	finding	a	suitable	building	by	
narrowing	down	options:	“The	government	will	be	considering	a	range	of	buildings	in	
central	and	inner	London	to	see	which	provides	suitable	accommodation	at	reasonable	
cost”	(p.	84).	And	sixth,	a	tight	timeframe	became	established	in	which	the	“final	decision	
																																								 																
21	The	construction	costs	of	City	Hall	alone	were	about	£35m	(Detail,	2002,	p.	1203).	
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on	the	GLA’s	building	will	need	to	be	taken	well	before	the	first	elections	to	the	GLA	and	
will	therefore	be	taken	by	Ministers”	(p.	84).	
The	White	Paper	did	not	specify	any	further	criteria	for	City	Hall’s	design	process,	so	
responsibilities	for	the	property	procurement	and	the	design	briefing	were	delegated	to	
Raynsford	and	his	team.	
4.2.3.4 GLA	referendum	(May	1998)	
In	February	1998	the	Houses	of	Parliament	passed	the	Greater	London	Authority	
(Referendum)	Act	1998	to	make	provisions	for	the	referendum	on	the	new	authority,	
entitlements	to	vote	and	referendum	expenditure,	and	to	set	out	the	ballot	paper.	On	7th	
May	1998,	together	with	the	London	Borough	Council,	eligible	Londoners	were	asked:		
Are	you	in	favour	of	the	Government’s	proposals	for	a	Greater	London	Authority,	
made	up	of	an	elected	mayor	and	a	separately	elected	assembly?	(Houses	of	
Parliament,	1998,	p.	7).		
The	referendum	gave	overwhelming	support	to	setting	up	the	GLA	with	majorities	in	every	
single	London	borough	voting	in	favour	of	the	proposal	based	on	a	low	referendum	
turnout	of	just	34.6%.	With	an	almost	3	to	1	approval	rating	(72%	yes,	28%	no	votes),	
Raynsford	and	his	colleagues	were	now	able	to	continue	with	their	task	of	establishing	the	
GLA	and	had	to	introduce	legislation	to	bring	the	new	authority	into	being	(London	
Research	Centre,	1998).	
In	summary,	the	Green	and	the	White	Papers	were	central	tools	in	outlining	and	defining	
the	functions	and	responsibilities	of	the	GLA,	but	they	were	not	simply	the	instantiation	of	
these	plans	since.	They	provided	the	basis	on	which	Londoners	voted	in	favour	of	the	new	
institution.		
The	‘environmental	crisis’	cannot	be	understood	in	its	full	entirety;	its	understanding	can	
only	be	appropriated	through	particular	concepts.	These	tend	to	emphasise	some	
challenges,	and	suppress	others.	Sustainable	development	was	set	as	the	overarching	
principle	for	the	GLA.	As	such,	the	DETR	constructed	the	environmental	crises	that	needed	
to	be	addressed:	climate	change,	air	pollution,	noise	pollution,	waste	generation	and	loss	
of	biodiversity.	Raynsford	wanted	these	environmental	responsibilities	to	be	exemplified	
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in	the	building	that	was	going	to	become	the	domicile	of	the	GLA.	This	desire	left	many	
questions	open	-	since	it	did	not	provide	unambiguous	design	instructions,	it	needed	
interpretation.	
The	major	challenge	for	Raynsford	and	his	team	was	then	to	translate	their	intentions	into	
a	design	briefing	that	would	provide	particular	goals	and	targets	that	could	be	taken	up	by	
developers,	architects,	engineers	and	others.	
4.3 Finding	a	‘home	for	the	GLA’	
4.3.1 Setting	up	the	property	procurement	process	
Following	the	positive	referendum	result,	Raynsford	and	his	team	entered	a	new	phase.	
After	Londoners	had	voted	for	the	GLA	to	be	set	up,	they	had	to	put	this	into	effect:	the	
new	mayor	and	the	assembly	needed	to	be	housed.	The	decision	to	build	a	new	city	hall	
presented	an	opportunity	that	capital	cities	rarely	obtain.		
There	was	a	tight	schedule	to	establish	and	bring	the	GLA	into	operation	and	after	May	
1998	things	moved	quickly.	Raynsford,	his	collaborators	and	parliament	now	needed	to	
introduce	the	necessary	legislation	in	the	form	of	a	bill;	this	became	the	Greater	London	
Authority	Act	1999	(UK	Government,	1999).	The	bill	needed	to	go	through	its	second	
reading	in	the	House	of	Commons	until	the	government	was	constitutionally	permitted	to	
commit	any	greater	expenditure	to	setting	up	the	GLA.		
Nick	Raynsford	expanded	his	team	to	set	up	a	procurement	process	for	the	new	
authority’s	home.	Heterogeneous	elements	co-shaped	City	Hall’s	design	briefing.	
Raynsford	headed	the	Government	Office	for	London	(GOL)	as	Minister	for	London,	and	
several	civil	servants	joined	his	team.	He	also	included	representatives	from	the	DETR.	The	
GOL	became	the	body	that	procured	the	building	(the	quasi	client)	for	the	GLA	
headquarters.	Gradually	Knight	Frank	Estate	Agents	(KFEA),	new	members	at	the	GOL,	and	
a	team	of	Turner	&	Townsend	Project	Management	(TTPM)	joined	Raynsford.	In	a	
collaborative	process	their	task	was	to	develop	a	design	briefing	for	the	GLA	
accommodation	search,	which	was	continuously	developed	and	refined	until	the	GLA	
building	materialised.		
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KFEA	won	the	instruction	to	find	a	suitable	building	for	the	GLA.	On	behalf	of	the	GOL,	
KFEA	started	to	consider	development	proposals,	new	buildings	or	refurbishments	in	
central	London,	with	room	for	a	debating	chamber	for	around	25	members	and	offices	for	
250	staff.	KFEA	was	commissioned	to	organise	the	procurement	process	and	to	issue	the	
documents	to	potential	teams	interested	in	housing	the	GLA.		
4.3.2 The	lease	deal	
KFEA	started	to	search	for	teams	composed	of	developers	and	architects,	which	had	a	
piece	of	land	or	an	existing	building	that	would	suit	the	projected	needs	of	the	GLA.	
According	to	Raynsford,	the	government	wanted	a	deal	with	developers	to	lease	
accommodation.	The	New	Labour	government	needed	to	spend	a	lot	of	money	on	the	
creation	of	the	GLA	and	was	obliged	to	work	within	previous	governments’	overall	
spending	commitments	(Interview	Raynsford,	2010).	It	thus	pledged	to	work	within	the	
Conservatives’	spending	commitments	for	two	years.	Consequently,	in	1998	and	1999,	the	
new	government	was	working	on	tight	budgets	and	Raynsford	explained	that	it	attempted	
to	make	sure	the	money	available	went	into	the	delivery	of	things	it	categorised	as	
absolutely	vital.	Yet	it	seems	that	owning	the	home	of	the	GLA	was	not	part	of	New	
Labour’s	vital	projects.	Nick	Raynsford	recalls:		
It	was	a	time	much	tighter	financially	than	it	became	the	case	later	on	in	the	life	of	
the	government.	I	think,	if	we	would	have	been	doing	this	five	years	later	it	would	
have	been	a	different	scenario.	However	having	said	that,	we	did	not	want	to	see	
the	kind	of	process	occurred	over	the	Scottish	parliament,	which	was	an	escalation	
of	cost	absolutely	on	[a]	horrific	scale.	So,	there	was	method	there,	we	were	
working	on	tight	budgets	but	we	wanted	to	deliver	something	of	quality,	we	didn’t	
want	to	take	too	many	risks,	we	wanted	to	try	to	set	high	standards,	but	we	didn’t	
want	this	thing	to	be	a	glorious	failure	(Interview	Raynsford,	2010).	
The	decision	to	look	for	a	lease	with	a	private	developer	was	informed	by	two	factors,	the	
first	of	which	was	the	limited	budget	to	establish	the	GLA.	Secondly,	the	leasing	scheme	
was	a	route	of	procurement	in	which	the	risks	of	construction	cost	overruns	would	be	
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outsourced	to	the	developer.22	Raynsford	summarised:	“[W]hat	we	were	trying	to	do	is	to	
make	sure	City	Hall	was	built	and	built	within	budget	and	on	time”	(Interview	Raynsford,	
2010).	The	option	for	the	government	to	commission	and	own	a	building	was	accordingly	
ruled	out.		
4.3.3 A	unique	type	of	competition	
In	the	summer	of	1998,	shortly	after	the	referendum,	Raynsford	and	his	officials	discussed	
potential	forms	the	property	search	could	take.	Officials	at	the	GOL	initially	suggested	a	
developer	competition	in	which	they	would	simply	set	out	the	brief,	leave	the	developer	to	
come	forward	with	schemes,	and	the	schemes	would	be	judged	essentially	on	their	fitness	
for	purpose	and	on	cost.	Raynsford	insisted	that	this	was	changed	to	ensure	that	the	GOL	
team	had	an	architectural	quality	component	in	the	assessment	and	that	there	would	be	
clear	emphasis	on	“meeting	the	objectives,	the	sustainability	objectives	which	
underpinned	the	whole	legislation.	The	principle	of	sustainable	development	is	stated	very	
clearly	here	in	the	overall	functions	of	the	GLA”	(Interview	Raynsford,	2010).	The	result	of	
discussions	between	Raynsford	and	his	officials	was	a	rather	unique	type	of	architectural	
competition:	the	judges	would	assess	the	cost	and	the	fitness	for	purpose	of	the	proposals,	
and	their	architectural	quality.	Raynsford	had	clashed	with	architects	at	the	Royal	Institute	
of	British	Architects	(RIBA)	who	wanted	him	to	launch	a	more	conventional	architectural	
design	competition.	But	Raynsford	argued	that	he	“wanted	an	integrated	approach	with	
the	developer	and	the	architect	as	part	of	the	team,	rather	than	going	through	the	
different	stages	of	the	architectural	competition,	then	the	procurement”.	Both	potential	
forms	of	developer	competition	and	architectural	design	competition	(open	to	architects	
to	design	schemes)	for	the	GOL	property	search	were	ruled	out	and	Raynsford	initiated	a	
unique	type	of	competition	that	could	be	described	as	a	developer-funded	property	search	
in	which	developers	were	required	to	team	up	with	architects.	The	difference	from	most	
architectural	competitions	was	that	developers	were	an	integral	part	of	the	selection	
process	and	the	design	teams.	
																																								 																
	22	There	was	massive	criticism	of	the	procurement	and	construction	process	for	the	new	Scottish	parliament.	A	
1997	White	Paper	set	the	construction	cost	of	a	new	building	at	£40	million.	The	new	Scottish	Parliament,	designed	
by	the	Catalan	architect	Enric	Miralles,	opened	three	years	late	in	September	2004	with	an	estimated	final	cost	of	
£431	million.	
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Most	architectural	design	competitions	are	conceived	in	one	or	two	stages,	in	which	a	
comprehensive	brief	is	first	issued,	normally	followed	by	a	question	and	answer	session,	
concluding	with	a	final	submission	of	schemes.	The	GOL	property	search	was	unique	in	its	
setup,	which	was	conceived	as	an	initial	call	for	outline	proposals	covering	financial	
aspects	and	questions	of	feasibility	but	not	architectural	design,	and	then	two	stages	of	
ministerial	presentations.	The	process	encouraged	intense	and	ongoing	communication	
between	government	officials,	government	consultants	and	the	developer	teams.	It	was	a	
competitive	procurement	process	based	on	enacting	a	property	deal	with	a	developer.	
Raynsford	declared	the	property	search	open	to	bids	from	developers	(accompanied	by	
architects)	who	could	deliver.	He	stated	that	the	competition	was	to	be	judged	on	three	
criteria:	architectural	quality	and	functionality,	cost,	and	building	performance	to	meet	the	
brief	(Interview	Raynsford,	2010).	To	discuss	questions	of	architectural	quality	within	the	
competition,	Raynsford	insisted	on	bringing	in	an	experienced	architectural	advisory	group	
of	five	that	was	led	by	Sir	Michael	Hopkins	(principal	at	Hopkins	Architects)	and	included	
Paul	Finch	(later	deputy	chair	of	the	Design	Council),	Lucy	Musgrave	(former	director	of	
the	Architecture	Foundation),	Pankaj	Patel	(principal	at	Patel	Taylor	Architects)	and	Jane	
Priestman	(former	Chairman	of	RIBA	awards).		
Following	the	successful	GLA	referendum,	the	GOL	and	KFEA	held	a	number	of	meetings	to	
clarify	the	requirements	and	attributes	of	the	new	authority’s	home.	KFEA	then	sent	out	a	
circular	on	its	‘normal’	agents’	circular	system	in	London	to	seek	details	of	any	properties	
or	sites	that	met	the	GLA’s	requirement.	This	circular	apparently	went	to	over	600	agents	
and	information	was	requested	back	by	29	May	1998	(TTPM,	1998h,	p.	29).	However	the	
procedure	was	not	as	open	as	Raynsford	claimed,	since	it	was	limited	to	a	pre-selection	of	
600	agents	through	KFEA.	It	was	not	an	open	call	published	in	one	of	the	typical	journals	
(Estates	Gazette,	Property	Week)	to	attract	interested	parties,	and	the	rationale	of	Knight	
Frank	for	selecting	the	600	developers	remains	unclear.	
Despite	intensive	attempts	through	different	avenues,	I	was	unable	to	get	hold	of	the	
original	document	that	formed	the	initial	call	for	outline	proposals	that	led	to	the	“long	
longlist”	of	55	proposals.	The	initial	call	was	drafted	between	KFEA	and	the	GOL	before	
TTPM	became	deeply	involved.		
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Gordon	Rautenbach	(TTPM),	who	joined	the	GLA	property	search	later,	recalls	that	KFEA	
approached	the	property	developer	market	“with	a	very	vague	requirement	where	a	size	
was	indicated	[…]	and	very	little	else	–	they	probably	mentioned	that	it	was	to	be	for	a	
government	or	local	authority	occupier	–	to	generate	interest”.	The	spatial	programme	
became	more	refined	later	in	the	process,	though	at	this	stage	it	could	only	be	a	rough	
estimation	(Interview	Rautenbach,	2010).	Anne	Griffiths,	who	also	just	joined	after	the	55	
proposals	were	received,	described	the	initial	invitation	for	projects:	“[I]t	was	very	high	
level	and	fairly	short”	(Interview	Griffiths,	2010).	And	Raynsford	recalls:	“We	asked	initially	
for	expressions	of	interest	and	outline	proposals,	but	not	asking	for	any	great	detail”	
(Interview	Raynsford,	2010).	The	initial	call	for	outline	proposals	most	likely	was	released	
right	after	the	successful	GLA	referendum	under	huge	time	constraints.	Retrospectively	it	
appears	that	the	beginning	of	the	property	search	was	initiated	through	a	vague	call	that	
didn’t	have	the	character	of	a	comprehensive	design	brief.	It	was	an	ongoing	process	to	
define	the	character	and	requirements	of	the	future	GLA.	At	that	time	nobody	had	a	clear	
idea	how	the	GLA	would	operate,	or	what	its	precise	demands	would	be,	since	this	process	
happened	before	the	new	authority	had	come	into	existence	as	an	organisation.	The	
future	occupiers	could	not	be	consulted.		
4.4 Assembling	design	challenges	for	developers	and	architects	
4.4.1 Shortlisting	55	responses	to	a	list	of	seven	
From	the	600	contacted	developers	KFEA	received	55	entries	by	29	May	1998.	It	was	at	
that	moment	that	the	developers,	CIT	(More	London),	and	Foster+Partners	architects	
submitted	their	initial	outline	proposal	that	began	to	align	their	interests	with	the	GOL	to	
construct	a	new	headquarters.	They	had	just	recently	teamed	up;	CIT	appointed	
Foster+Partners	architects	as	master	planners	for	its	£1bn	London	Bridge	project	in	the	
middle	of	May	1998.23		
																																								 																
23	See	Estates	Gazette,	23	May	1998,	Issue	9821,	p.	35.	
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KFEA	was	commissioned	to	identify	a	“longlist”	of	seven	properties	from	the	55	against	
broad	criteria	set	by	the	GOL	by	July	1998.24	
4.4.2 Expanding	Raynsford’s	team	
Just	before	KFEA	had	selected	the	longlist,	Raynsford	took	three	important	actors	into	his	
property	procurement	team.	Anne	Griffiths	joined	the	GOL	in	the	role	of	“project	sponsor”,	
which	is	a	government	term	for	a	named	individual	in	government	departments	with	
responsibility	for	bringing	major	building	projects	into	being	and	delivering	them	on	time,	
at	the	right	quality	and	on	budget	(Interview	Griffiths,	2010).	Raynsford	also	commissioned	
TTPM,	with	which	the	government	had	collaborated	on	several	building	assessments,	
feasibility	studies	and	cost	estimations.	TTPM’s	architect	Gordon	Rautenbach	and	building	
services	engineer	Jon	Spring	started	working	for	the	GOL.	They	had	support	from	cost	and	
logistics	consultants	at	TTPM.		
These	three	individuals	were	central	as	they	assembled	the	design	brief	on	behalf	of	
Raynsford.	Anne	Griffith’s	(GOL)	role	was	to	give	direction	on	policy,	especially	to	ensure	
that	the	proposals	set	out	in	the	Green	and	White	Papers	were	transformed	into	the	
design	briefs.	She	monitored	costs,	quality	and	time,	and	provided	information	on	
projected	GLA	staff	numbers	and	the	required	facilities.	Gordon	Rautenbach	and	Jon	
Spring	(both	TTPM)	were	the	“technical	team”	(Interview	Spring,	2010).	Gordon	
Rautenbach	focused	on	architectural	issues	such	as	programme	schedules,	materials	and	
architectural	specifications.	Jon	Spring	was	responsible	for	mechanical	and	electrical	
questions	and	“took	the	lead	on	environmental	issues”	(Interview	Rautenbach,	2010).	One	
difficulty	that	all	three	faced	was	that	nobody	knew	how	the	GLA	would	operate	so,	based	
on	assumptions,	the	GOL	and	TTPM	began	to	inscribe	their	visions	into	the	emerging	
design	briefing	(Akrich,	1992).		
																																								 																
24	The	“long	list”	included	the	following	developer-architect	teams	-	First:	London	Bridge	City,	SE1,	CIT	International	
Limited	and	Foster	&	Partners;	second:	Town	Square,	Victoria,	SW1,	Point	Ventures	Limited,	Munkenbeck	+	
Marshall	and	Atelier	10;	third:	Victoria	House,	Bloomsbury	Square,	WC1,	Blackfriars	Investments	Ltd,	William	Pears	
Group	and	Alsop	&	Stormer;	fourth:	Regents	Place,	Euston,	NW1,	the	British	Land	Company	plc	and	Sheppard	
Robson;	fifth:	Vauxhall	Cross	(the	Effra	site),	SW8,	St	Georges	plc	and	Broadway	Malyan;	sixth:	Camelford	House,	
Albert	Embankment,	SE1,	Chelsfield	plc	and	Watts	&	Partners;	and	seventh:	15	Westferry	Circus,	Canary	Wharf,	E14,	
Canary	Wharf	Limited	and	Terry	Farrell	(based	on	TTPM,	1998d;	1998h).		
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4.4.3 Drafting	the	initial	statement	of	requirements		
As	one	of	the	first	actions	at	the	beginning	of	July	1998,	TTPM	started	preparing	the	initial	
GLA	statement	of	requirements	(SOR)	in	conjunction	with	representatives	from	the	GOL.	
At	that	time	representatives	from	TTPM	were	discussing	spatial	requirements	for	the	GLA.	
It	was	a	new	body,	and	nobody	knew	how	it	would	operate.	This	happened	at	the	same	
time	as	KFEA	members	were	selecting	the	seven	proposals	for	further	consideration	(the	
longlist).	Immediately	before	announcing	the	long	list,	and	after	the	TTPM	began	to	work	
on	the	GLA’s	likely	space	requirement,	it	emerged	that	more	space	-	11,000	to	13,000	m2	-	
would	be	needed.	Knight	Frank	contacted	all	those	who	were	expected	be	on	the	shortlist	
to	enquire	whether	they	could	meet	this	additional	space	requirement.25	
Following	the	successful	referendum	the	development	of	the	design	briefing	for	the	GLA	
property	search	was	a	fragile	and	contingent	process	of	going	back	and	forth	that	took	a	
further	three	months.	Collaboratively,	the	GOL	and	TTPM	team	aimed	to	inscribe	more	
and	more	heterogeneous	elements	(functions,	square	metres,	number	of	people	to	
accommodate,	time	constraints,	etc.)	into	the	brief	in	order	to	refine	it.	The	consecutive	
versions	accumulated	more	information,	but	also	presented	choices	in	which	the	vast	
potentialities	were	narrowed	down.	The	goal	was	to	put	together	a	detailed	design	brief,	
to	be	issued	at	the	beginning	of	August	1998,	intended	to	align	the	design	activities	of	the	
seven	selected	developer-architect	teams	with	the	GOL’s	intents	for	the	design	of	the	GLA	
headquarters.	
Spring	explained	that	he	and	Rautenbach	had	carried	out	many	building	searches	for	other	
projects	prior	to	joining	Raynsford’s	task	so	they	had	a	base	structure	and	template	at	
hand	for	setting	out	the	design	brief	for	the	GLA	property	search.	After	a	couple	of	working	
sessions	with	the	GOL,	in	which	they	went	through	the	templates,	Spring	and	Rautenbach	
“started	adding	to	it	quickly”	(Interview	Spring,	2010).	Jon	Spring	recalled:	
So	there	was	a	kind	of	process	of	putting	forward	our	ideas,	from	what	we’d	done	
with	government,	we’d	done	a	lot	of	work	with	government,	and	looking	at	option	
																																								 																
25	According	to	the	GLA,	today’s	City	Hall	is	18,734m2	(Interview	Kraus,	2012).	
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building	studies	and	negotiating	with	developers.	So	we	had	a	good	idea	for	what	
was	right	(Interview	Spring,	2010).	
Spring	and	Rautenbach	drew	on	their	previous	knowledge	and	experiences	as	they	drafted	
the	GLA	property	search	brief	as	a	two-stage	specification:	a	general	specification,	which	
referred	to	government	and	public	building	design	standards,	and	then	a	particular	
specification.	Both	concentrated	more	on	the	particular	specification	that	would	associate	
diverse	issues,	questions	“around	space,	things	we	wanted	from	the	building,	in	terms	of	
visual,	feel	of	the	building,	but	also	performance”	(Interview	Spring,	2010).	
It	was	Raynsford’s	responsibility	to	check	and	sign	off	on	the	brief	before	its	release.	From	
his	perspective,	there	were	two	things	that	influenced	the	environmental	agenda	setting	
of	the	design	brief:		
I	was	construction	minister;	I	was	responsible	for	the	Building	Regulations.	One	of	
the	things	we	were	doing	was	upgrading	Part	L	of	the	Building	Regulations,	which	
was	the	energy	efficiency.	And	that	was	going	on	simultaneously.	So,	I	was	
particularly	keen	that	this	new	building	should	be	seen	[…]	to	deliver	high	quality	
building	that	performed	well	in	energy	terms	and	therefore	was	seen	as	an	
exemplar,	which	others	should	follow.	So	that	was	part	of	the	brief.	But	the	main	
reason	was	that	there	was	a	commitment	to	sustainable	development	as	one	of	the	
overarching	objectives	of	the	Greater	London	Authority	and	it	was	important	
therefore	that	the	building	that	the	authority	occupied	should	be	compatible	with	
that	(Interview	Raynsford,	2010).	
Environmental	politics	and	architectural	design	practices	crucially	“depend	on	the	specific	
social	construction	of	environmental	problems”	(Hajer,	1995,	p.	2).	Raynsford	explained	in	
interview	the	environmental	challenge	for	the	design	brief	as	both	“commitment	to	
sustainable	development”	and	a	question	of	“energy	efficiency”.	This	version	largely	
coincided	with	the	definition	of	the	GLA’s	environmental	responsibilities	outlined	in	the	
Green	and	White	Papers.	The	challenge	for	the	GOL	and	TTPM	team	became	essentially	to	
understand,	interpret	and	give	meaning	to	these	two	concepts	or,	in	other	words,	how	to	
link	policymaking	and	materialising	architectural	design	through	a	series	of	translations.	It	
was	the	role	of	Griffiths,	Rautenbach	and	Spring	to	align	their	different	vocational	
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perspectives,	gain	knowledge	in	this	exchange,	and	to	compose	a	joint	strategy.	The	design	
briefs	thereby	became	crucial	devices	to	align	the	GOL	and	competitors.	
4.4.4 The	first	three	design	briefs	
Following	the	initial	call	for	outline	proposals,	KFEA	then	issued	three	design	briefs	
prepared	by	TTPM	to	the	selected	seven	competing	developers	(long	list)	at	the	beginning	
of	August	1998.	The	Greater	London	Authority:	Preliminary	Summary	of	Authority’s	
Requirements	(TTPM,	1998a)	was	one	key	document	that	Spring	called	it	the	“particular	
specification”.	It	was	followed	approximately	a	week	later	by	the	Property	Search	Option	
Appraisal	–	Draft	4	(TTPM,	1998c),	setting	out	a	detailed	space	allocation	plan	(functions,	
square	meters)	alongside	the	Occupier	Brief	(TTPM,	1998b)	that	defined	mechanical,	
electrical,	material	and	other	specifications	for	distinct	spaces.	
The	three	design	briefs	became	important	“devices”	to	enlist	and	align	diverse	actors	and	
elements	into	the	“initial	plan	[…	of]	transaction”	(Callon,	1986).	They	assembled	many	
decisions	-	such	as	the	environmental	agenda	setting	of	the	GLA	-	and	can	therefore	be	
seen	as	particular	results	of	power.	But	the	briefs	also	possessed	the	power	to	instigate	
particular	actions	as	they	aimed	to	guide	and	align	the	diverse	vocational	actors	
(politicians,	civil	servants,	developers,	architects,	engineers)	into	the	joint	action	plan	to	
find	a	“suitable	accommodation”	for	the	new	authority.		
	
Figure	4.3		The	cover	pages	of	the	Greater	London	Authority:	Preliminary	Summary	of	Authority’s	Requirements,	
Property	Search	Option	Appraisal	(Statement	of	Requirements	Draft	4)	and	Occupier	Brief	(Turner	&	Townsend	
Project	Management,	1998a,	1998b;	1998c)	
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With	the	design	briefs	the	GOL	and	TTPM	team	brought	together	heterogeneous	and	
partially	contradictory	elements.	Although	my	interviewees	underlined	that	the	three	
design	briefs	were	informed	by	the	Green	and	White	Papers,	they	did	not	directly	refer	to	
them.	The	challenge	thus	remained	for	the	goals	of	policymaking	(e.g.	Green	and	White	
Papers)	to	be	translated	in	order	to	devise	problems	that	could	be	handled	and	for	which	
design	solutions	could	be	found	by	developers,	architects,	engineers	and	others	(cf.	Hajer,	
1995,	p.	15).	While	Raynsford	set	out	his	thinking	in	overarching	concepts,	the	GOL	and	
TTPM	team	had	to	translate	and	transform	these	concepts	into	a	set	of	problems	that	they	
could	address	through	architectural	design.	
Raynsford	wanted	the	design	of	the	new	GLA	building	to	be	“a	statement”	about	and	
“exemplar”	of	“its	commitment	to	the	environmentally	progressive	objectives,	the	
principles	of	sustainability”	(Interview	Raynsford,	2010).		
If	the	concept	of	sustainable	development	is	understood	as	a	“specific	kind	of	problem	
framing”	(Voβ	et	al.,	2006,	p.	4)	,then	the	focus	is	precisely	on	the	way	sustainable	
development	is	understood	and	translated	into	the	design	briefs	through	setting	out	
characteristics,	indicators	and	targets.	The	Green	and	White	Papers	hinted	at	the	difficulty	
of	giving	meaning	to	sustainability	and	this	became	one	of	the	central	challenges	of	the	
design	briefing.		
The	design	briefs	were	produced	through	processes	of	translations	that	shifted	particular	
understandings	of	the	initial	concept	and	suggested	particular	approaches	to	problem	
accommodation.	Decisively,	none	of	the	three	design	briefs	mentioned	the	concepts	of	
“sustainable	development”	or	“sustainability”.	They	became	abandoned	and	transformed	
as	elements	from	the	vocational	field	of	the	built	environment	were	introduced:	“square	
metres”,	“temperature	ranges”	and	“lux	levels”,	and	qualitative	characteristics	such	as	
“green”,	“prominent”	and	“distinctive”	were	common	framings.		
Raynsford,	Griffiths,	Rautenbach	and	Spring	explained	that	the	briefing	was	deliberately	
kept	vague	to	allow	the	widest	range	of	opportunities	to	be	investigated:	
We	deliberately	did	not	start	with	definitive	employer/client	requirements	in	
relation	to	construction	form,	fabric	and	finishes	or	green/environmental	criteria	
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[…]	The	only	exception	was	a	very	specific	requirement	for	space	where	we	
required	the	specific	amount,	no	less	and	not	a	lot	more.	[…]	For	the	remainder	of	
the	client	requirements,	we	provided	as	open	a	brief	as	possible	and	delivered	a	
challenge	to	the	bidders	–	to	exceed	the	efforts	of	their	competitors,	and	to	
promote	excellence	in	all	respects,	including	location,	architecture	and	
environmental	performance.	[…]	The	intention	was	for	the	brief	to	be	as	loose	as	
possible	to	allow	it	to	achieve	the	maximum	we	could	within	an	environment	of	
competition.	To	have	set	specific	requirements	would	have	been	seen	by	the	
developers	as	being	the	least	that	they	needed	to	provide	and	we	sought,	through	
competition	to	achieve	the	most	that	they	would	offer	(Interview	Rautenbach,	
2010).	
Anne	Griffiths	commented:	“We	wanted	to	bring	in	architects	who	would	bring	in	the	
innovation,	the	new	ideas.	You	don’t	produce	a	prescriptive	brief	if	you	want	to	encourage	
innovation”	(Interview	Griffiths,	2010).	
The	team	around	Raynsford	intended	to	use	the	competition	to	increase	thinking	about	
the	architectural	task	of	creating	a	new	domicile	for	the	GLA.	The	avoidance	of	any	
prescriptive	architectural	or	technical	pathways	seems	sensible	in	order	to	allow	for	
flexible,	imaginative	solutions,	and	not	fixed	products.	The	lack	of	prescription	did	not	
seem	to	be	problematic,	but	what	was	problematic	was	that	the	translation	of	the	concept	
of	sustainability	lacked	significant	environmental	ambition	and	force.	
4.4.4.1 The	GLA	Preliminary	Summary	of	Authority’s	Requirements	
The	Greater	London	Authority:	Preliminary	Summary	of	Authority’s	Requirements	was	the	
first	of	the	three	design	briefs	to	be	issued.	It	is	a	short	document	that	summarised	the	
then	“current	thinking”	about	the	GLA	headquarters’	requirements	(TTPM,	1998a,	p.	1).	
Within	the	GLA	property	procurement	process,	this	document	presents	the	most	
comprehensive	overview	of	the	design	criteria	that	the	new	home	of	the	GLA	needed	to	
meet	(see	Figure	4.4)	and	is	a	key	document,	central	to	the	design	development	to	come.	
It	illustrates	how	architectural	design	is	a	process	of	drawing	together	diverse	sets	of	
issues	and	spheres.	The	parameters	that	inform	design	strategies	and	related	material	
transformations	are	manifold	and	interrelated.		
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SUMMARY OF REQUIREMENTS 
An Occupier Brief and detailed Statement of Requirements are being developed, and the 
current thinking has been summarised below. 
§ Nett Lettable Floor Area 
12,000m2 to 13,000m2 total (130,000ft2 to 140,000ft2)  
ð To include approximately 1,900m2 (20,000ft2) for public areas, including the 
double height Assembly Chamber (approx. 16m x 22m), public and press 
viewing galleries for about 250 people, the committee rooms, etc. 
ð To include approximately 1,900m2 (20,000ft2) high quality offices for the 
Mayor, his appointed Deputies and Advisors, the Assembly Secretariat and 
Members, much of which will be in cellular configuration. 
ð The remaining area will be good quality, modern, adaptable, office space for 
administrative, research, and support staff (much of which will be open plan) and 
ancillary accommodation. 
 
§ Design Parameters 
The design of the building shall be appropriate for the intended use. There are three 
distinct areas of use within the building, being - 
ð The areas accessible to the public – portraying the vitality of London being as it 
is an important centre for local, national, European and international affairs – 
reflecting a blend of the progressive, even futuristic, with London’s rich heritage 
and cultural diversity. 
ð The interface between the public and the Authority – the Chamber and 
committee rooms – demonstrating openness and accessibility – reflecting the 
status and importance of the Authority. 
ð The offices, incorporating a common theme, but varying in quality and style 
from the impressive Mayor’s office, emphasising the status of the elected 
position, to the efficient, modern, functional open plan offices for the 
administrative and support staff.  
Externally, the building should be prominent and distinctive and be a design for the 
future, avoiding transience and ensuring longevity of design.  
Generally, the end product should be of high quality (but not opulent), and for every 
element value for money must be demonstrable. Innovation will be encouraged 
providing it is clearly beneficial and works. Simple, elegant, adaptable solutions will be 
preferred. 
Figure	4.4		The	GLA’s	Preliminary	Summary	of	Authority’s	Requirements	(Turner	&	Townsend	Project	Management,	
1998a)	
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§ Programme 
It is recognised that the programme for the selection of a site / property and for the 
implementation of the project are very tight. The following key dates are anticipated. 
ð Submit Business Case to HM Treasury – end of November 1998. 
ð Full commencement of the GLA operations – first quarter 2000. 
The costs of temporary accommodation will play a part in the Business Case. Overall 
solutions that minimise these costs and minimise the disruption of relocation would be 
preferred. 
 
§ Services Installations 
Services solutions should be simple and based upon current best practice. The design 
standards should be based on typical institutional grade office accommodation, tailored 
to suit the particular requirements. The assembly chamber will require special 
environmental services solutions, acoustic control, and specialist electronic systems to 
allow the live filming and transmission of proceedings. 
All parts of the design process should be properly coordinated to ensure that integrated 
solutions are achieved to provide flexibility and appropriate access for maintenance and 
repairs. 
Services solutions must be value engineered to ensure that the appropriate balance is 
achieved between initial capital costs and future running costs. 
Information Technology is to be given special consideration, the systems and 
infrastructure must be highly adaptable in order that the GLA can keep their IT systems 
up to date in line with the rapid advancements in the IT industry.  
‘Green’ issues should be given proper consideration. A full environmental assessment 
should be undertaken and an overall "BREEAM" rating of at 
least "very good" should be achieved.		
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This	brief	consists	of	four	main	sections.	The	first	sets	out	the	floor	area	of	about	13,000m2	
containing	the	three	key	areas	of	the	GLA:	those	accessible	to	public;	the	assembly	
chamber	with	a	viewing	gallery	for	250	people	and	committee	rooms;	and	enclosed	and	
open	plan	offices	for	the	GLA	members.	The	second	part	assigns	a	vast	set	of	
characteristics	to	the	design	of	the	interior	and	exterior:	appropriate,	progressive,	
futuristic,	open,	accessible,	efficient,	modern,	functional,	prominent	and	distinctive.	
Generally	the	building	should	be	of	“high	quality”	and	provide	“value	for	money”;	
“innovation	will	be	encouraged.	[…]	Simple,	elegant,	adaptable	solutions	will	be	preferred”	
(TTPM,	1998a).	These	heterogeneous	characteristics	require	interpretation	and	translation.	
The	third	section	set	out	the	tight	schedule	to	project	completion.	The	fourth	part	
describes	the	service	installations.	Solutions	should	be	“simple”,	“based	on	best	practice”	
and	“value	engineered”	(TTPM,	1998a).	The	last	paragraph	of	this	document	is	decisive	for	
the	purpose	of	this	chapter:	“‘Green’	issues	should	be	given	proper	consideration.	A	full	
environmental	assessment	should	be	undertaken	and	an	overall	‘BREEAM’	rating	of	at	
least	‘very	good’	should	be	achieved”	(TTPM,	1998a).		
The	call	for	“green	issues”	gave	some	vague	direction	to	the	architectural	designers	but	
provided	no	clear	directions.	The	adjective	“green”	may	be	interpreted	as	a	colour;	as	a	
symbol,	“green”	may	connote	some	idea	of	nature	or	environmental	protection	or	social	
justice.	Most	importantly,	the	brief	contained	one	unambiguous	criterion:	The	Building	
Research	Establishment	Environmental	Assessment	Method	(BREEAM)	required	at	least	a	
“very	good”	assessment	rating	for	the	new	headquarters.26	
																																								 																
26	The	Building	Research	Establishment	(BRE)	was	founded	in	1921	(then	named	Building	Research	Board)	as	a	
branch	of	the	British	Civil	Service.	BRE	was	privatised	under	the	Conservative	Government	in	March	1997	and	today	
is	a	non-profit	charitable	organization.	BRE	was	first	to	introduce	a	certification	system	in	1990.	When	BREEAM	was	
launched	it	sought	“to	provide	authoritative	guidance	on	ways	of	minimising	the	adverse	effects	of	buildings	on	the	
global	and	local	environments	while	promoting	a	healthy	and	comfortable	indoor	environment.	[…]	The	basis	of	the	
scheme	is	a	certificate	awarded	to	individual	buildings	on	the	basis	of	‘credits’	for	a	set	of	performance	criteria.	[…]	
The	main	objectives	of	the	scheme	are	to	distinguish	buildings	of	reduced	environmental	impact	in	the	market	place,	
[…]	to	encourage	best	environmental	practice	in	building	design,	operation,	management	and	maintenance,	[…]	to	
set	criteria	and	standards	going	beyond	those	required	by	law	and	regulations,	[…]	to	raise	the	awareness	of	owners,	
occupants,	designers	and	operators	of	the	benefits	of	buildings	with	a	reduced	impact	on	the	environment”	(BRE,	
1998,	p.	1).		
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By	law,	buildings	have	to	comply	with	regulations	that	apply	at	the	moment	the	architects	
submit	their	application	for	planning	permission.	The	BREEAM	certification	is	a	voluntary	
step	that	was	made	mandatory	through	this	brief	for	the	GLA	property	search.	
BREEAM	98	for	Offices	was	about	to	be	released	in	September	1998	and	the	BRE	described	
the	update	as	a	“major	overhaul”	that	introduced	the	current	layout	and	weighting	system.	
The	BRE	markets	its	assessment	method	as	a	tool	“to	ensure	a	broader	coverage	of	
sustainability	and	environmental	issues”	(BRE,	1998,	p.	5).27	BREEAM	98	established	a	
system	of	87	possible	credits	-	following	particular	accreditation	logics	-	that	are	grouped	
within	nine	assessment	sections	with	different	percentile	weightings	(Figure	4.5).	The	
future	GLA	headquarters	was	set	to	achieve	a	minimum	BREEAM	rating	of	“Very	Good”,	
which	required	at	least	55%	of	the	score	available	(“Excellent”	requires	70%).	
	 	
																																								 																
27	In	relation	to	the	concept	of	sustainable	development	BRE	claims	that	“BREEAM	addresses	the	following	which	
are	relevant	to	these	aims:	[…]	environmental	impacts,	leading	to	protection	and	perhaps	enhancement	of	the	
environment	by	reducing	pollution	of	air,	land	and	water.	[…]	Prudent	use	of	natural	resources	by:	providing	
durable	buildings	able	to	survive	changes	off	fashion	and	use;	selection	of	materials	and	products	with	better	
environmental	performance;	encouraging	appropriate	recycling;	encouraging	the	re-use	of	buildings;	encouraging	
the	re-use	of	land,	water	economy,	etc.	[…]	Quality	of	life	with	competitive	business	providing	high-quality	built	
environments,	buildings	and	indoor	environments	to	satisfy	human	and	business	needs”	(BRE,	1998,	p.	4).	
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Figure	4.5		The	BREEAM	98	for	Offices	weighting	scheme	(Diagram:	Author,	2014,	based	on	BRE	1998)	
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It	is	important	to	recognise	that	the	BRE	is	responsible	for	specifying	the	criteria	and	
methods	of	assessment	.	Therefore	BREEAM	must	be	understood	as	a	very	specific	way	of	
framing	and	evaluating	the	relationship	between	architectural	design	and	environmental	
challenges.	BREEAM	was	constructed	by	different	actors	with	different	viewpoints	and	
ways	of	addressing	problems	and	understanding	the	world	(Jamison,	2001,	pp.	27-32).	
Through	its	specific	“issue”,	“credit”	and	“weighting”	system,	it	translates	a	complex	and	
messy	world	into	a	set	of	quantifiable	parameters.	It	creates	a	worldview.	As	a	general	tool,	
BREEAM	suggests	particular	pathways	over	others.	For	instance	“materials”	are	weighted	
twice	as	high	as	“water”.	Then	these	categories	and	processes	of	awarding	credit	have	to	
be	defined.	BREEAM	is	a	tool	that	can	be	used,	but	how	it	is	assembled	and	why	particular	
categories	become	weighted	in	specific	ways	and	so	on,	remain	hidden	to	those	who	apply	
it.	BREEAM	is	an	essential	tool	that	was	drawn	into	the	GLA	property	search.	Jon	Spring	
recalled	when	he	and	colleagues	drafted	the	design	briefs:	“BREEAM	were	just	beginning	
to	kick	off	then	[…]	as	a	performance	tool”	(Interview	Spring,	2010).	In	1998	it	was	unusual	
and	innovative	to	require	a	BREEAM	assessment.	
Raynsford’s	claim	that	the	new	headquarters	was	to	exemplify	the	“commitment	to	the	
environmentally	progressive	objectives,	the	principles	of	sustainability”	(Interview	
Raynsford,	2010)	was	through	the	briefing	transformed	(in	association	with	other	
elements)	into	a	BREEAM	“very	good”	building	assessment.	BREEAM	thus	became	the	
crucial	“device”	within	the	design	briefing	to	align	the	heterogeneous	actors	and	entities	in	
the	overall	transaction	(Callon,	1986).		
The	concept	of	sustainability	is	clearly	not	equivalent	to	this	BREEAM	assessment	score	of	
55%;	its	transformation,	displacement	and	translation	are	therefore	of	crucial	importance.	
It	is	argued	that	the	BRE	has	become	a	dominant	force	in	the	struggle	to	attribute	meaning	
to	environmental	sustainability	in	architectural	design	practices	in	the	UK	(Hagan,	2001,	p.	
100).	Leach,	Scoones	and	Stirling	(2010)	argue	to	avoid	treating	“sustainability	in	a	general,	
colloquial	sense”.	Rather,	they	emphasise	the	importance	of	transforming	the	concept	into	
definitions	of	the	“explicit	qualities	of	human	well-being,	social	equity	and	environmental	
integrity”	(p.	5).	BREEAM,	on	the	other	hand,	is	criticised	for	its	tendency	to	“compress	the	
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meaning	of	sustainability	into	a	relatively	narrow	band	of	particular	issues”	(Farmer	&	Guy,	
2005,	p.	22).		
My	STS-inspired	approach	is	useful	to	analyse	how	the	design	briefing	was	constructed	and	
composed,	but	it	also	highlights	that	these	constructions	could	have	been	produced	in	
different	ways,	based	on	other	preferences	and	ambitions.	Leach,	Scoones	and	Stirling	
(2010)	argue	that	the	“goals	of	sustainability	are	context-specific	and	inevitably	contested”.	
Therefore	they	point	out	that	it	is	”essential	to	recognise	the	roles	of	public	deliberation	
and	negotiation	-	both	of	the	definition	of	what	is	to	be	sustained	and	of	how	to	get	there	
(p.	5,	emphasis	added).		
But	the	question	of	how	to	translate	the	concept	into	the	design	brief	for	the	GLA	
headquarters	to	come	was	neither	made	part	of	an	in-depth	debate	nor	declared	a	
controversial	issue	within	the	GOL	team.28	Raynsford	had	the	power	to	foster	this	debate	
through	his	role	and	responsibility	to	sign	off	on	the	competition	brief(s).	In	order	to	
exemplify	“the	principles	of	sustainability”,	Raynsford	and	his	team	could	have	explicitly	
passed	on	the	challenge	of	interpretation	to	the	bidders	to	come.	They	could	have	obliged	
the	developers,	architects	and	engineers	to	develop	a	tailored	strategy,	indicators	and	
vision	of	what	sustainability	could	mean	for	the	new	GLA	headquarters.		
BREEAM	was	deployed	as	the	dominant	pathway	(Leach	et	al.,	2010)	to	frame	
sustainability	in	the	GLA’s	headquarter	development.	With	this	transformation	especially	
the	social	and	ethical	components	of	the	concept	become	neglected	within	the	translation	
process	of	the	design	briefing.	The	design	brief	could	have	made	mandatory	“to	specify	
clearly,	for	particular	issues	and	settings,	what	is	to	be	sustained	for	whom,	and	who	will	
gain	or	lose	in	the	process”	(p.	171).		
The	idea	of	“innovation”	became	one	design	parameter.	Innovation	is	one	of	the	popular	
buzzwords	surrounding	approaches	to	sustainable	development.	It	may	be	understood	as	
the	“action	of	innovating;	the	introduction	of	novelties;	the	alteration	of	what	is	
																																								 																
28	This	question	was	acknowledged	in	1994	when	the	then	Prime	Minister	John	Major	stated	in	the	foreword	of	the	
Sustainable	development:	the	UK	strategy,	“Sustainable	development	is	hard	to	define.	[…]	Making	the	choices	
necessary	to	deliver	sustainable	development	requires	a	national	and	international	debate.	This	strategy	is	the	
starting	point	for	that	debate”	(DOE,	1994).	
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established	by	the	introduction	of	new	elements	or	forms”,	a	“[r]evolution”	and	a	“change	
made	in	the	nature	or	fashion	of	anything;	something	newly	introduced;	a	novel	practice,	
method”	(Oxford	English	Dictionary,	2011).	The	brief	stated,	“innovation	will	be	
encouraged	providing	it	is	clearly	beneficial	and	works”	(TTPM,	1998a).	The	idea	of	
innovation	was	brought	together	with	a	“risk	adverse”	approach.	These	two	ideas	conflict:	
how	can	a	technology	be	innovative	and	at	the	same	time	“tried	and	tested”?	(Interview	
Griffiths,	2010)	
In	summary,	the	Greater	London	Authority:	Preliminary	Summary	of	Authority’s	
Requirements	set	out	and	assembled	diverse	heterogeneous	elements	for	the	GLA	building	
search.	It	identified	the	three	key	programme	areas,	assigned	a	vast	set	of	design	
characteristics,	and	established	a	potential	conflict	between	“best	practice”	and	
“innovation”.	Essentially,	the	document	defined	the	environmental	challenge	for	the	
future	GLA	building	as	achieving	a	BREEAM	1998	assessment	rating	of	at	least	55%.	But,	
importantly,	this	goal	became	associated	with	other	elements	such	as	providing	12,000m2	
or	the	goal	that	the	building	should	be	perceived	as	externally	“prominent	and	distinctive	
and	be	a	design	for	the	future”	(TTPM,	1998a).	In	order	to	fulfil	the	majority	of	design	
goals,	not	only	a	BREEAM	“very	good”	assessment	was	required,	but	other	detours	had	to	
be	accepted	and	problems	solved	that	were	associated	with	BREEAM.	
4.4.4.2 The	GLA	Statement	of	Requirements	(SOR4)	
Approximately	a	week	after	the	first	brief,	KFEA	issued	the	detailed	Greater	London	
Authority:	Property	Search	Option	Appraisal	that	set	out	a	“Statement	of	Requirements”,	
draft	4	(SOR4),	prepared	collectively	by	TTPM	and	the	GOL.	This	brief	provided	a	detailed	
schedule	of	the	net	floor	space	required	to	let	for	400	staff	of	the	GLA.	The	generic	SOR	
identified	overall	needs	which	were	not	specific	to	any	particular	building.	It	formed	the	
benchmark	against	which	the	developers’	proposals	were	to	be	compared	and	set	out	a	
schedule	of	“GLA	Space	Standards”	that	included	information	on	the	required	
measurements	and	enclosure	(enclosed	cellular,	part	glazed	cellular,	screened	and	open)	
for	respective	staff	grades.	This	catalogue	of	space	standards	was	followed	by	a	“schedule	
of	accommodation”	of	more	than	eight	pages	of	detailed	information	on	proposed	GLA	
departments	(the	mayor’s	office,	the	assembly	secretariat	and	so	on)	by	function,	
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department,	grade,	area	per	unit	in	square	metres,	staff	number	and	total	floor	area,	and	
whether	they	should	be	open	plan.	Each	planned	room	was	listed	and	the	document	
concluded	by	giving	the	total	spatial	requirement	for	the	400	staff	to	be	11,609m2	(TTPM,	
1998c).	Gordon	Rautenbach	explained	the	very	specific	briefing	for	the	spatial	
requirements	as	an	approach	to	“avoid	excessive	energy	usage	for	unwanted	space”	
(Interview	Rautenbach,	2010).		
4.4.4.3 The	GLA	Occupier	Brief	
The	GLA	Occupier	Brief	was	issued	alongside	the	GLA	Property	Search	Option	Appraisal.	
The	brief	identified	16	distinct	areas	within	the	anticipated	GLA	headquarters	(mayor’s	
office,	assembly	chamber,	press	suite	and	others)	and	explained	their	related	“function”,	
“element”	and	“description”	in	a	three-column	schedule.	Gordon	Rautenbach	called	it	the	
“M&E	[mechanical	and	electrical]	brief”.	Under	“function”,	the	chart	specified	projected	
ways	of	inhabiting	the	areas,	and	quality	standards	of	finishes,	fixtures	and	fittings	
(sometimes	even	furniture).	The	richness	of	detail	varies	for	different	areas.29	Under	
“element”,	the	schedule	described	particular	mechanical	and	electrical	building	services	–	
“Heating,	Ventilation	and	Air	Conditioning”	(HVAC),	“HVAC	&	Control”	options,	“Noise	
Criteria”,	“Lighting”,	“Small	Power”,	“Fire	Protection”	and	“Specialist	Systems”.	The	third	
column,	“Description”,	brings	in	a	broad	range	of	different	technical	units	and	technical	
equipment	such	as	temperature	(oC),	noise	criteria,	lighting	lux	levels,	ampere	(amp),	
watt/m2,	power	sockets,	automatic	fire	detectors,	TV/FM	aerial	systems,	telephones,	data	
systems	and	much	more	(TTPM,	1998b).	These	specifications	for	typical	office	spaces	are	
set	out	in	accordance	with	recommendations	of	the	British	Council	for	Office’s	Guide	to	
Specification.	
The	GLA	headquarters	was	to	be	located	in	London,	implying	specific	projections	of	
temperature,	daylight	and	weather	conditions,	and	site-specific	boundary	conditions.	The	
GLA	Occupier	Brief	specified	the	environmental	challenge	for	the	building’s	interior	
																																								 																
29	The	function	of	the	mayor’s	office	is	described	as	such:	“The	Mayor’s	office	shall	accommodate	a	working	area,	a	
formal	meeting	area	with	seating	for	up	to	twelve	in	boardroom	style	and	an	informal	seating	area	with	armchairs	
and	sofas	for	six.	The	quality	of	the	fixtures,	furniture,	fittings	and	finishes	should	reflect	the	status	of	the	Mayor’s	
role.	The	layout	of	the	office	should	be	adaptable	to	suit	the	particular	needs	of	the	incumbent	Mayor”	(TTPM,	
1998b).	
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through	a	set	of	“user-specific	boundary	conditions”	(Lenz,	Schreiber,	&	Stark,	2011).	
These	reflected	particular	understandings	of	the	occupier’s	comfort	and	safety	conditions	
and	defined	them	through	quantitative	measures.	For	instance,	the	mayor’s	office	was	
required	to	be	kept	constantly	within	a	temperature	range	of	22oC	±	3oC.	The	brief	
specifies	targets	in	physical	dimensions	for	relative	air	humidity	(50%	±	10%),	airflows	(10	
air	exchanges	per	hour)	and	lighting	levels	(400lux	dimmable).	This	definition	of	the	user-
specific	boundary	conditions	provided	the	basis	for	designers	and	building	service	
engineers	to	design,	measure	and	create	the	building	service	devices	(for	instance	size	and	
number	of	air	handling	units).	Crucially,	it	is	a	particular	definition	of	user-specific	
boundary	conditions	that	influences	the	energy	demand	of	buildings	(Lenz	et	al.,	2011,	pp.	
12-13).	They	define	which	interior	environmental	conditions	are	acceptable.	Through	
energy	consumption	and	by	mechanical	and	electrical	devices	these	conditions	need	to	be	
maintained	at	any	time	of	the	year,	whether	hot	or	cold.	The	environmental	challenge	of	
the	exterior	is	inseparably	tied	to	the	environmental	challenge	of	the	interior.		
Following	the	release	of	the	GLA	Preliminary	Summary	of	Authority’s	Requirements,	the	
GLA	Property	Search	Option	Appraisal	(SOR4)	and	the	GLA	Occupier	Brief	to	the	seven	
selected	developer-architect	teams,	the	GLA	property	search	entered	a	new	phase.	These	
teams	started	interpreting	the	three	design	briefs	with	the	goal	to	further	translate	them	
into	design	strategies,	forms,	materialities	and	more.	In	the	following	chapter	I	explore	
how	the	CIT	(More	London),	Foster+Partners	and	Arup	design	team	(among	others)	
responded	to	this	set	of	criteria	during	the	design	development,	and	how	the	design	brief	
continued	to	evolve	parallel	to	the	development	of	the	architectural	design	schemes.	
4.5 Conclusions	
In	this	chapter	I	retraced	the	practices	that	brought	City	Hall	into	being	prior	to	the	
architects	and	engineers	of	the	More	London	team	taking	up	their	work.	The	central	aim	of	
this	chapter	was	to	explore	how	in	these	‘early’	design	practices	(envisioning	the	GLA	and	
its	accommodation)	the	environmental	challenge	was	constructed	as	an	issue	at	the	outset	
of	the	project,	and	how	particular	targets	and	goals	were	formulated	to	instruct	the	
architects,	engineers	and	developers	in	making	their	design	proposals.	
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In	his	role	as	Minister	for	London,	Nick	Raynsford	had	to	start	thinking	about	how	to	
establish	the	GLA.	As	part	of	this	process,	before	Raynsford	and	his	team	were	able	to	
draft	the	design	briefing	for	the	headquarters	to	come,	he	had	to	outline,	consult	and	pass	
(stabilise)	the	functions,	responsibilities	and	housing	of	the	new	authority	and	set	up	
legislation	to	bring	the	it	into	being.	Not	much	was	known	at	that	time	about	the	
anticipated	new	building,	“a	little-known,	abstract	and	fuzzy	entity”	that	began	to	
accumulate	more	and	more	well-known	characteristics	(Yaneva,	2009,	p.	21).	
The	GLA’s	overarching	function	was	defined	in	two	government	consultation	papers	(DETR,	
1997,	1998b)	as	being	to	promote	sustainable	development.	Under	the	umbrella	of	
“sustainable	development”,	Raynsford	and	his	DETR	team	constructed	the	GLA’s	
environmental	responsibility	predominantly	through	five	environmental	crises	that	need	
strategic	action:	climate	change,	air	pollution,	noise	pollution,	waste	generation	and	the	
loss	of	biodiversity.		
As	the	functions	of	the	GLA	became	gradually	defined,	heterogeneous	elements	began	to	
inform	the	design	development	of	City	Hall.	For	instance,	the	headquarters	had	to	become	
an	exemplar	of	the	authorities	overarching	environmental	responsibilities,	and	as	“symbol	
of	what	[…]	the	labour	government	[…]	tried	to	achieve”	in	their	early	years	(Interview	
Raynsford,	2010),	further	only	a	tight	budget,	and	a	tight	timeframe	were	allowed,	and	a	
vague	space	allocation	plan	emerged.	Through	the	accumulation	of	these	design	
knowledges,	the	design	briefing	also	increasingly	took	shape.	
Raynsford	defined	the	environmental	challenge	for	the	design	of	the	GLA	headquarters	
through	the	concept	of	sustainability.	In	his	hands,	as	well	as	in	the	government	papers,	
the	concept	of	sustainability	seemed	to	be	a	useful	frame	with	which	to	guide	
policymaking.	But	in	order	for	the	design	briefing	to	to	guide	and	align	the	developers,	
architects,	engineers	and	others	in	developing	their	design	proposals,	the	concept	needed	
to	be	translated	into	challenges	to	which	solutions	could	be	found.	Yet	the	question	of	
how	to	translate	the	concept	into	the	design	brief	was	neither	made	part	of	an	in-depth	
debate	nor	declared	a	controversial	issue	to	be	tackled	within	the	GOL	team.	Raynsford	
and	his	team	had	the	power	to	foster	this	debate	through	his	role	and	responsibility	to	
draft	and	sign	off	on	the	brief(s)	for	the	GLA	headquarters	to	come.	They	could	have	
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explicitly	delivered	the	challenge	of	interpretation	and	given	meaning	to	the	concept	
through	architectural	design	to	the	bidders.	They	did	not	ask	the	developers,	architects	
and	engineers	to	develop	a	tailored	strategy,	indicators	and	vision	of	what	sustainability	
could	mean	for	the	new	GLA	headquarters.	
Instead,	the	concept	of	sustainability	was	translated	into	a	certain	amount	of	BREEAM	
credits	and	score.	The	meaning	of	sustainability	was	thereby	reduced	to	a	narrow	
definition	of	selected	issues.	Furthermore,	only	a	score	of	55%	(i.e.	“very	good”)	of	this	
questionable	delegation	to	BREEAM	was	made	mandatory.	The	opportunity	to	come	up	
with	a	more	innovative	(beyond	typical	pathways)	interpretation	of	sustainability	for	the	
GLA’s	headquarters	was	not	taken.	Heterogeneous	elements,	scales	and	actors	became	
assembled	in	the	design	briefing.	The	environmental	challenge	to	achieve	55%	BREEAM	
assessment	credits	must	be	seen	in	relation	to	other	“design	parameters”	that	were	set	
out	for	the	GLA	design.	It	seemed	that	the	government’s	choice	to	stay	with	the	spending	
commitments	of	the	previous	government,	as	well	as	the	decision	to	enter	a	lease	deal	
with	a	commercial	developer,	were	factors	in	a	more	radical	translation	of	sustainability	
not	being	enacted.	
To	innovate	in	building	practices,	and	to	escape	the	typical	pathways	of	responding	to	
environmental	problems,	those	involved	have	to	eschew	usual	formulations	of	the	
environmental	problem	and	redesign	the	specific	social	construction	of	the	environmental	
problems	themselves.	Given	London’s	role	as	a	powerhouse	of	global	economic	activity	
and	interrelated	global	environmental	degrading,	the	brief	for	City	Hall	should	have	been	
more	radical.30	
	 	
																																								 																
30	London	hosts	a	vast	concentration	of	headquarters	of	leading	transnational	cooperations	(TNCs)	within	the	
administrative	boundaries	of	the	GLA.	Within	this	territory,	these	cooperations	draw	together	and	bundle	their	
command	hierarchies	that	span	across	the	globe.	London	therefore	forms	an	important	site	in	global	environmental	
accountability	(Sassen,	2004).		
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Chapter	5 	
Finding	forms,	choosing	strategies	
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5.1 Introduction		
Chapters	5	and	6	retrace	the	design	practices	that	led	to	City	Hall’s	materialisation.	In	this	
chapter	I	describe	how	many	new	actors	and	entities	became	associated	in	this	
unpredictable	and	conflictual	design	development	process.	By	the	end	of	August	1998,	CIT,	
Foster+Partners	architects	and	Arup	engineers	began	to	work	as	key	members	of	the	
developer	team,	shaping	their	proposals	in	order	to	win	the	competitive	property	search	
for	the	Greater	London	Authority	(GLA)	headquarters.		
The	involved	actors	comprehended	the	design	development	as	a	process	of	continuous	
transformation	in	which	four	transient	key	design	schemes	could	be	identified	that	built	on	
each	other	(Interview	Hyams,	2011)	(Figure	5.1).	Two	schemes	were	presented	to	Nick	
Raynsford	in	September	and	November	1998,	along	which	I	develop	this	chapter.	The	
other	two	schemes	presented	crucial	stages	within	the	planning	process:	the	Planning	
Application	Scheme	(July	1999)	and	the	Schematic	Design	Scheme	(November	1999),	
which	I	explore	in	Chapter	6.		
These	four	schemes	marked	the	progressive	accumulation	of	heterogeneous	elements	and	
design	knowledge.	Involved	actors	were	required	to	feed	in	to	and	coordinate	their	
contributions	in	a	supposedly	single	transient	scheme.	This	chapter	draws	on	presentation	
material,	design	documents,	guidelines	and	interviews	to	retell	the	history	of	the	GLA	
headquarters	design	proposal	of	the	CIT,	Foster+Partners	and	Arup	team	until	they	
succeeded	in	winning	the	GLA	property	search	in	February	1999.		
	
Figure	5.1		Four	transient	key	schemes	within	City	Hall’s	continuously	transforming	design	development;	from	left	
to	right,	the	first	Ministerial	Presentation	Scheme,	the	second	Ministerial	Presentation	Scheme,	the	Planning	
Application	Scheme	and	the	Schematic	Design	Scheme	(Drawing:	author,	2012).	
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Chapter	5	and	6	aim	to	explain	how	the	design	team	translated	the	environmental	
challenges	and	targets	defined	in	the	Government	Office	for	London’s	(GOL)	design	
briefings	into	design	strategies,	building	technologies	and	the	materialising	building.	The	
next	Chapter	explains	how	selected	strategies	were	further	tested,	transformed	and	
stabilised.	I	focus	on	the	development	of	City	Hall’s	unique	building	form,	orientation	and	
envelope.	The	design	of	these	building	elements	was	given	a	pivotal	role	within	the	design	
team’s	environmental	design	strategy,	and	their	design	associated	and	brought	together	
diverse	issues	and	heterogeneous	entities:	questions	of	environmental	control	(e.g.	heat	
losses,	solar	gains,	fresh	air,	daylight),	materiality	(e.g.	glass,	solidity),	operability	(e.g.	
openable	windows,	cleaning),	constructability	(e.g.	geometrical	definition,	assembling),	
perception	processes	(e.g.	transparency,	symbolism),	cost,	security,	durability	and	more.		
In	order	to	proceed	from	the	initial	design	briefing	towards	materialisation	of	the	GLA	
headquarters,	the	GOL,	Turner	and	Townsend	Project	Management	(TTPM),	CIT,	
Foster+Partners	and	Arup	necessarily	depended	on	the	simultaneous	production	of	new	
design	knowledge	and	the	additional	association	of	heterogeneous	entities.	The	initial	
design	briefing,	the	role	of	actors	and	their	interests,	the	properties	of	entities	and	their	
relationships	were	reciprocally	shaped	and	modified	during	the	design	process.	This	
process	was	performed	through	two	mechanisms:	the	various	sorts	of	transformations	and	
choices	and	the	diverse	negotiations	and	adjustments	that	accompanied	them	(Callon,	
1986,	p.	224).		
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5.2 Setting	the	scene	
	
Figure	5.2		Foster+Partners’	Riverside	Studio	in	2002	as	one	centre	of	transformations	and	choices	(Photograph:	
Nigel	Young	and	Foster+Partners,	2002)	
Two	disconnected	but	concurrent	processes	that	started	in	different	offices	by	different	
actors,	and	were	driven	by	different	interests	and	responsibilities,	began	to	merge	and	co-
shape	each	other	in	May	1998.	The	first	process	was	Labour’s	commitment	to	bring	back	a	
London-wide	government	and,	following	the	successful	election,	the	new	government’s	
preparations	to	install	the	GLA	overseen	by	Nick	Raynsford	(Chapter	4).	The	second	
process	was	the	development	of	the	139,350m2	site	on	the	River	Thames,	facing	the	Tower	
of	London	and	next	to	Tower	Bridge,	called	London	Bridge	City.	This	second	phase	had	
involved	several	architects,	masterplans	and	setbacks	since	1987.	These	two	processes	
became	interrelated	in	May	1998	when	CIT	submitted	their	London	Bridge	City	proposal	in	
response	to	the	initial	call	for	outline	proposals	by	Knight	Frank	Estate	Agents	(KFEA).	CIT	
entered	the	competitive	property	search	with	the	aim	of	building	the	GLA	headquarters	as	
part	of	its	masterplan.	
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On	behalf	of	the	GOL,	TTPM	issued	the	first	three	design	briefs	(Chapter	4)	to	the	seven	
selected	developer	teams	in	August	1998,	requesting	design	and	financial	proposals	for	
the	GLA	headquarters	to	come.	Then	the	London	Bridge	City	team	began	an	unpredictable	
design	process	which	prepared	for	the	first	ministerial	presentation	and	submission	of	
proposals	only	six	weeks	later	in	mid-September.		
5.2.1 The	London	Bridge	City	design	team	
The	London	Bridge	City	team	that	entered	the	GOL’s	competitive	property	search	was	
comprised	three	distinct	key	parties,	each	having	different	roles,	ways	of	working,	skills,	
and	interests	in	relation	to	the	GLA	headquarter	design.31	The	developer	CIT	was	itself	part	
of	a	consortium	of	three	different	groups	of	companies	(an	investor,	an	asset	management	
company	and	a	development	company).32	CIT,	as	the	client,	employed	Foster+Partners	and	
Arup.	The	CIT	team	was	responsible	for	marketing,	leasing,	financing,	accounting,	
development	delivery	and	space	management.	It	consisted	of	up	to	24	people.	The	team	
that	worked	on	development	delivery	never	exceeded	ten	people.	Liam	Bond	was	the	
development	director	at	CIT,	responsible	for	the	entire	London	Bridge	City	project,	which	
was	later	reorganised	and	rebranded	as	More	London	development.	In	this	role	he	focused	
on	the	appointment	and	briefing	of	the	design	teams,	taking	the	schemes	through	
planning,	establishing	the	phasing	strategy	(More	London	consists	of	eleven	other	projects	
besides	City	Hall),	setting	up	the	construction	procurement,	and	managing	a	team	of	
project	managers	internally	to	deliver	the	projects	(Interview	Bond,	2011).	
Foster+Partners	architectural	practice	was	founded	in	1967	by	Norman	Foster	and	Wendy	
Cheesman.33	Today,	Foster+Partners	is	one	of	the	largest	architectural	practices	in	the	
world	and	has	designed	architecture	and	infrastructure	projects	in	150	different	cities	and	
																																								 																
31	The	wider	team	included	Davis	Langdon	&	Everest	and	Mott	Green	&	Wall	(cost	consultants),	Montagu	Evans	
(planning	consultants)	and	MACE	(construction	managers).	
32	First	the	investors	DEPFA	Bank	and	CIT	Group	Plc,	which	formed	and	held	shares	in	the	holding	company,	London	
Bridge	Holdings,	located	offshore	in	the	Bahamas	for	tax	reasons.	Second	and	third,	CIT	founded	two	onshore	(UK-
based)	companies	in	order	to	set	up,	deliver	and	manage	the	development.	One	was	an	asset	management	
company	and	the	other	was	CIT	Markborough	Ltd	as	the	development	company.	
33	Initially	the	practice	was	called	Foster	Associates;	the	practice	was	renamed	Foster+Partners	in	1990.	
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50	countries.34	Three	key	people	at	Foster+Partners	led	the	GLA	project.	Ken	Shuttleworth	
was	in	charge	of	the	GLA	project	and	project	architect,	Sean	Afflek,	“ran”	the	day-to-day	
job.	Richard	Hyams	later	joined	him.	About	20	Foster+Partners	architects	worked	on	the	
project	over	its	course.	
The	third	key	party	to	join	City	Hall’s	design	team	was	Arup,	a	global	services	firm	that	
provides	engineering,	design,	planning,	project	management	and	consulting	services	to	
many	areas	of	the	built	environment.35	During	peak	times	the	GLA	team	at	Arup	comprised	
up	to	30	members.	James	Thonger	was	the	engineering	project	manager	and	the	lead	
building	services	engineer.	In	this	role	he	was	directly	involved	in	City	Hall’s	design.	
Thonger	had	a	counterpart	in	David	Glover,	who	was	the	structural	lead	designer,	and	the	
two	were	the	main	actors	responsible	for	developing	the	building	design.	Thonger	had	a	
lead	mechanical	engineer,	a	lead	electrical	and	a	public	health	engineer	below	him.	The	
team	working	with	building	services	comprised	up	to	ten	people	in	total.	The	structural	
engineering	team	was	much	bigger	with	approximately	20	structural	engineers	(Interview	
Thonger,	2011).	
In	August	1998	the	team	of	CIT,	Foster+Partners	and	Arup	began	to	put	the	first	three	
design	briefs	into	action.	Raynsford	had	been	responsible	for	the	design	briefing.	The	
briefing	had	translated	the	environmental	challenge	from	the	concept	of	sustainability	(as	
the	overarching	function	of	the	GLA)	into	a	narrowly	compressed	understanding	of	nine	
assessment	areas	in	architectural	practices	defined	under	BREEAM	as	“very	good”,	and	
into	an	undefined	vague	request	that	“‘Green’	issues	should	be	given	proper	consideration”	
(TTPM,	1998a).	This	design	challenge	was	clearly	not	posed	in	isolation,	but	associated	
with	diverse	heterogeneous	requirements	including	inter	alia	the	demand	for	a	
“prominent	and	distinctive”	building,	“high	quality”,	“innovation”,	“simple	and	based	upon	
																																								 																
34	The	practice’s	works	include	projects	like	the	Willis	Faber	&	Dumas	Headquarters,	Ipswich,	1971–1975;	the	
Sainsbury	Centre	for	the	Visual	Arts,	Norwich,	1974–1978;	the	Hongkong	and	Shanghai	Bank	headquarters,	Hong	
Kong,	1979–1986;	the	Commerzbank	Headquarters	in	Frankfurt,	1991–1997,	and	in	1998	Foster+Partners	was	close	
to	completing	the	Reichstag,	the	new	German	Parliament	in	Berlin,	1992–1999	(based	on	
http://www.fosterandpartners.com,	accessed	08	August	2014).	
35	In	1946	Ove	Arup	founded	the	firm	with	an	initial	focus	on	structural	engineering.	In	1963,	together	with	the	
architect	Philip	Dowson,	the	firm	became	Arup	Associates,	and	in	1970	it	was	transformed	into	Ove	Arup	&	Partners.	
Today	Arup	has	about	10,000	employees,	offices	in	37	countries	and	operates	in	more	than	160	countries	
(http://www.arup.com/About_us.aspx,	accessed	04	April	2014).	
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current	on	best	practice	[…]	service	solutions”,	a	chamber	“demonstrating	openness	and	
accessibility”	(TTPM,	1998a),	11,609m2	floor	area,	accommodation	for	400	GLA	staff,	more	
than	200	different	room	types	(TTPM,	1998c),	interior	temperature	differences	of	22oC	±	
3oC,	relative	air	humidity	(50%	±	10%),	400	lux	lighting	levels	(TTPM,	1998b).	These	diverse	
design	issues	were	required	to	be	addressed	as	a	package..	As	I	will	show	in	this	and	the	
following	chapter,	the	design	briefing	requirements	were	not	fixed,	but	developed	in	
relation	to	the	unpredictable	proceeding	design	practices.		
The	three	design	briefs	were	produced	and	deployed	on	behalf	of	the	GOL	as	powerful	
devices	to	align	the	London	Bridge	City	team	members	with	the	GOL	team	in	the	joint	
mission	to	develop	a	successful	proposal	that	could	spatially	manifest	and	materialise	the	
new	GLA	headquarters.	As	devices	the	briefs	aimed	to	instigate	particular	design	
developments	that	would	fulfil	the	supposedly	shared	interests	of	the	actors	involved	(cf.	
Callon,	1986).	GOL’s	key	interest	was	to	find	a	suitable	accommodation	for	the	GLA,	that	of	
CIT	was	to	start	kickstart	the	development	of	their	London	Bridge	City	site,	and	of	key	
interest	to	Foster+	Partners	and	Arup	was	a	new	and	prominent	design	commission.		
Upon	issuing	the	first	three	briefs,	the	GOL	gave	CIT,	Foster+Partners	and	Arup	only	six	
weeks	to	assemble	their	proposal	for	the	initial	presentation	to	Raynsford	and	his	advisors.	
They	first	had	to	translate	three	design	briefs	into	design	strategies,	proposed	spatial	
arrangements,	building	forms,	building	technologies	and	presentation	materials	(diagrams,	
design	drawings,	renderings,	3D	models)	in	order	to	create	a	proposal	that	could	succeed.	
They	entered	into	a	contingent	design	process	that	required	interpreting	the	design	
briefing	and,	in	order	to	progress,	the	team	was	dependent	on	the	accumulation	of	
additional	design	information,	prioritising	and	transforming	it.	In	this	process	additional	
heterogeneous	entities	became	associated	that	forged	a	conflictual	and	unpredictable	
alliance.		
City	Hall’s	design	development	emerged	through	the	rather	messy	day-to-day	interaction	
of	practitioners,	papers,	computers	and	physical	models.	Design	sketches,	drawings	and	
3D	models	were	a	crucial	means	to	investigate,	communicate	and	work	together.	They	
were	the	material	elements	that	the	design	team	sought	to	assemble,	since	the	two	
ministerial	presentations,	the	planning	application	and	the	scheme	design	drawing	
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package	(the	four	key	schemes)	were	decisively	built	and	constituted	through	them.	They	
were	central	and	necessary	intermediary	products	that	bound	participants	together	
(Henderson,	1999)	and	that	had	to	be	produced	to	enable	the	journey	towards	
materialisation.		
The	day-to-day	collaboration	between	CIT,	Foster+Partners	and	Arup	relied	on	frequent	
telephone	and	fax	exchanges	in	which	lots	of	data	were	transferred	over	and	back.	In	1998	
emails	were	only	beginning	to	become	important	and	were	then	not	capable	of	
transferring	large	files.	Further,	the	collaboration	was	built	on	three	types	of	meetings	in	
Foster+Partners’	Riverside	Studio	-	an	important	centre	of	negotiation	and	decision-
making	in	City	Hall’s	design	practices	(Figure	5.2).	Weekly	“design	team	meetings”	in	which	
project	managers	and	team	leaders	met	for	most	of	the	day	were	central.	In	addition	there	
were	“project	coordination	meetings”,	which	in	peak	times	also	took	place	weekly,	that	
dealt	with	financial	or	organisational	matters.	And	a	“meeting	of	principals”	was	held	
monthly	to	inform	each	other	about	key	issues	and	project	progress	(Interview	Thonger,	
2011).		
In	order	to	develop	my	account	of	the	heterogeneous	design	practices	that	took	place	I	
composed	an	additional	timeline	(Figure	5.3)	that	draws	together	key	elements	from	July	
1997	(the	beginning	of	the	design	briefing	development)	to	July	2002	(the	opening	of	City	
Hall).	In	comparison	with	the	timeline	in	Figure	4.2,	I	concentrate	here	on	a	particular	facet	
of	the	design	process	over	a	shorter	period	that	relates	important	events,	key	design	
phases	(e.g.	the	design	briefing,	the	competitive	property	search,	construction	on	site,	
etc.),	the	arrival	or	departure	of	important	different	vocational	actors	(e.g.	GOL,	
Foster+Partners,	Arup,	Raynsford’s	architectural	advisors),	the	release	of	design	
documents	(e.g.	design	briefs,	design	documents,	BREEAM	updates),	the	emergence,	
stabilisation	and	elimination	of	environmental	design	strategies,	and	the	release	of	key	
visual	representations	(e.g.	design	sketches,	diagrams,	drawings,	renderings).	The	four	
consecutive	key	design	schemes	along	which	I	develop	my	account	are	marked	through	
the	numbered	red	circles	on	the	bottom	of	the	timeline.		
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Figure	5.3		Timeline	1997	-	2003	with	the	four	key	schemes	(numbered	1	to	4	in	circles	on	red	background	at	
bottom),	mapping	reciprocal	presence	and	shaping	of	actors,	key	documents,	design	strategies	and	evolving	
schemes	(Timeline:	Author,	2014)		
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In	the	following	I	begin	to	analyse	the	multifarious	translation	processes	that	transformed	
the	design	briefing	requirements	into	environmental	design	strategies	and	building	
technologies.		
5.2.2 Constructing	the	context	and	commencing	massing	studies	
In	exploring	the	development	of	City	Hall’s	building	form	and	orientation	as	the	chosen	
pivotal	environmental	design	strategy	in	response	to	the	design	briefing,	it	is	necessary	to	
go	back	and	start	with	the	architectural	massing	studies	of	the	masterplan	design.	Prior	to	
KFEA’s	call	for	outline	proposals	on	29	May	1998	CIT	Markborough	Ltd	announced	that	it	
had	appointed	Sir	Norman	Foster	and	his	practice	as	masterplanner	for	the	139,350m2	site	
called	London	Bridge	City.	The	Estates	Gazette	commented	that	“CIT	boosted	its	chance	by	
appointing	Foster+Partners	as	masterplanners	for	the	£1bn	Thameside	site”	in	their	vital	
search	to	secure	a	major	tenant	for	their	development	(Estates	Gazette,	1998,	pp.	35,	40).	
CIT’s	development	director	Liam	Bond	argued	that	CIT	needed	a	masterplan	with	the	aim	
of	creating	a	“development	with	its	own	identity,	its	own	sense	of	place	and	its	own	critical	
mass”	(Interview	Bond,	2011).	He	explained	the	rationale	for	choosing	Foster+Partners	as	
follows:	
[T]hey	had	the	capability,	[…]	they	weren’t	overexposed	to	the	London	market	at	
that	particular	point	in	time.	[…]	There	weren’t	a	huge	cannon	of	Foster’s	buildings	
within	the	City	of	London	[…]	yet	they	had	an	international	renown.	So,	it	was	a	big	
draw	to	use	their	name	as	well	(Interview	Bond,	2011).	
Foster+Partners’	reputation	was	seen	as	a	strategic	asset	in	CIT’s	interest	to	attract	and	
secure	potential	tenants,	which	was	a	necessary	precondition	for	CIT	to	start	the	
development	process.	Bond	argued	that	CIT	chose	Foster+Partners	because	of	the	
practice’s	international	reputation	and	its	ability	to	handle	a	large	development.	Bond	did	
not	list	questions	of	‘environmental	design’	as	a	possible	rationale	for	the	choice.	CIT	
started	negotiations	with	potential	tenants	but	initially	couldn’t	secure	any	major	property	
deal.	Rather	than	developing	the	site	for	a	big	specific	occupier,	Foster+Partners	was		
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Figure	5.4		The	cleared	London	Bridge	City	site	in	the	1990s	in	front,	Tower	Bridge	in	the	back	(Photograph:	Estates	
Gazette,	14	March	1998,	Issue	9811,	p.59)	
briefed	to	develop	a	masterplan	for	the	whole	site	that	would	potentially	suit	different	
generic	users.	
The	masterplan	site	had	a	troubled	history.	Before	the	Second	World	War	Bermondsey	
Riverside	was	part	of	a	thriving	industrial	community	within	the	London	Docklands.	
Bombing	between	1940	and	1945	heavily	damaged	the	site	that	would	become	London	
Bridge	City.	Shifts	towards	railway	network	cargo	distribution	in	the	1960s,	larger	ships,	
the	liberalisation	of	port	legislation	and	expanding	container	ports	downstream	were	
some	of	the	factors	that	set	in	motion	the	general	decline	of	Bermondsey	Riverside	site	
and	the	Docklands	in	general.	During	the	1970s	the	site	that	More	London	occupied	later	
was	to	a	large	extent	cleared	of	its	existing	buildings.	There	had	been	a	number	of	design	
proposals	for	the	site	before	CIT	became	involved.36	Overall	the	site	had	lain	fallow	for	
																																								 																
36	The	owner	preceding	CIT,	the	Kuwaiti	Investment	Office,	represented	by	St	Martins	Property	Cooperation,	had	a	
huge	tract	of	land,	which	spread	from	London	Bridge	eastwards	to	Tower	Bridge.	After	completing	their	first	phase	
of	London	Bridge	City,	St	Martins’	failed	to	develop	the	two	subsequent	phases	of	London	Bridge	City.	In	the	1980s	
St	Martins	attempted	to	develop	the	site	through	the	Venice	on	Thames	scheme	by	John	Simpson	&	Partners,	and	a	
proposal	by	the	famous	architect	Philip	Johnson.	None	of	these	schemes	was	realised	over	the	course	of	many	
years.	In	November	1997	the	London	Bridge	City	site	II	and	III	were	sold	by	St	Martins	to	the	DEPFA	Bank	for	about	
£60	million.	Later	DEPFA	sold	a	major	equity	share	to	the	CIT	group.		
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over	25	years	until	Foster+Partners	started	constructing	City	Hall	and	the	More	London	
infrastructure.	In	May	1998	work	started	on	the	masterplan	in	a	design	collective	led	and	
coordinated	by	Foster+Partners.	The	team	included	Arup	in	the	role	of	consultants	for	
transportation,	services	engineering	and	infrastructure	engineering	and	a	growing	number	
of	other	building	specialists.37	
	
Figure	5.5		Assembling	the	heterogeneous	masterplan	context	in	City	Hall’s	later	Design	Statement	(Drawing:	
Foster+Partners,	1999a,	p.	11)		
The	context	for	the	masterplan	was	neither	fixed	nor	given	(Yaneva,	2009,	p.	16).	Rather,	
Foster+Partners	needed	to	develop	an	understanding	of	it,	abstract	it	and	assemble	it	
through	specific	design	elements	(Figure	5.5).	New	design	information	was	collected	and	
produced:	the	required	compliance	with	relevant	planning	guidance	and	building	codes,	
the	location	on	this	historic	stretch	of	the	Thames,	the	proximity	to	the	Tower	of	London	(a	
World	Heritage	site),	the	proximity	to	Tower	Bridge	(a	Grade	I	listed	building),	and	the	
																																								 																
37	For	a	full	list	of	the	design	collective	see	http://www.fosterandpartners.com/projects/more-london-masterplan		
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location	within	the	London	view	management	framework	from	Greenwich	to	St	Paul’s	
Cathedral	imposed	a	height	limit	for	buildings	of	50	metres	on	site.	The	site	also	became	
understood	through	particular	composed	environmental	design	criteria	such	as	predicted	
temperatures,	sunshine	angles	and	intensity,	wind	and	precipitation.	The	constructed	
context	became	one	important	driver	of	City	Hall’s	later	design	trajectory.	
Foster+Partners	were	instructed	by	CIT	to	develop	a	“very	flexible	masterplan”	(Interview	
Hyams,	2011).	This	plan	was	made	up	of	a	series	of	“fingers”,	which	pointed	towards	the	
river	(Figure	5.6). 
	
Figure	5.6		Initial	concepts	of	the	masterplan	design	in	City	Hall’s	later	Design	Statement	(Drawing:	Foster+Partners,	
1999a,	p.	17)	
City	Hall’s	later	Design	Statement	explains:	“The	layout	of	the	masterplan	is	principally	
derived	from	the	creation	of	a	series	of	views	and	routes	responding	to	the	River,	Tower	of	
London	and	Tower	Bridge”	(F+P,	1999a,	p.	17).	According	to	interviewees	the	layout	of	the	
fingers	was	intended	to	provide	flexibility.	Particular	tenants	could	take	one,	two	or	more	
different	fingers,	depending	on	their	spatial	requirements.	The	initial	spatial	configuration	
of	the	fingers	had	significant	consequences	for	the	later	architectural	design	of	the	entire	
development	since	the	possibilities	of	daylighting	and	natural	ventilation	became	partially	
shaped	by	building	depths,	distances	and	orientations	that	the	masterplan	in	its	schematic	
layout	stabilised.		
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5.3 	Assembling	the	First	Ministerial	Presentation	Scheme		
5.3.1 Translating	and	putting	the	design	briefing	into	action		
In	mid-August	1998	the	London	Bridge	City	team	began	to	develop	initial	translations	of	
the	challenges,	targets	and	aspirations	that	Raynsford	and	his	team	had	set	out	in	written	
form	through	the	three	initial	design	briefs	(see	Chapter	4).	The	three	briefs	were	the	
devices	chosen	to	inform	the	seven	developer/architect	teams	that	were	selected	to	
compete	for	closing	a	deal	with	the	GOL	to	house	the	future	GLA.	
Ken	Shuttleworth	of	Foster+Partners	was	in	charge	of	the	London	Bridge	City	masterplan	
design.	Wen	CIT	submitted	the	masterplan	project	for	the	GLA	headquarters	competition	
he	also	became	responsible	for	this	building	project	and	the	two	projects	then	began	to	
shape	each	other.	Arup	were	involved	in	the	masterplan	design	and	Thonger	recalls	that	
the	“masterplan	design	was	pushed	forward”	by	CIT	when	they	submitted	the	project	for	
the	GLA	headquarters	competition	(Interview	Thonger,	2009).	The	GOL	searched	for	a	
building	and	CIT	entered	the	competition	with	a	masterplan	development.	The	GLA	
Preliminary	Summary	of	Authority’s	Requirements	made	mandatory	the	GOL’s	request	for	
a	BREEAM	building	assessment	of	at	least	“very	good”	and	that	“‘Green’	issues	should	be	
given	proper	consideration”	(TTPM,	1998a).	Decisively,	the	design	briefing	did	not	demand	
a	BREEAM-assessed	masterplan,	but	concentrated	on	an	individual	building.	
	Shuttleworth	explained	that	during	the	masterplan	phase	the	concept	of	sustainable	
development	was	not	chosen	or	made	“a	major	driver	at	all”	(Interview	Shuttleworth,	
2010).	He	felt	a	bit	helpless	in	explaining	its	relation	to	the	masterplan	design.	He	argued	
that	the	challenge	of	the	concept	of	sustainability	had	been	transformed	by	CIT	and	
Foster+Partners	into	the	masterplan	design	through	the	design	strategy	of	creating	“a	
public	space	and	[...]	a	public	route	.	So	from	the	sustainability	point	of	view	we	were	
looking	at	trying	to	link	the	pedestrian	link	from	London	Bridge	station	right	through	to	
Tower	Bridge	and	beyond”(Interview	Shuttleworth,	2010).38	CIT’s	development	director,	
																																								 																
38	He	added	that	the	masterplan	design	conceived	50	per	cent	of	the	site	to	be	built	on,	and	the	other	50	per	cent	
to	become	a	“public	space”	with	paving,	landscaping	and	plantings.	It	is	important	to	highlight	that	Shuttleworth’s	
claim	is	problematic	since	the	concept	of	“public	space”	is	a	contested	one	(to	enter	into	in-depth	discussion	on	this	
is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	thesis).	Crucially,	the	More	London	development	is	privately	owned	and	this	has	far	
reaching	consequences.	It	allowed	More	London	to	later	deploy	its	own	security	service	in	order	to	exercise	their	
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Liam	Bond,	argued	that	there	was	a	shift	in	recognising	sustainability	as	a	driver	during	the	
entire	masterplan	design	and	materialisation	between	1998	and	2011:			
Well,	certainly	it’s	got	issues	to	do	with	sustainability	etc.,	but	peoples’	
understanding	of	those	and	the	pertinence	of	those	and	the	importance	of	those	
questions	did	develop	during	the	course	of	the	development.	Peoples’	
understandings	and	how	relevant	the	question,	how	important	an	issue	it	was	back	
in	here	[1998	-	Bond	pointing	at	one	of	my	timelines]	is	very	different	from	peoples’	
understanding	here	[2011].	Not	only	peoples’	awareness	of	it,	its	position	within	
the	market	and	how	people	wanted	to	respond	to	it	and	also	the	technology	and	
design	tools	that	were	available	to	address	it	have	changed	(Interview	Bond,	2011).	
While	Bond	develops	his	argument	from	the	perceived	perspective	of	general	“people”	
and	the	“market”,	he	conceals	his	own	involvement.	CIT	was	the	client	that	employed	
Foster+Partners	and	Arup.	Crucially,	they	had	the	power	and	responsibility	to	set	the	
agenda	for	the	masterplan	that	they	commissioned.	It	was	CIT’s	choice	not	to	make	
sustainability	an	issue	in	the	design	agenda.	Rather,	it	was	the	GOL	in	its	role	to	provide	a	
domicile	for	the	GLA	who	chose	to	make	this	question	a	design	issue	to	be	addressed.	
The	development	of	the	masterplan	is	a	crucial	phase	that	potentially	opens	up	strategic	
design	opportunities	that	cannot	be	addressed	on	the	scale	of	a	single	building.	Instead	of	
the	(later)	efforts	to	make	the	GLA	headquarters	“a	statement	about	[…]	the	principles	of	
sustainability”	(Interview	Raynsford,	2010),	CIT	largely	neglected	to	tap	the	opportunities	
that	could	have	been	seized	through	the	scale	of	the	masterplan	design.39	Consequently	
CIT	did	not	choose	to	give	the	masterplan	design	a	crucial	role	in	enacting	the	GOL’s	
demand	that	“‘Green’	issues	should	be	given	proper	consideration”	(TTPM,	1998a).		
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 		
property	rights.	In	this	way,	More	London	can	allow	or	suppress	particular	activities	and	access	for	various	groups	
and	individuals.	
39	City	Hall’s	project	architect	Sean	Afflek	criticised	that	the	issue	of	energy	efficiency	-	as	one	prominent	but	
limited	interpretation	of	sustainability	–	could	have	been	improved	through	taking	advantage	of	the	masterplan’s	
diverse	building	programme.	It	intended	to	include	offices,	a	hotel,	a	theatre	and	a	gym.	Afflek	stated	that	“mixed	
use”	could	have	been	introduced	to	“share	loads	around	buildings”	(Interview	Afflek,	2011).	Benefits	could	have	
resulted	from	the	different	building	service	demand	patterns	in	a	service	network	(e.g.	excess	heat	in	offices	could	
have	been	used	in	the	gym,	which	would	have	a	huge	heat	demand).	
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But	responsibility	was	not	only	in	the	hands	of	CIT.	In	principle,	Foster+Partners	and	Arup	
could	themselves	have	redefined	their	roles	to	critically	comment,	intervene,	refine	and	
expand	the	GOL’s	briefing.	The	GOL	was	driving	this	agenda	setting,	but	in	principle	also	
the	architects,	engineers	or	developers	could	have	insisted	on	making	the	sustainability	
question	a	crucial	issue	for	design	practice	that	needs	further	investigation	within	design	
processes.	But	it	wasn’t	until	after	the	first	ministerial	presentation	that	the	CIT,	
Foster+Partners	and	Arup	team	achieved	a	consensus	on	the	adoption	of	the	GOL’s	
‘environmental’	design	agenda	in	ways	that	surpassed	the	then	majority	of	mainstream	
commercial	office	developments.			
5.3.2 First	building	systems	
Alternative	design	strategies	were	put	forward,	negotiated	and	eliminated	in	the	attempt	
to	find	a	consensus	between	the	different	vocational	team	members	at	this	early	stage	of	
the	GLA	headquarters	design	process.	Thonger	explained	that	right	from	the	beginning	
they	interpreted	and	translated	the	design	challenge	for	the	GLA	headquarters	into	
designing	“a	very	low	energy	building,	[…]	energy	consumption	was	our	main	goal	on	it”	
(Interview	Thonger,	2011).		
While	BREEAM	98	for	offices	-	introduced	by	the	design	briefing	-	was	built	on	nine	
different	assessment	areas,	Arup	chose	to	translate	the	design	briefing	into	a	constricted	
endeavour	of	“low	energy”	design	as	their	initial	framing	of	the	competition	phase.40	While	
the	question	of	“Energy”	is	one	of	the	nine	BREEAM	assessment	areas,	Arup	did	not	use	or	
deploy	BREEAM	as	a	tool	to	guide	their	design	development.	Further,	the	way	Arup	framed	
“Energy”	was	different	to	that	of	BREEAM’s	framing.	Arup	attempted	to	generate	new	
design	knowledge	through	an	“option	process”	(Yaneva,	2009,	p.	162)	of	guessing,	
assuming	and	eliminating	that	included	diverse	forms	of	renewable	energy	generation:		
During	the	competition	phase	we	just	threw	everything	down	regardless	of	
whether	it	was	going	to	work	or	not,	[…]	wind	turbines	or	something	like	that,	[…]	it	
was	ranked	as	to	whether	or	not	it	was	suitable	for	[…]	this	particular	location.	We	
even	had	[…]	tidal	barriers	and	stuff	like	that	to	generate	[electricity],	so	nothing	
																																								 																
40	The	BREEAM	98	for	Offices	assessment	areas	are:	Management,	Health	&	Comfort,	Energy,	Transport,	Water,	
Materials,	Pollution,	Land	Use,	Site	Ecology	(see	Chapters	4	and	6).		
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was	held	back	[…].	Throw	it	all	out	there,	and	then	start	to	rank	it	and	so	from	that	
we	came	to	a	kind	of	series	of	proposals	if	you	like	for	how	this	building	could	
respond	in	terms	of	energy,	but	that	was	really	only	right	at	the	beginning	
(Interview	Thonger,	2011).	
Thonger’s	team	entered	a	different	way	of	exploring	design	options	when	TTPM	issued	the	
Property	Search	Option	Appraisal	–	Draft	4	(TTPM,	1998c)	that	set	out	a	detailed	space	
allocation	plan	(functions,	square	meters)	alongside	the	Occupier	Brief	(TTPM,	1998b)	that	
defined	mechanical,	electrical,	material	and	other	specifications	for	distinct	spaces.	
Thonger	explained	that	the	“whole	process	was	restarted	when	Turner	and	Townsend	[…]	
started	to	talk	about	real,	real	requirements	and	particularly	about	the	density	of	
occupation”	(Interview	Thonger,	2011).	
What	Thonger	called	“real	requirements”	were	the	particular	building	blocks	through	
which	Arup	constructed	the	“projected”	(Akrich,	1992,	p.	209)	operations	of	City	Hall	in	an	
attempt	to	anticipate	the	actual	operations	to	come	(see	Chapter	7).	This	data	Arup	were	
able	to	feed	into	their	calculations	and	computer	models.	Their	design	knowledge	
consisted	of	and	was	generated	through	projected	numbers	of	occupants,	a	set	of	specific	
construction	of	“external	design	conditions”,	which	became	the	basis	for	particular	
simulations,	modelling	exercises	and	building	services	calculations	(Arup,	1999,	p.	3).	
TTPM’s	GLA	Occupier	Brief	provided	essential	information	about	the	GOL’s	desired	
“internal	design	conditions”;	the	mayor’s	office	and	most	other	areas	were	set	to	be	
maintained	between	of	22°C	±	3°C,	with	a	relative	humidity	of	50%	±	10%	(TTPM,	1998b).	
This	information	formed	the	basis	to	frame,	estimate	and	calculate	particular	features	of	
the	building	form,	orientation,	envelope	and	technical	services	(heating,	cooling	and	
ventilation).	The	engineers	were	required	to	provide	a	building	service	design	that	
guaranteed	conditions	within	the	above	limits	at	any	time	throughout	the	entire	year.	The	
projected	interior	environment	became	defined,	constructed	and	reduced	through	a	set	of	
quantitative	measurement	units	(e.g.	temperatures	in	oC	or	light	levels	in	lux).	Arup	began	
to	translate	the	design	briefing	into	a	chosen	set	of	associated	elements	and	strategies.	
One	crucial	question	was	whether	Arup’s	chosen	building	blocks	would	be	sufficient	to	
anticipate	the	heterogeneous	forces	that	would	co-constitute	the	later	operations	and	
whether	these	would	fulfil	the	targets	set	by	the	GOL’s	briefing.	The	actual	operations	
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were	later	co-constituted	by	a	wide	range	of	unpredictable	elements,	for	instance	the	
actual	performance	of	specified	mechanical	devices,	occupancy	numbers,	and	behavioural	
preferences	of	users.	Arup’s	approach	in	designing	City	Hall	derived	from	their	specific	
expertise,	experience	and	responsibility	for	mechanical	engineering	of	the	project	(cf.	
Yaneva,	2009,	p.	154).	Arup’s	building	blocks,	tools,	and	issues	of	concern	were	
fundamentally	different	from	those	of	CIT	and	Foster+Partners.		
5.3.3 First	building	forms		
The	spatial	requirements	for	the	GLA	headquarters	were	defined	in	the	design	briefing	as	
11,609m2	(TTPM,	1998c).	Compared	with	the	total	floor	area	of	the	London	Bridge	City	
masterplan	the	GLA	requirements	were	a	tiny	part	–	about	5%.	In	mere	floor	area	quantity	
the	GLA	project	was	not	an	important	project	for	CIT,	which	was	more	interested	in	the	
other	95%	of	development.	Shuttleworth	explained:		
[The	site]	was	‘out	there’,	it	was	like	in	the	doldrums.	Nobody	wanted	to	go	there.	
It	[…]	had	been	empty	since	the	war.	It	wasn’t	a	site	that	people	saw	as	being	in	a	
way	developable	for	London.	[…]	To	encourage	people	to	go	there	[…]	was	very,	
very	difficult.	So	they	[CIT]	used	it	[the	GLA	headquarters]	to	kick-start,	to	sort	of	
put	it	on	the	map	[…]	it	was	the	[GLA]	building	that	[…]	signalled	the	start	of	More	
London	to	get	other	people	to	come	and	want	to	be	there.	And	I	think	it	was	a	sort	
of	catalyst	for	the	rest	of	More	London	(Interview	Shuttleworth,	2010).	
After	issuing	the	first	three	design	briefs	in	August	1998	the	seven	selected	
developer/architect	teams	began	to	develop	their	proposals	with	the	aim	of	winning	the	
competition.	CIT	had	the	strategic	advantage	that	they	wanted	to	kick-start	a	much	bigger	
development.	Therefore,	offering	a	good	deal	to	the	GOL	still	presented	a	profitable	
strategy,	since	the	GOL	headquarters	were	able	to	become	the	anchor	tenant	that	would	
enhance	CIT’s	chances	of	finding	tenants	for	the	remaining	95%	of	London	Bridge	City.	CIT	
recognised	that	housing	the	mayor	would	be	a	valuable	asset.	
Since	the	building	for	the	future	GLA	required	a	rather	small	area,	CIT	and	Foster+Partners	
needed	to	translate	the	11,609m2	into	a	form	within	the	overall	masterplan	(More	London	
later	got	planning	consent	for	280,000	m2	of	mixed-use	space).	The	masterplan	was	
developed	as	a	series	of	fingers	and	the	projected	GLA	headquarters	initially	was	placed	
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within	the	east	finger,	in	the	most	prominent	part	facing	Tower	Bridge	and	the	waterfront.	
Shuttleworth	explained	at	the	outset:	“Because	it	was	such	a	small	building	we	were	
playing	it	very,	very	safe	to	start	with.	And	it	was	just	a	sort	of	box”	(Interview	
Shuttleworth,	2010).	
	
Figure	5.7		The	masterplan	“finger	analogy”	(Drawing:	Richard	Hyams,	2011)	
Richard	Hyams	explained	the	development	of	the	initial	building	form	through	a	sketch	he	
called	“finger	analogy”	(Interview	Hyams,	2011)	(Figure	5.7).	Team	members	nicknamed	
the	emerging	scheme	that	was	first	presented	to	Raynsford	and	his	advisors	the	“box”	
scheme	(Figure	5.8).	The	architects	developed	and	tested	their	understanding	of	the	
anticipated	GLA	headquarters	through	basic	square	meter	calculations,	sketches,	basic	
drawings,	perspectives,	cardboard	and	foam	working	models.		
Hyams’	sketch	envisions	the	development	of	the	building	form	in	four	successive	steps,	
from	the	initial	massing	studies	through	increasing	independence	from	the	fingers	of	the	
masterplan.	First	(left)	the	GLA	building	was	in	a	rectangular	form,	part	of	the	east	finger;	
second,	the	front	facade	became	rounded;	then	the	third	scheme	became	detached	from	
the	finger	but	stayed	interconnected	with	the	finger	through	a	series	of	bridges.	This	
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temporary	scheme	was	initially	presented	to	Raynsford.	The	fourth	scheme	on	the	bottom	
right	was	a	consequence	of	the	first	presentation.	Hyams’	sketch	illustrates	how	the	design	
process	is	built	on	a	series	of	unpredictable	transformations	and	displacements	in	which	
heterogeneous	design	elements	become	accumulated,	stabilised	or	abandoned.		
While	CIT	did	recognise	that	housing	the	GLA	headquarters	would	be	a	valuable	asset	for	
their	development,	they	were	initially	hesitant	to	make	huge	concessions	regarding	the	
GOL’s	design	briefing	requirements.	CIT’s	development	director	Bond	stated:	
There	was	a	masterplan	for	a	series	of	buildings	on	the	site	and	that	happened	to	
be	the	site	we	chose	to	submit	for	it	[the	GLA	headquarters	competition]	because	
what	was	asked	for	was	a	site	with	effectively	a	pretty	standard	office	building.	So,	
we	used	one	of	the	offices	that	[was]	planned	from	the	masterplan	(Interview	
Bond,	2011).	
Ken	Shuttleworth	commented	on	CIT’s	approach	during	designing	the	first	presentation	
scheme:	
CIT	weren’t	taking	it	100%	seriously,	because	it	wasn’t	such	a	big	area	for	them.	
They	just	took	it	as	being	a	catalyst,	so	they	then	didn’t	really	want	us	to	give	them	
a	Rolls-Royce	scheme.	They	really	wanted	us	to	just	give	them	a	box,	which	they	
[the	GOL]	could	fit	out	(Interview	Shuttleworth,	2010).	
Shuttleworth	argued	that	CIT,	through	their	power	as	client,	initially	defined	the	“margins	
of	manoeuvre”	(Callon,	1986,	p.	203)	for	the	design	team.	Foster+Partners	and	Arup	did	
not	challenge	these	margins	and	consequently	were	prompted	to	assemble	a	“standard	
office	building”	(Interview	Bond,	2011).	Shuttleworth	emphasised	that	environmental	
design	strategies	did	not	play	an	important	role	in	the	initial	“box”	scheme:	
It	was	probably	just	a	typical	office	building.	[…]	BCO	[British	Council	for	Offices]	
standard	specs	because	it’s	an	offices	building.	And	the	chamber	just	had	to	be	a	
sort	of	add	on	[…]	put	on	the	end	(Interview	Shuttleworth,	2010).	
For	Bond	the	project	seemed	to	be	a	welcome	vehicle	to	kick-start	CIT’s	entire	London	
Bridge	City	development,	which	was	one	of	his	key	interests	and	responsibilities.	He	
interpreted	the	briefing	as	a	challenge	to	design	“effectively	a	pretty	standard	office	
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building”	(Interview	Bond,	2011).	At	this	stage	Bond’s	and	Raynsford’s	interests	were	in	
conflict,	since	Raynsford	and	his	team	claimed	that	they	intended	to	assemble	an	
ambitious	design	briefing	to	compel	developers	to	design	a	building	that	would	be	
perceived	as	a	“symbol	of	a	new	London”	and	as	a	“statement	about	the	new	authority,	
including	its	commitment	to	environmentally	progressive	objectives,	the	principles	of	
sustainability”	(Interview	Raynsford,	2010).	
Rautenbach	(TTPM)	emphasised	the	struggle	over	the	interpretation	and	translation	of	the	
design	briefing	between	the	involved	parties	and	their	conflicting	interests.	He	reinforced	
Raynsford’s	claim	that	the	GOL’s	design	briefing	intended	to	deliver	the	challenge	“to	
promote	excellence	in	all	respects,	including	location,	architecture,	and	environmental	
performance”	to	the	bidders,	but	at	that	stage	“many	of	the	developer	teams	did	not	get	it”	
(Interview	Rautenbach,	2010).	Consequently	the	GOL’s	design	briefing	as	a	device	to	align	
the	different	stakeholders	lacked	the	power	to	bring	the	London	Bridge	City	team	to	
develop	an	ambitious	design	proposal.	It	became	increasingly	evident	that	the	initial	
design	briefing’s	already	weak	translation	of	Raynsford’s	“environmentally	progressive	
objectives,	the	principles	of	sustainability”	(Interview	Raynsford,	2010)	into	a	“an	overall	
‘BREEAM’	rating	of	at	least	‘very	good’”	(TTPM,	1998a)	proved	rather	to	be	ineffective.		
Hence,	during	the	designing	of	the	“box”	scheme,	the	different	actors	and	their	interests	
(especially	between	the	GOL	and	the	developer	team)	that	derived	from	specific	
responsibilities	were	not	well	aligned	and	stood	in	conflict.	To	succeed	in	the	translation	of	
the	initial	design	briefing	the	actors	had	to	negotiate	to	find	a	consensus	on	particular	
design	objectives	and	strategies.	This	called	for	a	realigning	of	the	actor’s	roles,	
interpretations,	interests	and	practices	in	order	to	translate	the	briefing	into	form	and	
materialisation.	At	that	time	there	was	still	potential	for	the	project	to	fall	apart,	or	not	to	
progress	at	all.		
5.3.4 Reshaping	the	design	briefing		
The	design	briefing	was	not	limited	to	or	fixed	through	the	first	three	design	briefs.	It	
fluctuated	and	co-developed	with	the	design	progress.	The	GOL	encouraged	consultation	
with	the	developer	teams.	I	assume	that	after	first	negotiations	the	GOL	felt	the	necessity	
to	reshape	the	design	briefing	by	adding	additional	
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definitional	power.	The	environmental	design	goals	were	reshaped	through	six	relevant	
elements	(below)	that	included	both	quantitative	reference	values	and	suggested	design	
pathways.	
On	3	September	1998,	two	weeks	before	the	first	presentation	to	Raynsford,	TTPM	issued	
the	GLA	Information	Update	Notes	(TTPM,	1998e)	to	the	selected	seven	design	teams	to	
add	more	refined	design	criteria	to	the	GLA	property	search.	It	included	two	“architectural	
issues”	(TTPM,	1998e):	first,	a	recommendation	on	floorplate	widths	of	12m	to	14m	and	
no	more	than	19m;	second,	it	stated	that	if	“floor	to	ceiling	perimeter	glazing	is	proposed	
then	convincing	reasons	should	be	provided	to	overcome	concerns	relating	to	heat	gain	
[and]	running	cost	issues”.	Further	four	elements	defined	as	“environment	&	green	issues”	
(TTPM,	1998e)	were	added:	first,	BREEAM	became	reconfirmed	as	an	“important	
cornerstone	for	setting	environmental	standards”,	but	was	expanded	through	the	
additional	request	for	the	headquarters	to	“achieve	a	challenging	CO2	emissions	target,	set	
at	70kg/m2/annum”.	Second,	specific	renewable	energy	and	energy	efficiency	pathways	
were	encouraged:	“renewable	energy	sources,	CHP	[combined	heat	and	power],	district-
heating	schemes,	[and]	solar/electric	systems”.	Third,	it	addressed	the	issue	of	water	
consumption	by	recommending	“grey	water	use”	and	undefined	“other	efficiency	
measures”.	Fourth,	“sustainable	building	materials”	were	“given	high	priority”,	without	
any	indication	of	what	that	might	imply	for	the	material	selection.	
Even	when	the	design	teams	were	close	to	presenting	their	schemes	to	the	minister,	
additional	design	information	was	fed	into	the	briefing	process.	With	these	changes	the	
GOL	in	part	reinforced	its	translation	of	its	environmental	agenda	into	the	design	briefing.		
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5.3.5 Meeting	Raynsford	and	his	advisors	
	
Figure	5.8		The	CIT	team’s	proposal	for	the	GLA	headquarters	at	the	first	ministerial	presentation,	nicknamed	the	
“box”	scheme	(Drawing:	Foster+Partners,	2004)		
In	September	1998	CIT,	Foster+Partners	and	Arup	presented	their	initial	design	proposal	to	
Raynsford	and	his	architectural	advisors.	With	this	first	ministerial	presentation	the	search	
for	GLA	headquarters	moved	into	the	next	important	phase.	Following	site	visits	by	
Raynsford	and	his	advisors,	the	seven	selected	developer	teams	made	short	presentations	
to	this	group	followed	by	a	question	and	answer	session.	The	GOL	had	called	for	design	
and	financial	proposals	that	would	form	the	basis	of	the	envisaged	lease	deal	between	the	
GOL	and	one	chosen	developer.	Under	time	constraints	of	only	six	weeks,	the	CIT	team	
assembled	a	schematical	visual	presentation	package	that,	as	the	key	deliverable,	had	
been	the	target	point	of	their	previous	activities.	The	package	contained	basic	drawings,	
perspectives	and	3D	physical	models.	These	visual	tools	were	deployed	to	communicate	
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the	CIT	team’s	initial	proposal	and	translations	in	response	to	the	GOL’s	design	briefing.	
With	these	visualisations	the	team	tried	to	envision,	promote	and	convince	Raynsford	and	
his	team	of	their	proposal	assembled	in	the	design	studio	and	offices	of	CIT,	
Foster+Partners	and	Arup.	A	submission	of	technical	and	financial	reports	was	required	
two	weeks	later.		
The	GOL’s	objectives	with	this	first	presentation	were	complex	and	mixed	many	diverse	
elements:	to	shortlist	two	out	of	the	seven	proposals	for	continued	design	development,	
“to	encourage	distinctive	exciting	proposals	providing	appropriate	accommodation	
tailored	to	the	needs	of	the	GLA”,	“to	encourage	environmentally	sensitive	solutions”,	and	
“to	make	initial	assessments	of	financial	issues”	(TTPM,	1998h,	p.	1).		
Raynsford	and	his	advisors	then	looked	at	the	glass	“box”	that	was	placed	in	front	of	them	
by	the	CIT,	Foster+Partners	and	Arup	design	team.	Anne	Griffiths	(GOL)	described	the	
situation	thus:	
The	designs	were	then	looked	at	by	the	design	advisory	group,	and	I	know	–	with	
this	building	–	when	Fosters	first	came	forward,	they	had	presented	a	(sort	of)	glass	
box.	And	Nick	sent	them	away	and	said:	“It’s	looking	good,	but	go	away	and	play”	
(Interview	Griffiths,	2010).		
Similarly,	Bond	recalled:	
I	can’t	remember	exactly	the	words	that	Nick	Raynsford	said,	but	it	was	something	
that	went	along	the	lines	of,	“Fantastic	site,	brilliant	location,	very	interesting	
location	within	it,	it’s	very	interesting	facing	the	river	on	the	other	side	of	the	South	
and	regeneration	of	blah,	blah,	blah,	blah,	blah,”	but	the	building	isn’t	what	we	
want.	Can	you	have	your	architects	to	have	some	fun	please	and	actually	put	some	
imagination	into	it	(Interview	Bond,	2011).	
Many	of	my	interviewees	referred	to	the	initial	design	proposal	as	the	“box”.	This	banal	
labelling	became	the	preferred	way	to	characterise	the	scheme	from	the	first	presentation.	
The	scheme	was	not	fundamentally	different	to	many	others	of	Foster+Partners’	office	
schemes	at	the	time.	The	initial	scheme	was	located	in	the	east	finger	of	the	masterplan	
(Figure	5.6).	The	GLA	HQs	was	conceived	to	be	placed	within	two	distinct	fully	glazed	
volumes,	a	ten-floored	glass	drum,	which	was	connected	by	bridges	to	a	glass	“box”	of	the	
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same	height.	The	glass	“box”	merges	with	the	rest	of	the	finger	and	contains	generic	office	
areas.	The	assembly	chamber	and	committee	rooms	are	located	within	the	drum	facing	
the	Thames.	The	ground	floor	is	kept	empty;	above	hovers	the	double	height	assembly	
chamber	and	on	top	there	are	committee	rooms.	The	round	floor	plates	above	the	
assembly	chamber	contain	a	void	in	the	centre	so	as	to	allow	views	and	daylight	into	the	
assembly	from	above.		
Richard	Hyams	recalled	Raynsford	and	his	advisors	saying:	“well	actually	that’s	not	
particularly	inspiring”	(Interview	Hyams,	2011).	Raynsford	and	his	advisors	sent	the	team	
design	team	away	and	encouraged	them	to	redesign	their	initial	proposal.	The	“box”	
scheme	could	potentially	have	fulfilled	the	majority	of	requirements	set	out	in	the	first	
design	briefs,	but	after	the	presentation	it	became	clear	that	Raynsford	and	his	advisors	
were	looking	for	a	“landmark”	and	“symbol”.	The	need	for	the	building	to	have	a	
“distinctive”	character	was	made	a	dominant	requirement	that	presented	a	necessary	
detour	in	the	translation	process	for	the	environmental	design	agenda.	Crucially,	in	this	
presentation,	Raynsford	foregrounded	a	perception	of	building	form	that	pushed	
environmental	performance	into	the	background.	
5.3.6 Initial	reactions	of	the	GOL	team	
On	1	October	1998,	following	the	first	presentation,	TTPM	produced	a	set	of	
Questions/Queries	for	Developers	(TTPM,	1998f)	to	check	to	what	extent	the	presentation	
schemes	complied	with	and	translated	the	GOL’s	briefing.	As	confirmed	by	Shuttleworth	
and	Bond,	the	initial	“box”	scheme	did	not	include	any	in-depth	design	strategies	in	
response	to	the	suggested	BREEAM	“very	good”	assessment	(TTPM,	1998a)	or	the	briefing	
update’s	CO2	emissions	target	of	70kg/m2/a	(TTPM,	1998e).	The	London	Bridge	City	team	
initially	largely	neglected	to	provide	information	required	by	the	first	three	design	briefs	
developed	in	August	1998.	It	was	probably	in	the	verbal	part	of	the	presentation	and	the	
subsequent	question-and-answer	session	that	the	“green	issues”	(TTPM,	1998a)	began	to	
gain	more	recognition.		
The	above	TTPM	document	asked	specifically	for	the	London	Bridge	City	team	to	confirm	
their	“intention	in	providing	a	passive	environmental	solution	to	the	offices,	rather	than	4-
pipe	fancoils”	and	to	explain	their	“thoughts	regarding	the	application	of	the	‘bigger’	
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energy	environmental	systems	you	speak	of”	(TTPM,	1998f,	p.	2).	In	addition,	it	
emphasised	the	desire	of	Raynsford	and	his	advisory	group	to	associate	two	different	
design	elements	within	the	emerging	scheme:	that	the	design	team	should	relocate	the	
building	from	the	rear	of	the	site	closer	to	the	waterfront,	and	that	it	should	improve	“the	
shortfall	of	distinctive	identity”	(TTPM,	1998h,	p.	5).		
	
Figure	5.9		Evaluation	matrix	following	the	first	ministerial	presentation	(Chart:	Turner	&	Townsend	Project	
Management,	1998f,	p.	3)	
On	behalf	of	the	GOL,	TTPM	produced	an	evaluation	matrix	to	assess	the	seven	schemes	
through	six	distinct	“factor[s]”	(Figure	5.9).	Under	Raynsford’s	responsibility	TTPM	framed	
and	displaced	Raynsford’s	declared	“environmentally	progressive	objectives”	(Interview	
Raynsford,	2010)	through	two	perspectives:	one	“Environment”,	and	the	other	“Green	
Issues”	(TTPM,	1998e,	p.	3).	This	was	relevant	for	the	translation	process	as	the	GOL’s	and	
TTPM’s	evaluation	approach	led	the	CIT	team	to	adjust	and	reorder	their	design	strategies	
in	order	to	win	the	competition	process.	The	divergent	interests	of	the	GOL	and	CIT	teams	
thereby	became	more	aligned	through	particular	accepted	“movements	and	detours”	
(Callon,	1986,	p.	206).	CIT	began	to	recognise	the	necessity	of	following	TTPM’s	
transforming	design	briefing	that	began	to	suggest	specific	preferred	design	pathways:	to	
design	for	“reversible	energy”	systems	(TTPM,	1998e,	p.	3),	“passive	A/C	[Air-
	151	
Conditioning]”,	“chilled	ceiling”	and	“displacement”	ventilation	systems.	The	latter	three	
are	approaches	associated	with	projected	lower	energy	consumption.	
The	document	sated	that	TTPM’s	assessment	would	evaluate	“green	issues“	through	three	
questions:		
Does	the	scheme	have	the	‘Green	Identity’?	[…]	Have	the	team	adopted	the	‘Green’	
concept	fully?	[…]	Will	this	appreciation	be	fully	developed?	(TTPM,	1998f,	p.	8)	
These	questions	lack	definitional	clarity,	but	they	indicate	that	a	“green	issues”	agenda	
became	more	forceful	in	selection	and	thereby	design	criteria.	Jon	Spring’s	and	Gordon	
Rautenbach’s	roles	were	to	produce	the	TTPM	documents	on	behalf	of	the	GOL.	I	asked	
them	to	define	“green	identity”,	one	aspect	of	“green	issues”.	Rautenbach	replied:	
The	term	was	meant	to	imply	an	“image”	in	terms	of	perception	rather	than	
physical	appearance	[…]	-	green	credentials	that	can	be	benchmarked	against	other	
sustainable	buildings.	[…]	For	some	it	means	cladding	in	timber	to	be	instantly	
recognisable.	[…]	Portcullis	House	[MP’s	offices	in	Westminster]	also	comes	to	
mind	as	a	building	that	also	has	the	credentials	and	to	some	extent	the	appearance	
of	a	“green	identity”	with	its	large	natural	ventilation	flues	being	obviously	visible.	
[…]	For	the	layman,	I	suspect	it	has	to	look	like	a	log	cabin	to	truly	meet	the	
definition	of	“green	identity”	but	to	designers,	it	is	the	performance	capability	that	
is	most	important	–	the	dream	is	for	the	users	to	also	buy	into	the	concept	
(Interview	Rautenbach,	2010).	
Spring	added:	
I	think	that	the	other	aspect	of	green	identity	that	we	were	looking	for	on	behalf	of	
the	GLA	was	setting	an	example.	[…]	We	certainly	had	an	eye	upon	total	
operational	impact,	energy	and	environmental	impact	(electrical,	heating	and	
cooling)	being	one	key	aspect	(Email	Spring,	2011).	
Their	attempt	to	explain	the	issue	of	“green	identity”	remained	sketchy.	The	concept	of	
identity	has	been	widely	debated	in	psychology	and	sociology.	Yaneva	rejects	the	claim	
that	a	building	can	possess	“essence”	or	“stable	form”,	since	that	would	exclude	the	
possibility	that	a	building	can	be	interpreted	in	alternative	ways	(Yaneva,	2012,	p.	20).		
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Since	the	then-emerging	GLA	headquarters	could	not	itself	decide	its	own	identity,	the	
question	of	its	identity	is	ephemeral,	changing	with	time,	and	rather	difficult	to	define.	It	
may	be	ambiguously	coproduced	in	the	ways	individuals	perceive	the	building	and	how	
actors	(e.g.	architects,	journalists)	ascribe	particular	characteristics	to	the	building	through	
media	channels.	Rautenbach	made	clear	that	the	issue	itself	depends	on	heterogeneous	
actors	and	elements.	For	him,	it	oscillated	between	questions	of	perception	of	building	
form	and	materiality,	and	particular	framings	of	performance	criteria.	He	also	emphasised	
that	different	individuals	would	attribute	different	meanings	to	a	building,	which	hinted	
that	buildings	would	rather	have	multiple	identities	at	once.	Spring’s	explanation	of	
making	the	building	“an	example”	evokes	many	questions:	An	example	for	whom?	An	
example	of	what?		
Crucially,	the	introduction	of	the	issue	of	“green	identity”	in	a	vague	way	signalled	that	the	
emerging	headquarters	was	not	only	to	be	perceived	as	a	“landmark”,	but	also	as	“green”.	
These	two	desires	became	intrinsically	linked	and	the	challenge	to	enact	this	request	was	
delivered	to	the	developer	teams.		
The	seven	contenders	in	the	first	ministerial	presentation	in	mid-September	1998	were	
considered	by	Raynsford’s	team	in	order	to	compose	a	shortlist	of	proposals.	All	teams	
faced	potential	elimination	from	the	contest.	All	five	members	of	the	architectural	
advisory	group	met	Raynsford	on	9th	October	to	draw	up	a	shortlist	of	schemes,	on	the	
basis	of	some	additionally	submitted	material,	before	moving	on	to	the	next	competition	
stage.	They	appraised	the	schemes	through	a	specific	set	of	key	criteria:	“location,	
prominence,	accessibility	[,…]	external	design	[...],	building	design,	surrounding	civic	space,	
and	the	potential	to	regenerate	the	surrounding	area”	(TTPM,	1998h,	p.	7).	These	criteria	
can	be	seen	as	further	modification	and	expansion	of	the	initial	design	briefing	since	new	
elements	were	added.	Despite	serious	criticism	of	the	“box”	scheme,	Raynsford	and	his	
advisors	decided	on	the	basis	of	the	first	presentation,	as	well	as	additional	technical	and	
financial	submissions,	that	“London	Bridge	City	and	Victoria	House	should	be	shortlisted”	
(TTPM,	1998h,	p.	7).	The	group’s	comments	on	the	CIT,	Foster+Partners	and	Arup	proposal	
are	summarised	as:	
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An	excellent	site	and	proposal,	but	the	identity	of	the	GLA	building	should	not	be	
allowed	to	suffer	from	the	very	dense	office	buildings	planned	for	the	overall	
development.	Further	work	would	be	necessary	to	ensure	this	(TTPM,	1998h,	p.	7).	
CIT’s	competitor	was	the	Victoria	House	proposal	at	Bloomsbury	Square,	a	refurbishment	
of	an	existing	building	initially	completed	in	1926,	put	forward	by	Blackfriars	Investment	
Ltd	and	the	architects	Alsop	&	Stormer.	After	shortlisting	the	two	projects,	the	two	
remaining	developer	teams	had	only	four	weeks	to	transform	their	proposals	into	a	
scheme	that	could	win	in	the	final	presentation	on	4th	November	1998.			
5.4 Adapting	to	comments	and	re-strategising	for	the	Second	
Presentation	Scheme		
5.4.1 Accumulating	and	producing	design	knowledge,	adding	associations	
Following	the	first	ministerial	presentation	the	design	development	intensified	and	TTPM’s	
“green	issues”	became	increasingly	assimilated,	interpreted	and	translated	into	design	
strategies.	Liam	Bond	explained	that	the	environmental	challenge	
emerged	and	developed	significantly	as	their	[GOL]	procurement	process	went	on.	
[…]	It	wasn’t	as	high	on	their	agenda	when	we	first	were	involved	in	it	and	[…]	the	
development	of	some	of	the	environmental	themes	came	subsequently	(Interview	
Bond,	2011).	
There	were	conflicting	interpretations	within	the	CIT	team	regarding	the	point	at	which	
the	GOL’s	environmental	agenda	gained	significance.	The	first	design	brief	already	
translated	the	challenge	into	a	BREEAM	assessment	rating	of	“very	good”	and	into	the	
vague	request	that	“‘Green’	issues	should	be	given	proper	consideration”	(TTPM,	1998a).	
The	agenda	had	thus	been	introduced	at	the	outset	of	the	competition,	in	at	least	a	
narrow	translation	of	sustainability	(see	Chapter	4).	While	Bond	argued	that	this	agenda	
gained	significance	only	within	the	competition,	Shuttleworth	declared	in	contrast	that	CIT	
was	initially	not	willing	to	take	the	GOL’s	agenda	seriously:	
It	wasn’t	til	they	[CIT]	realised	in	fact	that	[…]	there’s	a	potential	here	to	kick-start	
the	whole	development,	they	became	all	interested	then	[…].	And	when	it	became	
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into	a	competition	and	we	were	in	the	last	two	[the	shortlist]	it	became	even	more	
evident	(Interview	Shuttleworth,	2010).	
Raynsford	and	his	team	had	reworked	the	initial	design	briefing	through	the	introduction	
of,	for	instance,	additional	benchmark	criteria	and	a	recommendation	to	integrate	a	
“passive”	air-conditioning	system	(TTPM,	1998e).	The	briefing	gained	more	definitional	
strength.	At	the	same	time	CIT	gained	interest	in	winning	the	competition.	They	adjusted	
their	position,	recognised	that	the	“alliance”	(Callon,	1986,	p.	206)	with	the	GOL	could	be	
beneficial,	and	agreed	to	make	more	concessions	as	necessary	detours	to	achieve	a	
consensus	with	the	GOL	and	keep	the	alliance	together.	In	consequence	CIT	agreed	and	
encouraged	Foster+Partners	and	Arup	to	assimilate	the	GOL’s	design	requirements	more	
seriously.	With	the	support	of	CIT	a	fundamental	rethinking	took	place	at	Foster+Partners	
and	Arup,	which	made	the	“box”	scheme	obsolete.	The	scheme	was	substantially	
redesigned	and	the	architects	at	Foster+Partners	started	to	“play”.	One	significant	design	
move	suggested	by	Raynsford	and	his	advisors	was	to	give	the	GLA	scheme	a	more	distinct	
appearance	compared	to	the	masterplan	fingers	by	creating	a	detached	building	and	
moving	it	towards	the	Thames.		
In	order	to	proceed	in	the	design	process	and	to	translate	and	materialise	the	GOL’s	design	
briefing,	the	CIT	team	depended	on	the	simultaneous	production	of	new	design	knowledge	
and	the	additional	association	of	heterogeneous	entities	(Callon,	1986,	p.	203).	In	order	to	
overcome	the	“box”	scheme,	new	design	ideas	and	knowledge	was	needed.	The	twinned	
agendas	of	creating	a	landmark	building	and	achieving	environmental	goals	gained	
increasing	significance	and	began	to	shape	each	other.	The	GOL	had	defined	“green	issues”	
predominantly	through	the	BREEAM	“very	good”	assessment	(TTPM,	1998a)	and	the	
briefing	update’s	CO2	emissions	target	of	70kg/m2/a	(TTPM,	1998e).	In	response,	Arup’s	
project	manager	with	responsibility	for	engineering	explained	that	they,	together	with	
Foster+Partners,	interpreted	and	transformed	the	design	briefing	into	the	challenge	of	
designing	“a	very	low	energy	building	[…].	Energy	consumption	was	our	main	goal	on	it”	
(Interview	Thonger,	2011).	As	such,	Arup	and	Foster+Partners	translated	the	target	CO2	
emissions	into	the	design	strategy	to	establish	“a	sound	basis	for	low	energy	design”	
(Shuttleworth,	Hyams,	&	Hall,	2003,	p.	303).	Two	specific	key	“devices”	(Callon,	1986,	p.	
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206ff)	were	chosen	to	align	the	activities	of	individual	teams	and	to	transform	the	issue	of	
low	energy	design	into	particular	design	strategies.		
5.4.1.1 Device	one:	Energy	Consumption	Guide	19	
In	order	to	address	and	develop	an	understanding	of	which	elements	affect	building-
related	energy	use,	Foster+Partners	and	Arup	chose	to	import	additional	design	
knowledge	via	the	Energy	Consumption	Guide	19:	Energy	Use	in	Offices.	Abbreviated	ECON	
19	by	my	interviewees,	it	was	produced	by	the	government’s	Energy	Efficiency	Best	
Practice	Programme	(DETR,	1998a)	as	design	guidance	for	building-related	energy	
efficiency.	ECON	19	was	chosen	by	Foster+Partners	and	Arup	as	a	crucial	reference	that	
later	underpinned	many	arguments,	although	the	anticipated	GLA	headquarters	did	not	
comfortably	fit	into	ECON	19’s	generalised	building	typologies	of	the	office	building.	
	
Figure	5.10		Cover	of	the	Energy	Consumption	Guide	19	(ECON	19):	Energy	Use	in	Offices	(Department	of	the	
Environment	Transport	and	the	Regions,	1998a)	
The	guidelines	devise	and	proposes	benchmark	values	for	“typical”	and	“good	practice”	
energy	use	patterns	and	related	carbon	emissions	for	four	differently	framed	types	of	
office	buildings.	Against	these	values,	Foster+Partners	and	Arup	later	began	to	compare	
the	projected	consumption	patterns	of	the	future	City	Hall.	Thonger	explained:		
What	we	were	actually	looking	at	was	a	thing	called	ECON	19.	[…]	It	was	a	
recommendation	[…]	it	was	part	historic,	so	you	kind	of	see	[how]	buildings	were	
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typically	operated.	[…]	That	was	our	benchmark,	if	you	like,	for	what	we	should	be	
aiming	for	[…]	It’s	a	reasonably	good	sort	of	starting	point	(Interview	Thonger,	
2011)	
In	the	further	design	practices	of	the	GLA	headquarters,	ECON	19	was	deployed	by	
Foster+Partners	and	Arup	as	the	tool	against	which	to	benchmark	City	Hall’s	predicted	
energy	performance.	ECON	19	suggests	breakdowns	of	distinct	energy	end	uses.	One	of	
the	key	claims	is	that	an	“Office	Type	4	air-conditioned	prestige”-	the	benchmark	
reference	chosen	for	the	development	of	City	Hall	-	would	consume	most	energy	for	
heating,	followed	by	cooling,	ventilation,	lighting	and	others	(DETR,	1998a).	ECON	19	
constructed	a	specific	hierarchy	of	the	major	building	services	associated	with	energy	
consumption	and	CO2	emissions	(Figure	5.11).41	This	hierarchy	informed	and	supported	the	
choice	of	design	strategies.	ECON	19	provided	a	particular	representation	of	how	energy	
consumption	might	be	constituted,	highlighting	specific	heterogeneous	elements	and	
assumptions,	while	excluding	others.	
	
Figure	5.11		ECON	19	diagram	comparing	“Good	practice”	and	“Typical”	Type	4	Offices	projected	energy	use	and	
carbon	emissions	(Diagram:	Author	2012,	based	on	DETR,	1998a,	p.	10)	
																																								 																
41	The	GLA	headquarters	design	brief	(and	later	building)	did	not	contain	a	large	computer	room.	Related	energy	
consumption	and	carbon	emissions	are	therefore	separated	from	the	total	benchmark	values.	
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The	GOL	had	defined	the	emissions	target	of	70kgCO2/m2/a.	CO2	converted	into	C	(Carbon),	
the	unit	used	in	ECON	19,	the	emissions	target	corresponded	to	approximately	
19.1kgC/m2/a.42	While	the	GOL	claimed	that	the	target	was	“challenging”	(TTPM,	1998e),	it	
was	at	least	significantly	lower	in	comparison	to	ECON	19’s	“good	practice”	reference	of	
24.6kgC/m2/a.43	This	GOL	target	thus	posed	a	design	challenge	that	required	serious	effort	
by	the	CIT,	Foster+Partners	and	Arup	team	to	comply	with	it.		
ECON	19	was	studied	in	the	architectural	‘laboratories’	as	new	design	information.	David	
Kong,	architect	at	Foster+Partners,	recalled:	
I	don’t	remember	it	[ECON	19]	as	a	big,	thick	document	[…]	we	actually	read	cover	
to	cover.	[…]	It	was	really	taking	the	salient	points	about	what	constitutes	the	
definition	of	a	best	practice,	and	minimum	energy	consuming	offices,	[…]	then	we	
took	that	(Interview	Kong,	2010).	
ECON	19	emphasises	the	role	of	“design	which	maximises	the	use	of	form	and	fabric	to	
control	the	internal	environment”	in	designing	a	low	energy	building	(DETR,	1998a,	p.	6).	
As	Kong	suggested	above,	Foster+Partners	“took”	that	advice	and	translated	it	into	their	
key	design	strategy	for	the	GLA	scheme.	ECON	19	was	conjointly	chosen	and	deployed	as	a	
key	device	by	Foster+Partners	and	Arup	to	guide,	align	and	coordinate	their	versatile	
translation	activities	of	design-briefing-to-design-materialisation.	It	became	a	reoccurring	
reference	in	the	later	design	(and	operation)	processes.	
5.4.1.2 Device	two:	the	diagram	of	the	‘Triangular	Approach’		
The	second	device	to	inform	and	align	the	CIT	team	in	developing	design	strategies	in	
response	to	the	GOL	briefing	was	a	diagram	entitled	“What	makes	a	building	green”	
(Figure	5.12),	jointly	produced	by	Foster+Partners	and	Arup.	It	was	also	referred	to	as	the	
“Triangular	Approach”	(Interview	Thonger,	2011).	In	the	development	of	the	
environmental	strategy	for	City	Hall,	Foster+Partners	and	Arup	shared	the	belief	in	a	
hierarchical	approach	in	which	it	is	most	important	to	address	“building	form	and	
orientation”	first,	then	“passive	elements”,	and	last	“active	systems”	in	relation	to	building	
																																								 																
42	Based	on:	“To	convert	from	kg	CO2	to	kg	C,	multiply	by	12/44”	(Carbon	Trust,	2008,	p.	2).	
43	The	GOL	does	not	specify	which	area	(m2)	to	refer	to,	while	ECON	19	refers	to	treated	floor	area	(m2).			
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costs.	Passive	elements	are	here	defined	through	“deep	space	natural	ventilation”	and	
“responsive	shading”.	Active	elements	include	“photovoltaics”	and	“heat	recovery	systems”	
(F+P,1999a,	p.	24).	The	diagram	in	part	presents	a	visualised	extension	of	ECON	19’s	
recommendation	to	maximise	“use	of	form”	into	a	hierarchy	of	different	design	pathways.			
In	Figure	5.12	environmental	strategies	and	building	costs	are	represented	in	the	
juxtaposition	of	two	triangles	facing	different	directions,	one	pointing	to	the	top,	the	other	
to	the	bottom.	This	approach	marks	the	renunciation	of	approaches	that	rely	heavily	on	
active	mechanical	building	service	systems	(e.g.	air	conditioning	systems	with	air	cooled	
chillers)	in	order	to	control	the	interior	climate.	At	the	outset	of	the	design	process,	
building	form	and	construction	are	given	a	pivotal	strategic	role.	
	
Figure	5.12		The	“Triangular	Approach”	entitled	“What	makes	a	building	green”,	relating	strategies	of	active	systems	
(top	left),	passive	elements	(middle	left)	and	building	form	(bottom	left)	to	potential	costs	(Diagram:	Author	2011,	
redrawn	from	Foster+Partners,	1999a,	p.	24)	
This	diagram	was	produced	interactively	between	Foster+Partners	and	Arup	and	was	an	
important	device	to	communicate,	work	together,	and	to	organise	the	design	
development	(cf.	Henderson,	1999,	p.	6).	This	approach	formed	a	sort	of	compass	for	the	
design	team	to	navigate	through	the	vast	possibilities	of	how	to	design	a	low	energy	
building.	Consequently,	explorations	of	building	form	and	orientation	were	central	from	
the	beginning	of	the	design	development	and	from	the	outset	of	developing	the	
environmental	strategy.	The	goal	was	to	establish	“a	sound	basis	for	low	energy	design”	
(Shuttleworth	et	al.,	2003,	p.	303)		
My	interviewees	without	exception	confirmed	this	approach,	though	there	was	some	
confusion	over	where	and	how	it	had	emerged.	Since	the	building	form	played	a	crucial	
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role	within	the	GLA’s	building	design,	this	strategy	also	became	a	crucial	tool	to	justify	the	
design	team’s	chosen	design	moves.		
Thonger	(Arup)	stated	that	the	“Triangular	Approach”	as	a	form	of	design	knowledge	is	
widely	accepted:44	
Who	owns	it	originally,	I	have	no	idea	[…].	It’s	a	very	crude	way	of	just	saying	that	
[…]	you	get	your	massive	benefits	by	just	making	sure	your	building	is	properly	
situated	[…].	If	you	don’t	get	the	basics	right	then	[…]	all	of	these	passive	elements	
are	never	going	to	really	work	particularly	well	(Interview	Thonger,	2011).	
He	confirmed	it	as	a	“key	diagram”	in	the	design	practices	of	City	Hall.	Thonger	stated	that	
the	“Triangular	Approach”	was	“pretty	directly	translated	into	City	Hall”	(Interview	
Thonger,	2009).		
The	CIT	team	transformed	the	GOL’s	design	briefing	of	“green	concerns”	(predominantly	
defined	through	BREEAM	and	the	CO2	target)	into	a	“low	energy”	design	approach.	
Foster+Partners	and	Arup	each	had	distinct	expertise,	and	CIT	had	assigned	distinct	
responsibilities	to	them.	Both	thus	began	to	transform	the	“low	energy”	approach	into	
design	strategies.	In	their	design	studio	and	offices	these	transformations	were	built	on	
specific	working	operations	and	assumptions,	and	the	invoking	of	selected	heterogeneous	
elements.	
5.4.2 Extending	assumptions	into	building	form	
Although	interviewees	mentioned	that	Norman	Foster	was	not	deeply	involved	in	the	
design	development,	he	did	comment	on	the	form	and	orientation	of	the	design	
development:	
The	jury,	however,	wanted	a	stand-alone	building	with	a	more	symbolic	form.	
Given	this	clear	direction,	the	design	team,	led	by	partner	Ken	Shuttleworth,	
progressed	to	the	first	version	of	a	unified	scheme.	Initially,	this	took	the	form	of	a	
spherical	building	raised	above	the	ground.	As	the	design	and	environmental	
																																								 																
44	The	architect	and	teacher	Inaki	Abalos	also	assigns	credit	for	a	later	version	of	this	diagram	jointly	to	
Foster+Partners	and	Arup	and	highlights	its	relevance	for	design	practices	(in	Harvard	Design	Magazine,	2009,	p.	15).		
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studies	progressed,	however,	this	assumed	a	more	fluid,	dynamic	shape	(Foster	in	
Detail,	2002,	p.	1090).	
And	Shuttleworth,	as	the	partner	endowed	with	the	responsibility	of	designing	City	Hall,	
later	commented:	
The	City	Hall	project	was	a	unique	opportunity.	It	had	to	express	the	values	of	the	
newly	formed	Greater	London	Assembly	and	be	a	symbol	for	change	for	London.	
The	real	architect	behind	the	scheme	was	Nick	Raynsford,	the	minister	responsible	
for	the	project.	It	was	his	briefing	and	his	desire	to	create	a	landmark	building	that	
inspired	us	to	produce	a	structure	unlike	any	other	(Shuttleworth	in	Detail,	2002,	p.	
1091).	
Both	attribute	much	significance	to	Raynsford’s	powerful	role	in	co-shaping	the	design	
direction	and	to	his	interest	in	building	“form”.	Although	Raynsford	had	a	powerful	role	as	
key	translator,	he	could	only	execute	this	by	working	with	a	complex	and	contested	
assemblage	of	heterogeneous	elements.	In	response	to	Raynsford,	Foster+Partners	and	
Arup	then	aligned	and	merged	their	different	interests	on	building	form,	thus	informing	
the	design	trajectory	that	overcame	the	“box”	scheme.	One	interest	concerned	the	
perception	of	form	and	attempted	to	evoke	a	symbolic	interpretation	of	it;	the	other	was	
about	maximising	the	use	of	building	form	in	order	to	aim	for	a	low	energy	design.	The	
first	interest	seemed	partially	suppressed	in	the	accounts	of	my	interviewees;	the	story	to	
emerge	later	formed	the	backbone	of	the	key	narrative	of	the	design	strategy,	and	was	
used	to	explain	and	justify	the	unique	(as	then	unseen)	building	form	that	was	
materialising.		
Raynsford	and	his	team	introduced	a	broad	set	of	terms	that	addressed	questions	of	
building	form	and	its	experience.	Initially,	the	first	design	brief	required	that	externally	
“the	building	should	be	prominent	and	distinctive	and	be	a	design	for	the	future”	(TTPM,	
1998a,	p.	1).	After	the	first	ministerial	presentation,	TTPM	resumed	work	on	the	“box”	
scheme,	having	a	“shortfall	of	distinctive	identity”	(TTPM,	1998h,	p.	5).	Later,	during	the	
meetings	of	the	initial	briefing	process,	the	TTPM	team	fed	more	information	into	the	
process	and	advised	the	design	teams	that	they	wanted	a	“landmark	building”	(TTPM,	
1998h,	p.	5).	Raynsford	wanted	the	GLA	building	to	be	a	“symbol	of	a	new	London”	
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(Interview	Raynsford,	2010).	Gordon	Rautenbach	recalled	they	wanted	“something	iconic	
and	instantly	recognisable”	(Interview	Rautenbach,	2010).	
Significantly,	Raysnford’s	team	did	not	criticise	the	CIT	team’s	“box”	scheme	for	a	shortfall	
in	“green	identity”	based	on	the	vague	assessment	category	that	TTPM	had	introduced	
into	the	selection	process	(TTPM,	1998f,	p.	3).	Their	concern	was	focused	more	around	the	
issue	to	generate	a	landmark	project.	Raynsford	and	his	advisors	pushed	Foster+Partners	
to	accept	“movements	and	detours”	(Callon,	1986,	p.	206)	in	their	development	of	
“building	form	and	orientation”	in	order	to	keep	the	alliance	together	and	make	it	succeed	
in	their	quest	to	bring	City	Hall	into	being.		
The	Foster+Partners	team,	in	consultation	with	Arup,	took	the	lead	in	developing	three	key	
strategies	to	develop	building	form	and	orientation	as	the	foundation	of	their	“low	energy”	
design	approach.	These	individual	perspectives	attempted	to	approximate	the	actual	
complex	entanglements	of	building	form	in	the	design	studio	through	specific	projected	
relationships	and	thereby	mobilised	specific	entities.		
5.4.2.1 The	strategy	to	create	a	compact	form	
Ken	Shuttleworth’s	idea	to	create	a	compact	building	form	appeared	to	be	strikingly	
simple:	“A	sphere	has	25%	less	surface	area	then	a	cube	of	the	same	volume”	(Figure	5.13).	
In	the	continuing	translation	process	this	simple	idea	later	posed	a	huge	challenge	in	
geometrical	definition	and	architectural	materialisation:	
When	it	became	more	of	a	competition	we	then	went	through	a	whole	process	
saying	well,	why	don’t	we	just	make	it	fantastic;	[…]	we	might	as	well	win	it!	[…]	
Starting	off	with	the	box,	[…]	the	box	actually	doesn’t	really	give	you	the	optimum	
amount	of	wall	to	floor	area;	if	you’ve	got	a	sphere	you’ve	got	less	wall	for	the	
same	amount	of	floor	area	so	you	actually	get	a	spherical	building,	which	gives	you	
the	tightest	possible	wall-to-floor	ratio.	So	we	were	saying	at	this	point,	[…]	you	got	
less	wall	to	handle	heating	and	cooling	(Interview	Shuttleworth,	2010).	
Surprisingly,	Shuttleworth	speaks	of	floor	area	while	Foster+Partners’	design	documents	
refer	to	surface	area	to	volume	-	they	are	not	the	same,	but	related	arguments.	ECON	19	
identified	heating	and	cooling	as	the	two	largest	sources	of	office-related	energy	
consumption.	In	consequence,	the	surface-to-volume	argument	suggested	that	a	reduced	
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amount	of	building	envelope	surface	would	lose	less	heat	in	winter	(and	less	cold	in	
summer)	and	thus	have	lower	energy	consumption.	This	ontological	view	generated	in	the	
design	studio	associated	selected	heterogeneous	elements:	building	form,	envelope	
surface,	losses	of	heat	and	cold.	Other	constitutive	elements	of	actual	energy	consumption	
and	operation	were	at	this	point	disregarded	(e.g.	the	build-up	of	the	facade	envelope	and	
its	heat	conductivity).		
							
Figure	5.13		Diagram	in	the	Planning	Application	Design	Statement	(Diagram:	Foster+Partners,	1999a,	p.	23)	
The	surface	area-to-volume	ratio	assumption	and	knowledge	claim	seems	simple	and	
robust.	Brought	forward	by	Foster+Partners,	it	extended	the	ECON	19	claim	about	the	
important	role	of	building	form.	Many	arguments	during	the	design	process	are	highly	
dependent	on	their	specific	understanding,	framing	and	interpretation.	
Decontextualised	and	drawn	from	geometry,	the	surface	area-to-volume	ratio	
argument	seemed	simple	and	convincing.	I	challenged	the	claim	and	calculated	the	
ratio	between	these	two	elementary	solid	figures	myself	to	find	that	the	sphere	had	
not	25%	less	surface	than	a	cube	of	the	same	volume	Instead	my	calculations	inferred	
that	it	has	approximately	only 19.4%	less	surface	area	(see	calculation	in	Appendices).	
Perhaps	Shuttleworth	and	his	team	confused	some	assumptions.	More	importantly,	there	
are	two	ways	of	understanding	clashing	here:	the	ideal	conception	of	a	Euclidian	geometry	
and	the	messy	architectural	design	practice.	To	translate	or	to	move	from	the	ideal	
conception	to	the	heterogeneous	practice	is	a	troubled	path,	and	the	argumentation	
during	the	translation	process	loses	its	momentum.	Decisively,	Foster+Partners	attributed	
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a	critical	role	to	the	compacting	approach	that	they	developed	and	predominantly	justified	
by	arguing	for	the	reduction	losses	of	heat	and	cold	through	the	perimeter	surface.		
The	spherical	building	strategy	was	not	new	in	the	Foster’s	design	studio,	but	was	
informed	by	previous	design	experience	and	knowledge.	Richard	Hyams	mentioned	that	at	
Foster+Partners	“there	was	a	big	debate	about	Buckminster	Fuller’s	domes	and	geometric	
forms”.45	Norman	Foster	had	used	Fuller	“quite	a	lot	to	follow	as	a	reference	through	the	
scheme”	(Interview	Hyams,	2011).	Shuttleworth	also	referred	to	“Bucky”	who	had	done	a	
lot	of	work	on	buildings’	surface-to-volume	ratio	(Interview	Shuttleworth,	2010).	Between	
1971	and	1983	Norman	Foster	and	his	practice	collaborated	with	Buckminster	Fuller	on	a	
number	of	projects:	For	instance	in	the	Climatroffice	in	1971	(Figure	5.14).		
	
Figure	5.14		The	Climatroffice	project	(1971)	by	Foster	Associates	and	Buckminster	Fuller	(Drawing:	Foster	&	Jenkins,	
2001,	p.	29)	
With	reference	to	Buckminster	Fuller,	Shuttleworth	and	his	team	redesigned	the	“box”	
scheme	and	introduced	the	strategy	of	compacting.	While	the	“box”	scheme	represented	
an	ordinary	way	of	doing	things,	the	approaches	towards	building	form	that	followed	were	
innovative.	Foster+Partners	tested	new	CAD	tools	at	the	design	studio	that	informed	and	
crucially	enabled	the	construction	of	complex	architectural	forms	that	were	largely	
unprecedented	in	1998.	While	Fuller’s	explorations	to	minimise	the	building’s	enclosure	
surface	kept	informing	the	design	for	the	GLA	building,	Foster+Partners	attempted	to	
																																								 																
45For	a	standard	account	of	Richard	Buckminster	Fuller	see	Krausse	and	Lichtenstein	(1999):	Fuller	lived	from	1895	
to	1983.	Trained	as	an	engineer,	his	worked	addressed	architecture,	design,	engineering	and	research,	and	he	could	
be	described	as	one	of	the	early	pioneers	attempting	to	innovate	architectural	practices	in	relation	to	effective	use	
of	materials.	One	of	Fuller’s	key	statements	is:	“Doing	the	most	with	the	least”	(Fuller	in	Krausse	&	Lichtenstein,	
1999,	pp.	92-93).	
	164	
introduce	two	seminal	changes.	Fuller’s	domes	were	based	on	basic	regular	geometries	in	
order	to	allow	for	easy	calculability,	fabrication	and	assembly	by	minimising	the	number	of	
different	structural	elements.	Fuller’s	domes	adapted	to	environmental	influences,	for	
instance	sunshine	through	moveable	surface	elements	(overlay	or	rotation	of	sun	
protection),	but	not	through	a	modulation	of	form	itself	in	interdependence	to	orientation.	
In	comparison	to	the	first	presentation	scheme,	the	Foster+Partners	team	seemed	to	have	
redefined	their	roles	and	ambitions.	Hyams	recalled	a	fundamentally	changing	interest	in	
which	Buckminster	Fuller’s	ideas	were	influential:		
A	building	like	this	has	got	to	demonstrate,	it’s	got	to	be	a	demonstration	project	
[…].	It	had	to	deliver	on	a	level	that	a	building	of	this	type	had	not	delivered	on	
before.	That	was	the	challenge.	How	you	then	define	that	into	contractual	terms	
was	then	a	debate	over	the	next	few	months.	[…]	The	starting	point	was	it’s	got	to	
be	the	best	building	of	its	type.	[…]	But	the	environmental	agenda	was	really	key	
and	that’s	why	the	whole	dome	[…]	studies	that	Norman	had	done	with	Bucky	were	
quite	key	to	his	agenda	on	energy	(Interview	Hyams,	2011).	
5.4.2.2 The	strategy	to	create	a	tilting	form	
The	GOL’s	design	briefing	allowed	for	the	interior	temperature	range	of	the	future	GLA	
building	to	vary	between	22°C	±	3°C	(TTPM,	1998b).	The	second	distinct	environmental	
issue	that	Foster+Partners	recognised	and	addressed	through	the	use	of	building	form	was	
the	attempt	to	reduce	direct	solar	gains.	Limiting	direct	solar	radiation	into	the	building	
through	the	glass	facade	was	in	turn	expected	to	reduce	the	required	cooling	loads	and	
related	energy	consumption.	
In	consultation	with	Arup	the	Foster+Partners	team	decided	to	modify	the	spherical	
building	form	by	stretching	and	tilting	it	along	the	north–south	axis.	This	move	indicated	
an	innovative	redesign	of	Fuller’s	regular	dome	structures.	The	geometrical	perfect	sphere	
was	discarded.	The	strikingly	simple	claim	that	“a	sphere	has	25%	[in	fact	19.4%]	less	
surface	area	than	a	cube	of	the	same	volume”	thereby	increasingly	lost	its	explanatory	
power,	since	the	emerging	building	form	became	less	compact.		
Ken	Shuttleworth	attempted	to	explain	the	building	form	and	orientation	experiments	
retrospectively:	
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I	think	that	the	sphere	[…],	because	we’re	[51]	degrees	north,	basically	you	[…]	
should	make	use	of	a	sort	of	sausage	shape;	an	oval	shape,	to	get	the	minimum	[…]	
amount	of	surface	area	angled	towards	the	sun.	So	that	was	why	we	angled	it	back	
at	the	angle	of	the	sun	to	actually	basically	reduce	the	amount	of	solar	gain.	And	
also	to	get	more	daylight	onto	the	river,	[…]	so	onto	the	riverside	walk.	And	also	to	
allow	the	building	to	be	self-shaded	on	the	south	side.	So	environmentally,	[…]	
when	it	was	built	it	was	one	of	the	most	environmentally	friendly	buildings	–	
probably	still	is	actually	–	in	London	(Interview	Shuttleworth,	2010).		
The	design	team	was	required	to	collect	and	adapt	particular	knowledge	about	solar	
irradiance.	City	Hall’s	geographical	position	is	at	a	latitude	of	51°30′N,	and	longitude	of	
0°08′W.	The	solar	radiation	associated	with	this	strategy	was	direct	radiation	
(unobstructed),	while	diffuse	radiation	(reflected)	became	ignored.	The	projected	angles	in	
which	direct	solar	radiation	hits	a	horizontal	plane	vary	depending	on	the	time	of	year	and	
time	of	day	–	between	as	high	as	61.9°C	(noon,	summer	solstice	in	June)	and	as	low	as	
15.1°C	(noon,	winter	solstice	in	December).	
The	design	team’s	first	objective	of	creating	a	compact	building	form	seemed	to	be	at	least	
partially	in	conflict	with	the	second,	which	was	to	create	a	tilted	building	form.	These	two	
objectives	addressed	two	distinct	environmental	issues:	reducing	heat	(cold)	losses	and	
reducing	solar	gains.	Although	creating	a	compact	spherical	building	form	seems	to	be	a	
promising	strategy	to	address	the	first	issue	of	reducing	heat	losses,	it	is	partially	
problematic	for	the	second	issue	of	reducing	solar	gains	as	spherical	building	surface	zones	
that	are	hit	by	sun	beams	almost	in	perpendicular	angles	gain	disproportionately	high	solar	
irradiance.	These	two	hypothetical	strategies	did	not	fully	contradict	each	other,	but	were	
at	least	partially	in	conflict	with	each	other,	a	conflict	not	thematised	by	Foster+Partners.	
5.4.2.3 The	strategy	to	create	a	stepping	form	
A	third	strategy	that	Foster+Partners	introduced	to	“get	the	basics	right”	was	to	introduce	
steps	in	the	building	form	in	areas	of	high	solar	irradiance.	Like	the	second	strategy	to	
create	a	tilting	form,	the	aim	was	to	reduce	direct	solar	gains.	Steeping	form	also	further	
weakened	the	argument	to	produce	a	compact	building	form.	Foster+Partners	proposed	to	
cantilever	individual	floors,	so	that	overlapping	floor	plates	would	cast	partial	shadow	on	
the	facades	of	the	floor	beneath	it	(Figure	5.16).	The	architects’	stepping	strategy	was	
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based	on	the	assumption	and	desire	to	equip	floors	with	a	floor	to	ceiling	perimeter	glass	
facade	(see	Chapter	6).	This	seemed	to	be	their	preferred	default	option,	evident	in	early	
renderings	and	physical	models.	Later,	when	the	building	form	was	largely	stabilised,	the	
CIT	team	dropped	full	height	glazing	and	introduced	opaque	facade	elements	on	the	
bottom	and	very	top	of	the	facade.	As	a	result,	the	stepping	strategy	later	became	partly	
redundant	in	the	contingent	design	practices,	since	shadows	were	mostly	cast	on	opaque	
facade	zones.	Shuttleworth	and	his	team	started	to	extend	the	above	hypotheses	and	
strategies	into	a	cohort	of	building	forms.		
Shuttleworth	and	his	team	continued	experimenting	and	sketching	alternatives.	Figure	
5.15	displays	some	of	Shuttleworth’s	ideas	for	intermediary	schemes.	In	response	to	the	
evolutionary	design	briefing	process,	these	sketches	demonstrate	the	drive	to	experiment	
with	building	form	as	a	vehicle	to	evoke	interpretations	of	a	more	“distinctive	identity”	
(TTPM,	1998h,	p.	5)	and	of	Raysnford’s	“desire	to	create	a	landmark	building”	
(Shuttleworth	in	Detail,	2002,	p.	1091).	
Sketches	like	this	presented	important	“tools	of	investigation”	for	the	architects	(Yaneva,	
2009,	p.	120)	in	which	particular	spherical	schemes	became	tested	and	discussed	between	
them.	These	hypotheses	constructed	in	the	design	studio	needed	to	be	strengthened	
through	computer	simulations	and	were	later	put	on	trial	in	actual	operation.	The	
strategies	of	the	compact,	tilted	and	stepped	building	form	convinced	the	wider	design	
team	and	thus	became	in	principle	stabilised	within	the	continued	translation	processes.		
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Figure	5.15		Sketches	by	Ken	Shuttleworth	in	1998	following	the	“box”	scheme	(Drawing:	Foster+Partners,	2004)	 	
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Figure	5.16		Development	sketch	in	1998	(Drawing:	Foster+Partners,	2004)	
My	Foster+Partners	interviewees	and	their	design	documents	explained	and	defended	the	
emerging	building	form	largely	through	simple	cause-effect	arguments:	particular	
hypotheses	on	how	to	limit	heat	losses	and	how	to	limit	solar	gains	through	the	use	of	
building	form	were	developed.	It	seemed	that	many	other	associations,	such	as	the	
question	of	perception,	involved	in	the	making	and	finding	of	form	were	largely	muted	or	
were	inadequately	communicated.	The	architect,	David	Kong,	explained:	
Iconic	for	us	isn’t	about	doing	an	organic	shape,	we	wanted	the	form	of	the	
building	to	reflect	some	kind	of	an	environmental	influence	[…].	It’s	that	shape	[...]	
for	an	environmental	reason,	it’s	not	that	shape	because	we	wanted,	we	felt	that	it	
looked	nice,	so	we	kind	of	married	the	two	together	(Interview	Kong,	2010).		
Norman	Foster	assigned	much	influence	to	Raynsford	who	gave	the	“clear	direction”	to	
develop	a	“more	symbolic	form”	(Foster	in	Detail,	2002,	p.	1090).	Yet,	surprisingly,	when	I	
spoke	to	the	team	members	of	Foster+Partners	they	indicated	that	it	was	only	next	to	the	
functional	hypotheses	(e.g.	compacting	to	reduce	heat	loss)	that	the	many	design	moves	
of	form	finding	were	also	driven	by	aesthetic	and	perceptual	questions.		
Kong’s	metaphor	of	marriage	is	a	rare	acknowledgement	from	an	architect	recognising	
other	influences	in	the	form-finding	process	beyond	the	mere	functional	argument.	The	
strategies	to	maximise	the	use	building	form	were	at	once	translations	of	the	CIT	team’s	
approach	to	low	energy	design,	as	well	as	attempts	to	adapt	to	Raysnford’s	request	for	a	
landmark	building.	This	became	a	necessary	detour	in	the	design	process	in	order	to	
enable	continued	participation	within	the	competitive	selection	process.	
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5.4.3 Extending	assumptions	into	cooling	systems	
In	the	following	section	I	explain	the	development	of	strategies	that	mainly	fell	to	Arup’s	
responsibility	and	expertise.	These	strategies	were	not	controversially	discussed	by	my	
interviewees,	hence	I	explain	them	only	briefly	here.		
The	building	services	engineers	at	Arup	also	worked	with	building	forms,	but	approached	
and	understood	them	in	different	ways	to	the	architects	at	Foster+Partners.	In	mutual	
exchange,	Arup	incorporated	emerging	building	forms	into	their	testing,	calculations	and	
modelling,	and	thus	commented,	checked	and	gave	feedback	on	individual	building	form	
proposals.	Consensus	on	design	issues	was	not	always	possible	between	the	two	parties.	
Thonger,	Arup’s	engineering	project	manager	with	responsibility	for	the	GLA	headquarters	
project,	commented	on	Foster+Partners’	intensively	propagated	strategy	of	the	surface-to-
volume	ratio:	“Oh	yes,	I	never	subscribed	to	that”	(Interview	Thonger,	2011).	He	explained:	
“Building	form	and	orientation	are	significant	[…],	rather	than	critical,	[…]	in	the	design	
process.	It	is	the	facade	treatment	that	is	arguably	more	significant”	(Email	Thonger,	2012).	
The	two	teams	had	conflicting	priorities	when	translating	the	low	energy	approach	into	
strategies.	Thonger	assigned	an	important	role	to	the	use	of	“building	form	and	
orientation”,	though	less	important	when	compared	with	Foster+Partners’	interpretation.	
He	gave	the	most	significant	role	to	the	design	of	the	facade	according	to	orientation.	The	
facade	design	emerged	as	a	topic	early	on	but	became	intensively	debated	and	developed	
only	after	the	building	form	was	largely	stabilised	(see	Chapter	6).	Arup’s	role	and	
responsibility	within	the	design	team	was	to	comment	on	and	thus	co-shape	emerging	
building	forms,	while	their	main	responsibility	was	to	design	and	develop	the	building	
services	design,	to	which	CIT	and	Foster+Partners	provided	comments	and	feedback.	This	
was	a	form	of	mutual	exchange	in	which	advice	was	sometimes	ignored.		
Thonger	explained	how	Arup	approached	the	design	of	the	GLA	headquarters	and	how	
they	chose	the	design	trajectories	of	building	services	to	extend	and	materialise	the	initial	
design	briefing.	TTPM’s	design	briefing	provided	crucial	design	information	to	develop	
particular	building	services	system	strategies,	for	instance	the	projected	11,609m2	floor	
area,	400	GLA	staff	(TTPM,	1998c),	occupancy	hours,	permitted	interior	temperature	
differences	of	22oC	±	3oC,	relative	air	humidity	(50%	±	10%),	and	projected	ventilation	air	
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exchange	rates	(TTPM,	1998b).	Further	consultation	with	TTPM	and	the	continuously	
developing	design	briefing	provided	design	directions.	Arup’s	design	knowledge	was	
grounded	in	their	practice,	in	their	previous	experiences,	and	in	the	technical	and	
organisational	possibilities	constructed	around	the	GLA	headquarters	project.	Thonger	
explained	how	Arup	evaluated	and	chose	potential	building	services	strategies	for	the	GLA	
project:	
Some	of	[…]	these	things	are	done,	[…]	probably	with	a	gut	feel,	to	say	you	know,	
what	are	the	advantages,	disadvantages,	what	you	can	see	(Interview	Thonger,	
2011).	
He	explained	that	at	an	early	stage,	when	the	building	form	and	other	parameters	were	
still	fluctuating,	choices	were	based	on	“a	few	kind	of	fairly	crude	calculations”.	Only	later,	
when	design	elements	would	be	more	stabilised,	Arup	would	go	
through	annual	energy	analysis,	so	we	would	have	worked	out	what	the	solar	gains	
were.	We	then	put	the	whole	thing	through	[…]	a	process.	[…]	So	we	have	a	fully	
automated	system	to	go	through.	But	[…]	we	only	run	those	when	you’ve	got	a	
fairly	good	idea	about	what	the	performance	is	or	what	the	building	is	going	[to]	
end	up	being,	so	up	to	this	point	[…]	it’s	kind	of	guesswork	and	knowledge	and	[…]	
just	previous	experience	to	get	to	a	point	where	you	can	say,	this	is	good	enough	
for	us	to	do	the	full	analysis	and	as	it	happened	on	this	building	there	was	no	need	
to	do	a	re-analysis	because	[…]	it	was	meeting	all	the	requirements	[…]	it	takes	a	
long	time	to	model	these	things	we	try	and	limit	it.	Reasonable	experience	to	get	to	
a	certain	point	and	then	press	the	button	to	analyse	it.	
Thonger’s	team	had	translated	the	GOL’s	design	briefing	together	with	CIT	and	
Foster+Partners	into	the	challenge	of	designing	“a	very	low	energy	building”	(Interview	
Thonger,	2011).	He	pointed	out	that	the	GLA	headquarters	project	was	exceptional,	since	
the	GOL	briefing,	on	behalf	of	the	long-term	occupier	GLA,	defined	non-standard	
environmental	design	goals:		
In	those	times	[…]	there	was	a	lot	of	debate	about	low	energy	buildings.	[…]	We	
very	rarely	get	to	design	owner-occupier	buildings,	mostly	they’re	for	developers	
and	then	they’re	sold	on,	[…]	so	the	debate	about	low	energy	kind	of	doesn’t	get	
that	far	because	you	are	designing	to	[…]	a	very	standard	brief.	
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But	in	the	development	of	the	building	services	strategies	(heating,	cooling,	ventilation)	
Thonger	did	not	make	much	reference	to	the	design	briefing	of	the	GOL	and	TTPM.	He	did	
not	mention	TTPM’s	design	briefing	update	on	the	CO2	emissions	target	of	70kg/m2/a	
(TTPM,	1998e)	as	relevant	to	the	translation	process.	Still,	the	CIT	team’s	low	energy	
approach	was	targeted	to	reduce	CO2	emissions.		
Thonger	also	explained	that	BREEAM,	which	was	chosen	by	the	GOL	as	an	“important	
cornerstone	for	setting	environmental	standards”	(TTPM,	1998e),	did	not	play	a	decisive	
role	in	informing	the	building	services	design	strategies.	He	acknowledged	that	the	
BREEAM	assessment	was	recognised:	“Yes,	it	was	[…]	but	[…]	we	don’t	tend	to	have	to	do	
a	lot	of	extra	stuff	for	BREEAM,	even	in	those	days,	we	were	just	following	kind	of	what	
was	required”	(Interview	Thonger,	2011).	Hence	the	BREEAM	device	chosen	by	TTPM	did	
not	exert	much	influence	over	the	CIT	team’s	trajectory	of	design	strategies.		
5.4.3.1 The	strategy	to	design	a	low	energy	cooling	system	
In	contrast	to	Foster+Partners,	Arup’s	initial	priority	to	further	translate	the	low	energy	
design	challenge	into	design	strategies	was	not	to	maximise	the	use	of	building	form.	Arup	
concentrated	on	the	development	of	building	services	and	their	design	strategy	was	based	
on	the	following	hypothesis:	
We	know	enough	as	engineers	to	know	that	if	you	wanted	to	go	for	a	really,	a	
proper,	low	energy	design	that	you	have	to	start	off	assuming	that	you’ve	got	a	low	
energy	cooling	system.	[…]	Otherwise	if	you	have	a	high	energy	cooling	system	
you’ll	never	be	low	energy	(Interview	Thonger,	2011).	
Arup’s	low	energy	cooling	strategy	was	built	on	three	elements:	chilled	beams,	a	borehole	
cooling	system,	and	a	“natural	ventilation”	system.	Following	the	first	presentation	to	
Raynsford,	TTPM	asked	the	London	Bridge	City	team	to	confirm	their	“intention	in	
providing	a	passive	environmental	solution	to	the	offices,	rather	than	4-pipe	fancoils”	and	
noted	that	a	“chilled	ceiling	with	displacement	[ventilation]	is	preferred”	(TTPM,	1998f,	pp.	
2-3).	It	is	not	clear	whether	Arup	adapted	to	TTPM’s	demand	or	if	they	themselves	chose	
that	design	direction.	Thonger	claimed	that	to	design	a	low	energy	cooling	system	“you’ve	
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got	to	start	off	with	saying	that	the	cooling	systems	have	to	be	either	chill	beams	[…]	or	
chilled	ceilings.46	
Thonger	and	his	team	proposed	to	use	a	borehole	cooling	system.	This	proposed	system	
was	(and	is)	quite	rare	-	in	central	London	there	are	only	about	30	buildings	equipped	with	
this	system	(Interview	Kraus,	2012).	Although	the	system	makes	it	unnecessary	to	use	
electricity	intensive	chillers,	it	still	requires	electricity	for	pumps	and	diverse	control	
elements.	Boreholes	were	projected	to	provide	water	from	the	aquifer	in	120m	depth	at	
12°C-13°C	as	cooling	source.	Thonger	argued	the	choice	of	the	borehole	cooling	strategy	
through	its	projected	use	of	only	“about	one	third	of	the	power	of	a	conventional	chiller”.	
He	framed	the	energy	efficiency	of	cooling	approaches	through	the	coefficient	of	
performance	(COP)	to	suggest	that	the	borehole	cooling	system	would	have	a	COP	
between	12	and	15,	compared	with	an	air-cooled	chiller	with	a	COP	of	4.5.47		
CIT’s	construction	cost	consultant,	Davis	Langdon,	estimated	that	the	borehole	system	
would	be	20%	more	expensive	than	typical	air	conditioning	systems,	which	were	accepted	
by	CIT.	Thonger	explained	that	they	considered	it	“a	risky	strategy	in	a	way”	(Interview	
Thonger,	2011).	They	claimed	that	they	knew	enough	about	the	expected	depth	of	the	
water	and	its	temperature,	but	what	they	didn’t	know	was	“how	much	water	you	can	
actually	expect	to	get	out	of	the	aquifer”.	Financially	they	decided	that	they	would	drill	a	
maximum	of	three	boreholes.	In	actual	operation	the	borehole	approach	could	have	failed.	
It	was	only	months	later,	after	the	first	borehole	was	drilled,	that	this	strategy	proved	to	
follow	predictions	and	could	be	stabilised	since	projected	water	flow	rates	were	confirmed.		
The	third	element	associated	with	the	low	energy	cooling	and	ventilation	strategy	was	a	
“natural	ventilation”	system:	
When	we	were	talking	about	the	fresh	air,	natural	ventilation	supply,	we	started	to	
do	some	calculations,	which	was	about	trying	to	work	out	what	the	buoyancy	of	
the	air	was,	and	how	much	the	wind	blew	and	whether	we	had	a	problem	in	terms	
																																								 																
46	In	contrast	to	4-pipe	fan	coil	units,	chilled	beams	do	not	depend	on	any	motors.	Space	cooling	(heating)	is	
achieved	through	air	convection	and	buoyancy.	Chilled	beams	have	a	comparatively	low	volume	flow-through	rate	
of	cooled	(warmed)	water	and	are	projected	to	consume	less	energy	than	fan	coils.	
47	COP	is	the	ratio	of	cooling	provided	to	electrical	energy	input.-	the	higher	the	ratio	the	more	efficient	it	is.	
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of	venting	the	stuff	out.	So	that	was	done,	a	few	kind	of	fairly	crude	calculations	
(Interview	Thonger,	2011).	
The	compact	building	forms	then	in	development	under	the	lead	of	Foster+Partners	were	
not	ideal	for	natural	ventilation	since	the	building	depth	was	relatively	big.	TTPM	
emphasised	in	their	design	briefing	Questions	/	Queries	for	Developers	(1998f,	pp.	2-3)	that	
developers	adopt	a	passive	air-conditioning	system.	Arup	adapted	to	this	request	and	
translated	it	into	the	three	specific	strategies	of	chilled	beams,	a	borehole	cooling	system,	
and	a	“natural	ventilation”	system	that	were	and	still	are	rather	exceptional	in	office	
developments.		
5.4.4 Assembling	the	second	Ministerial	Presentation	Scheme		
The	scheme	envisioned	in	Figure	5.17	emerged	in	the	mutual	exchange	of	ideas	and	
strategies	between	Foster+Partners	and	Arup.	The	team	began	to	translate	the	design	
brief	requirements	for	the	chamber	and	offices	(TTPM,	1998a)	into	spatial	arrangements.	
The	geometrically	perfect	sphere	was	transformed	into	a	unique	building	form:	a	northern	
lens-shaped	part,	and	a	southern	part	consisting	of	circular	floor	plates	positioned	non-
concentrically	in	relation	to	each	other.		
	
Figure	5.17		Environmental	concept	sketch	in	1998	(Drawing:	Foster+Partners,	2004)	
The	building	plans	suggested	to	follow	the	north-south	axis.	The	assembly	chamber	was	
designed	to	be	orientated	towards	the	north,	facing	the	Thames	and	the	City	of	London.	
The	tilting	building	form	was	projected	to	enable	indirect	daylight	to	enter	the	northern	
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side	of	the	building	and	allowed	for	wider	views	towards	the	City	of	London.	The	offices	
were	oriented	to	the	south	and	therefore	more	subjected	to	solar	gains.	Foster+Partners	
claimed	that	the	developed	“form	of	building	responds	to	sun	path	[…]	south	elevation	
self-shading”	(Figure	5.17).	In	the	next	chapter	I	explain	that	Foster+Partners’	claim	was	
only	partially	valid.	This	became	clear	when	Arup	-	in	the	translation	process	and	building	
form	stabilisation	attempt	-	undertook	a	computer-based	solar	gain	analysis	of	what	at	the	
time	was	unheard	of	complexity.		
The	GOL’s	design	briefing	had	associated	many	heterogeneous	elements.	In	developing	a	
GLA	headquarter	design	proposal,	the	CIT	team	had	to	invoke	a	set	of	additional	diverse	
entities.	Surprisingly,	in	the	continuous	transformation	processes,	BREEAM	-	that	TTPM	
reconfirmed	as	an	“important	cornerstone	for	setting	environmental	standards”	(TTPM,	
1998e)	-	played	a	rather	marginal	role.	Richard	Hyams	explained:	
BREEAM,	yes,	environmentally	that	was	the	only	brief,	the	environmental	goal.	
Because	it’s	the	only	thing	that	you	can	measure	at	the	time.	We	never	really	
talked	about	BREEAM	all	the	way	through	the	job	if	I	remember.	Not	like	you	do	
now:	BREEAM	is	on	every	meeting	agenda	every	week.	It’s	just	asked,	whereas	
then	it	wasn’t.	What	we	were	focusing	on	then	was	designing	the	best	possible	
environmental	building	we	could.	And	that’s	not	necessarily	BREEAM.		
Thus	Hyams	considered	BREEAM	a	useful	measuring	device,	but	not	as	a	tool	to	guide	
“environmental”	design.	I	asked	Hyams	if	the	Foster+Partners	team	addressed	any	other	
environmental	issues	beyond	energy	efficiency	or	CO2	emissions	as	crucial	drivers	for	the	
GLA	design	process:	
From	a	very	pragmatic	point	of	view,	there	weren’t	global	issues	that	[…]	this	
building	had	to	deliver.	We	knew	the	global	issues	needed	to	be	addressed	and	we	
addressed	them	through	low	energy	building.	Then	we	looked	at	the	building	and	
said	we	need	to	make	it	[transmit	as	little]	heat	through	the	skin	as	possible,	[and]	
as	passive	an	air	system	internally	as	possible.	Natural	ventilation	and	all	the	things	
that	were	normally	not	seen	in	offices.	So	at	Fosters	we	are	building	offices	all	over	
the	place;	you	looked	at	them	all	and	thought	actually	we	can	do	better	than	that,	
we	can	do	better	than	that,	and	do	better	than	that.	It	was	almost	like	an	internal	
benchmark.	[…]	So	you	say	right,	if	I	want	to	do	better	than	that	I’ve	got	to	work	
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really	hard.	It	was	almost	that	agenda	that	was	driving	the	energy	story	behind	this.	
So	we	were	working	and	also	struggling	at	the	time	because	the	tools	didn’t	exist	
(Interview	Hyams,	2011).	
In	preparation	for	the	second	ministerial	presentation	the	two	remaining	developer	teams	
were	informed	about	the	format,	expected	content	and	procedure	of	the	second	
presentation	to	Raynsford	scheduled	for	4th	November	1998.	Besides	the	presentation,	the	
selection	process	was	also	based	on	a	“Design	&	Technical	Submission”,	scheduled	for	the	
20th	November,	that	required	defined	proposals	in	written	and	drawn	format	(TTPM,	
1998g,	p.	3).	
TTPM	advised	the	design	teams	that	the	criteria	for	the	final	shortlist	selection	process	
were	established	through	a	mixed	set	of	heterogeneous	elements.	These	were	framed	
through	seven	main	categories	with	interrelated	questions	of	“location	and	accessibility”,	
“conceptual	design”	further	defined	through	a	focus	on	the	”landmark	building”,	the	
“assembly	chamber”,	and	“civic	space	(the	context	in	which	the	building	is	sited)”.	Further	
related	questions	concerned	“operational	suitability”,	the	“programme”	addressing	
temporal	questions	of	the	project	schedule,	“finance”	regarding	the	GOL-developer	lease	
deal	(i.e.“the	total	cost	of	operation	over	15-20	years”),	and	“public	consultation”.	One	of	
these	main	categories	was	“environmental	issues”,	defined	through	the	“construction	&	
operation	of	the	building”	(TTPM,	1998h,	p.	6).		
The	design	briefing	of	“green	issues”	predominantly	defined	through	the	recommended	
BREEAM	assessment,	the	CO2	target,	and	preference	for	“passive”	air-conditioning	
systems	had	to	be	evaluated	in	relation	to	these	heterogeneous	entities.	
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5.4.5 Meeting	Raynsford	and	his	advisors	at	the	final	presentation		
		
Figure	5.18		Second	ministerial	presentation.	Presenting	the	scheme	that	later	won	the	competition	(Collage	/	
Rendering:	Foster+Partners,	2004)	
On	4th	November	1998	the	two	remaining	contenders	in	the	competition	presented	their	
adapted	schemes	to	about	30	people:	Raynsford	and	other	ministers,	his	design	advisory	
group,	representatives	of	the	GOL	and	TTPM,	property	advisors	to	the	civil	estate	and	
members	of	KFEA.	Technical	content	was	meant	to	be	limited	to	the	30-minute	
presentations,	which	were	followed	by	question-and-answer	sessions	of	up	to	15	minutes	
(TTPM,	1998g).	
Ken	Shuttleworth	and	his	colleagues	presented	their	“mask”	scheme	that,	through	many	
design	transformations,	modified	and	replaced	the	“box”	scheme.	I	was	unable	to	access	
any	detailed	documentation	on	this	transient	scheme,	but	my	interviewees	confirmed	that	
at	this	stage	the	central	elements	of	the	environmental	design	strategy	of	the	later	City	
Hall	building	were	introduced.	These	included	the	projected	spherical	compact,	tilted	and	
stepped	building	form,	high	performance	facade,	deep	space	natural	ventilation,	borehole	
cooling	and	chilled	beams.	Photovoltaics	were	considered	at	this	point	as	well,	but	CIT	
decided	that	funding	for	it	would	have	to	be	covered	by	the	GOL	and	not	by	the	developer.	
The	CIT	team’s	design	proposal	included	the	promise	to	outmatch	the	GOL’s	“cornerstone	
for	setting	environmental	standards”	(TTPM,	1998e)	by	claiming	that	their	design	scheme	
would	reach	a	BREEAM	“excellent”	(min.	70%	score)	assessment	instead	of	only	“very	
good”	(min.	55%	score)	(Interview	Thonger,	2011).	As	I	discuss	in	the	next	chapter,	all	
	177	
these	strategies	were	schematic	and	required	further	design	development,	testing	and	
stabilisation.	For	instance,	the	project’s	suggested	building	form	and	orientation	was	later	
significantly	redesigned	and	after	the	planning	application	the	design	of	the	facades	
became	a	crucial	focus	of	the	design	practices.		
On	26	February	1999	Nick	Raynsford	announced	that	the	CIT,	Foster+Partners	and	Arup	
scheme	had	won	the	contract.	This	decision	was	widely	trailed	in	media	and	reactions	
were	controversial.	With	the	selection	of	the	More	London	Bridge	team,	the	design	
practice	of	the	GLA	headquarters	went	into	the	next	and	final	phase	of	materialisation,	
which	is	explored	in	the	next	chapter.			
5.5 Conclusions	
In	this	chapter	I	have	explained	how	mainly	Foster+Partners	and	Arup	translated	
environmental	challenges	and	targets	–	defined	through	the	GOL’s	design	briefing	–	into	
specific	design	strategies	and	building	service	systems	in	the	first	two	key	design	schemes	
for	GLA	headquarters.	In	order	to	put	the	design	briefing	into	action	and	to	proceed	in	the	
translation	processes	targeted	towards	materialisation	of	the	GLA	headquarters,	a	set	of	
heterogeneous	entities	(e.g.	guidelines,	diagrams,	strategies,	heat	losses)	had	to	be	
invoked.	I	therefore	focused	on	the	use	of	“building	form	and	orientation”	that	was	given	a	
pivotal	role	by	Foster+Partners	within	the	development	of	their	design	strategies.		
In	Chapter	4	I	explained	that	the	initial	design	briefing	of	the	GOL	had	transformed	the	
environmental	design	challenge	predominantly	into	a	request	for	a	BREEAM	building	
assessment	of	at	least	“very	good”	and	the	vague	statement	that	“‘green’	issues	should	be	
given	proper	consideration”	(TTPM,	1998a).	Crucially,	it	was	the	GOL	that	was	driving	the	
environmental	agenda.	In	principle,	CIT,	Foster+Partners	and	Arup	could	have	conceived	
their	roles	as	not	only	to	enact	the	design	briefing,	but	instead	to	critically	comment,	
intervene,	refine	and	expand	the	GOL’s	briefing.	They	could	have	insisted	on	making	the	
question	of	what	sustainability	(as	the	overall	objective	of	the	GLA)	might	imply	for	design	
practice	a	crucial	issue	that	needed	further	investigation	within	the	design	processes.	They	
could	have	developed	indicators,	targets	and	visions	tailored	specifically	to	the	diverse	
groups	of	people	that	were	projected	to	be	associated	with	the	GLA	headquarters.	Instead,	
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under	the	lead	of	CIT,	it	took	the	team	until	after	the	first	ministerial	presentation	to	adopt	
environmental	design	strategies	that	surpassed	then	mainstream	commercial	office	
developments.	CIT,	Foster+Partners	and	Arup	consequently	accepted	that	the	concept	of	
sustainability,	with	its	fundamentally	broader	set	of	related	issues,	was	largely	abandoned	
in	the	translation	processes.	
Rautenbach	stated	that	many	developer	teams	initially	failed	to	translate	the	GOL’s	
environmental	agenda	defined	through	the	first	three	design	briefs	(TTPM,	1998a,	1998b,	
1998c)	into	their	emerging	design	approaches	(Interview	Rautenbach,	2010).	The	initial	
briefing,	as	a	guiding	device,	thus	lacked	the	power	to	align	the	heterogeneous	activities	of	
design	teams	with	the	GOL’s	interests.	In	response,	TTPM	transformed	and	reinforced	the	
environmental	design	briefing	through	a	set	of	additional	requirements.	Amongst	these	
were	a	required	CO2	emissions	target	of	70kg/m2/a	(TTPM,	1998e)	that	was	more	
ambitious	than	ECON	19’s	suggested	“good	practice”	CO2	benchmark.	Furthermore,	the	
modified	design	briefing	encouraged	the	use	of	particular	technological	pathways	such	as	
“renewable	energy	sources”	(TTPM,	1998e)	and	“passive	A/C	[Air-Conditioning]”,	“chilled	
ceiling”	and	“displacement”	ventilation	systems	(TTPM,	1998f,	p.	3).		
The	main	criticism	of	Raynsford’s	advisory	team	to	the	presented	“box”	scheme	centred	
around	the	“shortfall	of	distinctive	identity”	in	the	proposal	(TTPM,	1998h,	p.	5).	Although	
Raynsford	had	propagated	an	ambitious	environmental	agenda	for	the	GLA	headquarters,	
this	seemed	to	be	of	secondary	importance	in	his	teams’	comments.	The	CIT	team	changed	
strategies	and	intensified	their	interest	in	winning	the	competition	after	the	first	
presentation.	They	realised	that	the	GOL’s	desire	to	create	a	landmark	building	was	one	
important	and	necessary	“detour”	(Callon,	1986)	in	the	translation	processes	of	
environmental	design	briefing	towards	design	materialisation	that	had	to	be	adopted	in	
order	to	stay	in	and	win	the	competition.	Thus	CIT,	Foster+Partners	and	Arup	changed	
preferences	that	resulted	in	a	more	ambitious	re-ordering	of	their	design	practices.		
Foster+Partners	and	Arup	interpreted	the	design	briefing	mainly	as	a	singular	issue	of	“low	
energy	design”	(Interview	Thonger,	2011).	This	was	a	significant	transformation,	since	it	
further	limited	the	already	narrowly	compressed	scope	of	issues	that	the	BREEAM	
certification	implied.	
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In	order	to	translate	the	“low	energy	design”	into	specific	design	strategies	and	building	
service	systems	the	design	team	was	dependant	on	the	accumulation	and	producing	of	
additional	design	information	and	knowledge.	ECON	19	and	the	“Triangular	Approach”	
were	chosen	as	two	key	devices	with	which	to	work	together,	communicate	and	align	the	
teams	in	their	continued	design	and	transformation	activities.	The	“Triangular	Approach”	
presented	an	important	visual	and	conceptual	device	to	align	the	design	team	in	its	
declared	ambition	to	maximise	the	potential	of	passive	design	strategies.	Shuttleworth	
interpreted	the	approach	as	“a	sound	basis	for	low	energy	design”	(Shuttleworth	et	al.,	
2003,	p.	303).	Thonger	described	the	approach	as	getting	“the	basics	right”	(Interview	
Thonger,	2011).	All	the	interviewees	with	whom	I	discussed	the	approach	confirmed	it	as	a	
valuable	device	in	aiming	towards	low	energy	design.	
Foster+Partners	and	Arup	transformed	the	low	energy	design	approach	into	different	
strategies	that	were	co-shaped	by	their	respective	roles,	responsibilities	and	expertise.	Out	
of	a	vast	array	of	possible	design	trajectories,	drawing	on	both	ECON	19	and	the	
“Triangular	Approach”,	Foster+Partners	chose	to	maximise	the	use	of	“building	form	and	
orientation”	as	their	fundamental	basis	of	low	energy	design.	In	their	Riverside	Studio	they	
constructed	the	projected	building	operation	mainly	through	the	selected	issues	of	heat	
losses	and	solar	gains.	They	proposed	a	spherical	compact	building	form	to	reduce	the	first	
issue.	To	reduce	the	second,	they	proposed	to	tilt	and	step	the	building	form	towards	the	
south.	I	explained	that	these	three	strategies	also	partially	conflicted	and	that	the	team	did	
not	address	this	potential	conflict	in	any	way.	I	return	to	the	conflict	between	compact	
form	and	solar	gain	in	the	next	chapter	where	I	explore	the	development	of	the	facade.	
These	hypotheses	(heat	losses	and	solar	gains)	and	building	form	strategies	inscribed	a	
particular	“vision	of	(or	prediction	about)	the	world”	into	the	emerging	GLA	proposal	
(Akrich,	1992,	p.	208).	They	underpinned	the	construction	of	building	form	strategies	and	
the	design	strategies	can	be	seen	as	the	materialising	extensions	of	design	hypotheses.	
The	design	team	had	foregrounded	the	issue	of	heat	losses	and	solar	gains	in	their	
activities	and	thus	pushed	other	design	issues	associated	with	“building	form	and	
orientation”	into	the	background	that,	in	actual	operation,	could	become	significant	
elements	in	co-shaping	energy	consumption	levels	(e.g.	daylight	to	reduce	electrical	
lighting).	In	Figure	5.19	I	attempt	to	envision	a	selection	of	the	many	heterogeneous	
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elements	that,	during	the	multiple	translations	of	design-briefing-to-design-materialisation,	
became	associated	with	the	design	of	building	form	and	orientation.		
	
Figure	5.19		Assembly	of	heterogeneous	elements	associated	with	the	building	form	and	orientation	design	
(Diagram:	Author,	2012)		
No	consensus	was	achieved	between	Foster+Partners	and	Arup	regarding	the	role	of	
building	form.	Thonger	questioned	whether	the	emphasis	on	building	form	and	orientation	
was	critical,	suggesting	that	it	might	instead	be	only	significant.	He	attributed	a	more	
decisive	role	to	the	use	of	the	facade	design	that	became	a	focus	of	design	development	
after	the	building	form	stabilised.	In	the	next	chapter	I	continue	the	investigation	of	the	
translation	processes	through	a	focus	on	the	re-design	of	building	form	and	orientation,	
the	intensifying	facade	development	and	the	stabilisation	of	these	elements	that	were	
necessary	to	build	the	GLA	headquarters.		 	
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Chapter	6 	
Adjusting	building	form,	expanding	the	facade	
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6.1 Introduction		
In	February	1999	the	initial	plan	of	transaction,	initiated	by	Nick	Raynsford	and	the	
Government	Office	for	London	(GOL),	to	find,	design	and	realise	a	suitable	headquarters	
for	the	Greater	London	Authority	(GLA)	continued	its	unpredictable	path	through	
multifarious	transformations	and	displacements.	The	plan	was	still	contingent	and	could	
have	failed.	This	chapter	explores	the	continued	design	development	through	the	third	
and	fourth	key	design	schemes,	the	Planning	Application	scheme	(July	1999)	and	
Schematic	Design	scheme	(November	1999).	The	aim	of	this	chapter	is	to	explore	how	the	
design	alliance	continued	to	translate	the	environmental	challenges	and	targets	defined	in	
the	design	briefings	into	design	strategies,	building	technologies	and	the	materialising	
building.	I	analyse	the	transformations,	displacements,	negotiations	and	adaptations	
centrally	involved	in	this	process	(Callon,	1986).		
While	the	previous	chapter	focused	mainly	on	the	initial	development	of	building	form	and	
orientation	through	Foster+Partners’	chosen	strategies	of	compacting,	tilting	and	stepping	
building	form,	this	chapter	focuses	on	how	the	these	design	strategies	were	transformed	
and	how	in	reciprocity	the	facade	design	advanced.	Building	form,	orientation	and	facade	
design	were	the	key	elements	of	Foster+Partners’	and	Arup’s	selected	“low	energy	design”	
objective	and	are	therefore	at	the	centre	of	my	investigation.		
After	More	London	(rebranded	from	CIT),	Foster+Partners	and	Arup	won	the	design	
competition	for	GLA	headquarters	with	the	“mask”	scheme,	roles	and	responsibilities	were	
reordered.	Knight	Frank	Estate	Agents	completed	their	task	of	organising	the	property	
search,	Turner	&	Townsend	Project	Management	(TTPM)	stepped	into	the	background	
with	their	advisory	activity,	and	developer	More	London	entered	a	new	role	by	becoming	
the	client	to	commission,	build	and	own	the	future	City	Hall.	More	London	and	the	GOL	
began	to	share	responsibility	for	the	GLA	headquarters	development,	bound	together	
through	a	25-year	contractual	lease	agreement.	More	London	assumed	responsibility	for	
commissioning	and	financing	the	shell	and	core	construction	(e.g.	building	envelope,	
building	structure,	vertical	transportation	and	main	plants),	while	the	GOL	was	responsible	
for	the	fit	out	of	City	Hall	(e.g.	partition	walls,	finishes,	computer	infrastructure	and	
furniture).		
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The	GOL’s	design	briefing	for	the	competition	was	largely	adopted	and	expanded	by	the	
new	alliance	of	More	London	and	GOL,	and	later	manifested	through	the	“Employer’s	Brief”	
(F+P,	1999e,	p.	8)	and	“Engineering	Services	Design	Brief”	(Arup,	1999,	p.	7)	to	guide	the	
continuing	design	development	towards	sign-off	and	materialisation.		
With	the	GOL’s	selection	of	the	“mask”	scheme	elementary	design	strategies	had	been	
chosen	(e.g.	the	compact	building	form,	the	borehole	cooling	strategy)	in	mutual	
agreement	between	More	London	and	the	GOL.	These	design	strategies	needed	further	
translation	through	the	simultaneous	production	of	additional	design	knowledge	and	the	
construction	of	new	associations.	They	became	transformed,	redesigned,	geometrically	
defined,	adjusted	through	diverse	tests,	simulations,	renegotiations	and	choices	in	the	
quest	to	make	them	perform	as	predicted,	stable	and	material.		
I	explicate	how	the	design	team	came	to	understand	the	complex	associations	and	
functions	of	building	form,	orientation	and	envelope	design,	which	could	not	be	
understood	in	their	actual	heterogeneous	complexity.	In	order	to	progress,	the	design	
team	had	to	choose,	foreground	and	define	particular	workable	complexes	of	main	design	
issues	(e.g.	building	form,	orientation	and	heat	loss)	that	they	considered	most	important	
at	that	time,	while	other	related	issues	were	either	pushed	into	the	background	or	not	
addressed	at	all.	Thus	the	GLA	headquarters	design	practices	were	built	on	an	alternating	
play	of	thematisations,	de-thematisations	and	omissions	of	design	issues.	These	choices	
had	decisive	implications	for	the	designers’	ability	to	project,	approximate	and	account	for	
the	complexity	and	consequences	of	the	GLA	headquarters’	actual	construction	and	
operation.	
This	chapter	ends	by	exploring	how	City	Hall	was	assessed	by	BREEAM	98	for	offices	
following	completion	in	March	2002.	This	had	been	made	a	central	requirement	of	its	
design	briefing.		
	184	
6.2 Reshaping	building	form	and	orientation	
	
Figure	6.1		Ken	Shuttelworth,	Niall	Monaghan	and	Max	Neal	(left	to	right)	working	on	City	Hall’s	design	
development	at	Foster+Partners’	studio	(Photograph:	Nigel	Young	and	Foster+Partners,	2002)	
Following	their	successful	selection	in	late	February	1999,	the	design	alliance	around	
Foster+Partners	went	back	to	work	as	they	had	embarked	on	a	project	that	had	huge	time	
constraints.	The	“mask”	scheme	outlined	a	key	environmental	strategy,	founded	on	the	
spherical,	tilted	and	stepped	building	form,	and	with	low	energy	borehole	cooling,	chilled	
beams,	a	high	performance	envelope	and	deep	space	natural	ventilation.	The	scheme	had	
been	selected	and	approved	by	Nick	Raynsford	and	his	architectural	advisory	team.		
Nevertheless,	Foster+Partners	wanted	to	significantly	transform	the	winning	scheme.	Ken	
Shuttleworth	recalled	the	“problem”	of	the	“mask”	scheme:	
Having	sold	it	[to	Raynsford],	we	had	[…]	second	thoughts	because	the	space	inside	
the	ring	outside	the	chamber	and	the	space	behind	the	ring	was	exactly	the	same	
space	and	yet	we	had	a	different	expression.	And	I	remember	saying	I	felt	it	was	
wrong.	We	need	to	change	it	and	make	it	all	the	same	and	just	pick	out	the	bowl	as	
a	different	shape.	[…]	So	diagrammatically	it	was	a	bit	flawed	really.	[…]	When	I	
changed	this	there	was	[an]	absolute	riot	at	[the	GOL	…].	I	remember	having	a	
phone	call	from	Nick	Raynsford	–	and	Nick	Raynsford	had	already	approved	this;	it	
was	being	signed	off	as	far	as	the	civil	service	was	concerned;	this	was	what	we’re	
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going	to	build.	And	we	went	back	and	said	we	want	to	change	it.	They	[…]	just	
couldn’t	understand	why	we’d	want	to	do	that.	[…]	I	know	Nick	Raynsford	is	terrific.	
He	wasn’t	the	architect	and	I	was.	[…]	I	believed	this	was	the	right	thing	to	do.	And	
they	were	very,	very,	very	stroppy	about	it.	But	they	set	up	another	session	
between	me	and	Nick	(Interview	Shuttleworth,	2010).	
Foster+Partners	met	with	Raynsford	to	explain	to	him	and	his	team	why	the	architects	had	
introduced	changes	to	the	“mask”	scheme.		
	
Figure	6.2		Architectural	sketch	and	model	of	the	winning	City	Hall	competition	scheme,	nicknamed	the	“mask”	
scheme	(Juxtaposition:	Author	2012,	based	on	Foster+Partners	in	Detail,	2002,	pp.	1089-1090)	
Richard	Hyams,	one	of	City	Hall’s	project	architects	at	Foster+Partners,	described	the	
“mask”	scheme	as	“almost	an	extension	of	an	architect’s	sketch”	(Interview	Hyams,	2011).	
Between	the	first	design	briefings	in	August	1998	and	the	second	presentation	to	
Raynsford	they	had	only	three	months	to	develop	the	design.	According	to	Hyams	one	of	
the	key	difficulties	in	the	“mask”	scheme	was	that	
the	mask	was	there	to	sort	of	define	the	chamber	and	again	the	offices	were	
behind	the	mask	or	not	behind	the	mask,	[…]	it’s	quite	an	odd	form	in	that	sense.	
The	logic	of	the	diagram	and	the	principal	way	of	doing	it	was	lost	a	bit,	it	was	
weakened	(Interview	Hyams,	2011).		
Hyams	considered	the	problem	to	be	that	the	2D	diagrammatic	sketch	(Figure	6.2	left)	
couldn’t	be	translated	into	a	3D	architectural	design	proposal;	it	required	adjustment.	
The	diagram	suggested	a	building	that	half	consisted	of	the	chamber,	and	half	of	offices.	
But	the	design	briefing	called	for	a	spatial	programme	of	a	double	height	chamber	of	
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about	1,900m2	and	about	8,000m2	of	office	space.	Foster+Partners	wanted	the	facade	
design	to	correspond	to	and	reflect	the	programme	behind	the	facade.	Additionally	the	
chamber	could	not	be	accommodated	within	the	shallow	shape	of	a	lens.	Foster+Partners	
therefore	decided	to	redesign	the	“mask”	scheme.	
Another	issue	was	that	the	architects	at	Foster+Partners	also	needed	to	tame	the	irregular	
spherical	building	form	in	order	to	make	it	more	controllable	in	preparation	of	the	then	
imminent	application	for	planning	permission	and	the	further	materialisation	process.	In	a	
mixed-media	process,	drawings	and	models	became	influential	tools	of	investigation,	
testing,	assumption	making	and	modification.	3D	cardboard	and	blue	foam	models	were	
assembled	through	Computer	Aided	Design	(CAD)	printed-paper	templates,	checked	on	3D	
models	and	insights	transferred	back	to	CAD	drawings.			
	
Figure	6.3		Testing	of	building	forms,	programme	distributions,	appearance	and	other	elements	(Photograph:	
Foster+Partners,	2004)	
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It	took	us	a	long	time	to	actually	devise	City	Hall’s	form,	which	we	did	through	
testing.	Loads	and	loads	of	testing	of	different	models.	[…]	That	journey,	[…]	it	was	
like	a	really	interesting	one	which	shows	30	different	shapes	of	how	City	Hall	could	
evolve	(Interview	Hyams,	2011).		
Shuttleworth,	Hyams	and	colleagues	gained	knowledge	through	the	interpretation,	
examination,	and	reassessment	of	models.	Figure	6.3	displays	this	“option	process”	
(Yaneva,	2009,	p.	162)	that	foregrounded	inter	alia	the	interplay	of	diverse	building	forms,	
orientations,	chambers,	offices	and	facades.	The	headquarters’	possible	design	trajectories	
were	multiplied	through	conserving	and	innovating	elements.	Options	were	changed,	
redefined	and	compared	to	rethink	and	evaluate	the	emerging	design	proposal.	As	a	result	
of	the	intensive	modelling	exercises	in	cardboard,	foam	and	mesh,	the	design	scheme	was	
significantly	transformed	and	reordered.	The	“mask”	was	eliminated	and	a	more	unified	
building	form	created.	In	disagreement	with	Arup,	and	after	initial	resistance	by	the	GOL,	
Foster+Partners	pushed	this	design	move	through.	
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6.2.1 The	Planning	Application	drawing	set		
	
Figure	6.4		Drawings	of	the	north	and	east	elevation	of	the	Planning	Application	scheme	(Drawing:	Foster+Partners,	
1999b)	
While	the	previous	“mask”	scheme	could	be	described	as	a	hybrid	building	form,	the	
Planning	Application	scheme	followed	a	more	unified	approach	to	form	with	two	distinct	
facade	designs.	After	elimination	of	the	lens-shaped	part	of	the	building	form,	this	third	
key	scheme	became	adapted	through	a	more	spherical	form;	the	south	was	less	tilted	and	
stepped,	the	north	smooth	with	a	similar	tilt	as	before,	and	significantly	the	upper	east	and	
west	were	made	more	round.	The	chamber	inside	took	the	shape	of	a	“flask”	and	became	
proportionally	less	exposed	in	the	facade	area.		
In	mid-July	1999	Foster+Partners	submitted	a	comprehensive	set	of	planning	application	
documents	to	the	Borough	of	Southwark	for	planning	permission.	This	package	was	an	
important	planning	tool	in	the	design-to-materialisation	process,	since	it	had	to	
demonstrate	compliance	with	the	then	valid	Building	Regulations.	It	assembled	
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heterogeneous	elements,	choices	and	diverse	struggles	that	were	temporarily	stabilised	
for	the	purposes	of	submission.	
This	set	of	planning	application	documents	served	to	advance	the	design	development	
through	the	further	accumulation	of	design	information;	to	transform	previous	hypotheses	
and	strategies	into	more	certain	arrangements;	and	to	expand	performance	predictions	
and	design	strategies.		
Besides	a	full	drawing	set	of,	among	other	things,	the	site,	individual	floors,	elevations,	
sections	and	perspectives	(F+P,	1999b)	,the	Planning	Application	package	also	comprised	a	
Design	Statement	composed	of	mixed	texts,	diagrams,	drawings	and	photographs	(F+P,	
1999a).	In	the	statement	Foster+Partners	explained	the	design	process	for	GLA	
headquarters	from	the	outset	as	they	attempted	to	render	it	plausible	and	agreeable.	The	
Design	Statement	adopted	most	of	the	GOL’s	selection	criteria	from	the	second	final	
design	presentation	(see	Chapter	4)	as	themes:	for	instance,	the	site,	the	site	context,	the	
masterplan	context,	public	space,	accessibility	and	others.	Foster+Partners	explicitly	
dedicated	pages	in	both	the	drawing	set	and	the	Design	Statement	to	reinforcing	the	GLA	
headquarters	scheme’s	“design	logic”	of	“building	form”.		
The	drawing	set	invokes	a	vast	set	of	heterogeneous	arguments	to	justify	the	“building	
form”,	for	example	the	relationship	to	the	“pivotal	site”,	the	spatial	programme,	the	
importance	of	the	assembly	chamber	as	“the	heart	and	focus	of	the	building”,	etc.	(Figure	
6.5).	Foster+Partners	declared	unequivocally,	“Energy	efficiency	is	of	primary	importance	
in	the	design	of	the	GLA	Building.	The	appropriate	use	of	form	and	orientation	are	
fundamental	to	energy	efficiency”	(F+P,	1999a,	p.	23).	The	important	co-constitutive	forces	
in	shaping	the	emerging	building	form	–	the	low	energy	design	strategies	of	compacting,	
tilting	and	stepping	–	could	only	be	inscribed	and	stabilised	within	a	complex	set	of	other	
heterogeneous	issues	(the	site,	programme,	etc.).	These	can	be	understood	as	necessary	
“movements	and	detours”	(Callon,	1986,	p.	206)	to	translate	the	team’s	“primary”	low	
energy	design	objective	into	the	developing	building	shape.		
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Figure	6.5		“Design	Logic	Diagrams	-	Building	Form”	(Drawing:	Foster+Partners,	1999b)	
The	Design	Statement	contained	an	almost	identical	set	of	building	form	justification	
strategies	but,	in	addition,	contained	two	pages	to	substantiate	the	“Design	Logic”	of	
“Building	Form	and	Environment”	(Figure	6.6).	Crucially,	the	environment	constructed	and	
defined	in	the	Design	Statement	was,	in	its	scale	and	environmental	problematic,	very	
limited.	It	included	the	site	as	one	co-constitutive	element,	the	building	itself	and	the	
building	interior.	The	design	issues	of	this	“environment”	were	framed	as	operational	
“energy	efficiency”	and	“heating,	cooling	and	ventilation”	issues	(F+P,	1999a,	pp.	23-24).	
The	architects’	responsibility	appeared	to	end	at	the	boundary	of	the	GLA	headquarters’	
site	and	no	reason	was	provided	as	to	why	their	narrowly	framed	primary	design	objective	
of	energy	efficiency	was	important.	In	the	translation	process	the	multifarious	and	
complex	interactions	between	building	construction	and	operation,	and	the	global	
environment	and	human	wellbeing,	were	here	reduced	to	the	single	issue	of	energy	
efficiency.	
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Figure	6.6		Selected	diagrams	of	the	“Design	Logic	[…]	Building	Form	and	Environment”	(Collage:	Author	2014,	
based	on	Foster+Partners,	1999a,	pp.	23-24)	
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Foster+Partners	continued	attempting	to	turn	their	design	hypotheses	and	strategies	into	
arrangements	that	would	gain	wider	acceptance:	
The	siting,	orientation	and	response	to	surroundings	and	building	brief,	
coupled	with	the	extensive	environmental	considerations	and	responses	
support	the	proposed	building	form	with	the	aim	to	provide	a	truly	green	
building	(F+P,	1999a,	p.	23).	
The	minimisation	of	the	building	envelope	surface	to	volume	ratio	formed	the	backbone	or	
“sound	basis”	of	the	design	team’s	argument.	They	declared	the	building	would	be	in	
temperature	balance	with	its	environment	for	only	20%	of	the	year;	for	the	remainder	of	
the	year	it	would	need	heating	or	cooling.	All	the	design	knowledge	claims	of	the	form-
finding	exercises	since	the	first	ministerial	presentation	seemed	to	be	legitimised.		
All	design	struggles,	potential	conflicts	(e.g.	between	spherical	form	and	solar	gains)	and	
unresolved	issues	were	in	this	representation	of	the	design	process	removed	and	rendered	
non-existent.	Foster+Partners	made	huge	effort	to	legitimate	their	strategies	of	form	
finding,	which	raised	questions	over	their	actual	legitimacy.	Arup’s	Engineering	Project	
Manager,	Thonger,	later	declared	that	Foster+Partners	had	“post-rationalised”	building	
form	(Interview	Thonger,	2009).			
But	Foster+Partners’	efforts	to	explain	their	proposed	building	form	seemed	to	spread	as	
robust	claims.	As	a	non-architect,	Raynsford	retold	Foster+Partners’	argumentative	claim	
regarding	building	form:	
And	issues	like	that,	[…]	at	that	stage,	that	was	quite	new	thinking,	in	the	late	90s,	
about	how	you	created	a	building	which	by	its	very	shape	was	likely	to	perform	
better	environmentally	and	to	avoid	overheating	in	summer	(Interview	Raynsford,	
2010).	
The	Planning	Application	set	of	documents	built	on	and	conserved	three	previous	design	
devices	that	were	co-constitutive	of	the	“mask”	scheme	(see	Chapter	4).	First,	the	
argument	of	the	sphere	to	cube	surface	area	comparison;	second,	the	ECON	19	energy	
benchmarking	tool;	third,	the	“Triangular	Approach”	to	prioritise	building	form	and	
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orientation	and	then	passive	design	elements	(see	Figure	6.6:	top,	third	from	top,	and	
fourth	from	top).		
Having	established	a	sound	basis	for	low	energy	design,	the	design	team	has	
applied	passive	energy	saving	techniques	to	further	reduce	the	building	energy	
usage	(F+P,	1999a,	p.	23).	
Besides	conserving	entities,	the	Planning	Application	also	introduced	innovations	by	
associating	elements	with	the	design	development	for	the	first	time.	With	the	
“appropriate	use	of	form	and	orientation”	Foster+Partners	shifted	the	design	challenge	to	
further	expand	“passive”	and	“active	elements”	(F+P,	1999a,	p.	23).	Three	elements	were	
important	in	the	continued	translation	process.	
The	first	was	the	development	of	the	high	performance	building	envelope	(as	an	idea	
already	introduced	in	the	“mask”	scheme)	and	the	“responsive	cladding”	strategy	(F+P,	
1999b,	p.	26).	In	principle,	the	GLA	facade	was	conceived	to	consist	of	three	distinct	areas:	
the	offices,	the	chamber	and	the	ground	floor	(F+P,	1999a,	p.	25).	I	focus	on	the	design	of	
the	office	facade	that	stood	at	the	centre	of	design	controversies.	Following	the	responsive	
building	form	strategy	(compacting,	tilting,	stepping),	Foster+Partners	introduced	the	
responsive	cladding	strategy:	“Cladding	build-up	is	in	response	to	the	amount	of	sunlight	
reaching	it”	(see	Figure	6.6,	second	from	top).	Arup	produced	some	preliminary	facade	
design	studies	of	projected	solar	irradiance	on	the	differently	angled	parts	of	the	envelope.	
These	were	still	rough	since	the	building	form	had	then	not	been	geometrically	defined	
and	stabilised.	On	this	basis	the	Design	Statement	conceived	the	facade	build-up	to	
integrate	
opaque,	translucent	and	clear	panels	with	integral	shading	devices	responding	to	
sun	paths	creating	a	varied	and	interesting	appearance.	[…]	The	cladding	[…]	
responds	naturally	to	the	sun	path;	self-shading	where	required;	more	solid	to	
prevent	heat	gain;	more	transparent	where	sun	angles	prevent	direct	solar	gain	
(F+P,	1999a,	p.	23).	
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Figure	6.7		Planning	Application	scheme	(Photograph:	Richard	Davies,	2004)	
	
Figure	6.8		Collage	with	rendering	of	the	Planning	Application	scheme	(Collage/	Rendering:	Foster+Partners,	2004)	
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In	contrast	to	the	statement	above,	related	drawings,	models	and	renderings	(Figure	6.4,	
Figure	6.7	and	Figure	6.8)	suggest	that	the	architects	seemed	to	have	a	strong	preference	
to	deploy	a	predominantly	transparent	glass	facade	from	floor	to	ceiling	around	the	entire	
building,	combined	only	with	flexible	shading	provisions	and	printed	dot	patterns	on	the	
glass.	I	explain	later	in	this	chapter	why	the	responsive	cladding	strategy	was	abandoned	
as	the	facade	design	accumulated	more	design	information	and	underwent	further	
negotiations.	
The	second	important	expansion	of	design	strategies	was	termed	“Energy	story”	(Figure	
6.10)	by	Foster+Partners.	This	combined	“building	form	and	orientation”,	“passive”	and	
“active”	design	strategies,	highlighting	their	interplay.	As	diagram	form,	the	“Energy	story”	
served	as	a	pictorial	communication	tool	(see	also	below)	that	introduced	additional	
design	strategies.	In	collaboration	with	Arup,	the	“heating,	cooling	and	ventilation	system	
design”	was	further	advanced	and	tested	(F+P,	1999a,	p.	24).	The	compact,	tilted	and	
stepped	building	form,	the	“passive	cooling	with	chilled	beams”,	the	borehole	cooling	and	
openable	perimeter	office	windows	had	already	been	introduced	in	the	“mask”	scheme	
and	became	stabilised.	New	elements	introduced	included	the	responsive	cladding	
strategy	(see	above),	a	displacement	ventilation	system,	and	a	heat	(cold)	recovery	system	
from	the	mechanical	ventilation	exhaust	air	through	a	heat	exchanger	(F+P,	1999b,	p.	26).	
Some	other	elements	had	been	introduced	but	were	eliminated	shortly	thereafter	(e.g.	
photovoltaic	panels).	Not	related	to	the	energy	efficiency	approach,	the	design	team	also	
established	a	grey	water	strategy	that	collected	the	return	borehole	water	in	tanks	to	
reduce	the	use	of	water	from	the	main.	Crucially,	the	diverse	anticipated	design	strategies	
were	developed	in	relation	to	one	another.	I	demonstrate	this	interdependence	later	
through	the	example	of	the	continuing	facade	design	that,	among	other	things,	had	to	
respond	to	the	limited	cooling	capacities	of	the	chilled	beam	system.	The	architects	
deployed	the	“Energy	Story”	diagram	as	a	key	tool	to	communicate	the	design	teams	
chosen	and	partially	stabilised	design	strategies	of	their	primary	objective	of	energy	
efficiency.		
The	third	important	element	introduced	was	the	first	approximate	energy	performance	
prediction.	Based	on	the	chosen	ECON	19	benchmarking	device	(Chapter	4),	
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Foster+Partners	predicted	that	the	GLA	headquarters	would	use	only	“approximately	a	
quarter	of	a	typical	office	building”	(F+P,	1999a,	p.	23).48	This	venturous	claim	was	made	in	
comparison	to	the	chosen	ECON	19	reference	of	an	“Office	Type	4	air-conditioned	prestige”	
(DETR,	1998a,	p.	5).	
	
Figure	6.9		Diagrammatic	comparison	of	projected	energy	consumption	between	a	typical	prestige	office,	a	good	
practice	office	and	the	future	GLA	building	based	on	the	ECON	19	device	(Diagram:	Foster+Partners,	1999a,	p.	24)	
Foster+Partners’	predicted	energy	performance	benchmark	for	the	future	City	Hall	was	
later	often	referred	to	in	the	design	and	operation	process.	Replacing	the	GOL	design	
briefing,	this	prediction	was	adopted	in	More	London’s	“employer	brief”	as	a	mandatory	
design	target	(F+P,	1999e,	p.	5),	hence	becoming	an	important	design	target	in	the	
translation	processes.	
Crucially,	Foster+Partners	launched	this	performance	predication	without	achieving	
consensus	with	Arup.	On	account	of	their	particular	expertise	and	reasons	of	liability,	Arup	
refused	to	take	responsibility	for	total	energy	consumptions,	instead	limiting	predictions	to	
the	heating,	cooling	and	ventilation	services	only.	Arup	predicted	the	building	services	
would	consume	25%	of	a	typical	prestigious	office	–	the	ECON	19	reference	scenario	(Arup,	
2002,	p.	7).		
	
																																								 																
48	In	Chapter	7	I	compare	these	predictions	with	City	Hall’s	actual	recorded	energy	consumption	for	the	year	2010-
11.		
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Figure	6.10		Diagram	of	the	“Energy	Story”:	“The	objective	is	to	reduce	the	energy	consumption	to	25%	of	a	typical	
air	conditioned	office	requirement”	(Foster+Partners,	1999b)	
Within	the	complex	translation	processes	of	design-briefing-to-design-materialisation,	
Foster+Partners’	diagram	of	the	“Energy	Story”	(Figure	6.10)	was	a	crucial	tool	in	
attempting	to	align	the	diverse	design	parties	and	in	rendering	the	“displacement”	from	
previous	design	hypothesis-making	into	accepting	design	strategies	easier	(Callon,	1986,	p.	
218).	It	envisioned	an	expanded	version	of	the	team’s	primary	design	objective	of	energy	
efficiency.	The	diagram	summarised	the	design	team’s	proposal	of	design	strategies	and	
elements	to	be	associated	in	the	actual	operations	of	the	GLA	headquarters.	It	sought	to	
establish	equivalences	between	the	projected	design	and	the	actual	building	operation,	as	
if	the	two	worlds	would	be	identical.	City	Hall’s	building	services	design	exists	in	“two	
presentational	states”:	in	the	studio	as	a	“well-known,	concrete,	and	precise	object”	in	
diagrams	and	models,	and	as	a	little-known	“fuzzy	entity”	of	the	actual	technical	
equipment	that	was	to	be	constructed	(Yaneva,	2009,	p.	21).		
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The	diagram	draws	together	and	orders	diverse	heterogeneous	entities.	It	combines	an	
architectural	section	with	numerous	arrows	that	point	in	different	directions.	It	projects	
the	spatial	position	and	dimension	of	structural	components	like	floor	slabs	and	facade.	It	
proposes	the	headquarters	stretch	over	ten	floors	and	a	basement,	and	approximately	120	
metres	below	earth	surface	(not	depicted	here).	The	section	depicts	and	embraces	the	sun	
in	the	sky.	The	building	form	tilts	towards	the	sun	and	its	facade	is	roughly	at	a	tangent	to	
a	sunbeam	arrow,	which	is	an	awkward	angle	for	a	north–south	cross-section.	On	the	left	
Thames	side,	the	building	section	is	smoothly	curved;	opposite,	the	floor	plates	are	
stepped	and	cantilevered	with	floor	level	to	provide	shade	to	level	below.	The	left	part	of	
the	building	section	indicates	the	vertical	atrium	with	the	spiral	stair	that	reaches	from	the	
ground	to	the	top	floor.	On	the	right	there	are	nine	floors,	which	are	disconnected	from	
the	rest	of	the	building.	Some	words	explain	the	arrows.	C-shaped	arrows	seek	to	
communicate	air	ventilation	movements	through	“openable	windows”.	Other	arrows	
indicate	groundwater	pumped	up	via	boreholes	from	the	water	table	120	metres	below	as	
a	“free	cooling”	source.	A	box	labelled	“heat	exchanger”	suggests	the	thermal	transfer	of	
cold	to	a	building	water	circuit	that	supplies	the	chilled	beams	integrated	in	the	office	
ceilings.		
The	diagram	attempts	to	envision	what	will	be	invisible	in	the	actual	perception:	air	flows,	
water	circuits	and	system	functions	that	are	dynamic	and	beyond	static	architectural	form.	
As	a	“communication	booster”	(Holert,	2000),	it	sought	to	render	plausible	interactions	
between	heterogeneous	entities	that	would	otherwise	be	hardly	comprehensible.	It	is	a	
hybrid	object,	fluctuating	between	facts	and	fictions,	documentation	and	construction	
(Latour,	2002,	p.	23).	It	is	a	snapshot	of	a	specific	moment,	has	its	own	bias,	constitutive	
knowledge	and	personal	drive.	The	puzzle	between	visibility	and	invisibility,	the	projected	
world	and	the	actual	world,	is	difficult	to	resolve,	and	the	dynamic	relationship	between	
image-producer,	beholder,	the	diagram	and	the	actual	City	Hall	is	complex.		
Foster+Partners’	energy	story	diagram	provided	a	particular	way	of	seeing.	Produced	in	
the	design	studio,	it	sought	to	project	the	relevant	elements	of	City	Hall’s	actual	building	
services	operation.	These	projected	assumptions	and	strategies	“inscribed”	a	particular	
“vision	of	(or	prediction	about)	the	world”	into	the	emerging	GLA	headquarters	(Akrich,	
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1992,	p.	208).	The	actual	sunbeams,	irradiation	and	airflows	were	displaced	and	
represented	in	the	architectural	studio.	Would	they	in	actual	operations	follow	predictions?	
The	diagram	contains	numerous	arrows,	which	seemed	to	suggest	that	the	building	would	
function	as	an	autarkic	system.	But,	crucially,	Foster+Partners	“Energy	story”	rendered	
entities	inexistent	that	exceeded	these	picture-boundaries.	In	Chapter	7	I	show	that	City	
Hall’s	actual	operation	was	essentially	dependent	on	significant	quantities	of	energy	
supply	though	the	grid	(electricity	and	gas).	Electrical	lighting	became	the	single	largest	
share	of	energy	consumption	recorded	was	also	excluded	in	the	“Energy	story”.	
Furthermore,	energy	was	framed	without	taking	into	consideration	the	energy	embodied	
in	the	actual	construction	of	City	Hall	(e.g.	4,050	tonnes	of	steel,	13,100m3	of	concrete).				
Energy	consumption	was	limited	and	framed	through	the	scale	of	the	building	alone.	
Decisively,	this	framing	suppressed	the	fact	that	that	energy	is	enmeshed	in	far-reaching	
heterogeneous	associations:	through	its	demand	for	resources	which	entails	extracting	
and	processing	materials	across	the	globe	and	through	the	diverse	environmental	
damages	related	to	that.		
6.2.2 Cheating	with	building	form	
Two	different	design	parties	did	not	seem	to	be	convinced	by	the	transformations	of	the	
Planning	Application	scheme.	One	was	the	GOL	team	around	Raynsford,	who	recognised	
that	the	“mask”	scheme	they	had	selected	had	undergone	significant	transformations.	The	
other	group	was	the	Arup	engineers,	who	considered	that	major	environmental	design	
achievements	of	the	previous	“mask”	scheme	had	been	diluted.		
Arup’s	project	manager	Thonger	seemed	to	believe	in	principle	that	“the	right	orientation	
and	form	of	the	building	gives	the	best	payback	in	terms	of	energy	efficiency”	(Thonger	
inBuilding	Magazine,	2001b,	p.	59).	He	described	City	Hall’s	projected	solar	gains	through	
the	spherical	shape	as	less	“peaky”	than	that	of	a	box-shaped	building.	He	meant	that	
principally	a	box	with	only	four	distinct	facade	orientations	(plus	roof)	receives	a	more	
varying	solar	irradiance	pattern	in	its	exposure	to	changing	sun	angles	during	the	day	(and	
season).	In	contrast,	a	spherical	shape	principally	has	a	more	homogenous	irradiance	
pattern	since	approximately	the	same	amount	of	area	(of	the	same	orientation)	is	exposed	
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to	changing	sun	angles.	“As	a	result,	less	instantaneous	cooling	is	needed.	This	translates	
into	smaller	plant	capacity,	saving	money”	and	energy	(Building	Magazine,	2001b,	p.	59).		
Nevertheless	Arup’s	engineers	did	interpret	the	role	of	“building	form	and	orientation”	for	
City	Hall	in	different	ways	to	the	Foster+Partners’	architects.	This	had	to	do	with	the	
different	vocational	perspectives,	associated	tools,	expertise,	interests	and	responsibilities	
(cf.	Bucciarelli,	1994;	Feenberg,	1999).	Arup’s	service	engineers	were	called	on	to	solve	
challenges	through	solar	irradiance	analysis,	facade	specifications	and	mechanical	plants,	
rather	than	through	radical	experiments	with	building	forms	in	3D	CAD,	cardboard	and	
mesh.	Thonger	made	clear	although	he	“never	subscribed”	to	Foster+Partners’	argument	
of	the	surface	to	volume	ratio	comparison	between	cube	and	sphere	of	the	same	volume	
(Interview	Thonger,	2011).	He	acknowledged	it	was	an	interesting	concept	but,	for	him,	
building	form	and	orientation	were	more	about	aiming	to	limit	irradiance	through	effective	
shading	strategies:	
If	you	don’t	get	the	basics	right	then	[…]	all	of	these	passive	elements	are	never	
going	to	really	work	particularly	well	(Interview	Thonger,	2011).	
Thonger	explained	getting	“the	basics	right”	thus:	
Making	sure	that	you’ve	got	proper	shading	in	the	right	direction,	and	in	fact	the	
reality	is	[…]	if	you’re	determined	to	have	[…]	full	height	windows,	then	your	
orientation	is	all	about	trying	to	make	sure	you	got	some	sort	of	self-shading	or	if	
not	self-shading	then	you	have	to	put	in	[…]	external	shading.	I’m	not	sure	if	it	
particularly	applies	to	the	GLA,	’cos	essentially	we	ended	up	with	[…]	a	circular	
building	and	the	facade	treatment	was	the	same	all	the	way	around.	
Crucially,	Thonger	questioned	whether	Foster+Partners’	arguments	of	appropriate	use	of	
“Orientation	form”	and	“Responsive	shading”	both	foundational	elements	of	the	
“Triangular	Approach”	(F+P,	1999a,	p.	24)	were	later	in	the	actual	design	enacted.			
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Figure	6.11		Comparison	of	the	“mask”	scheme	(left)	and	the	Planning	Application	scheme	(right)	regarding	
Foster+Partners’	argument:	“Developed	form	of	the	building	responds	to	sun	path”	(Juxtaposition:	Author	2012,	
based	on	Foster+Partners,	1999b,	2004)	
To	clarify,	Thonger	pointed	to	prints	of	the	two	drawings	shown	in	Figure	6.11.	He	argued	
that	the	“self-shading	image”	on	the	left	had	
huge	cutbacks	and	[…]	providing	a	fair	amount	of	shading	to	the	one	below	[…]	in	
this	sort	of	guise	as	drawn,	you	do	get	a	fair	amount	of	self-shading.	
For	him,	the	idea	of	self-shading	was	compromised	during	the	design	transformations.	The	
orientation	of	facade	elements	also	changed	from	one	scheme	to	the	next	during	the	
planning	application.	Thonger	continued	to	explain:	
[right	drawing:]	Now	this	is	another	thing,	[…]	it’s	all	very	subtle.	[Left	drawing:]	
Effectively	at	this	point	all	of	the	facades	[…]	were	actually	vertical;	[right:]	as	you	
start	to	tilt	the	facades	over	like	here.	[…]	You’re	starting	to	look	up	at	the	sky	and	
actually	that	means	that	your	solar	gain	is	worse	as	a	result	of	tilting	it	up,	so	in	our	
minds,	the	engineers’	minds,	this	actually	came	to	be	less	about	solar	shading	and	
self-shading	and	more	about	proper	facade	design.	
Then	Thonger	pointed	at	the	print	shown	in	Figure	6.11:		
The	problem	that	seems	to	happen	is	as	time	develops	[…]	you	have	this	image	[…]	
of	where	you	think	you’re	going	[left],	but	things	subtly	change	so	even	from	there	
to	there	this	is	a	subtle	change	[right],	which	means	that	actually	you	get	very	little	
self-shading,	particularly	on	the	first	three	or	four	[top]	levels.	
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He	explained	that	these	controversial	transformations	were	made	through	discussion.	
Thonger	recalled	the	architects	asking:	“Is	this	okay	and	how	do	you	think	we’re	doing?”	
While	the	early	versions	of	the	“mask”	scheme	provided	significant	self-shading,	that	
benefit	was	lost	in	consecutive	schemes:	
It	became	the	self-shading	thing	that	really	was	dropped	around	this	sort	of	time	
[with	the	Planning	Application	scheme]	because	in	the	end	it’s	not	actually	
responding	to	the	sun	path	(Interview	Thonger,	2011).	
From	Thonger’s	point	of	view	two	of	Foster+Partners’	Design	Logic	Diagrams	were	
therefore	“cheating	a	bit”:	the	one	claiming	“the	spherical	form	of	the	building	is	
developed	to	respond	to	the	sun	path”,	and	the	other,	“the	cladding	build	up	is	in	direct	
response	to	the	amount	of	sunlight	reaching	it”	(Figure	6.5	top	row	third	from	left,	middle	
row	second	from	left).		
Translation	processes	are	not	neutral,	but	enacted	through	two	inseparable	mechanisms:	
first,	transformations	and	displacements;	and	second,	controversies,	choices	and	
adjustments	(Callon,	1986).	Arup	questioned	one	of	Foster+Partners’	key	design	strategies	
and	arguments.	The	controversy	between	the	engineers	and	architects	arose	out	of	
Foster+Partners’	assignment	of	the	“critical”	rather	than	“significant”	role	(Email	Thonger,	
2012)	of	“building	form	and	orientation”	and	regarding	their	modified	design	strategies	of	
building	form	(compacting,	tilting,	stepping)	that	were	introduced	with	transformed	shape	
in	the	Planning	Application	scheme.	Foster+Partners’	desire	to	create	a	more	unified	
design	proposal	was	a	major	force	in	eliminating	key	design	achievements	of	the	“mask”	
scheme	that	had	been	previously	agreed.	As	such,	Foster+Partners	ignored	and	overruled	
Arup’s	expertise	and	concern	regarding	the	reduced	ability	of	the	then	new	building	form	
to	limit	solar	irradiance.	I	assume	that	the	GOL	and	More	London	were	not	fully	aware	of	
the	consequences	caused	by	Foster+Partners’	change	of	building	form	as	they	accepted	
and	agreed	the	transformation.	
In	a	clash	of	values,	Foster+Partners	preferred	the	more	unified	building	form,	thus	
accepting	that	solar	gains	would	increase.	These	choices	have	significant	consequences	for	
energy	consumption,	CO2	emissions	and	contribute	to	the	global	threat	of	climate	change.	
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This	was	not	an	exemplary	design	move	and	certainly	not	a	lesson	for	other	design	
alliances	to	follow.		
6.2.3 Translating	spherical	form	into	flat	panels	-	new	3D	CAD	tools	
	
Figure	6.12		Rationalising	the	vague	and	complex	building	shape	through	simple	geometric	rules	of	three	arcs	
(Juxtaposition:	Author	2012,	based	on	Richard	Davies,	2004,	and	Foster+Partners,	2004)		
In	order	to	progress	and	transform	the	compact,	tilted	and	stepped	building	form	design	
strategies	into	actual	floor	plates	and	facade	elements,	the	design	team	relied	on	new	3D	
CAD	tools.	Deprived	of	its	manifold	contexts,	the	idea	to	minimise	perimeter	to	minimise	
heat	loss	was	strikingly	simple.	The	City	Hall	design	became	temporarily	reduced	into	a	
design	problem	of	geometrical	rationalisation	and	definition.	All	the	heterogeneous	issues	
that	the	City	Hall	design	had	to	assemble	were	pushed	into	the	background.	Constructing	a	
spherical	building	form	was	not	a	simple	task.	
David	Kong	was	one	of	Foster+Partners’	architects	who	collaborated	on	the	development	
of	City	Hall’s	building	form	and	facade.	He	recalled	a	“very	rigorous	period	that	overlapped	
the	planning	process	of	rationalising	the	geometry	of	the	facade”	(Interview	Kong,	2010).	
Foster+Partners’	building	form	experiments	were	supported	by	the	construction	managers,	
MACE,	who	helped	address	the	question,	“How	realistic	is	it	to	build	[…]	something	like	
this?”	Discussed	were	issues	of	constructability	and	costs,	both	of	which	were	central	
concerns	of	More	London.	Regarding	all	experiments	of	compacting,	tilting	and	stepping	
City	Hall’s	building	form,	the	challenge	for	the	architects	was	“trying	to	rationalise	that,	
but	not	ignore	all	of	the	findings	that	we’d	developed	and	agreed	upon	with	the	engineers”	
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(Interview	Kong,	2010).	As	discussed	above,	their	building	form	transformations	accepted	
the	sacrifice	of	particular	findings.	
While	also	working	on	other	related	design	issues	(see	Figure	6.3,	spatial	programme,	
appearance,	etc.),	the	architects	had	“sort	of	settled	on	the	form”	for	the	Planning	
Application.	Nevertheless	they	still	“were	trying	to	rationalise	the	geometry”	(Interview	
Kong,	2010).	At	that	point,	the	form	was	conceived	as	an	irregular	sphere	that	had	the	
tendency	to	have	double	curved	facade	elements.	Mace	made	clear	that	More	London	
could	not	afford	to	construct	double	curved	facade	elements,	therefore	individual	facade	
panels	needed	to	be	flat.	
In	order	to	control	the	building	form,	to	develop	the	facade	and	later	to	tender	the	
building	design,	the	building	form	needed	to	be	subjected	to	a	set	of	simple	geometric	
rules.	Hyams	recalled	that	after	the	Planning	Application	submission	the	design	team	had	
“to	start	again”	to	define	the	building	form.	He	explained	that	Foster+Partners	chose	and	
defined	three	key	design	criteria	to	guide	and	align	the	design	team:	
So	there	was	a	set	of	rules	to	how	we	set	the	building	out,	[…]	going	right	back	to	
our	main	principles.	[…]	Developing	a	building	like	this	on	a	budget,	[…]	there	needs	
to	be	a	set	of	criteria.	What	are	the	three	things	we’re	going	to	hang	onto?	The	
green	story	was	one,	the	environmental	story,	the	shape	[second]	and	[…]	the	
public	ramps	through	the	building	[third].	So	that’s	what	this	building	is	about,	
those	three	things.	Everything	else	we	won’t	hold	onto	and	fight	for.	Those	three	
things	we’re	going	to	fight	for.	That	was	a	method	of	ensuring	that	what	you	start	
off	with	at	the	beginning	is	that	you	define	in	practice	or	as	a	project	for	the	whole	
team	that	you	want	is	still	there	at	the	end.	And	that’s	a	great	lesson	to	learn	
(Interview	Hyams,	2011).	
As	previously	noted,	Thonger	was	rather	sceptical	about	how	the	“environmental	story”	
was	held	onto	in	the	Planning	Application	scheme.	Hyams,	Kong	and	others	began	to	
transform	the	geometry	of	the	building	through	simple	geometric	shapes	that	were	
defined	through	a	basic	geometric	formula:	
The	final	form	of	the	building	is	not	a	conventional	geometric	shape.	Instead,	the	
form	is	generated	from	the	constraints	of	the	site,	the	sun	angles	and	the	required	
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floor	areas.	The	shape	is	formed	by	a	series	of	non-concentric	circles,	the	diameters	
of	which	are	set	by	design	curves	which	describe	the	section	of	the	building	
(Shuttleworth	et	al.,	2003,	p.	304).	
In	this	way,	a	geometrical	model	was	constructed	that	promised	high	accuracy	in	defining	
the	approximately	3,800	individual	two-dimensional	facade	panels	–	the	size	of	their	four	
corner	points,	orientation	and	dimension	–	for	the	tender	and	construction	process	that	
followed	(Figure	6.12).		
	
Figure	6.13		Defining	the	“Cladding	Set	Out”	(Drawing:	Foster+Partners,	1999b)	
The	heterogeneous	design	practices	originating	City	Hall’s	form	are	inseparable	from	
advances	in	3D	CAD	software.	Innovative	computer	tools	were	necessary	to	make	City	Hall	
buildable.	Hyams	described	the	design	move	away	from	a	regular	geometric	form	into	a	
more	random	shape	as	“quite	a	big	move	philosophically”.	He	explained	that	City	Hall	“was	
unique	for	Fosters	at	the	time”,	while	CAD	was	around	for	while:		
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People	drew	the	way	they	drew	by	hand	with	a	computer	and	just	translated	the	
2D	drawings	into	a	computer.	It	was	like	really	odd	that	you	get	a	new	tool	and	you	
use	it	a	traditional	way.	[…]	That’s	what	fascinated	me.	So	we	set	up	at	Fosters	[…]	
a	3D	group.	And	so	it	was	through	the	development	of	City	Hall	that	the	3D	group	
became.	It	started	just	thinking	about	how	to	address	form.	[…]	Before	they	were	
[…]	doing	very	traditional	hidden	line	drawings	for	perspectives.	[…]	So	when	City	
Hall	came	along,	I	thought	this	is	a	great	opportunity	to	jump	onto	a	different	way	
of	working.	There	was	a	whole	debate	at	the	time	in	Fosters	going	on,	which	was	
about	form.	Swiss	Re	[30	St	Mary	Axe,	“The	Gherkin”]	was	being	designed	and	City	
Hall	was	being	designed	(Interview	Hyams,	2011).	
Foster+Partners	had	a	specialist	in	the	office	with	the	unique	skill	to	write	macros	(mini	
programmes)	that	could	be	plugged	into	MicroStation,	their	CAD	software,	which	alone	
was	not	able	to	provide	the	necessary	functions.	With	these	macros,	the	team	was	then	
able	to	generate	necessary	information	including	plans,	sections,	elevations,	axonometric	
projections	and	so	on	(Figure	6.13).	After	that,	City	Hall	was	co-developed	in	a	virtual	
space	of	three-dimensional	coordinates.		
Shuttleworth	explained	the	role	of	CAD	tools	within	City	Hall’s	design	process:	
In	that	way,	you	can	test	the	various	shapes	and	various	versions	of	the	building	on	
the	computer.	[…]	For	probably	a	year,	we	were	moulding	the	shape,	making	sure	
the	sun	angles	were	right	and	the	view,	twisting	the	building	round	to	confront	the	
Tower	of	London	and	that	sort	of	thing	–	all	in	parallel	on	the	computer.	It	was	a	
very	interactive	process	(in	Detail,	2002,	p.	1107).	
He	stated	that	“even	three	years	earlier”	the	CAD-supported	form	finding	would	not	have	
been	possible.	Detail	magazine	asked	Shuttleworth,	“Is	the	form	of	the	GLA	building	purely	
a	response	to	energy	aspects,	or	were	you	searching	for	a	unique	form	as	well?”	He	
answered:	
It	started	out	by	being	a	building	that	would	use	only	25	per	cent	of	the	energy	
required	by	a	comparable	structure.	The	starting	point	for	a	low-energy	project,	
therefore,	was	to	get	it	as	compact	as	possible.	Having	said	that,	though,	it	also	has	
a	beautiful	shape.	[…]	Probably	it’s	a	bit	of	both:	a	need	to	make	it	low-energy;	but	
at	the	end	of	the	day,	it	has	to	look	beautiful	as	well.	
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Asked	whether	Foster+Partners	was	“also	able	to	control	the	aesthetic	aspects”,	
Shuttleworth	replied:	
Yes,	obviously	we	did;	but	you	would	be	hard	pushed	to	find	those	points	where	
visual	decisions	were	made	that	weren’t	purely	the	outcome	of	energy	
requirements.	Inevitably,	as	an	architect,	you	think	visually	as	well,	and	everything	
you	come	up	with	goes	through	your	head	in	terms	of	your	visual	judgement.	But	
what	really	drove	the	project	to	start	with	was	the	need	to	ensure	it	was	low-
energy.	[…]	There	was	obviously	a	lot	of	consultation	with	all	the	City	authorities,	
and	there	was	actually	great	enthusiasm	to	have	an	expressive	building	on	this	site.	
Shuttleworth	claims	that	building	form	could	be	driven	“purely”	by	a	singular	design	issue	-	
energy	efficiency.	Throughout	this	thesis	I,	in	contrast,	argue	for	the	co-constitutive	effect	
of	elements	in	the	complex	translation	processes.	With	the	Planning	Application	scheme,	
the	building	form	accumulated	many	heterogeneous	elements.	Seen	from	a	different	
perspective	there	were	various	interpretations	of	how	City	Hall’s	building	form	emerged.	
Following	the	submission	of	the	Planning	Application,	City	Hall’s	building	form	became	
largely	stabilised,	a	necessary	choice	and	precondition	in	order	to	progress	towards	
construction	since	the	project	came	under	huge	time	constraints	from	the	GOL	and	More	
London.		
Once	the	geometry	of	building	form	was	defined	and	stabilised,	the	design	strategies	were	
transformed	by	further	extending	them	into	constructible	and	buildable	elements.	
Although	City	Hall’s	form	was	conceived	as	a	spherical	shape,	it	was	constructed	using	660	
unique	flat	trapezoid	facade	elements,	which	formed	the	office	envelope	and	a	total	of	
3,844	unique	glass	panels.	The	definition	of	the	form	through	the	three	non-concentric	
circles	required	that	facade	panels	were	twisted	(not	vertical).	Individual	panels	were	
derived	from	an	internal	partition	grid	of	1.5m,	often	used	in	commercial	office	layouts.	
City	Hall’s	floor	plates	are	staggered	in	their	horizontal	position	to	each	other.	Geometrical	
in	plan,	they	are	all	conceived	as	perfect	circles,	whose	perimeter	is	divided	into	a	fixed	
number	of	linear	facade	segments	defining	two	points	on	which	the	bottom	of	the	flat	
glass	trapezoidal	panels	are	positioned.	The	special	programmed	macros	were	helpful	to	
flatten	and	unfold	individual	panels:	“doing	forms,	flattening	them	and	build	models”	
(Interview	Hyams,	2011).	Each	facade	panel	has	a	different	shape	and	a	four	point	defined	
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position	(Figure	6.14).	This	additional	design	information	enabled	the	facade	
manufacturers	to	provide	estimates	of	tender	prices,	“to	produce	schedules	and	cutting	
lists”,	and	to	use	data	“for	the	computer-controlled	fabrication	of	the	mullions	and	
transoms”	(Interview	Hyams,	2011).	In	addition,	the	information	“also	allowed	the	team	to	
audit	the	design	by	comparing	the	output	of	a	computer	model	with	a	mathematical	
calculation	of	the	panel	locations”	(Shuttleworth	et	al.,	2003,	p.	304).	During	construction	
the	cladding	coordinator	for	Mace,	Gerry	Sinnott,	pointed	out:	“It’s	the	building’s	shape	
that	makes	the	cladding	such	a	challenge.	[…]	It’s	not	directly	comparable	to	any	other	
cladding	scheme”	(Building	Magazine,	2001a).	The	simple	idea	that	a	sphere	has	the	
smallest	surface	to	volume	ratio	had	far-reaching	implications.	It	required	huge	efforts	
from	the	entire	design	team	to	transform	the	idea	into	building	activity	that	was	
financeable,	construable,	manufacturable,	buildable	and	usable.			
	
Figure	6.14		Unfolding	geometry	of	facade	elements	left;	facade	panel	geometric	points	right	(Drawing	/	Photograph:	
Foster+Partners,	2004)	
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6.2.4 Modelling	building	form	and	sun	-	new	simulation	tools	
		
Figure	6.15		Arup	simulation	of	annual	peak	solar	gain	in	W/m2	(Rendering:	Arup,	2004)	
To	test,	verify	and	ensure	that	previous	design	hypotheses	and	strategies	perform	as	
predicted,	Arup	embarked	on	computer	solar	irradiance	analysis	of	previously	unseen	
complexity.	Arup	had	undertaken	preliminary	design	analyses	before	(see	Figure	6.6,	
second	from	top),	but	could	not	begin	to	explore	the	complex	building	form	more	
accurately	until	there	was	a	geometric	definition	of	it.	In	comparison	to	Foster+Partners,	
Arup	produced	design	knowledge	through	different	tools,	empirical	and	ontological	
perspectives.	The	redesigned	shape	underwent	testing	through	the	overarching	
perspective	of	solar	irradiance,	understood	as	an	important	factor	of	energy	performance	
(Figure	6.15).	Arup	looked	at	the	design	from	changing	perspectives	(e.g.	energy	
effectiveness	of	technologies,	costs,	feasibility)	but	at	this	stage	the	problem	of	solar-
irradiance-modelling	was	defined	as	one	of	direct	solar	irradiance	measured	in	watts	per	
square	metre	(W/m2).	The	shape	was	subjected	to	a	constructed	problem-environment	
under	laboratory	conditions.	The	aim	was	to	establish	which	differently	angled	facade	
panels	would	receive	which	solar	irradiance	in	order	to	define	their	specific	facade	build-
up	and	thermal	properties.	Based	on	particular	constructed	settings	this	isolated	computer	
laboratory	environment	simulated	sun	angles,	duration	and	intensity	that	City	Hall’s	
projected	form	would	be	exposed	to	on	its	actual	site.		
The	dimension	of	solar	irradiance	was	an	important	design	factor	for	advancing	the	facade	
build-up	since	the	chilled-beam	and	borehole-cooling	strategies	had	limited	cooling	
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capacities	and	were	irreversibly	stabilised	and	locked	in	during	the	competition	phase.	
Calculating	solar	irradiance	for	a	box-shaped	building	would	have	been	relatively	simple,	
since	there	would	have	been	only	five	different	facade	orientations.	But	City	Hall’s	unique	
shape	also	posed	a	new	challenge	to	the	tools	of	computer	modelling	and	visualisation	
software	at	Arup:	
There	are	no	books	that	deal	with	the	strange	angles	in	this	building.	We	did	
computer	modelling	to	find	out	where	the	hotspots	were	over	the	whole	year.	We	
did	every	single	orientation	and	elevation	you	can	think	of	(Thonger	inBuilding	
Magazine,	2001b).	
Figure	6.15	shows	a	rendering	of	Arup’s	irradiance	model,	which	determined	the	peak	
solar	gain	on	each	individual	panel	during	the	full	year.	Data	for	660	office	facade	panels	
was	translated	into	660	colour-coded	cones.	
Thonger	explained	that	after	the	Planning	Application	Arup	
[started]	to	do	the	proper	modelling	of	it,	where	the	thing	was	reasonably	well	
fixed	in	terms	of	its	orientation.	We	had	already	decided	that	this	was	going	to	be	a	
chilled	beam	solution,	and	as	a	result	of	having	a	very	limited	amount	of	cooling	
inside	of	the	building,	[…]	actually	that	means	that	you	have	to	treat	this	facade	in	a	
particular	way	(Interview	Thonger,	2011).		
The	facade	design	had	to	guarantee	that	solar	gains	were	limited	in	order	to	allow	the	
building	interior	design	specifications	(e.g.	temperature	range	of	22oC	±	3oC	in	summer)	to	
be	met.	Thonger	described	the	solar	gain	analysis	shown	in	Figure	6.15:	
A	very	sophisticated	model,	modelling	the	sun	for	the	whole	year,	[…]	we’d	never	
done	anything	like	that	before,	so	this	is	like	a	worse-case	scenario	for	that	
particular	location,	[…]	an	awful	lot	of	calculation	for	this	lot	here,	but	by	that	time	
we’d	pretty	much	[decided]	where	we	were	going	[…]	in	terms	of	the	systems.	
Following	the	Planning	Application	scheme	City	Hall’s	environmental	design	strategies	and	
systems	had	been	largely	chosen	and	locked	in	through	partially	controversial	design	
practices	based	on	particular	conceptions,	physical	models,	crude	calculations,	“gut	
feeling”,	preferences	and	experiences.		
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The	“sophisticated”	solar-irradiance-modelling	picture	was	later	widely	published	as	a	key	
diagram	that	was	instrumental	in	City	Hall’s	design	process.	There	is	a	certain	irony	to	that,	
since	precisely	this	pictorial	tool	indicated	that	the	redesigned	building	form	of	the	
Planning	Application	scheme	“cheated	a	bit”	and	diluted	the	chosen	design	strategies	of	
self-shading	and	responsive	cladding	(Interview	Thonger,	2011).	It	‘evidences’	that	
Foster+Partners	proclaimed	maximised	use	of	“building	form	and	orientation”	produced	
particular	facade	orientations	of	high	solar	irradiance.	The	building	form	of	City	Hall	does	
not	only	follow	the	sunpath.	Arup’s	rendering	indicates	that	the	upper	levels	of	the	many	
faces	directed	towards	east	and	west	would	have	the	highest	solar	irradiance	exposure	of	
800W/m2	(red	cones).	It	seems	that	Foster+Partners	had	addressed	building	form	and	
solar	irradiance	largely	through	the	perspective	of	the	north-south	cross-section	(e.g.	
Figure	6.10).	In	this	section	the	two-dimensional	building	shape	seems	to	provide	sufficient	
self-shading.	But	this	is	just	one	orientation	of	many.	To	support	this	argument	the	
juxtaposition	of	the	two-building	form	outlined	in	Figure	6.4	is	helpful.	Foster+Partners	
never	presented	an	east-west	section	with	interrelated	sunbeams,	probably	for	a	good	
reason,	since	it	would	have	jeopardised	their	intensely	propagated	building	form	logics.		
Figure	6.15	demonstrates	what	were	then	new	ways	of	envisioning	relevant	information	
for	design	processes,	but	this	newly	produced	design	knowledge	did	not	inform	the	later	
facade	since	Foster+Partners	and	Arup	started	to	develop	a	“modular	system,	which	
effectively	could	be	used	regardless	of	the	orientation	[…]	instead	of	responding	to	the	
facade”	(Interview	Thonger,	2011).	In	other	words,	the	facade	design	became	adjusted	to	
one	of	the	660	office	facade	panels	receiving	the	projected	peak	solar	irradiance.	
Consequently,	in	the	continuing	design	transformations,	the	solar	irradiance	testing	of	the	
redesigned	building	form	did	not	stabilise,	but	eliminated	the	response	facade	design	
strategy	introduced	with	the	Planning	Application	drawing	set.	Arup	managed	to	convince	
the	design	alliance	to	give	up	this	strategy.	The	office	facades	did	not	respond	any	more	to	
different	orientations	and	were	designed	with	the	same	specifications	on	all	660	office	
facade	elements.		
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6.3 Expanding	the	facade	design	
This	part	of	the	chapter	focuses	on	the	continuing	design	transformations	of	the	facade	
design	geared	towards	materialisation.		
The	More	London,	Foster+Partners	and	Arup	team	had	decided:	“Energy	efficiency	is	of	
primary	importance	in	the	design	of	the	GLA	Building”	(F+P,	1999a,	p.	23).	The	“Triangular	
Approach”	(Chapter	5)	was	one	important	device	deployed	to	transform	the	energy	
efficiency	objective	into	building	design	strategies.	The	diagram	suggested	that	it	was	most	
important	to	maximise	the	use	of	“building	form	and	orientation”	(F+P,	1999a,	p.	24).	In	
response,	Foster+Partners	developed	three	fluctuating	building	form	design	strategies	
(Chapter	5	and	6).	The	spherical	form	and	orientation	were	stabilised	through	a	set	of	
geometrical	rules	by	late	summer	1999.	The	“Triangular	Approach”	proposed	making	use	
of	“passive	elements”	as	the	second	most	important	design	issue,	addressed	and	
transformed	by	the	design	team	into	a	set	of	facade	design	strategies	(besides	other	
strategies,	e.g.	“deep	space	natural	ventilation”).	Arup	had	even	taken	the	position	that,	
rather	than	building	form	and	orientation,	it	“is	the	facade	treatment	that	is	arguably	more	
significant”	(Interview	Thonger,	2011).	The	design	team	attributed	a	key	role	to	the	design	
of	the	facade.	The	continuation	and	expanding	of	the	facade	design	towards	buildability	is	
therefore	the	main	focus	of	the	second	part	of	this	chapter.		
The	building	facade	can	be	understood	as	a	zone	that	mediates	between	the	outside	and	
inside.	At	City	Hall	this	zone	is	approximately	300mm	wide.	Rather	than	a	simple	envelope,	
it	should	be	understood	as	a	complex,	layered	device.	The	facade	is	one	crucial	element	of	
how	a	building	presents	itself	in	its	form,	surface	and	materiality	to	its	surroundings.	The	
facade	therefore	plays	a	significant	role	in	the	ways	people	on	the	outside	perceive	City	
Hall	and	attribute	meaning	to	it.49		
This	facade	can	be	understood	through	particular	characteristics	(transparency,	
translucence,	opacity,	thermal	conductivity,	weight,	etc.),	protective	functions	(of	water,	
																																								 																
49	Etymologically	the	word	facade	stems	from	the	French	face	after	the	Latin	word	facciata	and	faciēs,	which	refer	
to	the	face,	to	“form,	appearance,	visage”	(Hoad,	1993).		
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wind,	sun,	glare,	noise,	sight,	etc.),	and	supply	functions	(daylight,	air,	views	out,	views	in,	
thermal	gains,	etc.),	amongst	others	(Hegger,	Fuchs,	Stark,	&	Zeumer,	2008).		
Design	drawings	and	documents	suggest	that	the	Foster+Partners	and	Arup	teams	
understood	and	negotiated	City	Hall’s	facade	development	mainly	through	four	elements:	
1. Heat	loss	(framed	through	U-values)	
2. Heat	gain	(framed	through	watts	per	square	metre)	
3. Glare	
4. Natural	ventilation	(framed	through	air	flow	rate	per	metre	of	facade)	
These	interrelated	elements	demonstrate	how	the	designers,	in	their	studios	and	offices,	
approximated	and	composed	the	actual	world	of	the	City	Hall	facade	through	a	set	of	
specific	issues.	Although	other	factors	-	for	instance	daylight	entering	the	building,	the	
question	of	how	the	facade	would	be	perceived,	or	how	windows	would	be	opened	-	were	
considered	to	be	influential,	they	were	largely	faded	out	in	the	‘official	story’	of	the	design	
documents:	
Two	major	factors	determine	the	design	parameters:	the	amount	of	heat	entering	
the	building	through	the	facade	in	the	summer	months,	which	will	require	
mechanical	cooling;	and	the	amount	of	heat	escaping	through	the	facade	during	
the	winter	months,	which	will	require	heating	(Shuttleworth	et	al.,	2003,	p.	306).		
City	Hall’s	expected	heat	losses	were	addressed	through	the	specific	heat	transfer	
coefficients	of	U-values	(W/m2K),	which	indicate	how	well	a	particular	facade	element	
transfers	heat.	The	then	current	requirements	of	Part	L	(Conservation	of	fuel	and	power)	
of	the	Building	Regulations	(DOE,	1995)	required	a	minimum	U-value	target	rating	of	
0.6W/m2K	to	be	code	compliant,	which	was	chosen	as	a	reference	benchmark	against	
which	to	measure	City	Hall’s	expected	U-values.		
City	Hall’s	expected	heat	gains	were	understood	to	have	significant	effects	on	the	
building’s	energy	consumption	and	effectiveness	of	its	cooling	system.	Potential	heat	gains	
were	simulated	through	computer	software	and	addressed	through	the	coefficients	of	
watt	per	linear	metre	of	facade	(W/m)	or	watt	per	square	metre	of	facade	(W/m2).	Various	
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types	of	solar	shading	devices	(frit	patterns,	mesh,	blinds,	etc.)	were	additionally	
considered	to	further	reduce	solar	gains	and	provide	glare	control.	
One	of	the	design	team’s	early	design	strategies	was	to	provide	City	Hall	with	a	
combination	of	mechanical	ventilation	and	natural	ventilation.	“Natural	ventilation”	was	
conceived	to	“lead	to	reduced	energy	consumption	and	running	costs,	and	increased	levels	
of	fresh	air”	(Shuttleworth	et	al.,	2003,	p.	308).	In	exploring	the	natural	ventilation	flow	
rates	of	particular	window	or	vent	designs,	Arup	used	their	in-house	thermal	analysis	
programme	VENT	to	help	define	their	sizes	and	locations.		
The	extent	of	the	heat	losses	and	solar	gains	of	City	Hall’s	facade	was	closely	related	to	its	
heating	and	cooling	systems.	Since	the	design	team	had	already	chosen	to	deploy	a	
borehole	cooling	system	with	passive	chilled	beams,	Thonger	made	clear	that	the	cooling	
capacity	of	this	low	energy	system	was	limited	(Interview	Thonger,	2011)	and	that	
consequently	the	facade	development	had	to	ensure	it	would	limit	internal	solar	gains	to	
the	maximum	of	60W/m2	of	facade	(Arup,	1999,	pp.	3-5).	Arup’s	solar-irradiance-
modelling	suggested	that	the	chosen	building	form	would	exceed	800W/m2	on	several	
highly	exposed	panels	(Figure	6.15;	see	colour	legend	and	red	cones),	which	meant	that	
the	facade	build-up	design	required	a	tough	reduction	of	solar	gains.	At	this	point,	other	
design	teams	not	dedicated	to	a	low	energy	and	passive	design	approach	would	probably	
have	raised	the	cooling	capacity	of	their	chillers	in	order	to	deal	with	the	solar	gains.	City	
Hall’s	design	team	went	along	another	path.	
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Figure	6.16		One	of	the	first	detailed	drawings	of	the	facade	development,	showing	full	height	glazing	with	
“responsive”	ceramic	frit	patterns	printed	on	the	glass,	15	July	1999	(Drawing:	Foster+Partners,	1999c)		
Early	models	and	drawings	suggest	that	the	architects	at	Foster+Partners	had	a	default	
setting	that	assumed	there	would	be	floor-to-ceiling	glazing	at	City	Hall.	This	might	have	
been	partly	influenced	by	the	GOL’s	briefing	for	a	“futuristic”,	“modern”	headquarters	
expressing	“openness”	and	“accessibility”	(TTPM,	1998a).	It	seemed	that	at	least	two	
worlds	clashed:	the	world	of	architects’	dreams	and	the	world	of	thermodynamic	
modelling	by	engineers.	Hyams	explained	the	struggles	that	came	with	the	emerging	
facade	development	in	which	particular	understandings	broke	down	and	new	ones	
emerged.		
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Figure	6.17		Richard	Hyams’	sketch	displaying	the	“facade	journey”	from	its	initial	full	height	floor-to-ceiling	glazed	
facade	elements	(top	left)	with	limited	shading	devices	(bottom	left)	to	facade	elements	largely	opaque	with	only	
300mm	high	glazing	(top	right)	(Sketch:	Richard	Hyams,	2011)	
Foster+Partners	were	building	offices	“all	over	the	place”	and	Hyams	and	his	colleagues	
“looked	at	them	all	and	thought,	actually	we	can	do	better	than	that”	(Interview	Hyams,	
2011).	To	achieve	these	ambitions	they	decided	on	particular	design	strategies	for	the	City	
Hall	project:	“Make	it	[transmit]	least	heat	through	the	skin	as	possible,	as	passive	an	air	
system	internally	as	possible,	natural	ventilation	and	all	the	things	that	were	normally	not	
seen	in	offices”.	He	called	the	picture	of	Arup’s	solar-irradiance-modelling	(Figure	6.15)	the	
“hedgehog	image	[...]	a	really	nice	image”	the	first	one	of	its	type	he	had	“ever	seen”	as	
“visual	formal	analysis.	It	was	brilliant	but	I	couldn’t	do	anything	with	it.”	Hyams	translated	
the	data	behind	this	picture	into	spreadsheets	that	enabled	him	“to	understand	exactly	
what	every	single	panel	on	the	building	was	going	to	do	environmentally”.	He	began	to	
understand	the	interrelation	and	consequences	of	differently	oriented	facade	panels,	solar	
irradiance,	and	a	fully	glazed	faced	build-up:		
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So	there’s	a	whole	load	of	things	we	had	to	take	into	account.	But	this	for	me	was	a	
day	of	enlightenment	in	a	sense.	When	I	suddenly	understood	that	this	was	
architecture,	this	was	engineering.	And	the	two	had	to	sit	side	by	side.		
Reflecting	on	the	earlier	facades	of	City	Hall’s	design	process	he	said:	
It	suddenly	dawned	on	me	that	[through]	the	importance	of	the	environmental	
story	that	was	the	moment	for	me	where	my	kind	of	whole	creative	direction	
literally	exploded.	[…]	Because	you	can’t	design	one	without	the	other.	[…]	I	
suddenly	felt,	“oh	my	god”.	[…]	We’re	all	designing	things	like	this	that	look	good	
on	models	and	have	no	idea	what	they’re	doing.	All	glazed,	floor-to-ceiling	glass,	all	
assuming	you	can	put	a	bit	of	frit	on	the	glass	and	it	will	all	be	fine.	Whereas	this	is	
telling	me	it	ain’t	fine	at	all.		
The	drawing	Hyams	was	commenting	on	(Figure	6.16)	shows	City	Hall’s	facade	design	as	
fully	glazed,	which	“responded”	to	east,	south	and	west	orientated	facade	panels	through	
on-glass	printed	ceramic	frit	patterns	and	integral	blinds.	The	natural	ventilation	strategy	
was	projected	to	have	sufficient	ventilation	through	a	single	openable	vent	located	on	top	
of	the	facade	panel.	
It	began	to	dawn	on	Hyams	that	there	was	an	irresolvable	conflict	between	the	desire	to	
have	floor-to-ceiling	glazing	and	the	requirement	to	limit	the	projected	maximum	external	
peak	solar	gain	of	850W/m2	on	several	facade	panels	to	a	maximum	internal	solar	gain	of	
60W/m2.	Hyams	pointed	out:	
Then	I	went	through	what	the	facade	has	to	do	in	order	to	meet	the	passive	air	
system	that	we	designed	the	building	to.	So,	actually,	if	you	compared	it	–	if	you	
wanted	a	complete	clear	glass	approach,	the	amount	of	glass	you	can	afford	was	
300mm,	and	this	[facade	element	above	and	below]	was	all	solid.	[…]	So	this	glass	
ball	isn’t	a	glass	ball	at	all.	Because	if	we’re	designing	this	true	low	energy	building,	
that	is	how	you	do	it	and	it’s	300	mm.		
This	process	brought	new	insights	into	Hyams’	understanding	of	the	architectural	
profession	and	the	worlds	of	architectural	sketching	and	engineering	calculations:	
At	this	point	I	was	still	very	much	an	architect	with	an	architect’s	head	on,	looking	
at	shape	and	form	and	beauty.	And	here	I	was	looking	at	something	completely	
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different.	Still	making	it	beautiful	but	[…]	understanding	the	impact	of	every	line	
you	draw.		
Confronted	with	the	solar	analysis	and	the	locked	in	approach	of	passive	cooling,	the	
architects	at	Foster+Partners	accepted	abandoning	their	dream	of	a	fully	glazed	facade.	
Yet	some	hope	remained;	they	then	thought	they	could	express	these	findings	within	the	
facade	design	by	having	a	strip	of	300mm	glass	surface	in	the	peak	solar	gain	zones	and	
then	gradually	move	towards	fully	glazed	faced	panels	in	low	irradiance	areas:	
I	thought,	wouldn’t	it	be	great	if	it	went	from	that	[300mm]	up	to	that	[floor	to	
ceiling	glazing]	all	round	the	building.	That	was	what	I	was	setting	myself	as	a	goal	
for	a	facade	design.	Actually	what	we	found	out	was	it	goes	from	300	to	450.	So	
[the]	kind	of	change	over	the	panels,	which	I	was	getting	quite	in	a	panic	about,	
was	literally	that	subtle.	That	was	lost	on	everybody	(Interview	Hyams,	2011).		
The	architects	eliminated	this	change	since	it	was	considered	too	subtle	and	decided	to	
continue	with	a	constant	glass	height.	The	“environmental	link	between	this	as	a	study	and	
that	as	a	piece	of	architecture	taught	me	a	hell	of	a	lot	[…]	you	can’t	just	create	these	
divisions”	(Interview	Hyams,	2011).	For	the	Foster+Partners	team	this	was	a	journey	
stretching	over	months	in	which	they	explored	double	glazed	units,	triple	glazed	units,	
external	shading,	internal	shading	and	different	vent	layout	designs.	These	options	were	
presented	to	Liam	Bond	(More	London)	who	had	to	agree	to	pay	and	take	ownership	of	
particular	features:	
We	were	saying	it’s	going	to	be	the	best	environmental	building	and	what	it	
needed	was	so	much	more	than	ever	anyone	thought	about	at	the	time.	(Interview	
Hyams,	2011)	
This	journey	ended	the	Foster+Partners	team’s	strategy	of	“responsive	cladding”	and	
dream	of	floor-to-ceiling	glazing	for	City	Hall’s	offices.	
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6.3.1 Letting	go	of	the	fully	glazed	facade	design	
		
Figure	6.18		Further	development	of	the	office	facade	design	introducing	the	solid	spandrel	element	at	the	bottom	
and	hidden	ventilation	vents	at	top	and	bottom	of	the	facade	panel,	10	September	1999	(Drawing:	Foster+Partners,	
1999d)	
Figure	6.18	shows	successive	transformation	in	the	office	facade	development.	In	
comparison	to	the	design	previously	submitted	as	part	of	the	Planning	Application	(Figure	
6.16),	two	key	transformations	were	introduced.	First,	the	team	added	a	solid	spandrel	
element	at	the	bottom	of	the	facade	panel.	The	journey	of	the	facade	design	stretched	
over	several	months	and	the	architects	battled	for	some	time	over	their	preference	to	
have	as	much	glazing	as	possible	in	the	office	facades.	The	double	glazed	element	is	
conceived	to	have	a	solar	control	interlayer	of	a	metal	mesh	in	order	to	keep	the	glazing	
percentage	higher.	Sean	Afflek	called	that	momentum	the	“old	reluctance”	that	kept	them	
from	“understanding	actually	what	you	should	do	is	to	make	it	more	solid”	(Interview	
Afflek,	2011).	The	second	important	innovation	was	the	addition	of	hidden	ventilation	
vents	at	the	top	and	bottom	of	the	facade	panel	that	followed	the	principle	of	a	traditional	
sash	window.	The	previous	openable	window	on	top	with	a	height	of	300mm	was	replaced	
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by	two	hidden	vents.	Arup	undertook	ventilation	flowrate	analyses	that	suggested	two	
150mm	vents	located	on	top	and	bottom	would	provide	better	ventilation	than	one	
300mm	single	window	(as	in	Figure	6.16).	The	compact	building	form	strategy	(Chapter	5)	
made	natural	ventilation	more	difficult	since	the	floor	space	was	relatively	deep	-	a	related	
effect	not	previously	raised.	
6.3.2 Expanding	the	Scheme	Design	towards	sign-off		
	 	
Figure	6.19		Drawings	of	the	north	and	west	elevation	of	the	Scheme	Design	Report,	4	October	1999	(Drawings:	
Foster+Partners,	1999e)	
In	early	October	1999,	eight	months	after	Raynsford	had	announced	the	selection	of	the	
More	London	proposal,	both	Foster+Partners	and	Arup	completed	their	Scheme	Design	
Reports	to	further	accumulate	design	information,	outline	and	detail	strategies	and	
specifications	for	the	projected	City	Hall.		
The	Scheme	Design	was	identified	as	the	fourth	key	scheme	in	the	series	of	many	design	
transformations	that	City	Hall	underwent.	In	comparison	with	the	third	key	scheme,	the	
Planning	Application	scheme	depicted	in	Figure	6.4,	the	Scheme	Design	presented	three	
important	design	advancements	(Figure	6.19).	
First,	the	changes	of	the	scheme’s	building	form	and	orientation	are	subtle	–	this	scheme	
set	out	the	building	form	for	the	first	time	in	geometric	detail,	through	geometric	
rationalisation,	in	a	way	that	allowed	it	to	be	tendered	and	made	buildable.	The	spherical	
form	became	a	little	less	round	and	began	to	step	slightly	more	between	individual	floor	
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plates.	The	second	significant	change	was	the	redesign	of	the	chamber	form	and	facade	
that	was	decided	on	following	acoustic	studies.	Arup	had	projected	considerable	
repercussion	effects	for	the	flask-shaped	chamber	so,	together	with	Foster+Partners,	
transformed	the	spherical	flask	form	into	a	stepped	cone,	which	was	also	expressed	in	the	
design	of	the	north	facade.	The	third	key	change	was	part	of	the	office	facade	
development.	For	the	first	time	the	office	facade	was	represented	not	as	glazed	from	floor	
to	ceiling	but	as	being	opaque	in	the	lower	part	(see	the	horizontal	line	in	the	centre	of	
individual	levels	in	Figure	6.19).		
The	Scheme	Design	reports	were	further	important	devices	to	align	the	different	parties	
within	the	design-to-construction	process.	More	London	and	the	GOL	were	required	to	
“sign-off	“proposed	design	details	in	order	to	continue	design	development	towards	
tendering	and	construction	(F+P,	1999e,	p.	i).50	Many	of	the	previously	introduced	design	
strategies	were	reconfirmed	and	many	new	elements	became	associated	in	the	
“Employer’s	Brief,	[…]	General	Description,	[…]	Contractor	design	responsibilities,	
[…]	Quality	assurance,	Quality	control	and	Testing,	[…]	Standard	of	Materials”	and	more	
(F+P,	1999e).	Arup	expanded	design	information	through	the	“Engineering	Services	Design	
Brief,	[…]	Description	of	Mechanical	Services	[...]	Electrical	Services”	and	many	others	
(Arup,	1999).	
At	that	stage	the	“building	form	and	orientation”	were	geometrically	defined,	and	key	
design	strategies	largely	stabilised.	The	challenge	for	the	design	team	was	to	make	the	
“passive	elements”	and	“active	systems”	perform	as	predicted.	This	required	a	complex	
coordination	exercise	of	integrating	the	systems,	checking	specifications,	producing	tender	
documents	for	contractors,	checking	their	interpretations	of	elements,	comparing	prices,	
and	more	(Interview	Kong,	2010).	
The	Scheme	Design	report	reiterated	many	of	the	previous	environmental	strategies	and	
targets	introduced	in	the	Planning	Application,	for	instance:	
																																								 																
50	The	tender	process	included	dozens	of	individual	tender	packages	that	were	issued	successively,	starting	with	the	
“basement	structure”	setting	out	the	concrete	works,	the	foundation	design,	the	bore	hole,	and	later	waterproofing,	
block	work,	facades,	services,	metal	works,	etc.	(Interview	Kong,	2010).	
	222	
Energy	efficiency	is	the	primary	importance	in	the	design	of	the	GLA	Building.	The	
appropriate	use	of	form	and	orientation	are	fundamental	to	the	energy	efficiency	
in	buildings.	[…]	The	facade	insulation	performance	is	being	set	to	improve	current	
regulations.	[…]	Having	established	a	sound	basis	for	a	low	energy	design,	the	
design	team	has	applied	passive	energy	saving	techniques	to	further	reduce	the	
building	energy	usage.	The	energy	consumption	will	be	approximately	a	quarter	of	
a	typical	office	building	(F+P,	1999e,	pp.	4-6).	
The	report	intended	to	provide	“a	statement	of	the	employer’s	general	requirements	for	
[…]	the	new	Greater	London	Authority	Headquarters”	with	a	“general	description	and	
basic	standards	of	performance”.	Unsurprisingly,	the	concept	of	sustainability	that	was	
central	to	Raynsford’s	framing	of	the	overarching	function	of	the	GLA	(cf.	DETR,	1998b)	
remained	absent.	Also,	central	environmental	design	targets	were	not	reiterated,	such	as	
the	BREEAM	assessment	(TTPM,	1998a)	or	the	CO2	emissions	target	set	at	70kg/m2/annum	
(TTPM,	1998e).	A	BREEAM	assessment	of	the	GLA	headquarters	was	nonetheless	
undertaken	after	building	completion	(Section	6.4.2).		
During	the	entire	design	process	there	seemed	to	be	no	discussion	as	to	whether	it	made	
sense	to	have	the	north	facade	of	the	chamber	constructed	in	full	glazing.	From	the	
perspective	of	heat	losses	(and	not	solar	gains),	the	decision	to	deploy	full	glazing	seemed	
to	contradict	many	environmental	design	guidelines,	since	significant	heat	losses	were	
predictable.	It	was	probably	in	the	interests	of	GOL	and	Foster+Partners	to	expose	the	
inside	of	the	chamber	to	selected	views	from	the	other	Thames	side,	Riverwalk	and	inside	
of	City	Hall.	These	viewing	possibilities	enabled	through	architectural	design	did	not	mean	
that	the	policymaking	activities	of	later	GLA	members	would	therefore	become	more	
transparent	(cf.	Yaneva,	2010).51	The	Planning	Application	did	present	renderings	of	the	
chamber	that	suggested	that	the	fully	glazed	chamber	facade	would	allow	stunning	views	
over	the	Thames	towards	the	City	of	London.		
																																								 																
51	I	am	referring	to	the	myth	that	the	construction	material	glass	would	automatically	render	activities	behind	the	
glass	more	“democratic”.	
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6.3.3 Composing	and	stabilising	the	world	of	facade	design	
The	office	facade	design	of	the	GLA	headquarters	did	not	pre-exist;	it	needed	to	be	
constituted	and	produced	through	the	teams’	design	practices.	While	some	rough	facade	
designs	had	already	been	introduced	with	the	“box”	scheme,	the	Scheme	Design	Reports	
introduced,	not	only	in	drawn	but	also	in	written	form,	detailed	specifications.	More	
London	and	GOL	were	to	“sign-off”	on	the	facade	design	and	continue	towards	tendering	
and	construction.	
A	brief	comparison	between	Foster+Partners’	and	Arup’s	Scheme	Design	Report	highlights	
their	diverging	ontological	perspectives	on	composing	the	facade	design:	Foster+Partners’	
Scheme	Design	Report	framed	and	constituted	the	office	facade	as	trapezoidal	panels	of	
aluminum	frames	that	integrate	first	a	“glass	window”	element	on	the	top,	and	second	a	
“solid	spandrel	element	at	the	base”	(F+P,	1999e,	pp.	10-11).	Following	an	excerpt	from	
their	facade	definition:			
The	office	facade	is	made	up	of	anodised	aluminium	thermally	broken	frames,	
which	span	vertically	from	floor	slab	to	concrete	soffit.	The	mullions,	spaced	at	
approximately	1.5m	centres,	are	shaped	to	minimise	visual	impact	on	the	office	
floor.	The	glass	window	elements	are	high	performance	double	glazed	units	with	
solar	control	interlayer	and	low	E	coating	to	limit	internal	heat	gain.	The	panels	are	
trapezoidal	in	shape	(p.	10).	
Their	facade	world	was	mainly	constructed	through	materiality	(“anodised	aluminium”,	
“glass”,	“mesh”,	“metal”),	material	characteristics	(“opacity”,	“clear”),	thermal	
characteristics	(“high	performance”,	“thermally	broken”,	“low	e[mission]	coating”,	“u-
value”),	forms	(“trapezoidal”,	“shaped”),	positions	(”top”,	“bottom”,	“floor	to	floor”,	
“spaced	at”),	perception	(“minimize	visual	impact”),	and	processes	(“allow	to	be	shaded”,	
“air	movement”).	The	key	issues	taken	into	account	within	the	design	teams	energy	
efficiency	objective	were	heat	losses,	solar	gains	and	air	movements.	
In	contrast,	Arup’s	Scheme	Design	Report	developed	the	facade	design	by	focusing	on	two	
main	perspectives:	“thermal	insulation”	and	“solar	gain	factors”	(Arup,	1999,	p.	3).	The	
first	perspective	was	addressed	through	u-values.	The	overall	facade	element	was	set	to	
achieve	an	overall	target	rating	of	0.6W/m2K,	composed	of	a	“high	performance	glazing”	of	
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1.2W/m2K,	and	a	solid	composite	panel	of	0.2W/m2K.	These	U-values	were	chosen	with	
the	goal	of	outperforming	the	then	current	requirements	of	Building	Regulations	Part	L	of	
1.5W/m2K.	The	second	perspective	defined	the	“maximum	permissible	solar	gain”	in	W/m	
(watt	per	linear	meter)	-	In	other	words,	the	maximum	value	of	solar	warmth	tolerated	
and	to	be	transmitted	through	the	facade	element.	This	value	was	“270W	per	linear	metre	
of	facade,	and	where	possible	achieves	the	target	of	180W/m”.52	These	targets	were	
intended	to	be	achieved	through	varying	facade	build-ups	“in	relation	to	the	peak	incident	
solar	gain	associated	with	any	particular	orientation”.	Arup	set	out	a	precise	definition	of	
the	projected	variable	facade	build-up	of	24	mm	thickness	(inside	to	out):	with	or	without	
“internal	blinds”,	“6mm	clear	float”	glass,	“12mm	cavity”	with	or	without	“fixed	louvres	
angled	to	suit	the	facade”,	and	“6mm	high	performance	solar	control	glass”	(Arup,	1999,	p.	
3).53	Arup’s	facade	design	mainly	constructed	through	specific	thermodynamic	coefficients	
that	defined	heat	losses	and	solar	gains,	specific	materials	and	their	buildup.			
These	two	approaches	demonstrate	how	the	teams	redesigned	previous	facade	design	
strategies	-	“responsive	cladding”	was	eliminated	and	replaced	by	an	increasingly	uniform	
cladding.	The	two	approaches	further	expanded,	specified,	and	stabilised	entities	and	
relationships	in	the	design-to-materialisation	translations.		
Foster+Partners	and	Arup	each	produced	a	largely	divergent	framing	of	the	facade	design	
through	their	respective	recognition	of	different	entities,	attribution	of	different	roles	to	
entities,	and	by	establishing	different	relations	of	dependency.	These	different	practices	of	
framing	did	not	develop	independently,	but	were	reciprocally	shaped	during	the	transient	
design	development.	However,	they	were	not	always	well	aligned.	In	actual	materialisation	
conflicting	perspectives	and	preferences	had	to	be	settled	in	a	particular	way,	in	order	that	
the	facade	design	could	become	one	facade	on	site.	For	both	the	architects	and	engineers	
it	was	important	to	recognise	that	other	values,	interests	and	responsibilities	were	
involved,	and	that	better	solutions	could	be	found	if	the	“multiplicity”	(Law,	2004,	p.	63)	of	
the	facade	design	were	recognised	and	accounted	for.	While	the	design	team’s	interests	
																																								 																
52	Also	in	the	report	defined	as	W/m2	(watt	per	square	meter):	60W/m2	(Arup,	1999,	p.	5)	
53	Surprisingly,	Arup	did	not	specify	the	build-up	of	the	“solid	spandrel	element”.	I	assume	that	this	did	not	pose	a	
design	challenge	for	them	and	therefore	was	neglected.	
	225	
and	values	were	not	well	negotiated	and	aligned	during	the	modification	of	“building	form	
and	orientation”	design	strategies,	it	was	essential	for	the	design	teams’	primary	“energy	
efficiency”	design	objective	(F+P,	1999a,	p.	23)	that	the	architects	did	not	ignore	or	
overrule	Arup’s	expertise	and	responsibility.	They	relied	on	this	input	in	order	to	
successfully	translate	the	energy	efficiency	objective	into	the	GLA	headquarters.	
Shuttleworth’s	team	had	to	let	go	of	their	dream	of	full	height	glazing	in	response	to	the	
constraints	of	solar	gain	control	emphasised	by	Arup.	While	the	architects	partially	refused	
to	let	go	of	their	aesthetic	preferences	in	the	“building	form	and	orientation”	design,	they	
seemed	to	have	learned	this	lesson	during	the	expanding	facade	design.	
6.3.4 Solidifying	the	facade	design	
	
Figure	6.20		Office	facade	development	of	the	tender	phase	that	was	built	later;	facade	made	up	of	opaque	
elements	on	the	bottom	and	top,	with	a	strip	of	1,200mm	glazing	with	integrated	louvres	(Rendering:	
Foster+Partners,	2004)	
The	design	team	tendered	and	constructed	an	office	facade	design	that	had	a	1,200mm	
high	glass	window	with	fixed	but	manually	adjustable	aluminium	louvre	sunshading,	within	
the	storey	height	(slab	to	slab)	of	4,200mm	(floor	to	ceiling	of	2,750mm).	The	office	
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facade-glazing	ratio	was	only	about	25%.	Compared	with	the	beginnings	of	the	facade	
development,	the	design	team	ended	up	with	a	relatively	closed	office	facade.	Today,	City	
Hall	is	the	only	building	in	the	entire	More	London	development	built	between	1999	and	
2011	that	does	not	have	a	floor-to-ceiling	glazed	office	facade	design.		
The	build-up	of	the	materialised	design	“is	a	vented	triple-glazed	flush	facade”.	The	two	
internal	glass	layers	form	the	main	thermal	barrier,	comprising	top-	and	bottom-insulated	
spandrel	elements	and	in	between	a	low	emissivity	double-glazed	unit:		
The	cavity	between	the	two	skins	houses	shading	blinds,	which	provide	both	solar	
shading	and	glare	control.	Natural	buoyancy	effects	drive	air	movement	within	the	
cavity	which	cools	the	blinds,	thereby	enhancing	the	efficiency	of	the	system.	The	
vented	cavity	also	provides	the	air	inlet	for	the	natural	ventilation.	An	automatic	
top	opening	vent	allows	the	hot	air	to	escape	at	high	level	when	the	lower	vent	is	
opened	(Shuttleworth	et	al.,	2003,	p.	306).	
In	the	materialised	design	the	team	also	introduced	a	second	solid	spandrel	on	the	top	of	
the	facade	panel.	It	partially	contradicted	the	stepping	strategy	which	was	stabilised	in	the	
Planning	Application	scheme:	the	steps	cast	shadow	mainly	on	facade	areas,	which	were	
redesigned	as	opaque	facade	zones	not	requiring	any	shading	after	the	Scheme	Design	
(see	Figure	6.20	right).		
The	team’s	“natural	ventilation”	strategy	became	enacted	through	a	highly	complex	
system	that	included	two	vents,	one	of	them	motor-driven,	controlled	and	steered	by	a	
sophisticated	building	management	system	(BMS).	Under	each	window	a	vent	at	low	level	
can	be	manually	opened	by	occupants	to	allow	direct	air	intake.	In	response,	a	BMS-
controlled	motor	opens	a	vent	at	high	level	to	allow	for	circulation	and	exhaust.	
While	Foster+Partners	and	Arup	foregrounded	the	design-issue-complex	of	heat	losses,	
solar	control,	glare	control	and	natural	ventilation	in	the	City	Hall	design	reports	and	
design	documentations	(Figure	6.21),	my	interviewees	also	mentioned	a	vast	set	of	other	
heterogeneous	facade	design	issues	that	were	pushed	into	the	background	or	suppressed	
in	the	official	design	documents.		
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Figure	6.21		Facade	design	framed	through	(from	left	to	right)	heat	loss,	solar	control,	glare	control	and	natural	
ventilation	(Drawing:	Foster+Partners	in	Shuttleworth	et	al.,	2003,	p.	307)		
For	Kong	(Foster+Partners)	the	natural	ventilation	strategy	was	linked	to	a	factor	that	he	
termed	a	“psychological	advantage”.	He	argued	that	the	team	at	Foster+Partners	felt	that	
it	was	important	to	incorporate	natural	ventilation,	the	ability	to	open	windows,	“a	bit	of	
that	outside	noise	coming	in”,	to	have	“fresh	air	coming	in”.	It	was	“an	environmental	
influence	within	the	building	that	also	affected	the	psychology”.	Kong	stated	that	
integrating	a	natural	ventilation	approach	is	rare	in	office	buildings	and	that	the	
Foster+Partners	team	“fought	quite	hard	to	have	that	in,	because	[when]	you	think	about	
how	the	natural	ventilation	occurs	in	the	building	[...]	there’s	a	vent	integrated	in	the	
double	skin,	a	micro	switch	with	another	vent	in	the	top,	so	it’s	quite	a	complex	
integration”.	Kong	argued	that	occupants	he	spoke	to	were	“very	pleased	and	[…]	they	
quite	like	the	idea	of	[not	being	in]	a	sealed	box”	(Interview	Kong,	2010).		
Afflek	(Foster+Partners)	added	to	the	co-constitutive	facade	design	issues	issues	of	
occupier	control,	maintenance,	reliability	and	warranty.	He	argued	that	it	is	“really	
complicated	[…]	trying	to	step	your	way	through	and	trying	to	weigh	up	completely	
different	criteria	to	try	and	make	an	informed	judgement”	(Interview	Afflek,	2011).	
Over	a	period	of	more	than	24	months,	more	design	issues	became	increasingly	associated	
during	the	expanding	facade	design	practices.	The	design	alliance	gradually	constituted	the	
facade	design	through	a	small	set	of	manageable	elements.	In	order	to	develop	and	
progress	the	facade	it	was	necessary	to	define	a	set	of	key	criteria	in	order	to	progress.	But	
defining	these	sets	of	criteria	was	a	difficult	and	responsible	task:	How	far	to	follow	the	
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many	associations	that	are	co-constitutive	of	its	design?	What	elements	have	not	been	
recognised	as	potentially	relevant	design	issues?	The	energy	consumption	recorded	in	City	
Hall’s	actual	operation	process	(next	chapter)	exposes	that	the	main	consumption	is	
through	electrical	lighting,	not	heating	or	cooling.	The	lighting	issue	was	not	foregrounded	
and	did	not	enter	the	main	design-issue-complex.	When	addressing	heat	losses	and	solar	
gains	the	designers	largely	neglected	to	consider	how	to	maximise	daylight	for	the	interior.	
The	designers	of	the	facade	did	not	expand	the	design-issue-complex	to	consider	the	
reciprocal	shaping	of	heat	losses,	solar	gains	and	maximising	daylight,	the	latter	as	a	
strategy	to	reduce	projected	lighting	energy	consumption.		
Temporarily	alternative	design	issues	were	brought	to	attention	by	switching	between	
different	framings	and	representations	–	specifications	(e.g.	U-values),	reports,	physical	
models,	solar-irradiance	modelling,	drawing	sets,	cost	analyses,	3D	geometrical	
coordinates,	projected	user	behaviours,	and	many	more.	But	City	Hall’s	design	documents	
and	my	interviews	both	indicate	that	heat	losses	and	solar	gains	were	the	design	issues	
that	remained	foregrounded,	and	were	key	factors	in	the	complex	shaping	of	the	facade	
design.			
The	design	team	chose	“energy	efficiency”	as	a	primary	design	objective	in	the	translation	
processes	of	design	briefing	to	materialisation.	As	shown	above	for	the	facade	design,	this	
design	objective	was	largely	framed	and	expanded	through	foregrounding	the	design	
issues	of	heat	losses	and	solar	gains.	But	questions	of	how	to	perceive	the	many	transient	
facade	design	versions,	especially	Foster+Partners	desire	to	enact	fully	glazed	facades,	
were	important	co-constitutive	forces	in	the	translation	processes.	They	were	largely	
pushed	in	to	the	background	in	official	design	documents	and	press	statements.	The	
architects	created	physical	models	(Figure	6.7),	sketches,	renderings	(Figure	6.8)	and	
drawings	(Figure	6.18,	Figure	6.19,	and	Figure	6.20).	These	were	important	tools	in	the	
cognitive	moves	of	“rethinking	[…],	re-interpreting,	re-looking,	re-doing	everything	once	
again”	(Yaneva,	2009,	p.	200)	and	were	central	in	order	to	further	transform	and	advance	
the	facade	design	towards	the	actual	building.	Many	of	Foster+Partners’	arguments	and	
statements	regarding	City	Hall’s	building	form	and	facade	development	centre	around	
questions	of	function	and	performance.	The	issue	of	perception	and	aesthetic	preferences	
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played	a	crucial	role	in	their	translation	practices.	However,	this	question	remained	largely	
suppressed	in	design	reports	and	press	announcements;	although	Shuttleworth	in	a	rare	
statement	explained	that	they	as	architects	obviously	also	did	control	the	“aesthetic	
aspects”	(in	Detail,	2002,	p.	1107).		
6.4 Materialising	design	transformations	on	site	
6.4.1 Reframing	energy	efficiency		
The	construction	of	City	Hall	started	on	site	in	April	2000	and	the	shell	and	core	were	
completed	in	October	2001.	Its	complex	geometry	posed	new	challenges	within	the	
construction	process,	which	brought	into	being	a	ten-storey	building	of	18,734m2.	During	
those	18	months	13,000m3	of	concrete	were	poured,	about	4,000	tonnes	of	steel	were	
welded	or	bolted	together,	and	3,844	unique	facade	panels	were	adjusted.	
Within	the	“energy	efficiency”	design	objective	one	question	that	was	largely	ignored	in	
the	briefing-to-strategy	translations	was	that	of	“embodied	energy”.	It	can	be	defined	as	
“the	sum	of	the	energy	requirements	associated,	directly	or	indirectly,	with	the	delivery	of	
a	good	or	service”	(Cleveland	&	Morris,	2009,	p.	162).	Embodied	energy	was	not	
foregrounded	and	not	integrated	into	the	key	design-issue-complexes.		
During	the	GLA	property	search	Raynsford’s	team	had	declared	that	as	“environmental	
issues”	both	“construction	and	operation	of	the	building”	would	be	part	of	the	evaluation	
criteria	(TTPM,	1998g,	p.	6).	TTPM’s	design	briefing	specified	that	the	GLA	headquarters	
was	mandated	to	use	“sustainable	building	materials”	(TTPM,	1998e).	TTPM	did	not	
specify	what	they	meant	by	this.	In	response,	the	More	London	team	failed	to	develop	for	
themselves	a	definition	or	to	choose	an	existing	material	specification	guideline	to	
translate	this	requirement	into	their	design	practices.	
The	construction	materials	for	building	City	Hall	were	fabricated	across	Europe	and	most	
probably	involved	resource	extracting	and	processing	far	beyond.54	Between	1998	and	
																																								 																
54	The	diagrid	(the	structure	of	the	chamber	facade),	the	chamber	facade,	the	facade	of	London’s	living	room	and	
the	internal	facade	all	came	from	Seele	(Gersthofen,	Germany).	Seele	sourced	the	glass	from	St	Gobain	(France).	
The	660	unique	office	cladding	panels	came	from	Schmidlin	(Aesch,	Switzerland).	City	Hall’s	seven	elevators	were	
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2002,	and	even	today,	the	question	of	how	to	account	for	these	networks	of	sourcing,	
transporting	and	producing	is	still	highly	contested.	Afflek	declared:		
Embodied	energy,	wow	that’s	something	which	you	never	really	got	the	handle	on	
at	all.	You	create	this	device	which	is	gonna	save	your	energy	but	how	much	energy	
have	you	wasted	to	install	this	device	on	your	building	and	does	that	really	bounce?	
So	it	is	really	complicated	[…]	even	today	(Interview	Afflek,	2011).		
City	Hall’s	design	objective	of	“energy	efficiency”	remained	framed	and	limited	in	
operational	terms.	While	Kong	and	Afflek	stated	that	material	sourcing	was	discussed	as	a	
design	issue,	it	did	not	enter	City	Hall’s	design	practices	in	any	depth.	I	argue	that	it	is	
surprising	that	much	thought	was	spent	on	operational	energy	efficiency,	while	the	
question	of	which	role	embodied	energy	would	play	in	the	“energy	story”	was	not	even	
addressed.	The	question	of	embodied	energy	is	still	a	field	characterised	by	a	dearth	in	
knowledge.	Some	studies	suggest	that	the	embodied	energy	of	an	office	building	may	be	
around	15%	of	its	total	lifetime	operational	energy	usage	(Institution	of	Civil	Engineers,	
2012).	There	are	many	factors	that	might	distort	such	assumptions.	But	is	seems	
reasonable	to	assume	that	City	Hall’s	low	energy	design	is	associated	with	more	embodied	
energy	through	its	more	complex	facade	build-ups	and	building	service	systems.	
Foster+Partners’s	declared	performance	target	of	“energy	consumption	will	be	
approximately	a	quarter	of	a	typical	office	building”	(F+P,	1999e,	pp.	4-6)	was	problematic	
as	the	relative	importance	of	embodied	energy	compared	to	total	operational	energy	
increased	fourfold.	It	gained	proportionally	and	significantly	in	weight	and	responsibility.	
But	the	question	of	material	sourcing	for	City	Hall	cannot	be	limited	to	the	singular	
question	of	embodied	energy.	It	is	a	significantly	compressed	matter	compared	to	
“sustainable	building	materials”.	Just	to	follow	one	material:	where	did	the	aluminium	for	
the	680	facade	elements	come	from?	Where	and	how	was	the	bauxite	won	that	is	its	main	
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 		
produced	in	Finland	by	Kone.	The	spiral	staircase	came	from	Wagner	Biro	in	Austria.	The	structural	steel	was	
sourced	within	the	UK	by	West	Coal	(Northowarm).	Suspended	ceilings	were	produced	by	Astec	Projects	(Reading,	
UK)	(Detail,	2002,	p.	1203;	Interview	Kong,	2010).		
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constituent?	Which	regions	and	which	people	were	implicated	and	under	which	conditions	
in	the	extracting	and	processing	of	the	raw	materials?		
Without	having	any	detailed	information,	City	hall’s	material	sourcing	arguably	implicated	
a	complex	dynamic	that	is	multifaceted	in	scope	and	involves	a	far-reaching	geography	of	
resource	extraction,	material	processing	and	environmental	damage.	It	has	its	own	specific	
and	unknown	“ethical	significance	[…]	of	the	greatest	social	and	cultural	importance”	
(Hagan,	2001,	p.	76).	To	push	such	questions	into	the	background	is	not	an	exemplary	
practice	for	designers	to	follow.		
6.4.2 Meeting	BREEAM	98	for	offices	
	
Figure	6.22		Cover	of	the	BREEAM	98	for	Offices	design	and	procurement	assessment	of	City	Hall	(IBSEC,	2002,	p.	1).	
BREEAM	was	one	key	device	chosen	in	the	initial	design	briefing	of	the	GOL	to	translate	
the	“commitment	to	environmentally	progressive	objectives,	the	principles	of	
sustainability”	(Interview	Raynsford,	2010)	into	the	design	practices	of	the	GLA	
headquarters.	BREEAM	was	deployed	to	align	the	GOL’s	interests	and	the	design	teams’	
interests	in	the	joint	action	plan	of	accommodating	the	GLA.	The	BREEAM	device	was	
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reconfirmed	during	the	design	competition	as	an	“important	cornerstone	for	setting	
environmental	standards”	(TTPM,	1998e)	within	the	GLA	headquarters	design	competition.	
Within	the	design-briefing-to-design-materialisation	translation	processes,	the	BREEAM	
assessment	was	set	as	an	“obligatory	passage	point”	(Callon,	1986,	p.	206).	
The	initial	GOL	briefing	asked	for	a	minimum	rating	of	“very	good”	(minimum	55%	score).	
In	the	final	presentation	to	Raynsford	and	his	advisors,	the	More	London	design	team	
promised	that	their	proposed	“mask”	scheme	would	achieve	the	then	highest	possible	
rating	of	“excellent”	(minimum	70%	score).	In	March	2002,	two	months	before	the	
opening,	the	GLA	headquarters	was	assessed	through	BREEAM	98	for	Offices	and	was	
awarded	the	rating	of	“excellent”	with	a	score	of	76.6%	(IBSEC,	2002,	p.	3).55	In	Figure	6.23	
I	depict	the	amount	of	credits	awarded	to	the	building	within	the	nine	distinct	assessment	
areas,	each	differently	weighted	according	to	the	BREEAM	system.56	The	More	London	
team	thus	managed	to	successfully	translate	the	BREEAM	requirement	as	one	key	design	
target	into	their	design	practices,	since	the	BREEAM	assessors	confirmed	the	required	
“excellent”	assessment	rating.			
																																								 																
55	Later	in	2003	City	Hall	also	underwent	a	BREEAM	“post	construction	review”	in	which	its	“excellent”	rating	was	
confirmed.		
56	Through	the	BREEAM	weighting	individual	credits	achieved	in	different	assessment	areas	do	not	have	the	same	
weight	(e.g.	5	credits	in	“Management”	and	16	credits	in	“Health	&	Comfort”	are	each	weighted	with	15%).	
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Figure	6.23		Diagram	proportionally	depicting	the	credit	weighting	of	City	Hall’s	BREEAM	98	for	Offices	assessment	
(Diagram:	Author	2014,	based	on	IBSEC,	2002)	
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In	Chapter	4	I	pointed	out	that	BREEAM	98	for	Offices	claimed	to	“ensure	a	broader	
coverage	of	sustainability	and	environmental	issues”	(BRE,	1998,	p.	1)	and	argued	that	the	
GOL	chose	BREEAM	as	one	key	translation	device	to	explicitly	define	the	heterogeneous	
challenges	implicit	in	the	concept	of	sustainability	for	the	specific	context	of	the	GLA	
headquarters	design	practices.	Crucially,	BREEAM	is	criticised	for	compressing	(Farmer	&	
Guy,	2005,	p.	22)	the	“explicit	qualities	of	human	well-being,	social	equity	and	
environmental	integrity”	(Leach	et	al.,	2010,	p.	5)	into	a	narrow	set	of	51	distinct	design	
issues	and	87	available	credits.	Callon	highlights	that	“displacements”	occur	throughout	
the	manifold	translation	processes	but	that	“some	play	a	more	strategic	role	than	others”	
(1986,	p.	223).	The	displacement	through	BREEAM	was	a	very	strategic	one	since	the	
commitment	to	the	concept	of	sustainability	in	the	context	of	GLA	design	practices	is	
clearly	not	equivalent	to	a	commitment	to	a	BREEAM	assessment.		
Since	energy	efficiency	was	declared	a	primary	design	objective	and	since	City	Hall’s	actual	
energy	consumption	caused	controversy	between	different	parties	during	design	
development	and	operation,	I	briefly	attempt	to	unpack	how	“energy”	credits	were	
attributed	in	assessment.	This	area	addresses	operational	energy	consumption	and	related	
CO2	emissions.	Out	of	the	17	possible	credits	for	energy,	City	Hall	achieved	14.	These	14	
credits	contributed	just	11.5%	to	the	total	weighted	BREEAM	score	of	76.6%	(Figure	6.23).		
BREEAM	98	calculates	the	overall	energy	score	by	looking	at	results	in	three	distinct	credit	
categories.	The	first	possible	credit	for	“sub-metering”	was	not	achieved.	Second,	one	
credit	for	“check-metering”	was	achieved.	The	third	category	is	most	influential	allowing	
for	a	maximum	of	15	credits	and	City	Hall	achieved	13	of	them.	Credits	are	awarded	on	the	
basis	of	the	energy	calculation	software,	ESICHECK.	The	software	processes	heterogeneous	
design	information	in	order	to	predict	City	Hall’s	annual	CO2	emissions	(e.g.	gross	floor	
area	in	m2;	U-values	W/m2	K	of	wall,	window	and	roof	types;	heating	and	cooling	features;	
location;	exterior	and	interior	temperature	guideline	values;	projected	occupation	days	
and	hours).	How	the	BREEAM	assessment	report	actually	arrived	at	the	13	achieved	credits	
remains	concealed.		
The	result	of	this	software-constructed	prediction	is	that	City	Hall’s	energy	use	would	
result	in	CO2	emissions	of	8.17	kg/m2/a	(IBSEC,	2002,	p.	13).	This	value	was	far	lower	than	
	235	
the	“challenging”	CO2	emissions	target	of	70kg/m2/a	defined	during	design	briefing	
updates	(TTPM,	1998e,	p.	2).	On	the	basis	of	the	projected	CO2	emissions,	the	assessment	
reports	declared	that	13	out	of	15	credits	were	awarded	“mostly	due	to	the	electricity	
being	completely	derived,	under	contract,	from	renewable	sources”	(IBSEC,	2002,	p.	13).	It	
seems	that	City	Hall	achieved	the	13	credits	predominantly	through	a	contractual	
procurement	commitment	to	source	electricity	from	certified	renewable	sources.	This	
commitment	was	the	responsibility	of	the	GLA	as	building	occupiers,	and	not	under	the	
control	of	the	More	London	design	team.	
In	other	words,	it	seems	that	City	Hall	did	not	achieve	these	13	credits	solely	as	a	result	of	
its	low	energy	design	strategies	–	through	the	characteristics	of	its	form,	orientation	
envelope,	heating	or	low	energy	cooling	systems	–	but	by	buying	renewable	electricity.	
Based	on	the	particular	credit	awarding	system	of	BREEAM	98	–	the	BRE	constructs	the	
specific	conventions	of	how	to	frame,	measure,	evaluate	and	credit	specific	aspects	of	
building’s	design	and	operation	–	City	Hall	achieved	the	highest	BREEAM	rating	possible.57	
In	consequence,	BREEAM	did	not	just	assess	the	achievements	of	the	More	London	team’s	
design	practices,	but	also	mixed	other	heterogeneous	elements	that	were	beyond	the	
design	team’s	influence,	for	instance	the	operational	practices	of	the	occupier.			
As	I	demonstrated	in	the	previous	and	in	this	chapter,	BREEAM	was	not	adopted	by	the	
More	London	design	team	as	an	important	device	to	inform	the	choice	and	development	
of	design	strategies.	In	City	Hall’s	design	practices	the	BREEAM	assessment	was	an	
important	reference,	but	did	not	play	a	huge	role	in	the	making	of	day-to-day	design	
decisions.	Thonger	stated,	“Yes,	we	followed	BREEAM,	[…]	but	[…]	we	don’t	tend	to	have	
to	do	a	lot	of	extra	stuff	for	BREEAM”	(Interview	Thonger,	2011).	In	Hyams’	view	BREEAM	
played	just	a	marginal	role:	“We	never	really	talked	about	BREEAM	all	the	way	through	the	
job	if	I	remember”.	He	stated	that	BREEAM	was	not	yet	a	dominant	framework	in	
architectural	design	practice	as	opposed	to	“not	like	you	do	now.	BREEAM	is	on	every	
meeting	agenda	every	week,	it's	just	asked.	Whereas	then	it	wasn't”	(Interview	Hyams,	
2011).		
																																								 																
57	It	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	dissertation	to	explore	the	manual	and	the	definitions	it	uses.		
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BREEAM,	as	deployed	by	the	GOL	with	the	intention	to	act	as	powerful	device	“for	setting	
environmental	standards”	(TTPM,	1998e),	was	not	significantly	adopted	within	Cities	Hall’s	
design-briefing-to-materialisation	translations,	and	thus	did	not	exert	much	power	and	
influence	on	City	Hall’s	contingent	design	trajectory.			
On	29th	July	1997	the	new	Labour	government	announced	it	would	bring	back	a	local	
government	for	London.	Five	years	later,	on	23rd	July	2002,	City	Hall	was	opened	by	the	
Queen	and	the	first	elected	Mayor	of	London,	Ken	Livingstone.	On	16th	May	2002	the	
design	team	had	almost	finished	their	work	and	handed	City	Hall	over	to	the	GLA.	Under	
the	GLA’s	responsibility,	City	Hall	underwent	an	eight-week	fit-out	development.	
Upon	formally	opening	the	new	home	of	the	GLA	the	Queen	said:	 
Thank	you	for	inviting	me	to	open	City	Hall,	this	remarkable	building,	which	now	
becomes	home	to	the	Mayor	of	London	and	the	London	Assembly.	This	striking	
new	addition	to	the	capital’s	skyline	is	situated	amongst	some	of	our	best-known	
landmarks	which,	over	the	years,	have	come	to	represent	not	only	London	but	
Great	Britain	for	millions	across	the	globe	(Queen	Elizabeth	II,	2002).	
At	least	for	the	Queen,	City	Hall	seemed	to	present	a	successful	translation	of	the	GOL’s	
ambition	to	create	a	landmark	building,	but	City	Hall’s	low	energy	objective	was	not	
recognised.		
6.5 Conclusions	
This	chapter	explored	how	the	design	strategies	chosen	with	the	“mask”	scheme	(i.e.	the	
compact	building	form,	the	borehole	cooling	strategy,	Chapter	5)	were	transformed,	
expanded,	redesigned,	adjusted	through	diverse	tests,	simulations,	renegotiations	and	
choices	in	the	quest	to	make	them	perform	as	predicted,	further	stabilised	and	
materialised.		
This	chapter	focused	first	on	the	transformation	and	redesign	of	the	building	form	and	
orientation	introduced	with	the	Planning	Application	scheme.	As	part	of	the	continued	
design	transformations	the	design	team	had	significantly	redesigned,	modified	and	
crucially	weakened	their	design	strategies	of	tilting	and	stepping	building	form	that	were	
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aiming	to	reduce	solar	gains	(see	Chapter	5).	Within	the	manifold	heterogeneous	design	
issues	associated	with	building	form	and	orientation	the	architects	were	keen	to	simplify	
and	clarify	the	advancing	building	form.	The	previous,	more	hybrid	building	form	was	
increasingly	abandoned	through	diverse	model	exercises	(Figure	6.3)	and	was	merged	into	
modified	building	forms	of	more	homogenous	shapes.	Against	initial	resistance	from	the	
GOL,	the	architects	succeeded	in	pushing	through	a	more	“unified	scheme”	and	“a	more	
fluid,	dynamic	shape”	(Norman	Foster	in,	Detail,	2002,	p.	1090).	This	transformation	was	
not	neutral,	but	had	far-reaching	consequences.	With	this	design	move	Foster+Partners	
gave	preference	to	the	perception	of	building	form	-	despite	‘official’	arguments	that	drew	
on	rather	functional	explanations	-	thus	accepting	higher	solar	irradiance	and	the	dilution	
of	the	self-shading	strategy	(tilting	and	stepping)	that	they	had	developed	and	agreed	
upon	with	Arup.		
The	emergence	of	conflicting	design	priorities	must	be	seen	as	a	central	mechanism	of	
translation	process,	since	multiple	heterogeneous	issues	are	built	into	conflictual	relations	
that	shape	each	other.	Different	expertise,	responsibilities,	interests	and	values	clashed	
between	the	architects	and	the	building	services	engineers	in	the	development	and	
redesign	of	building	form	and	orientation.	It	was	the	responsibility	of	Foster+Partners	
responsibility	to	translate	the	GOL’s	interest	in	a	landmark	building	into	design	strategies,	
form	and	materialisation.	If	that	translation	had	failed,	hardly	anyone	would	hold	Arup	
accountable.	This	different	responsibility	for	building	form	also	partly	explains	the	dissent	
over	the	role	of	“building	form	and	orientation”	between	Foster+Partners	and	Arup	in	
their	low	energy	design	maxim.	Foster+Partners	defined	the	role	as	“critical”,	Arup	just	as	
“significant”	(Email	Thonger,	2012).	The	transformation	was	an	enormous	modification	as	
building	form	was	deemed	more	important	than	low	energy	design	optimisation.	
Foster+Partners	seemed	to	have	overruled	the	engineers	who	themselves	did	not	insist	on	
vetting	this	transformation.	The	architects	failed	to	take	full	advantage	from	the	mutual	
exchange	in	which	engineers	“learn	about	the	architectural	assumptions,	and	in	exchange	
the	architects	learn	from	these”	engineers	(Yaneva,	2009,	p.	152)	in	order	to	achieve	the	
best	low	energy	performance	possible.	Foster+Partners	in	part	violated	both	the	design	
teams’	chosen	primary	objective	of	energy	efficiency	and	the	responsibility	to	minimise	
the	energy	consumption	impact	as	far	as	possible.	
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The	second	part	of	this	chapter	focused	on	the	expansion	of	the	facade	design.	For	Arup,	
“the	facade	treatment	that	is	arguably	more	significant”	than	building	form	(Email	Thonger,	
2012).	Nevertheless,	“building	form	and	orientation”,	the	facade	design	and	the	design	of	
building	service	systems	developed	in	interplay,	were	enmeshed	in	multiple	
heterogeneous	design	issues	at	once,	and	the	design	practitioners	had	no	choice	other	
than	to	break	down	the	actual	intricacy	into	alternating	small	workable	design	issues	and	
interdependencies	(e.g.	facade	build-up,	heat	losses,	solar	gains	and	air	movements).		
With	the	geometrical	rationalisation	and	definition	through	3D	CAD,	the	facade	design	
became	increasingly	expanded,	tested,	modified	and	rearranged	towards	tendering	and	
construction.	The	design	team	had	chosen	a	low	energy	cooling	strategy	that	included	
chilled	beams	and	a	borehole-cooling	source	(Chapter	5).	This	strategy	had	been	agreed	
with	the	GOL	and	thus	irreversibly	stabilised.	During	the	continued	facade	design,	the	
limited	cooling	capacity	of	this	approach,	in	combination	with	the	partially	diluted	self-
shading	strategy,	triggered	a	long	battle	between	architects	and	engineers	over	
Foster+Partners	desire	to	have	a	‘fully	glazed’	office	facade.	Through	many	experimental	
moves	back	and	forth,	transformations	and	renegotiations	the	architects	changed	their	
preferences,	gave	up	the	“old	reluctance”	(Interview	Afflek,	2011),	eliminated	their	dream	
of	floor-to-ceiling	glazing,	and	adopted	Arup’s	design	arguments	to	make	the	facade	more	
solid.		
One	important	finding	was	that	architects	and	engineers	could	not	be	locked	into	fixed	
roles	and	values	systems	–	for	instance,	the	preference	of	perception	over	performance.	
The	architects’	roles	and	preferences	fluctuated	as	the	design	alliance	progressed	and	
confronted	different	design	issue	sets.	While	Foster+Partners	accepted	increased	solar	
irradiance	of	the	redesigned	building	form,	they	changed	preferences,	accepted	to	let	go	
of	their	desire	for	fully	glazed	facades,	and	instead	took	other	passive	design	strategies	
seriously	in	order	to	assemble	the	only	largely	opaque	office	facade	at	the	More	London	
development.	It	was	the	engineers	who	changed	preferences,	this	time	decided	to	veto,	
and	thus	prevent	the	assemblage	of	yet	another	floor-to-ceiling	glazed	office	building.	
This	chapter	has	demonstrated	the	power	of	visuals	–	sketches,	diagrams,	drawings	and	
renderings	-	in	the	translation	process.	Although	different	individuals	might	interpret	
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visuals	in	different	ways	(Henderson,	1999),	or	might	refuse	them,	these	visual	devices	
helped	align	various	practitioners	in	their	design	activities	in	the	joint	action	plan	towards	
design	materialisation	(e.g.	the	“Triangular	Approach”	in	Figure	6.6),	and	to	participate	in	
the	production,	accumulation	and	exchange	of	design	knowledge	(e.g.	the	Planning	
Application	drawing	set,	as	example	Figure	6.13).	They	acted	as	tools	of	investigation	and	
negotiation	(e.g.	Arup’s	solar	irradiance	simulation	Figure	6.15)	and	rendered	design	
transformation	easier	by	seeking	to	stabilise	previously	introduced	strategies	in	the	
attempt	to	make	them	succeed	(e.g.	Foster+Partners’	“Design	Logic	Diagrams	-	Building	
Form”	Figure	6.5).		
In	the	GOL’s	contingent	translation	processes,	a	vast	number	of	heterogeneous	elements	
have	been	associated,	re-ordered,	eliminated,	tested,	simulated	and	modified	in	order	to	
arrive	at	the	actual	set	of	design	strategies	that	make	up	the	GLA	headquarters.	The	design	
team	managed	to	assemble	a	set	of	design	strategies	that	are	normally	not	found	in	most	
office	designs,	for	instance	largely	solid	facades,	chilled	beams	and	borehole	cooling	
source,	openable	windows	(vents),	displacement	ventilation,	heat	recovery	and	grey	water	
tanks.	The	design	protagonists	I	spoke	to	share	a	proud	attitude,	without	exception,	
towards	their	overall	design	achievements.	One	central	design	target	of	the	environmental	
design	briefing	was	the	BREEAM	assessment	following	building	completion.	This	target	was	
successfully	translated	into	City	Hall’s	design	practices,	since	the	actual	City	Hall	was	
assessed	as	“excellent”.	Whether	the	design	teams	also	successfully	translated	other	key	
projected	environmental	performance	goals	could	only	be	verified	in	actual	operation	and	
this	will	be	addressed	in	the	next	chapter.	
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Chapter	7 	
Occupying,	managing	and	measuring	
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7.1 Introduction	
This	chapter	explores	City	Hall	in	operation	between	2002-03	and	2010-11.	In	May	2002	
the	GOL’s	initial	plan	to	find,	design	and	build	a	domicile	for	the	GLA	that	was	associated	
with	an	ambitious	environmental	design	agenda	had	been	completed.	The	design	team	
had	in	principle	fulfilled	their	tasks,	and	about	500	GLA	members	began	to	take	up	their	
work	in	the	new	headquarters.	The	evolving	design	briefings	were	largely	translated	into	
hypotheses,	design	strategies,	building	forms,	technological	choices	and	materialisations	
(Chapters	5	and	6).	These	translations	were	then	put	on	trial	in	operation.	Actual	
materials,	devices	and	occupants	could	have	deviated	from	or	violated	their	projected	
roles	and	behaviours.	Would	the	actual	world	of	City	Hall	follow	the	world	of	predictions?	
Success	was	not	assured.		
City	Hall’s	materialised	design	was	based	on	an	ambitious	agenda.	Raynsford	declared:		
I	was	particularly	keen	that	this	new	building	[…]	performed	well	in	energy	terms	
and	therefore	was	seen	as	an	exemplar,	which	others	should	follow.	So	that	was	
part	of	the	brief	[…]	there	was	a	commitment	to	sustainable	development	as	one	of	
the	overarching	objectives	of	the	Greater	London	Authority	and	it	was	important	
therefore	that	the	building	that	the	authority	occupied	should	be	compatible	with	
that	(Interview	Raynsford,	2010).		
Given	this	ambition	and	responsibility,	the	actual	operation	of	City	Hall	was	exposed	to	
increased	public	interest.	Predicting	environmental	performances	during	design	
development	was	risky,	since	actual	performance	depended	on	a	variety	of	rather	
unpredictable	elements,	for	instance	forms	of	occupancy,	management	and	methods	of	
measurement.		
This	chapter	consists	of	three	main	parts.	The	first	part	briefly	reflects	on	the	coefficient	of	
kilowatt-hours	per	square	metre	per	year	(kWh/m2/a),	which	was	centrally	deployed	to	
understand	and	assess	the	environmental	impact	of	City	Hall’s	operation.	Since	
operational	performance	did	not	only	depend	on	the	materialised	deign	as	handed	over,	
but	was	also	co-shaped	by	City	Hall’s	building	infrastructure	management,	the	second	part	
of	this	chapter	looks	at	its	role	and	responsibilities,	the	heterogeneous	world	in	which	its	
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activities	were	embedded,	and	four	key	building	updates	introduced	to	improve	energy	
efficiency.		
The	third	main	part	aims	to	explore	how	City	Hall’s	building	infrastructure	management	
constructed	knowledge	about	the	headquarters	environmental	impact	in	actual	operation.	
I	examine	recorded	results	for	the	period	between	2002-03	and	2010-11.	I	then	compare	
results	for	2010-11	with	three	key	environmental	performance	targets	that	were	defined	
during	City	Hall’s	design	development	to	guide	and	align	the	multifarious	translation	
processes	targeted	towards	design	materialisation.		
7.2 Framing	City	Hall’s	environmental	performance	
All	translations	of	City	Hall’s	design	were	tested	once	the	building	was	in	operation.	
Performance	predictions	through	the	kWh/m2/a	(kilowatt-hour	per	square	metre	per	year)	
convention	were	one	link	between	City	Hall’s	design	practices	and	its	operation	practices.	
7.2.1 The	kilowatt-hour	per	square	metre	framing	
The	magazine	Building	Design	stated	on	its	July	2005	cover	page:	(Figure	7.1):		
Ken’s	gas	guzzler	[…]	London	mayor's	'sustainable'	City	Hall	is	missing	energy	
consumption	targets	by	50%	(Building	Design	&	Bennett,	2005,	p.	1).	
Building	Design	publicised	an	explosive	political	issue,	since	the	GLA	and	mayor	Ken	
Livingstone	had	a	constitutional	responsibility	to	promote	the	concept	of	sustainable	
development	and	because	City	Hall	was	promoted	by	the	design	team	as	an	exemplar	of	
sustainability.58	The	magazine	seemed	to	suggest	that	the	annual	kWh/m2	could	be	one	
meaningful	indicator	to	account	for	the	sustainability	of	the	GLA	headquarters:	“City	Hall	
[…]	failed	to	meet	sustainability	targets”.	The	home	of	the	GLA	was	accused	of	missing	its	
“energy	consumption	targets”	by	using	“376kWh/sqm	in	2003-4	compared	to	the	
236kWh/sqm	it	was	designed	to	use”	(Building	Design	&	Bennett,	2005,	p.	1).	The	
controversy	in	Building	Design’s	cover	story	called	into	question	the	validity	of	the	GOL’s	
and	the	design	teams’	environmental	performance	predictions.		
																																								 																
58	Ken	Livingstone	was	the	Mayor	of	London	from	May	2000	to	May	2008.		
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Figure	7.1		Building	Design	cover	story	entitled	“Ken’s	gas	guzzler:	London	mayor's	'sustainable'	City	Hall	is	missing	
energy	consumption	targets	by	50%”	(Cover:	Building	Design	&	Bennett,	2005,	p.	1)	
Energy	is	an	elusive	topic.	Energy	consumption	in	itself	is	not	visible;	what	is	understood	as	
energy	consumption	critically	depends	on	the	methods	of	measurement,	ways	of	
representation	and	ways	of	experience	(Shove,	1997).	Building	Design	defined	energy	
consumption	according	to	annual	kilowatt-hours	per	square	metre	(kWh/m2/a).		
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The	kilowatt-hour	(kWh)	is	a	physical	measurement	unit	of	power,	which	is	defined	as	
energy	over	time.	One	kilowatt-hour	correlates	to	the	energy	that	an	energy	convertor	
with	the	power	of	one	kilowatt	consumes	or	releases	in	one	hour.	The	kilowatt-hour	is	a	
common	billing	unit	for	energy	(electricity	and	gas)	delivered	to	consumers.	The	energy	
consumption	of	buildings	is	often	represented	in	kilowatt-hours	in	relation	to	a	particular	
building	area	in	square	metres	for	the	duration	of	one	year	(kWh/m2/a).		
The	measurement	unit	of	kWh/m2/a	is	an	insufficient	indicator	to	account	for	the	
sustainability	of	a	building,	since	it	only	addresses	one	facet	and	ignores	many	of	the	
multidimensional	issues	implicated	in	the	concept	(cf.	Leach	et	al.,	2010).	Also,	as	sole	
indicator	of	the	energy	efficiency	of	a	building,	the	convention	of	kWh/m2/a	has	limitations.	
If	Building	Design	stated	that	City	Hall	consumed	376kWh/m2	in	2003-4,	then	the	
coefficient	does	not	say	more	than	the	sum	of	all	City	Hall’s	‘energy	convertors’	used	376	
kWh	per	square	metre	in	that	year.	Crucial	operational	and	heterogeneous	factors	that	
codetermine	the	amount	of	kWh	consumed	are	left	out,	for	instance	the	number	of	GLA	
occupants,	their	behaviour	and	working	hours,	the	number	of	visitors,	the	actions	of	
building	infrastructure	managers,	variations	in	annual	mean	external	temperatures	and	
other	climate	parameters.	In	addition,	the	coefficient	of	kWh/m2/a	does	not	provide	any	
information	about	the	type	of	energy	consumed,	which	might	vary	significantly	in	terms	of	
associated	carbon	dioxide	and	equivalent	emissions	(kgCO2e/kWh).59		
The	coefficient	kWh/m2/a	is	thus	associated	with	numerous	factors	specific	to	the	actual	
operations	of	City	Hall.	Reducing	the	energy	consumption	of	buildings	is	a	task	of	great	
importance,	but	the	framing	through	kWh/m2/a	has	limitations	since	it	depends	on	a	range	
of	heterogeneous	factors.	It	is	also	necessary	to	explore	and	understand	the	energy	
performance	of	buildings	through	different	analytical	framings	and	in	relation	to	other	
factors.	Furthermore,	in	accounting	for	environmental	impact	or	the	sustainability	of	City	
Hall	the	coefficient	in	isolation	is	inadequate.		
																																								 																
59
 For	 instance,	 grid	 electricity	 0.5246kgCO2e/kWh,	 natural	 gas	 0.1836kgCO2e/kWh	 and	 renewable	 electricity	
generated	on-site	0kgCO2e/kWh	(Carbon	Trust,	2011a). 
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7.3 Managing	and	updating	City	Hall	
	
Figure	7.2		City	Hall,	home	of	the	GLA	and	open	to	the	public	Monday	to	Friday;	foyer,	above	the	chamber,	below	
visitor	centre	and	café	(Photograph:	Author,	2012)	
In	May	2002	City	Hall	was	handed	over	to	the	GLA.	The	design	team	had	completed	its	task	
to	develop	the	headquarters	which	Foster+Partners	ambitiously	promoted	as	“a	model	of	
democracy,	accessibility	and	sustainability”	(F+P,	2002).	All	the	assumptions,	calculations,	
predictions,	hopes	and	dreams	of	the	design	team	were	then	put	to	the	test	in	actual	
operations.	The	responsibility	to	enact	these	ambitions	in	making	the	translations	of	
design-briefing-to-design-materialisation	perform	as	predicted	was	then	in	part	handed	
over	to	the	new	authority.	Its	challenge	was	to	become	an	exemplary	building	occupier	
and	manager.	The	GLA	acknowledged	that	“City	Hall	is	designed	to	minimise	its	impact	on	
the	environment”	and	declared	that	the	“GLA	will	ensure	City	Hall	is	operated	efficiently	to	
maximise	the	potential	of	the	design”	(GLA,	2004a).	At	local	management	level	this	
responsibility	was	largely	in	the	hands	of	City	Hall’s	facility	management	team.		
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7.3.1 The	building	infrastructure:	Management’s	roles	and	responsibilities	
The	facilities	management	(FM)	of	City	Hall	is	a	broad	field	comprising	the	coordination	of	
people,	processes,	spaces	and	technologies.	It	is	both	bound	to	ongoing	operations	and	
strategically	orientated	towards	the	future.	In	response	to	changing	parameters	(e.g.	
exterior	temperature,	occupation	levels)	the	FM	team	has	to	negotiate	a	complex	set	of	
diverse	and	interrelated	issues	in	a	form	of	“heterogeneous	engineering”	(Law,	1987):	
energy	management,	environmental	impacts,	maintenance,	optimisations	of	operating	
conditions,	compliance	with	regulations,	availability	of	agreed	services,	running	costs,	
investment	costs,	security,	safety,	wellbeing,	comfort	and	quality	of	the	space.	
City	Hall	had	been	in	operation	for	approximately	two	years	when,	in	2004,	the	GLA	began	
to	realise	that	actual	energy	performance	fell	behind	the	designers’	predictions	(GLA,	
2004b,	p.	2).	Through	the	GLA’s	constitutional	responsibility	to	follow	and	promote	
sustainable	development	(UK	Government,	1999,	pp.	35-36),	the	institution	had	to	live	up	
to	its	own	aspirations	and	was	thus	under	pressure	from	public	scrutiny.	The	FM	team	and	
the	mayor	were	aware	that	“without	improving	energy	utilisation	the	GLA	will	be	exposed	
to	adverse	press“	(GLA,	2008).	Energy	consumption	seemed	to	be	a	preferred	(but	
deficient)	criterion	of	accountability	(as	demonstrated	in	the	article	of	the	Building	Design	
magazine).		
As	part	of	the	GLA’s	mission	to	“improve	the	sustainability	of	its	own	operations”	and	to	
develop	“effective	management	systems”	(GLA,	2004a),	the	GLA	increased	the	FM	team	
from	one	to	five	managers	in	2007.	One	became	the	Head	of	Facilities	Management	at	the	
GLA,	one	responsible	for	resilience,	one	for	catering	and	events,	one	for	questions	of	
security,	and	one	for	the	building	infrastructure	of	City	Hall.		
Rennie	Kraus	became	the	building	infrastructure	manager	of	the	GLA	headquarters.	He	is	a	
trained	electrical	engineer	and	is	responsible	for	City	Hall’s	facade,	structure,	mechanical	
and	electrical	services.	Kraus	is	supported	by	a	small	number	of	GLA	employees	and	by	
external	“contractors”	who	assist	him	in	measuring	particular	material	flows	within	City	
Hall,	programming	building	management	systems,	and	carrying	out	smaller	maintenance	
works,	repairs	and	updates	(Interview	Kraus,	2011).	
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Unlike	a	standard	office	building,	City	Hall	hosts	a	lot	of	events	for	numerous	visitors.	
Kraus	commented,	“we’re	almost	an	event-based	organisation”.	City	Hall	hosts	a	range	of	
different	activities,	and	it	is	the	responsibility	of	the	FM	team	to	“manage	the	spaces,	
manage	the	cleaning,	manage	the	catering,	manage	the	infrastructure	and	sort	it	all	out”	
(Interview	Kraus,	2011).	
Kraus	not	only	had	to	ensure	that	City	Hall,	as	a	working	environment,	supported	the	GLA	
staff,	but	that	operational	practices	also	had	to	follow	the	GLA’s	and	the	mayor’s	
overarching	principles:	“So	we	have	to	be	in	tune	with	what	his	[the	mayor’s]	policies	are,	
and	make	City	Hall	appear	to	be	in	line	with	the	policy”	(Interview	Kraus,	2011).60		
Kraus	never	mentioned	the	“Core	GLA	Environment	Policy	and	Environment	Procedure”	
(GLA,	2004a)	in	interviews	or	emails,	despite	his	role	also	being	defined	by	this	policy	
introduced	by	Mayor	Ken	Livingstone.	This	policy	set	out	“the	GLA's	aims	to	improve	the	
sustainability	of	its	own	operations;	influencing	the	sustainability	of	London	and	enabling	it	
to	lead	by	example”.	It	applies	to	“areas	where	the	GLA	impacts	on	the	environment,	
through	the	management	and	administration	of	City	Hall	(including	the	catering	
operations)”.		
In	Chapter	2	I	highlighted	the	importance	of	providing	context-specific	interpretation	and	
definition	to	the	concept	of	sustainability	(Leach	et	al.,	2010,	p.	171).	While	it	is	beyond	
the	scope	of	this	thesis	to	enter	an	in-depth	discussion	on	the	above	policy,	I	briefly	point	
out	that	the	role	of	the	FM	was	defined	through	a	set	of	building	operation	related	issues	
that	transgressed	the	single	issue	of	improving	energy	efficiency.	The	objectives	defined	
for	City	Hall’s	building	infrastructure	management	are	related	to	a	wide	set	of	issues,	aims,	
responsibilities	and	routines,	which	cannot	be	meaningfully	understood	through	the	
narrow	analytical	frame	of	measuring	the	annual	kilowatt-hour	per	square	metre.	
As	building	infrastructure	manager	of	the	GLA	headquarters,	Kraus	conceived	his	main	task	
as	“wrestling	the	energy	performance	down”	(Interview	Kraus,	2011).	While	he	explained	
that	City	Hall’s	design	strategies	–	the	building	form,	the	thermal	insulation,	the	passive	
																																								 																
60	Rennie	Kraus	referred	to	Mayor	Boris	Johnson	who	has	been	in	office	since	1	May	2008.		
	248	
cooling	system	–	all	contributed	to	energy	savings,	he	explained	that	the	activities	of	the	
GLA	FM	team	were	fitted	around	that	and	the	FM	team	tried	“to	use	[…]	the	building	to	its	
best	advantages”.	He	explained	that	the	borehole	cooling	system	is	a	low	energy	cooling	
source,	that	the	space	heating	system	is	powered	by	gas	boilers,	but	that	all	other	building	
services	are	electrically	powered:	“The	building	generally	is	electric.”	City	Hall’s	kitchen,	
warm	water	generation,	lighting,	air-handling,	the	pumps	for	the	borehole	water,	the	lifts	
and	IT	are	all	based	on	electricity:	
So	the	building	has	an	enormous	electrical	appetite.	[…]	My	tasks	have	been	to	try	
and	control	how	much	electricity	it	needs	by	changes	in	technology,	changes	in	
regimes	and	how	we	manage	things,	so	if	I	try	to	get	the	electricity	down	and	
controlled,	then	I’m	in	a	better	position	with	the	building	(Interview	Kraus,	2011).	
Although	Kraus	interpreted	his	key	task	as	reducing	City	Hall’s	electricity	consumption	and	
carbon	dioxide	emissions,	his	activities	were	somewhat	more	diverse	since	the	key	task	of	
energy	efficiency	had	to	be	seen	in	relation	to	other	heterogeneous	issues.	In	part,	the	
building	infrastructure	management’s	focus	on	energy	efficiency	was	influenced	by	the	
GLA’s	choice	to	select	and	employ	an	electrical	engineer	for	that	role.		
Before	I	explain	the	central	activities	that	Kraus	undertook	as	building	infrastructure	
manager,	I	attempt	to	provide	some	insights	into	the	practical	world	of	his	responsibilities.		
7.3.2 Managing	a	complex	building		
City	Hall	is	“composite,	heterogeneous,	and	physically	localised”	(Akrich,	1992,	p.	205).	
Kraus	is	mainly	responsible	for	City	Hall’s	facade,	structure,	mechanical	and	electrical	
services.	His	day-to-day	working	world	is	made	up	of	eleven	floors,	18,734	m2	of	gross	
floor	area,	13,100m3	of	concrete,	4,050	tonnes	of	steel,	3,844	unique	facade	panels,	seven	
lifts,	six	air-handling	units	(AHUs),	two	boilers,	two	120m	deep	boreholes,	3,312	luminaires,	
four	building-management	systems,	1,950	data	points,	14	motor	control	centres,	
approximately	400	intelligent	unitary	controllers	(IUCs),	supply	and	control	wiring,	ducts,	
switches,	plugs	and	much	more.	This	infrastructural	sphere	of	responsibility	cannot	be	
meaningfully	understood	without	including	the	500-900	humans	occupying	and	operating	
the	building	(through	switches,	vents,	presence,	plugs,	etc.),	and	the	diverse	flows	of	
materials	(electricity,	gas,	water,	etc.)	that	traverse	City	Hall’s	technical	infrastructure,	
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transformed	through	boilers,	pumps,	luminaires	and	more.	Consequently,	the	operation	of	
City	Hall	can	only	be	meaningful	understood	in	the	reciprocal	shaping	between	
technological,	social	and	material	elements.		
This	heterogeneous	assemblage	that	was	brought	into	being	by	the	designers	contained	
particular	hypotheses	about	how	the	projected	occupants	would	use	the	building.	City	Hall	
suggested	specific	ways	of	how	it	could	be	operated	(openable	vents,	adjustable	blinds,	
etc.)	and	its	design	was	based	on	particular	assumptions	of	how	it	might	be	operated	
(operation	hours,	equipment,	etc.).	The	building	came	to	be	occupied	by	more	than	500	
individuals,	each	with	their	own	preferences	for	fresh	air,	temperature,	use	of	devices	and	
so	on.	It	was	Kraus’s	responsibility	to	explain	this	heterogeneous	machine	to	the	hundreds	
of	occupiers,	to	understand	their	needs	and	modes	of	working,	to	fine-tune,	adjust	and	
optimise	the	building	infrastructure,	to	meet	the	requirements	of	its	diverse	users,	and	to	
mediate	between	these	facets	of	City	Hall,	which	became	inseparable	once	it	was	in	
operation.	
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Figure	7.3		City	Hall’s	main	plant	room	with	air	handling	units	left	and	right	(Photograph:	Author,	2011)	
	
Figure	7.4		City	Hall’s	main	plant	room	with	the	arrival	point	of	the	borehole	extraction	pipe	in	the	front	
(Photograph:	Author,	2011)	
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Figure	7.5		City	Hall’s	boiler	plant	room	in	the	basement	(Photograph:	Author,	2011)		
	
Figure	7.6		City	Hall	plant	room	in	the	basement	with	grey	water	tanks	(Photograph:	Author,	2011)	
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7.3.3 Updating	City	Hall		
With	building	completion	many	elements	of	the	multiple	translations	from	design	briefing	
to	design	materialisation	had	been	largely	stabilised.	But	City	Hall	is	not	generally	a	fixed	
or	static	object.	Rather,	I	propose	conceiving	the	building	as	a	heterogeneous	assemblage	
that	is	occupied,	used	and	changed	in	an	ongoing	manner	(cf.	Latour	&	Yaneva,	2008).	
Seen	this	way,	City	Hall’s	design	continued	to	transform	after	the	handover	from	design	
team	to	occupier.	While	key	decisions	taken	during	the	design	process	could	not	be	
destabilised	(e.g.	the	flawed	building	form	and	orientation	strategies),	others	have	become	
transformed	and	adapted.			
The	GLA	building	infrastructure	management	team	was	committed	to	“improve	the	
sustainability	of	its	own	operations,	[…]	improve	its	environmental	performance,	[…]	
improve	energy	efficiency”,	and	to	introduce	“new,	more	energy-efficient	technologies	
and	techniques”	(GLA,	2004a).		
As	noted	above,	the	building	infrastructure	team	interpreted	their	central	task	as	wrestling	
the	energy	performance	down	–	these	activities	had	to	be	negotiated	against	questions	of	
compliance	with	the	mayor’s	and	GLA’s	objectives	and	questions	of	acceptability,	
feasibility	and	cost-benefit	assumptions.	Through	a	process	of	measuring,	interpreting	and	
projecting,	Kraus’	team	attempted	to	improve	City	Hall’s	operational	processes.	
Interventions	aimed	to	optimise	the	interplay	of	City	Hall’s	physical	elements	(fabric,	
structure,	mechanical	and	electrical	services)	together	with	modes	of	occupation	(routines,	
habits,	etc.)	and	procurement	practices.	Changes	were	made	in	all	these	areas;	some	were	
easy	to	achieve,	some	involved	huge	financial	investment,	and	some	involved	changes	to	
City	Hall’s	material	structure.	Below	I	briefly	outline	four	selected	key	interventions	that	
have	been	put	into	practice.	These	modifications	could	have	been	adopted	in	the	initial	
design	practices,	but	were	either	not	recognised	as	relevant	design	issues	or	were	rejected	
on	the	basis	of	costs	that	neither	More	London	nor	the	GOL	wanted	to	cover.	
7.3.3.1 Retrofit	of	door	enabling	maintenance	of	air	inlet	grilles	
First,	one	of	the	key	improvements	that	Kraus	and	his	colleagues	made	in	2008	was	to	
retrofit	a	missing	access	door	to	the	AHUs	(Interview	Kraus,	2011).	Foster+Partners	and	
Arup	seemingly	forgot	to	include	a	door	for	maintenance	access	in	their	planning	
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documents	and	design.	GLA	members	complained	that	the	air	supply	in	the	building	was	
feeling	“stuffy”	and,	in	order	to	counteract	this,	they	manually	opened	the	vents	below	the	
office	windows.	As	a	first	response,	the	BMS	was	established	to	run	the	AHUs	at	their	
maximum	capacity	without	significant	change.	The	FM	team	then	realised	that	there	was	
no	access	door	to	check	the	inlet	grilles	where	the	AHUs	pull	in	the	air	from	the	air	duct.	
They	knocked	an	opening	through	a	wall	in	the	basement	to	gain	access	to	the	grilles	for	
fresh	air	intake	and	found	that	they	were	clogged	with	rubbish,	which	blocked	the	air	from	
coming	in.	Cleaning	these	grilles	was	a	new	maintenance	activity	added	to	the	FM	team’s	
routines:		
They’re	now	set	into	the	maintenance	regime,	[…]	which	wasn’t	there	previously	
’cause	we	didn’t	know	we	had	[…]	the	problem	until	we	ran	out	of	air,	and	we’ve	
never	had	a	complaint	with	air	since.	[…]	A	simple	improvement	[…]	made	a	big	
difference	(Interview	Kraus,	2011).		
The	simple	intervention	of	knocking	a	hole	into	a	wall	led	to	substantial	improvements	in	
air	quality	and	savings	in	electricity.	Dirt	and	rubbish	were	elements	that	were	not	
projected	in	the	design	studios	and	thus	not	associated	or	addressed	in	the	multiple	
translations	of	design	materialisation.	
7.3.3.2 Retrofit	of	voltage	optimisation	
The	second	key	update	introduced	to	City	Hall’s	building	services	was	voltage	optimisation	
in	2009.	Kraus	explained	that	this	strategy	takes	advantage	of	the	voltage	harmonisation	
within	the	European	Union.	To	adjust	to	historically	different	nominal	voltage	levels	of	
electrical	supply	within	the	EU	(mainland	EU	220V,	UK	240V),	electrical	equipment	is	
required	to	operate	at	approximately	230V	±	10%	that	is	between	approximately	207V	and	
253V.	Kraus	explained	that,	typically	in	the	UK,	electricity	is	provided	at	between	235V	and	
236V.	The	basic	principle	of	voltage	optimisation	is	to	reduce	the	incoming	voltage	level	
through	an	electrical	transformer.	The	FM	team	installed	“this	device	which	sits	between	
[…]	the	main	switch	and	the	rest	of	the	installation	and	it	drops	the	voltage	in	the	building	
to	about	220V,	and	that	saves	us	about	14%	per	annum	on	electricity”	(Interview	Kraus,	
2011).	The	cost	of	this	intervention	was	approximately	£85,000.	It	enabled	considerable	
savings	in	energy	usage	and	bills.	The	payback	time	was	projected	to	be	approximately	3.5	
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years	(GLA,	2008).	There	seems	to	be	some	disagreement	about	the	percentage	of	savings	
–	a	GLA	document	states	that	the	annual	electricity	savings	of	City	Hall	through	voltage	
optimisation	is	only	8%	(GLA,	2011).	Still,	an	8%	reduction	of	annual	electricity	
consumption	is	a	major	achievement.	This	efficiency	improvement	is	enabled	through	a	
boxed	electrical	transformer	that	is	locked	away	in	City	Hall’s	basement.	It	is	an	
achievement	not	exposed	to	the	direct	sensual	perception	of	GLA	staff	or	visitors	and	is	
therefore	difficult	to	communicate.	In	comparison	to	the	design	team’s	intensive	efforts	to	
optimise	City	Hall’s	building	form,	this	strategy	is	a	simple	and	effective	strategy	to	
improve	the	goal	of	energy	efficiency.	
7.3.3.3 Retrofit	of	photovoltaic	panels			
	
Figure	7.7		Photovoltaic	modules	on	the	roof	and	eyelash	of	City	Hall	(Photograph:	Sunny	Portal,	2012)	
Third,	the	retrofit	of	photovoltaic	modules	is	a	well-communicated	update	to	City	Hall.	
During	the	design	practices	initial	attempts	to	integrate	photovoltaics	(PVs)	failed	as	the	
extra	costs	were	rejected	by	both	More	London	and	the	GOL.	At	that	stage,	PVs	did	not	
qualify	as	a	strategy	that	provided	“value	for	money”(Interview	Griffiths,	2010).	According	
to	Hyams	(F+P),	even	the	proposal	to	prepare	City	Hall’s	roof	with	studs	for	the	later	
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installation	of	PVs	did	not	succeed.	It	would	have	saved	a	lot	of	money	(Interview	Hyams,	
2011).	The	GLA	continued	to	apply	for	funding	to	install	PVs	on	the	City	Hall	roof	following	
occupation.	First	attempts	failed	but	in	2006	an	alliance	of	GLA,	More	London,	the	London	
Climate	Change	Agency,	Foster+Partners,	Arup,	the	Department	of	Trade	and	Industry	(DTI)	
and	others	was	successful.	The	PV	modules	retrofit	was	funded	by	the	London	Climate	
Change	Agency	with	£540,000,	which	was	set	up	by	mayor	Ken	Livingstone	in	2006	to	
tackle	climate	change	by	promoting	decentralised	renewable	energy	projects,	and	by	a	
grant	of	£190,000	from	the	DTI’s	Major	Photovoltaic	Demonstration	Programme,	which	is	
managed	by	the	Energy	Saving	Trust	(London	Development	Agency,	2008).		
A	total	active	cell	area	of	417m2	of	over	28,000	individual	photovoltaic	cells	with	a	capacity	
of	67kWp	(kilowatt-peak)	was	installed.61	These	comprised	617	modules	in	nine	different	
sizes,	51	translucent	modules	of	52.4kWp	on	City	Hall’s	roof	and	46	bespoke	translucent	
glass-glass	laminates	of	14.6kWp	at	its	eyelash	(Figure	7.7).	They	were	projected	to	
generate	50,000kWh/a.	City	Hall’s	spherical	shape	thus	posed	a	significant	challenge	to	the	
team	that	designed,	developed	and	installed	the	photovoltaic	modules.	Adjusting	the	solar	
modules	to	City	Hall’s	spherical	form	required	the	design	and	manufacture	of	custom	
trapezoid-shaped	solar	panels.	More	London’s	spherical	building	form	strategy	was	not	
well	suited	to	the	installation	of	PV	cells	in	the	most	ideal	orientation.	Ideally,	they	should	
face	within	45	degrees	of	south	and	are	sloped	at	an	angle	of	30	degrees	to	the	horizontal	
(Carbon	Trust,	2011b).	
The	architects	argued	that	City	Hall’s	form	would	reduce	solar	gains	through	self-shading.	
Regarding	PVs,	this	logic	largely	turned	against	itself.	It	was	a	predominantly	aesthetic	
design	decision	to	have	all	photovoltaic	modules	sit	flush	on	City	Hall’s	spherical	shape.	
Most	photovoltaic	cells	on	the	roof	are	tilted	north	rather	than	south,	and	the	cells	on	the	
eyelash	are	much	steeper	than	the	ideal	angle	of	30	degrees.	The	installation	would	have	
been	much	simpler,	financially	cheaper	and	made	more	effective	use	of	energy	had	
standard	rectangular	solar	panels	been	placed	in	an	ideal	orientation	as	add-ons	on	the	
top	of	City	Hall’s	roof.	But	that	would	have	compromised	City	Hall’s	monolithic	shape.	
																																								 																
61	Kilowatt-peak	(kWp)	is	a	measure	of	the	nominal	power	of	a	photovoltaic	solar	energy	module	under	laboratory	
illumination	conditions.	
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Technology,	money,	efficiency	and	perception	become	inseparable	in	the	retrofit	of	
photovoltaic	cells.		
Since	operations	commenced,	City	Hall’s	photovoltaic	cells	have	not	reached	their	
predicted	electricity	generation	of	50,000kWh/a,	and	have	instead	delivered	between	
30,000	and	38,000kWh/a.	This	amount	is	approximately	1%	of	its	total	electricity	demand	
and	equals	approximately	£2,700	in	electricity	bill	savings.	In	principle,	this	can	be	
translated	into	a	payback	time	of	280	years	for	the	investment	of	£750,000.62	But	payback	
evaluations	should	be	framed	through	the	UK	Government's	Feed-In	Tariffs	scheme	for	
electricity-generation	of	renewable	or	low-carbon	sources.63	Confronted	with	the	
contribution	of	photovoltaic	cells	to	the	total	electricity	consumption,	Kraus	commented:	
“1%,	[…]	I	think	1%	is	fine”(Interview	Kraus,	2012).	So	how	should	the	intervention	of	PVs	
be	evaluated?	Kraus’	team	was	committed	to	obtaining	“best	value	and	achieving	value	for	
money”	(GLA,	2004a)	and,	in	the	case	of	the	photovoltaic	retrofit,	it	becomes	obvious	that	
value	is	a	term	open	to	interpretation.	From	a	financial	perspective	the	photovoltaic	
modules	did	not	provide	value	for	money.	But,	crucially,	value	was	associated	with	
potential	symbolic	value:	as	a	pioneer	project	of	the	mayor’s	policy	target	to	increase	PV	
electricity	generation	within	London,	the	PV	modules	are	perceived	by	passers-by	on	the	
river	walk,	provided	they	are	familiar	with	the	appearance,	principle	and	contribution	of	
PV	modules.	Some	oppose	the	enactment	of	PV	electricity	generation	sine	the	production	
of	PV	cells	largely	depends	on	significant	energy	and	material	resource	inputs.	
Nevertheless,	in	February	2008,	during	the	official	opening	of	City	Hall’s	photovoltaic	
panels,	Ken	Livingstone	declared:	
Reducing	carbon	emissions	in	order	to	tackle	climate	change	is	the	biggest	challenge	
facing	this	planet.	This	renewable	energy	scheme	is	an	example	of	City	Hall	leading	
by	example	(London	Development	Agency,	2008).	
The	integration	of	PVs	failed	during	the	multiple	translations	from	design	briefing	to	design	
materialisation.	But	following	City	Hall’s	building	completion,	the	retrofitting	of	
																																								 																
62	Based	on	35,000kWh/a,	a	constant	price	of	1kWh	=	£0.076265	(City	Hall’s	day	tariff	with	EDF	in	2011)	and	no	
interest	rate.		
63	See	https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/environmental-programmes/feed-tariff-fit-scheme/tariff-tables	
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photovoltaic	modules	in	February	2008	succeeded,	and	was	a	key	intervention	chosen	by	
the	GLA	in	its	attempt	to	promote	City	Hall	as	an	exemplary	building	in	renewable	energy	
generation.	It	was	not	the	voltage	optimisation	intervention	that	was	chosen	to	be	
communicated	to	the	public,	despite	the	fact	that	it	was	cheaper	and	led	to	more	
significant	reductions	in	energy	demands.		
7.3.3.4 Retrofit	of	increased	energy	efficient	lighting	
The	fourth	key	adaptation	to	improve	City	Hall’s	energy	efficiency	was	to	begin	replacing	
1,200	tungsten	luminaires	with	either	fluorescent	or	LED	lamps	and	a	refinement	of	the	
ways	in	which	lighting	is	controlled.	According	to	Kraus	and	the	GLA,	lighting	is	the	single	
largest	source	of	electricity	consumption	in	City	Hall,	estimated	at	approximately	42%	of	all	
electricity	usage.	In	comparison,	the	generalised	ECON	19	guideline	suggests	lighting	
should	account	for	only	26%	of	total	electricity	usage	for	type	4	office	buildings	(DETR,	
1998a,	p.	20).		
	
Figure	7.8		Different	types	of	lighting	on	floor	6	(Photograph:	Author,	2010)		
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For	Kraus’	team	the	question	of	lighting	brings	together	heterogeneous	elements.	
Generally,	good	quality	lighting	is	important	for	building	occupiers,	but	what	that	means	in	
practices	remains	contestable.	Lighting	is	important	for	human	sensory	input	(which	relies	
to	a	large	degree	on	sight),	for	comfort	and	well-being,	and	as	an	architectural	design	
element.	Lighting	brings	together	four	crucial	elements:	lamps,	control	gears	(a	ballast	or	
driver	for	the	lamp),	luminaires	(the	casing	of	the	lamp)	and	controls	(e.g.	a	switch).	Key	
characteristics	of	lamps	are	their	efficiency	(measured	in	lumen	per	watt	lm/w),64	
expected	lifetime,	costs	and	ability	to	render	colour.	The	affectivity	of	lighting	depends	on	
the	lamp	efficiency,	its	control	(whether	the	right	light	is	on	at	the	right	time)	and	its	
suitable	lumen	level	for	a	particular	purpose.	
City	Hall	contains	more	than	3,300	luminaires,	which	are	partially	equipped	with	two	or	
more	lamps.	Kraus	declared	that	the	lighting	design	of	City	Hall’s	fit-out	was	partially	
deficient	as	one	of	the	lighting	designers		
made	a	mistake.	[…]	Lighting	design	in	the	offices	[…]	is	fine,	but	on	all	the	common	
spaces	he	put	in	twelve	hundred	bloody	tungsten	halogen	lamps,	[…]	90	watts	each	
(Interview	Kraus,	2011).	
Kraus	argued	that	the	tungsten	downlights	are	not	an	efficient	lighting	source	as90	watts	
of	tungsten	halogen	generate	about	85	watts	of	heat	and	only	5	watts	of	light:	
There’s	a	major	cost-saving	if	you	can	get	rid	of	the	halogen	in	terms	of	the	energy	
it’s	taking	and	[…]	the	heat	it	gives	to	the	building	that	you	have	to	cool.	
In	other	words,	the	tungsten	lamps	have	two	negative	aspects:	a	low	luminous	efficacy	
and	a	relatively	high	heat	radiation,	which	increases	the	cooling	loads	when	cooling	is	
required:	
There’s	so	many	lights	in	this	building,	we’re	finding	that	it’s	[…]	budget	amongst	
other	things	which	are	the	constraints	on	being	able	to	do	the	changes	that	you	
want	to	do;	[…]	we’ve	still	got	quite	a	distance	to	go	with	that,	but	it	will	improve.	
																																								 																
64	Lumen	(lm)	is	a	unit	to	describe	the	amount	of	light	that	a	lamp	produces.	
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In	total,	City	Hall	contained	1,200	90W	tungsten	lamps	as	circular	downlights	inserted	
within	the	ceiling	soffit	(see	luminaries	for	instance	on	the	ceiling	of	the	elevator	lobby	
shown	in	Figure	7.8).	In	non-public	areas	the	FM	team	has	started	to	replace	some	of	the	
tungsten	halogen	lamps	with	fluorescent	lamps	described	as	a	“utility	type	lighting”.	Kraus	
explained:	“If	I	can	save	30	kilowatts	by	changing	the	lights	to	fluorescent,	that’s	a	
significant	saving	and	will	drive	the	cost	down.”	But	the	fluorescent	lamps	do	not	fit	within	
the	luminaires	-	they	stick	out.	This	was	considered	acceptable	only	for	non-public	areas.	In	
the	public	areas	the	FM	team	began	to	replace	the	90W	tungsten	lamps	with	9W	LED	
lamps.	But	this	also	required	changing	the	luminaires	costing	£80-300	each.	Given	the	total	
number	of	1,200	lights,	this	was	still	a	big	investment	(Interview	Kraus,	2012).	Kraus’	
choices	were	driven	by	the	trade-off	between	investment	costs,	the	duration	of	lamp	
lifetimes	and	the	overall	lease	agreement	between	the	GLA	and	More	London	(25	years,	
from	2002	to	2027).	For	the	lighting	upgrade,	“cost	benefit	[…]	is	significant”.	The	FM	team	
works	with	payback	timeframes	of	three	to	three	and	a	half	years.	They	monitor	the	
changes	over	time	to	prove	interventions	have	been	effective.	Manufacturers’	predictions	
of	life	expectancy,	light	output	and	electricity	consumption	of	lamps	can	be	checked	once	
they	have	been	installed.		
Kraus	considered	the	tungsten	lighting	partly	responsible	for	City	Hall’s	failure	to	live	up	to	
Foster+Partners’	prediction	that	the	building	would	consume	only	25%	energy	of	a	typical	
office	(F+P,	1999a,	p.	5).	The	lighting	designer	“could	have	started	with	a	more	efficient	
lighting	system,	and	it	would	have	been	nearer	the25%.	They	didn’t	[…]	follow	the	
guidance	or	stay	as	close	to	it	as	they	could	[have	done]”	(Interview	Kraus,	2011).	Updating	
the	lighting	sources	was	only	one	part	of	the	FM	team’s	strategy	towards	lighting;	other	
interventions	targeted	the	ways	in	which	lighting	was	controlled.			
Here	I	have	explained	four	selected	adaptations	by	the	GLA	building	infrastructure	team	
that	are	relevant	for	my	perspective	of	translation.	Foster+Partners	and	Arup	“inscribed”	
(Akrich,	1992,	p.	209),	through	the	multiple	translations	from	design	briefing	to	design	
materialisation,	particular	hypotheses	and	assumptions	into	City	Hall.	In	actual	operation,	
some	elements	deviated	from	their	predicted	performance,	for	instance	the	air	handling	
units	that	did	not	operate	as	they	should	have.	In	order	to	deal	with	the	complexity	of	City	
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Hall’s	design,	Foster+Partners	and	Arup	chose	particular	alternating	and	small	workable	
design	issues	and	interdependencies.	In	the	construction	of	design	strategies	rubbish	
clogging	the	air	inlet	grilles	was	not	captured	as	a	potential	force	that	would	affect	
operation.	The	materialised	lighting	design	had	significant	consequences	for	operational	
energy	consumption,	and	was	an	element	largely	neglected	in	translation.	Kraus	and	his	
team’s	updates	therefore	present	particular	corrections	and	refinements	to	the	initial	
design	translations.	
The	updating	of	City	Hall	will	continue	further	in	the	future.	Kraus’	efforts	are	directed	
towards	achieving	the	projected	energy	consumption	targets	launched	by	Foster+Partners,	
that	City	Hall	would	use	only	25%	energy	of	a	typical	office	building:		
Since	I’ve	been	here	I	may	have	been	driving	it	[the	electricity]	down	towards	the	
25%	[…].	I	have	been	tackling	it	and	I’ve	been	[…]	wrestling	the	energy	performance	
down.	[…]	We’re	not	there	yet,	we’ve	still	got	a	distance	to	go,	but	I’ll	get	there	
(Interview	Kraus,	2011).	
In	order	to	compare	predicted	environmental	performances	with	measured	performance,	I	
will	now	explore	how	City	Hall’s	building	infrastructure	management	produced	knowledge	
about	the	headquarters	environmental	impact	and	describe	its	key	findings.		
In	order	to	compare	predicted	environmental	performances	with	measured	performance,	I	
next	explore	how	City	Hall’s	building	infrastructure	management	produced	knowledge	
about	the	headquarters	environmental	impact	of	operation	and	what	its	key	findings	were.		
7.4 	Approximating	the	actual	environmental	impact		
7.4.1 Creating	knowledge	about	the	environmental	impact	of	operation		
The	GLA	assigned	a	central	role	to	City	Hall’s	building	infrastructure	management	in	its	
commitment	“to	improve	the	sustainability	of	its	own	operations”,	to	“reduce	the	
organisation’s	environmental	impact”,	to	“lead	by	example”,	to	“maintain	high	standards	
of	energy	and	environmental	management”,	to	“continuously	improve	its	environmental	
performance”	and	to	“monitor	performances”	(GLA,	2004a).	The	“environmental	impact”	
of	the	GLA	as	an	organisation,	of	the	“core	GLA”	defined	as	“the	Mayor,	the	London	
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Assembly	and	their	staff”,	and	of	City	Hall	as	the	GLA	headquarters,	are	in	principle	
different	analytical	perspectives.	Yet	the	latter	two	in	particular	are	interrelated	and	
cannot	be	neatly	disentangled.		
From	their	design	studios	and	offices,	Foster+Partners	and	Arup	approached	the	question	
of	how	to	frame	the	environmental	impact	of	City	Hall’s	operation	largely	through	the	
issue	of	energy	efficiency	and	carbon	dioxide	emissions.	The	GOL,	Foster+Partners	and	
Arup	each	defined	specific	performance	predictions	to	guide	and	align	the	heterogeneous	
design	practices	in	developing	City	Hall	that	were	defined	through	the	coefficients	of	
kWh/m2/a	and	CO2/m2/a.	In	part	7.4.4	I	compare	these	predicted	performances	with	
measured	performances	in	an	attempt	to	evaluate	the	translations	of	design	briefing	to	
design	materialisation.	
I	have	already	argued	that	the	‘environment’	is	a	vague	concept	that	resists	being	defined	
in	an	unambiguous	way	(cf.	Schlosberg,	1999).	Following	this,	I	suggest	that	the	
‘environmental	impact’	of	City	Hall’s	operation	is	also	difficult	to	define.	City	Hall’s	
environmental	impact	can	be	seen	as	the	short-	and	long-term	consequences	of	the	
(system-like)	interactions	between	heterogeneous	elements:	the	building	as	materialised	
by	the	designers	(the	arrangement	of	e.g.	spatiality,	forms,	materiality,	and	devices)	that	
enabled	and	suggested	particular	forms	of	occupation	and	usage;	the	diverse	activities	of	
occupants	and	building	infrastructure	management	(e.g.	opening	vents,	switching	on	lights,	
and	management,	procurement	and	commissioning	practices);	diverse	material	flows	(e.g.	
electricity,	gas,	water)	upon	which	many	occupational	activities	depend.	Essentially,	the	
building	infrastructure	management’s	understanding	of	City	Hall’s	environmental	impact	
depended	on	the	scope	of	material	flows	and	material	transformations	that	they	
themselves	took	into	account,	recorded	and	re-represented.	In	other	words,	
‘environmental	impact’	was	understood	in	terms	of	how	the	GLA	itself	created	knowledge,	
in	turn	omitting	several	other	aspects	in	this	process	(e.g.	emissions	of	nitrogen	oxides	and	
sulphur	dioxides	released	during	gas	combustion	were	not	monitored).		
In	May	2002	the	GLA	began	to	operate	City	Hall.	Since	then	the	FM	team	has	started	to	
collect	and	transform	data,	producing	diverse	representations.	As	time	has	gone	on	the	
FM	team	has	expanded	the	scope	of	data	collection.	Thus	City	Hall	and	its	occupation	has	
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increasingly	become	better	known.	Meters	play	a	key	role	as	instruments	of	control	and	
knowledge	production	(Akrich,	1992),	and	did	so	in	the	attempts	to	define	and	construct	
the	environmental	impact	of	City	Hall’s	operations.	The	FM	team’s	practices	of	taking	
meter	readings	have	transformed	significantly.	Initially,	they	recorded	key	utilities	on	a	
manual	basis:	main	meter	readings	were	taken	once	a	day,	Monday	to	Friday,	and	written	
down	on	a	paper-based	schedule.	Due	to	cost	considerations,	the	FM	team	has	only	
gradually	begun	to	retrofit	smart	meters	and	sub	meters,	which	were	not	provided	with	
the	design	provided	by	the	More	London	team	(GLA,	2004b).	The	retrofit	aimed	to	
produce	more	refined	knowledge	of	operations.	Smart	meters	are	electronic	devices	that	
automatically	record	and	store	particular	activities	in	predefined	temporal	intervals	(e.g.	
daily,	hourly,	half	hourly).	They	do	not	require	to	be	manually	read	as	information	is	stored	
and	can	be	transmitted	on	request	to,	for	instance,	City	Hall’s	external	electricity	supplier	
EDF,	to	GLA	internal	databanks	and	to	the	headquarters’	BMSs,	which	can	initiate	
particular	actions	(e.g.	open	or	close	valves)	in	response.	This	way,	particular	material	
flows	(e.g.	borehole	water)	can	be	monitored,	information	stored	and	retrospectively	
checked.	Sub-meters	help	the	building	infrastructure	management	to	advance	a	more	
detailed	understanding	of	where,	how,	when	and	which	quantities	of,	say,	electricity	City	
Hall	consumes.		
Kraus’s	team	installed	additional	smart	and	sub-meters	mainly	to	monitor	and	control	the	
electricity	consumption	of	specific	areas	and	zones:	
The	meter	[…]	can	produce	accurate	data	about	what’s	going	on.	[…]	That	is	then	
sent	to	a	central	point,	which	I	have	access	to,	and	I	can	monitor	[…]	all	the	meters	
in	the	building.	For	instance,	I	can	look	at	a	discrete	meter	on	the	seventh	floor	
east,	then	compare	it	to	a	discrete	meter	on	the	seventh	floor	west.	It’s	about	
energy	conservation,	energy	usage,	who’s	good,	who’s	bad,	[…]	who	doesn’t	turn	
the	computer	off,	I	can	tell	you	(Interview	Kraus,	2011).	
With	the	smart	meters	Kraus	and	his	team	claimed	that	they	could	monitor	particular	
activities	locally.	The	analysis	of	this	data	is	crucial	in	enabling	the	team	to	check	energy	
reduction	strategies	and	to	consider	new	interventions.		
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City	Hall’s	environmental	impact	through	operations	was	never	completely	known	and	its	
approximation	relied	on	particular	trials,	comparisons,	calculations,	expansions	of	scope,	
checking	readings,	taking	new	readings,	and	was	represented	through	Excel	spreadsheets	
and	as	specific	sets	of	issues	assembled	in	summary	reports.		
During	the	first	years	of	operation	information	was	mostly	represented	and	summarised	in	
yearly	“utilities”	sheets,	produced	per	financial	year.	Data	collection	and	representation	
have	since	become	expanded	through	more	comprehensive	“FM	Statistics”	produced	on	a	
monthly	basis.	The	utilities	sheets	covered	monthly	and	total	yearly	quantities	of	
measured	electricity	consumption	(in	kWh),	gas	consumption	(in	kWh),	carbon	dioxide	
emissions	(in	CO2t)	calculated	through	specific	conversation	factors	from	measured	
electricity	and	gas	consumptions,	borehole	water	abstraction	and	discharge	(in	m3),	and	
mains	water	(in	m3)	(GLA,	2009).	Figure	7.9	depicts	the	summary	page	of	the	FM	Statistics	
from	December	2011,	including	a	review	of	the	previous	twelve	months	from	December	
2010	that	enabled	a	retrospective	comparison.	Multiple	issues	are	assembled	in	related	
Excel	worksheets	from	which	individual	datasets	and	graphs	can	be	retrieved.	Beyond	grid	
electricity	(kWh),	gas	(kWh),	carbon	dioxide	emissions	(CO2)	and	main	and	borehole	water	
(m3),	the	FM	Statistics	capture	additional	material	flows	and	transformations.	They	also	
represent	electricity	production	through	City	Hall’s	photovoltaic	modules	–	data	retrieved	
online	beforehand	from	the	external	Sunny	Portal	provider.65	The	GLA’s	waste	separation	
practices	are	documented	in	two	main	categories:	residual	waste	(kg)	and	waste	collected	
for	recycling	(kg).	A	breakdown	of	the	latter	is	produced	by	the	recycling	contractor,	
Bywaters.	Next	to	the	selected	material	flows	and	transformations,	the	FM	statistics	
document	diverse	occupational	activities	that	took	place	in	City	Hall	during	this	time.	
These	include	room	bookings,	room	use,	televised	events	and	visitor	numbers,	amongst	
other	issues	(GLA,	2012).	In	Figure	7.14	I	have	attempted	to	detail	the	scope	of	selected	
measured	material	transformations	and	respective	quantities	for	the	period	April	2010	-	
March	2011.		
																																								 																
65	See	Sunny	Portal	webpage	for	information	about	past	and	ongoing	photovoltaic	electricity	generation	of	City	Hall	
[accessed	1	December	2013]:	http://www.sunnyportal.com/Templates/PublicPageOverview.aspx?page=8f35bd18-
5407-487c-8378-33688c0bbe5a&plant=00cddb27-1baf-4d19-9cdb-b54e4f184056&splang=en-US		
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The	FM	Statistics	represent	selected	issues	in	the	attempt	to	account	for	City	Hall’s	actual	
environmental	impact.	They	are	devices	with	which	to	communicate	and	render	visible	
material	transformations	operations	that	are	themselves	difficult	to	comprehend,	since	
they	in	part	elude	sensory	perception.	The	ways	in	which	these	textual	and	visual	displays	
have	been	constructed	through	diverse	transformations	-	framing	and	capturing	particular	
activities,	meter	reading,	adding	and	calculating	data	-	are	selective,	biased	and	not	value	
free.		
In	the	next	section	I	explore	the	quantitative	recordings	of	material	flows	captured.	I	begin	
with	the	period	from	2002-03	to	2010-11,	and	then	analyse	material	flows	between	April	
2010	and	March	2011	in	more	detail.		
	
Figure	7.9		Summary	page	of	the	Detailed	Facility	Management	Statistics,	December	2011,	including	a	review	of	the	
period	December	2010	-	November	2011	(Chart:	Greater	London	Authority,	2012)	
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7.4.2 Recorded	material	transformations	from	2002-03	to	2010-11	
Using	GLA	data,	this	section	traces	City	Hall’s	recorded	material	flows	since	its	official	
opening	in	June	2002.	Most	annual	data	from	City	Hall’s	FM	team	is	framed	according	to	
financial	years,	beginning	in	April	and	ending	in	March	the	following	year.	In	Figure	7.10	I	
have	attempted	to	capture	City	Hall’s	quantitative	material	flows	in	the	financial	years	
from	2002-03	to	2010-11.66	I	have	thereby	collected	particular	material	flows.	I	display	
them	in	a	single	diagram	in	order	to	‘draw	them	together’.	In	this	way	they	can	be	
explored	in	their	quantitative	relation	and	over	time.		
Since	operations	commenced,	City	Hall’s	FM	team	has	purchased	electricity	from	EDF	that	
has	been	certified	a	100%	renewable	electricity	source	through	the	Renewable	Energy	
Guarantee	Origin	(REGO).	However,	“due	to	concerns	over	the	complete	suitability	of	
these	tariffs	raised	by	GLA	Energy	policy	advisors	the	CO2	calculation	utilises	the	Grid	
average”	(GLA,	2009).	Whether	CO2	emissions	from	grid-sourced	‘renewable’	electricity	
should	be	included	or	omitted	in	constructing	City	Hall’s	environmental	impact	was	a	
controversial	issue.	The	FM	team	based	their	CO2	emission	calculations	on	factors	of	
0.00043tCO2	per	kWh	electricity	and	on	0.0002tCO2	per	kWh	gas	(GLA,	2009).	Crucially,	
one	kWh	of	grid	electricity	is	estimated	with	more	than	double	the	amount	of	CO2	than	
one	kWh	of	gas	consumption.	This	comparison	evidences	that	kWh	(or	kWh/m2/a)	in	
isolation	have	limited	explanatory	value.	I	consider	the	diverging	CO2	emissions	shares	for	
grid	electricity	and	gas	in	Figure	7.10.	Since	the	validity	of	CO2	emission	shares	of	the	grid	
‘renewable’	electricity	was	contented,	I	visually	represent	these	(and	totals)	in	dotted	lines.	
	
																																								 																
66	Since	City	Hall	was	occupied	only	in	June	2002	the	data	for	the	year	2002-03	is	based	on	months	from	June	2002	
to	March	2003	only	(10	months).	I	stopped	exploring	the	material	flows	in	the	financial	year	2010/11	when	my	
fieldwork	came	to	an	end.			
	266	
	
Figure	7.10		Material	flows	monitored	in	City	Hall,	2002	to	2011	(Diagram:	Author,	2014,	based	on	GLA	data)	
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Gas	consumption	increased	slightly	in	the	first	years	of	occupation	up	to	2004-05,	while	
electricity	increased	by	approximately	39%	until	2005-06.	For	the	year	2006-07	the	
consumption	of	both	gas	and	electricity	was	surprisingly	low	-	electricity	consumption	was	
11%	less	than	the	previous	year	-	but	they	rose	to	previous	levels	by	2007-08.	During	one	
interview	I	showed	Kraus	an	earlier	printed	version	of	Figure	7.10.	Kraus	admitted	that	he	
had	not	seen	a	graphical	representation	of	material	transformations	(nor	of	electricity	in	
isolation)	between	2002	and	2011,	and	that	he	was	not	aware	of	an	apparent	decline	in	
the	consumption	of	electricity,	gas	and	borehole	water	for	2006-07.	His	first	reaction	was	
that	the	decline	and	graph	might	be	based	on	a	data	error.	From	his	computer	he	pulled	a	
data	set	of	various	readings	for	2006-07,	but	we	did	not	detect	any	missing	data	that	could	
have	explained	the	drop.	In	the	end,	Kraus’	interpretation	was	that	2006-07	probably	had	
a	cold	summer	and	mild	winter.	Weather	conditions	are	another	idiosyncratic	force	co-
shaping	consumption.	Electricity	consumption	since	2007-08	dropped	annually	by	1%	to	
5%.	It	seemed	that	the	central	objective	of	“wrestling	the	energy	performance	down”	
(Interview	Kraus,	2011)	had	been	partially	successful.	
7.4.3 Recorded	material	transformations	in	2010-11	
In	Figure	7.11	I	convey	the	scope	of	selected	material	transformations	that	City	Hall’s	FM	
team	metered	and	which	external	contractors	recorded	in	respective	quantities	for	the	
period	April	2010	-	March	2011.	
During	the	development	phase	More	London,	Foster+Partners	and	Arup	framed	the	
environmental	impact	of	City	Hall’s	design	and	projected	operations	largely	through	the	
issue	of	energy	consumption.	While	they	dedicated	much	work	both	on	designing	City	Hall	
to	reduce	projected	operational	energy	consumption	and	on	communicating	these	efforts,	
they	did	not	explain	why	this	design	activity	was	of	great	importance.	Some	might	argue	
that	the	reasons	were	obvious	and	thus	did	not	need	to	be	mentioned.	I	suggest	instead	
that	by	focusing	on	an	ostensibly	local	and	quantitative	problem	only	(e.g.	kWh/m2/a),	the	
designers	attempted	to	disconnect	the	responsibilities	that	their	design	specifications	and	
materialisations	had	beyond	the	object	they	created.	As	a	readily	quantifiable	concern,	
energy	consumption	was	treated	as	if	it	could	be	addressed	on	and	could	be	constrained	
to	the	local	scale	of	the	building	only.		 	
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Figure	7.11		Recorded	set	of	City	Hall’s	material	flows	in	operation,	April	2010	to	March	2011	(Diagram:	Author,	
2014,	based	on	GLA	data)	
Largely	predetermined	through	its	design	practices,	City	Hall’s	operation	is	essentially	
dependent	on	the	supply	of	electricity,	gas,	main	water	and	borehole	water	that	involve	
specific	locations	beyond	the	building	site,	and	that	are	co-constitutive	of	carbon	dioxide,	
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carbon	monoxide,	nitrogen	oxide	and	sulphur	dioxide	emissions,	as	well	as	discharge	of	
borehole	water	that	exits	the	building	site	to	locations	further	afield	(Figure	7.11).	
These	transformations	cannot	be	comprehensively	framed	on	the	local	scale	of	the	
building	only.	Neither	do	they	present	a	merely	quantitative,	physical,	rational	or	technical	
problem.	Rather,	they	must	be	seen	as	highly	political	and	complex	challenges.	These	
material	transformations	are	necessarily	bound	up	with	many	heterogeneous	associations	
and	have	a	significant	(mostly	deteriorating)	impact	on	the	planet’s	life	support	systems,	
which	are	a	vital	precondition	for	human	existence.	They	involve	a	complex	dynamic	that	is	
multifaceted	in	scope	and	far-reaching	in	terms	of	resource	extraction,	processing,	
transportation	and	the	environmental	damage	produced.	They	cannot	be	disconnected	
from	the	specific	working	conditions	and	questions	of	wellbeing	implicated	through	these	
geographies	and	associations.	Material	transformations	therefore	present	an	important	
realm	of	endangerment	to	humans.	
As	such,	City	Hall’s	materialised	design	(as	a	crucial	force	co-determining	consumption)	
and	its	actual	operational	material	transformations	acquire	“ethical	significance	[…]	a	
position	of	the	greatest	social	and	cultural	importance”	(Hagan,	2001,	p.	76).	In	order	to	
better	address	challenges	of	“human	well-being,	social	equity	and	environmental	
integrity”,	Leach,	Scoones	and	Stirling	(2010,	p.	5)	emphasise	the	particularities	of	analysis	
and	understandings,	since	they	depend	on	specific	positions	and	assumptions.	They	argue	
that	“any	negotiation	of	pathways	to	sustainability	in	dynamic,	complex	systems	must	
therefore	be	centrally	about	focusing	on	framings	of	systems	and	their	properties”	(p.	64).	
In	order	to	overcome	merely	quantitative	considerations	and	instead	enter	into	a	more	
comprehensive	understanding	of	City	Hall’s	material	transformations,	it	is	important	to	
recognise	that	these	transformations	implicate	diverse	issues,	“positions,	goals	and	values	
of	diverse	actors”	(p.	64)	near	and	far	of	which	some	“will	gain	or	lose	in	the	process”	(p.	
171).		
Therefore	it	is	important	to	extend	the	assessment	of	the	impact	of	City	Hall’s	material	
flows	beyond	the	building	scale	and	to	also	include	heterogeneous	factors	such	as	other	
localities,	actors,	activities,	conventions	and	materialities	associated	with	them.		
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Many	questions	emerge	when	attempting	to	trace	these	heterogeneous	associations.	To	
develop	a	more	comprehensive	understanding	of	City	Hall’s	material	transformations,	the	
issue	of	incomplete	knowledge	must	be	addressed.	A	crucial	step	is	to	decide	which	
assumptions	and	statements	are	borrowed	as	‘facts’,	which	concealed	practices	open	to	
debate,	and	how	far	to	follow	these	associations?	
For	instance,	City	Hall	buys	‘renewable’	electricity	from	EDF	who	buys	electricity	through	
the	UK	national	grid	that	is	certified	by	the	Renewable	Energy	Guarantee	Origin	(REGO)	
scheme.	Where	does	this	electricity	actually	come	from?	How	is	the	REGO	certification	
system	defined?	Where	does	Corona	purchase	gas	supplies	from?	According	to	Corona,	
approximately	40%	of	gas	is	imported	from	Europe	and	abroad	(Email	Dumbelton,	2012).	
Who	is	affected	by	City	Hall’s	CO2	emissions?	What	does	it	mean	when	Bywaters	claims	to	
‘recycle’	waste	generated	within	City	Hall?	With	high	probability,	some	shares	cannot	be	
‘recycled’.	So	where	do	they	go	and	how	do	they	affect	areas	and	groups?	
The	responsibility	for	these	material	transformations	and	related	consequences	is	intricate	
and	distributed	across	many	actors.	It	was	the	responsibility	of	both	the	GOL	(through	its	
design	briefing)	and	the	More	London	design	team	(through	design	development,	
specification	and	materialisation)	to	develop	City	Hall	in	a	way	that	it	could	minimise	
quantities	of	actual	operational	material	transformations	(Chapter	4	to	6).	City	Hall	was	
designed	in	response	to	a	specific	(developing)	brief	of	requirements	and	projected	
occupation.	It	was	the	responsibility	of	the	GLA	and	its	building	infrastructure	
management	team	to	fine-tune	the	materialised	design,	to	explain	the	building	to	its	users,	
to	adopt	new	occupation	strategies	(e.g.	hot	desking)	and	emerging	technologies	(e.g.	
LEDs),	to	adapt	to	changing	requirements	and	the	needs	of	the	GLA.	In	addition,	it	was	
their	responsibility	to	procure	electricity,	gas	and	main	water	from	sources	that	would	not	
greatly	impact	“human	well-being,	social	equity	and	environmental	integrity”	(Leach	et	al.,	
2010,	p.	5)	in	accordance	with	GLA	definitions.		
The	next	section	explores,	Based	on	the	FM	team’s	recordings,	the	next	section	explores	to	
what	extent	City	Hall	in	actual	operation	achieved	the	projected	environmental	
performance	targets	that	were	defined	to	guide	and	align	the	multifarious	translation	
processes	targeted	towards	design	materialisation.	
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7.4.4 Projected	performances	and	actual	recorded	performances		
In	an	attempt	to	align	the	heterogeneous	actors	and	entities	implicated	in	the	making	of	
City	Hall	and	to	achieve	specific	environmental	design	goals,	the	involved	actors	defined	
and	deployed	multiple	environmental	performance	targets	that	were	adapted	along	with	
the	continuing	design	processes.	These	entered	the	design	process	in	diverse	forms:	
statements,	design	briefs,	briefing	updates	and	planning	documents.	Five	central	
environmental	targets	were	defined	during	City	Hall’s	design	development.	I	have	
discussed	two	of	these	goals	in	previous	chapters.	First,	the	concept	of	sustainability	
displaced	early	on	and	compressed	into	the	second	target,	the	obligatory	requirement	for	
a	BREEAM	assessment	of	minimum	“very	good”,	later	upgraded	to	“excellent”.	While	the	
BREEAM	goal	had	been	successfully	met	just	before	the	handover	of	headquarters,	the	
third,	fourth	and	fifth	targets	could	only	be	assessed	during	actual	operations.	These	three	
performance	goals	are	explored	here	in	an	attempt	to	evaluate	City	Hall’s	environmental	
performance	in	operation	for	the	year	April	2010	-	March	2011.		
7.4.4.1 The	GOL’s	CO2	emissions	target	of	70kg/m2/a	
The	third	key	environmental	performance	goal	(Figure	7.12)	that	was	included	in	the	GOL’s	
design	briefing	update	in	September	1998	(Chapter	5)	demanded,	in	addition	to	BREEAM,	
that	“the	development	should	also	achieve	a	challenging	CO2	emissions	target,	set	at	
70kg/sq.m./annum”	(TTPM,	1998e,	p.	2).	In	operations,	City	Hall’s	CO2	emissions	were	
approximated	by	the	building	infrastructure	management	team	through	conversion	
factors,	since	actual	CO2	emissions	were	not	recorded.	City	Hall’s	operation	relies	on	
significant	amounts	of	electricity	supply	and	related	CO2	emissions	were	not	produced	and	
emitted	on	site.	Although	the	building	infrastructure	team	purchased	electricity	that	was	
certified	‘renewable’,	City	Hall’s	CO2	calculations	were	based	on	CO2	averages	of	grid	
electricity.	The	GLA	constructed	them	through	recorded	quantities	of	gas	combustion	on	
site	and	recorded	electricity	consumption	from	the	grid.	Other	operational	activities	with	
rather	small	CO2	effects	were	not	taken	into	account	(e.g.	CO2	effects	of	main	water	
consumption).	A	specific	CO2	representation	was	thus	created.67		
																																								 																
67	Thames	Water	suggests	that	delivering	treated	potable	water	was	in	2011-12	associated	with	emissions	of		
0.283kgCO2/m
3	(Thames	Water,	2012).	
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Figure	7.12		Comparison	of	the	third	key	environmental	performance	target	defined	by	the	GOL	during	City	Hall’s	
design	and	actual	recorded	performance	in	operation	framed	through	carbon	dioxide	emissions	in	CO2/m
2/a	of	
related	energy	consumption	(Diagram:	Author,	2014,	based	on	ECON	19	and	GLA	data)	
The	GOL’s	briefing	update	did	not	specify	how	to	calculate	the	CO2	performance	target.	
Based	on	City	Hall’s	total	floor	area	of	18,734m2,	the	calculated	emissions	were	
87.4kgCO2/m2	for	the	period	April	2010	to	March	2011.	Based	on	“treated	floor	area”	(the	
framing	used	by	ECON	19)	of	15,115m2,	its	emissions	were	108.3kgCO2/m2.	Either	way,	it	
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seemed	that	City	Hall’s	operations	missed	this	emissions	target	by	approximately	25%,	or	
even	55%.	Although	the	GOL	did	not	refer	to	the	ECON	19	benchmark	system,	I	juxtapose	
the	CO2	emission	benchmarking	of	ECON	19	to	the	GOL’s	quantitative	target	in	Figure	7.15	
in	order	to	compare	the	two.	In	total	numbers,	the	GOL’s	“challenging	CO2	emissions	
target”	of	70kgCO2/m2/a	was	more	ambitious	than	the	ECON	19	“good	practice”	target	of	
90.9kgCO2/m2/a.	The	comparison	between	projected	performances	of	best	practice	
guidelines	and	recorded	performances	in	actual	operation	is	difficult,	since	these	distinct	
worlds	do	not	neatly	match.	I	therefore	highlighted	the	assumptions	on	which	this	
comparison	is	built	in	Figure	7.12.	
7.4.4.2 Foster+Partners’	total	energy	performance	target	based	on	ECON	19	
The	fourth	key	environmental	performance	goal	was	brought	into	the	design	process	in	
July	1999	by	Foster+Partners	in	their	Planning	Application	documents.	It	aimed	to	convince	
the	GOL	of	the	project,	to	give	credibility	to	their	environmental	goals	and	to	guide	the	
team’s	own	ambitions	of	developing	a	low	energy	design	building.	Instead	of	focusing	on	
CO2	emissions,	Foster+Partners	claimed	the	GLA	headquarters’	total	energy	consumption	
would	be	“approximately	a	quarter	of	a	typical	office	building”	(F+P,	1999a,	p.	23)	(Chapter	
6).	This	comparison	referred	to	the	ECON	19	benchmark	system	and	the	recorded	
performance	data	suggests	that	this	translation	from	the	Planning	Application	to	design	
materialisation	and	actual	operation	failed.	Instead	of	the	projected	116kWh/m2/a,	the	
recorded	energy	consumption	of	City	Hall	in	2010-11	was	273kWh/m2/a	-	that	is	more	
than	double,	about	135%	more	(Figure	7.13).	Foster	+Partners’	performance	goal	was	
missed	despite	all	attempts	undertaken	by	the	building	infrastructure	management	after	
handover	to	reduce	City	Hall’s	energy	consumption.		
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Figure	7.13		Comparison	of	the	fourth	and	fifth	key	environmental	performance	target	defined	by	Foster+Partners	
and	Arup,	respectively,	during	City	Hall’s	design	and	actual	recorded	performance	in	operation	framed	through	
energy	consumption	in	kWh/m2/a	and	in	reference	to	the	ECON	19	benchmarking	device	(Diagram:	Author,	2014,	
based	on	ECON	19	and	GLA	data)	
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7.4.4.3 Arup’s	building	services	energy	performance	target	based	on	ECON	19	
The	fifth	key	environmental	performance	goal	was	defined	by	Arup	(Figure	7.13).	In	
contrast	to	Foster+Partners,	Arup	declined	to	take	responsibility	for	City	Hall’s	total	energy	
consumption	estimates	(including	lighting,	equipment	and	catering)	and	limited	their	
predictions	to	the	mechanical	services	(heating,	cooling	and	ventilation)	only	(Interview	
Thonger,	2011).	How	City	Hall’s	projected	energy	consumption	should	de	defined	was	not	
well	aligned	between	the	two	design	parties	and	no	consensus	was	achieved	during	the	
design	development	(Chapter	6).	Arup	claimed	that	the	mechanical	services	would	
consume	only	25%	of	energy	of	the	same	services	of	a	typical	ECON	19	Type	4	office	
reference	(Arup,	2002,	p.	6).	This	prediction	indicated	83kWh/m2/a	for	the	mechanical	
services.	
Whether	this	goal	was	successfully	translated	into	City	Hall’s	design	remains	unclear	to	
date.	Kraus	stated	that,	“as	general	headlines”,	City	Hall’s	electricity	consumption	is	
estimated	to	consist	of	lighting	42%,	followed	by	IT	21%	and	then	kitchen	15%	(Email	Kraus,	
2012b).	But	City	Hall’s	operational	breakdown	of	electricity	use	was	a	controversial	matter,	
which	I	discussed	with	Kraus	over	several	months.	Surprisingly,	despite	retrofitting	of	
numerous	smart	and	sub	meters	Kraus	and	his	colleagues	were	not	able	to	specify	the	
electricity	consumption	of	the	mechanical	services	(for	cooling,	fans,	pumps	and	controls)	
as	an	isolated	share	of	consumption.	Kraus	recognised	“the	need	to	pick	up	more	data”	
(Email	Kraus,	2012a)	and	attributed	this	lack	of	information	mainly	to	City	Hall’s	multi-
stranded	power	distribution	system	and	limited	budgets	to	install	additional	meters	that	
would	allow	a	more	precise	rendering	of	the	building’s	electricity	consumption	breakdown.	
Without	this	data	it	is	difficult	to	understand	whether	the	design	teams’	low	energy	
cooling	approach	(built	on	the	borehole	cooling	source	and	chilled	beams)	performed	as	
predicted	in	actual	practice,	and	whether	Arup’s	claim	that	“the	building's	mechanical	
systems	will	be	approximately	75%	less	than	that	of	a	typical	prestigious	office”	(Arup,	
2002,	p.	6)	were	achieved.	Heating	shares	are	relatively	simple	to	monitor,	since	City	Hall	
uses	only	gas	for	space	heating	(neither	for	the	kitchen	nor	warm	water	supply)	and	gas	
meter	readings	are	provided.	This	share	is	64.5kWh/m2/a.	Based	on	Kraus’	estimated	
electricity	breakdown	(lighting	42%,	IT	21%	and	kitchen	15%),	the	remaining	22%	of	
electricity	amounts	to	approximately	46kWh/m2/a,	comprising	not	only	the	mechanical	
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services	but	also	all	other	smaller	electricity	consumption	shares.	It	can	thus	be	assumed	
that	the	actual	mechanical	services	did	not	consume	significantly	more	than	Arup	had	
predicted.		
Compared	to	measured	and	recorded	performance,	City	Hall’s	actual	operation	seemed	to	
have	missed	two	of	the	central	environmental	performance	targets	defined	during	its	
design	development,	while	Arup’s	prediction	target	could	not	be	verified.			
Confronted	with	Foster+Partners	prediction	that	City	Hall’s	energy	consumption	would	
only	be	a	quarter	of	a	typical	(ECON	19)	office	building,	Raynsford	stated:		 	
No,	it	has	not	performed	as	well	as	was	anticipated.	[…]	Well,	if	I	would	have	had	
the	benefits	of	insight,	I	would	have	asked	more	questions	about	that	[prediction]	
and	perhaps	that	would	have	improved	the	performance	if	I	would	have	been	more	
demanding,	but	I	just	simply	wasn’t	experienced	enough.	Well,	and	it	was	ten	years	
ago	(Interview	Raynsford,	2010).	
The	failure	of	City	Hall’s	performance	predictions	requires	intricate	explanation,	since	
actual	performance	was	co-shaped	by	several	elements	and	practices.	Nevertheless,	I	
develop	three	relevant	perspectives:	the	framing	of	the	performance	comparison,	the	
design	practices	and	the	operation	practices.	
First,	I	argue	that	the	ECON	19	comparison	was	problematic	from	the	outset	when	
Foster+Partners	and	Arup	chose	it	as	a	benchmarking	device	to	guide	and	align	the	their	
practices	during	the	multiple	translations	of	design	briefing	to	design	materialisation.	
Thonger	(Arup)	considered	ECON	19	as	a	fairly	crude	but	useful	tool	to	provide	orientation	
during	the	design	development	(Interview	Thonger,	2009).	But	the	comparison	is	not	a	
straightforward	numeric	procedure	–	the	ECON	19	guide	needed	transformation	through	
interpretation,	moderating	assumptions	and	adjustments,	since	City	Hall	did	not	match	the	
generalised	characteristics	of	the	ECON	19	reference.	City	Hall’s	FM	team	declared	that	
City	Hall’s		
extended	occupancy	hours	…	are	not	used	in	the	ECON	19	calculation	and	…	
although	City	Hall	is	compared	as	a	prestige	office	environment,	a	number	of	
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activities,	ie	broadcasting	on	a	weekend	and	public	open	days,	are	not	taken	into	
consideration	in	the	ECON	19	calculation	(GLA,	2004b,	p.	2).	
One	question	that	deserves	further	exploration	is	to	what	extent	the	strategy	of	the	
compact	building	form	–	predominantly	pushed	by	Foster+Partners	–	contributed	to	
increasing	lighting	demand	(through	deep	floor	spaces)	and	thus	to	increased	electricity	
consumption.	The	argument,	“a	sphere	has	25%	less	surface	area	then	a	cube	of	the	same	
volume”	(F+P,1999a,	p.	23)	was	not	only	associated	with	heat	losses,	and	solar	gains,	it	
was	also	associated	with	reduced	daylight	-	a	question	seemingly	not	broached	in	the	
process.		
Third,	the	GLA’s	operational	requirements	deviated	significantly	from	predictions	in	the	
design	briefing	process.	When	the	design	briefing	was	drafted	(Chapter	4)	the	GLA	did	not	
yet	exist	as	an	authority;	any	outline	of	its	needs	was	therefore	hypothetical.	.	Instead	of	
400	GLA	staff,	City	Hall	was	occupied	by	more	than	650	staff,	thus	contributing	to	higher	
consumption	levels.	For	political	reasons,	the	building	infrastructure	management	team	
could	not	measure	actual	occupation:	
Anybody	who	needs	to	get	through	that	door	[City	Hall	…]	might	be	Boris,	might	be	
other	politicians,	might	be	political	advisors,	might	be	anybody	who	might	not	want	
to	be	monitored	where	they	go,	so	we	wouldn’t	necessarily	do	it.	It’s	bad	enough	I	
monitor	who	turns	the	computers	on	and	off	(Interview	Kraus,	2011).	
It	was	through	the	number	of	PCs	that	Kraus	estimated	actual	occupation	(in	2002	
approximately	400	PCs	were	in	use,	in	2012	it	was	approximately	656)	(Email	Hardy,	2012).	
Kraus	noted	that	the	GLA	committed	to	the	principle	of	hot	desking	(i.e.	no	specially	
allocated	desks)	and	therefore,	in	peak	times,	occupation	was	assumed	even	higher	than	
900	GLA	members	(Interview	Kraus,	2011).	Thonger	(Arup)	also	attempted	to	explain	the	
deviation	between	energy	predictions	and	measurements	through	the	higher	occupation	
numbers	than	the	building	was	designed	for	(Interview	Thonger,	2011).			
	278	
7.5 Conclusions	
The	attempt	to	understand	City	Hall’s	environmental	performance	is	contingent	on	a	
number	of	elements	co-shaping	each	other:	the	materialised	design,	forms	of	occupancy,	
management	practices	and	methods	of	measurement.	I	started	this	chapter	by	reflecting	
on	one	crucial	link	introduced	to	align	design	practices	and	operation	practices,	namely	
City	Hall’s	environmental	performance	prediction	framed	through	the	coefficient	of	
kilowatt-hours	per	square	metre	per	year	(kWh/m2/a).	I	argued	that	this	coefficient	in	
isolation	has	limited	explanatory	value	to	explain	City	Hall’s	energy	consumption,	since	
many	associated	heterogeneous	elements	that	co-shape	the	buildings’	actual	operational	
energy	consumption	are	disconnected	from	it	(e.g.	occupancy	levels,	usage).	The	purpose	
of	the	section	was	to	draw	attention	to	the	difficulty	of	conceptualising	and	framing	the	
projected	energy	consumptions	of	actual	building	operations.		
In	order	to	develop	a	better	understanding	of	City	Hall’s	actual	environmental	
performance,	I	then	introduced	the	building	infrastructure	management	and	its	
heterogeneous	world	of	operational	practices.	The	team	conceived	its	key	task	as	reducing	
City	Hall’s	operational	electricity	consumption.	I	explained	four	key	building	updates	
introduced	by	Kraus	and	his	colleagues	to	further	reduce	electricity	consumption.	As	a	
form	of	fine-tuning,	correction	or	adaptation,	these	updates	aimed	to	improve	design	
issues	that	were	either	not	captured	or	had	failed	to	be	successful	during	the	design	
team’s	translations	of	design	briefing	to	design	materialisation.	These	interventions	are	
one	way	of	highlighting	the	significance	of	the	building	infrastructure	management’s	role	
in	influencing	City	Hall’s	actual	energy	consumption.		
City	Hall’s	environmental	impact	from	operations	has	never	been	completely	known.	The	
building	infrastructure	management’s	understanding	of	this	impact	essentially	depended	
on	the	scope	of	issues	and	indicators	taken	into	account,	recorded	and	represented	and	
what	they	omitted	in	this	process.	It	defined	this	impact	largely	by	monitoring	selected	
material	transformations	that	were	metered	through	calculations	and	which	external	
contractors	recorded.	I	argued	that	it	is	important	to	extend	the	assessment	of	the	impact	
of	City	Hall’s	material	flows	beyond	the	building	scale	to	include	heterogeneous	localities,	
actors	and	activities	that	are	necessarily	associated	with	them.		
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The	last	part	of	this	chapter	tied	City	Hall’s	operation	practices	back	to	its	design	practices.	
I	reviewed	three	key	projected	performance	targets	that	were	defined	during	design	
development	to	guide	and	align	the	multifarious	translation	processes	targeted	towards	
design	materialisation	and	that	could	only	be	evaluated	in	actual	operation.	Both	the	
GOL’s	required	CO2	emissions	target	of	70kg/m2/a	and	Foster+Partners	prediction	that	the	
GLA	headquarters’	energy	consumption	would	only	be	“a	quarter	of	a	typical	office	
building”	(F+P,	1999a,	p.	23)	seemed,	on	the	basis	of	recorded	GLA	data,	to	be	missed.	
Although	intricate,	I	discussed	this	issue	from	three	perspectives:	first,	I	argued	that	the	
ECON	19	comparison	was	problematic	from	the	outset,	second	that	the	designers	did	not	
pay	sufficient	attention	to	the	design	issue	of	electrical	lighting	(according	to	the	GLA	it	
presented	by	far	the	largest	share	of	electricity	consumption	at	42%),	and	third	that	in	
operation	the	GLA’s	actual	requirements	deviated	significantly	from	the	requirements	
predicted	in	the	design	briefing	process	-	instead	of	400	GLA	staff,	City	Hall	was	occupied	
by	more	than	650	staff	members,	contributing	to	higher	consumption	levels.		
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Chapter	8 	
Conclusions	
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8.1 Introduction	
My	thesis	is	an	in-depth	exploration	of	City	Hall’s	design	(and	operation)	practices.	
Beginning	in	1997	with	the	initial	conception	of	functions	and	responsibilities	of	the	
Greater	London	Authority	(GLA),	my	explorations	extended	into	City	Hall’s	operation	
practices	until	2011.	In	covering	this	period,	my	aim	was	to	connect	the	design	briefing,	
projected	design	and	actual	design	in	operation.	The	thesis	explored	how,	in	a	contingent	
and	complex	process,	architects,	engineers,	clients	and	others	assembled	(and	operated)	
City	Hall	through	particular	conceptions,	negotiations,	choices	and	transformations	in	their	
studios,	offices	and	on	site.	Through	these	practices	heterogeneous	elements	such	as	
materiality	and	agency,	as	well	as	diverse	temporal	scales	and	spaces,	were	drawn	
together.	Hence,	I	focussed	on	how	environmental	challenges	were	constructed	to	inform	
design	and	how,	in	response,	design	strategies	and	building	technologies	were	developed	
and	expanded.	By	emphasising	the	importance	of	the	making	of	City	Hall,	I	have	focused	
on	the	plural	and	shifting	activities	of	diverse	actors	and	entities	involved	in	the	design	
processes	through	a	pragmatic	approach	influenced	by	positions	in	the	field	of	Science	and	
Technology	Studies	(STS).	
In	this	closing	chapter	I	first	reflect	on	the	STS-	and	translation-inspired	theoretical	
framework	adopted	in	this	thesis.	Secondly,	I	revisit	central	questions	and	present	key	
findings	from	my	empirical	chapters	(4	to	7)	in	order	to	draw	out	wider	contributions	for	
architectural	design	research	and	practice.	I	do	this	by	foregrounding	three	selected	
mechanisms	(which	are	themselves	interrelated)	that	are	central	to	translation	processes.	
The	final	part	briefly	summarises	the	contributions	that	the	translation	framework	can	
make	to	inform	future	research	and	practice	in	environmental	design.		
8.2 Reflections	on	the	STS-	and	translation-inspired	theoretical	
framework	
This	thesis	explored	the	design	practices	that	materialised	City	Hall,	which	Foster+Partners	
ambitiously	described	at	the	handover	to	the	GLA	as	such:	“City	Hall	has	been	designed	as	
a	model	of	democracy,	accessibility	and	sustainability”	(F+P,	2002).	In	order	to	explore	
what	architects,	engineers,	clients	and	others	did	in	their	design	studios,	offices	and	on	site,	
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I	took	a	pragmatic	approach	towards	these	heterogeneous	assemblages,	influenced	by	
debates	in	the	field	of	STS.		
City	Hall’s	design	practices	involved	a	lot	of	work	and	efforts	that	spanned	several	years.	
They	(temporarily)	associated	more	than	100	different	actors	belonging	to	different	
vocations	(architects,	engineers,	government	officials,	developers,	etc.),	diverse	
materialities	(glass,	foam,	concrete,	CO2	etc.),	varied	technological	devices	(computers,	
fans,	gas	boilers,	etc.),	different	spatial	locations	(F+P’s	design	studios,	diverse	other	
offices,	constructions	sites,	technical	details,	the	“atmosphere”,	etc.),	diverse	policy	
documents	and	guidelines	(Building	Regulations,	consultation	papers,	design	briefs,	
BREEAM,	etc.),	disparate	timeframes	(construction	schedules,	lifespan	assumptions,	future	
generations)	and	much	more.	The	STS-inspired	approach	allowed	me	to	commit	to	and	
embrace	the	heterogeneity	that	City	Hall’s	design	practices	necessarily	drew	together.	City	
Hall	was	not	just	discursively	established,	diverse	elements	reciprocally	co-shaped	the	
design	practices	and	building	in	emergence:	building	forms,	a	unique	site,	a	minister,	
choices,	design	briefs,	diagrams,	negotiations,	etc.		
One	difficulty	was	how	to	deal	with	elements	that	the	design	practices	left	out	-	the	gaps,	
elements	that	were	ignored	and	not	enrolled	in	design	practice	and	that,	for	instance,	
jeopardised	the	mediation	between	projected	environmental	performances	and	‘real’	
performances.	The	STS	approach	allowed	me	to	come	to	terms	with	this	challenge	by	
emphasising	that	design	knowledge	and	design	strategies	are	constructed	and	therefore	
could	also	have	been	produced	in	more	desirable	or	more	inclusive,	alternative	ways	(Law,	
2004).		
One	further	challenge	was	how	to	retrace	the	heterogeneous	assemblages.	Given	the	
outlined	complexity	of	the	design	process,	it	was	an	impossible	task	to	describe	all	the	
links	that	made	up	the	City	Hall	assemblage.	The	links	were	immense,	continuously	
extended	and	partially	reshaped.	The	attempt	to	trace	all	associations	at	once	would	have	
been	impossible,	as	well	as	a	banal	collection	that	would	not	explain	much	about	the	
associations	forged	into	being	(Akrich,	1992,	pp.	205-206).	The	challenge	was	where	to	
stop	tracing	associations,	and	how	to	find	ties	that	were	stronger	than	others.		
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In	connection	with	the	research	questions	that	have	guided	this	thesis,	the	adaption	of	
Callon’s	(1986)	concept	of	translation	provided	a	helpful	strategy	through	which	to	
navigate	and	analyse	the	messy	and	fluctuating	practices	of	environmental	architectural	
design	and	City	Hall.	Callon	provides	a	compelling	set	of	vocabulary,	principles	and	
elements	that	enables	foregrounding	the	diverse	mechanisms	that	are	central	to	
translation.	Callon	conceives	the	initial	“moment”	of	translation	as	“problematization”	
(1986,	p.	203)	in	which	a	group	of	protagonists	defines	a	problem	and	action	plan.	
Following	Callon,	I	began	my	explorations	by	investigating	how	Minister	Raynsford	and	the	
Government	Office	for	London	(GOL)	set	up	a	shared	action	plan	to	(find	and)	design	a	
headquarters	for	the	GLA,	targeted	to	become	a	statement	of	sustainability.	Similarly,	I	
used	further	elements	proposed	by	Callon	for	analysis.	
Crucially,	environmental	challenges	and	performance	targets	in	design	practices	do	not	
become	enacted	in	a	linear	and	simple	causal	chain.	Initial	design	goals	need	to	be	
translated	into	particular	mediated	parameters,	strategies	and	technological	pathways	
towards	the	complex	materialisation	of	new	buildings.	The	form	of	these	ongoing	
transformations	is	crucial.	Translation	is	thus	a	compelling	approach	through	which	to	
explore	the	struggles	of	how	environmental	design	objectives	are	created,	continuously	
interrelated	and	transformed	into	design	strategies	and	materialised	in	specific,	localised	
settings.	Using	the	concept	of	translation,	I	analysed	how	environmental	problems	were	
constructed	as	an	issue	for	design,	and	how	they	were	continuously	transformed	and	
adjusted	through	contingent,	complex	and	dynamic	practices.	This	analytical	frame	was	
particularly	useful	to	understanding	the	partially	conflicting	preferences	between	
architects	and	engineers,	and	between	building	form	and	performance.	The	concept	
provided	a	helpful	tool	to	trace	agency	and	power	within	these	practices,	and	to	
understand	the	mediations	and	struggles	between	the	projected	building	and	the	‘real’	
building	
The	concept	of	translation	is	particularly	geared	to	analyse	the	inseparable	mechanisms	of	
the	production	of	design	knowledge,	the	construction	of	heterogeneous	relationships,	
diverse	displacements	and	transformations,	and,	negotiations	and	adjustments	(Callon,	
1986,	pp.	203,224),	which	were	central	in	bringing	City	Hall	into	being.	
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Adapting	the	concept	of	translation	in	this	way	seems	to	be	a	novel	contribution	to	the	
field	of	environmental	architectural	design	and	I	propose	to	further	test	and	develop	this	
approach	in	this	area	of	research	and	practice.	
8.3 Contributions	of	translation	(as	central	analytical	frame)	
8.3.1 Strategic	transformations	and	displacements	
In	Chapter	4	I	explored	how	environmental	problems	were	constructed	as	an	issue	for	
design,	and	how	they	were	then	transformed	into	particular	targets	and	goals	formulated	
to	instruct	and	align	the	architects,	engineers	and	developers	in	their	design	proposals.	
Prior	to	the	architects	and	engineers	of	the	More	London	team	taking	up	their	work,	
Raynsford	and	his	GOL	team	were	in	1997	endowed	with	the	responsibility	to	outline	the	
functioning	of	and	bring	into	being	the	GLA,	conceived	as	an	innovative	and	dynamic	body	
that	would	provide	strategic	leadership	for	London	at	the	beginning	of	the	21st	century.	
The	GLA’s	overarching	function	was	defined	in	two	government	consultation	papers	(DETR,	
1997,	1998b)	to	promote	sustainable	development.	Raynsford	expanded	his	team	by	
including	members	of	Turner	&	Townsend	Project	Management	(TTPM)	to	launch	a	unique	
developer-architect	team	design	competiton,	calling	for	suitable	proposals	to	
accommodate	the	GLA	on	the	basis	of	a	25-year	lease	deal	with	the	GLA.	Raynsford	
proclaimed	that	the	GLA	headquarters	was	set	“to	be	a	statement	about	the	new	authority,	
including	its	commitment	to	environmentally	progressive	objectives,	the	principles	of	
sustainability”	(Interview	Raynsford,	2010).		
To	inform	the	design	activities	of	an	initially	selected	group	of	55	competitors	,	his	GOL	
team	drafted	three	design	briefs	(TTPM,	1998a,	1998b,	1998c)	that	contained	a	range	of	
requirements,	for	instance	a	transient	spatial	programme	for	400	GLA	staff,	a	prominent	
and	distinctive	building	appearance,	and	beneficial	cost-effective	innovations.	Related	to	
these	heterogeneous	design	elements,	the	environmental	design	challenge	was	
predominantly	defined	as	the	goal	to	achieve	a	Building	Research	Establishment	
Environmental	Assessment	Methodology	(BREEAM)	rating	of	at	least	"very	good".		
Callon	suggests	that	the	“repertoire	of	translation”,	amongst	others,	is	“designed	to	give	a	
symmetrical	and	tolerant	description	of	a	complex	process	which	constantly	mixes	
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together	a	variety	of	social	and	natural	entities”	(Callon,	1986,	p.	224).	“Symmetrical”,	
here,	does	not	mean	that	involved	elements	are	equally	important.	Instead,	Callon	rejects	
giving	any	preference	to	particular	sorts	of	elements	or	relationships.	Crucially,	he	argues	
that	displacements	and	transformations	“occurred	at	every	stage.	Some	play	a	more	
strategic	role	than	others.”	(Callon,	1986,	p.	223).	In	City	Hall’s	translation	processes	of	
environmental	design	briefing	to	design	materialisation,	one	key	strategic	transformation	
was	the	displacement	of	the	concept	of	sustainability	into	a	BREEAM	requirement	
(outlined	in	Chapter	4).	One	contribution	of	translation	to	design	practice	and	research	in	
design	practices	is	to	shift	attention	to	these	crucial	transformations,	to	what	they	do	and	
to	how	they	are	enacted.	
Raynsford	was	endowed	with	the	power	to	form	teams,	assign	roles,	give	directions,	
oversee	activities	and	sign	off	the	design	briefs	issued	to	the	developer	teams.	In	the	
hands	of	Raynsford	and	his	team	of	government	officials,	the	concept	of	sustainability	
seemed	to	be	a	useful	frame	with	which	to	guide	policymaking	to	instigate	particular	
actions	directed	towards	translating	the	multiple	and	heterogeneous	issues	of	the	concept	
into	related	strategies.	But	the	question	of	how	to	translate	the	concept	into	design	
practices	for	the	GLA	headquarters	to	come	was	neither	made	part	of	an	in-depth	debate	
nor	declared	a	controversial	issue	to	tackle	within	the	GOL	team.	Raynsford	(and	his	team)	
had	the	power	to	explicitly	foster	this	debate	through	his	role	and	responsibility	to	draft	
the	competition	brief(s)	for	the	GLA	headquarters.	The	GOL	team	could	have	delivered	the	
challenge	of	how	to	interpret	and	give	meaning	to	the	concept	of	sustainability	to	the	
bidders	to	come.	They	did	not	ask	developers,	architects	and	engineers	to	develop	a	
tailored	strategy,	indicators	or	vision	of	what	sustainability	could	mean	for	the	case	of	the	
GLA	headquarters.	In	order	to	exemplify,	advance	and	innovate,	architectural	approaches	
towards	sustainability	may	need	to	reformulate	and	redesign	the	existing	problem	and	
target	definitions.	
Given	the	GOL’s	environmental	ambitions,	they	had	to	define	targets	that	went	beyond	
Building	Regulations	requirements.	Sustainability	as	a	concept	could	not	just	be	
materialised	–	it	crucially	required	transformation.	The	GOL	chose	to	take	responsibility	
themselves	(instead	of	transferring	it	to	the	bidders)	through	transforming	sustainability	
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into	a	displaced	set	of	design	issues	that	were	more	building	related	(see	BREEAM	below).	
The	three	initial	design	briefs	(TTPM,	1998a,	1998b,	1998c)	–	then	representative	of	the	
GOL’s	design	intents	–	were	the	main	devices	with	which	to	translate	sustainability	(and	all	
other	design	requirements)	from	the	GOL	offices	into	the	design	studios.	They	aimed	to	
link	and	align	the	activities	between	the	associated	actors	of	politicians,	government	
officials,	property	developers,	architects	and	engineers	in	the	joint	action	plan.	This	way,	
the	design	briefs	were	powerful	devices	to	render	transformations	easier,	to	associate	
heterogeneous	practitioners	and	entities,	to	attempt	to	keep	the	conflictual	and	
unpredictable	alliance	together,	and	to	preliminarily	set	out	the	“the	margins	of	
manoeuvre”	(Callon,	1986,	p.	203).	As	a	result,	the	concept	of	sustainability	was	(largely)	
abandoned	in	City	Hall’s	design	practices	with	and	through	the	design	briefing.	Later	on	in	
the	design	practices	neither	architects,	engineers	nor	developers	deviated	from	the	roles	
assigned	to	them	(to	fulfil	the	design	briefing)	by	bringing	back	the	concept	in	order	to	re-
integrate	particular	design	issues	captured	by	sustainability	that	the	briefing	had	excluded.	
Before	architects	and	engineers	entered	the	design	process,	many	features	of	the	future	
GLA	headquarters	were	just	vaguely	outlined	and	shaped	(e.g.	approximate	amount	of	
square	meters,	functional	programme,	etc).			
Instead	of	inviting	an	exploration	of	what	sustainability	could	mean	for	the	GLA	
headquarters	design	practices,	the	GOL	(TTPM,	1998a)	abandoned	the	concept	by	
translating	it	into	the	request	for	a	BREEAM	rating	of	at	least	"very	good"	in	the	first	design	
brief.	BREEAM	was	thus	chosen	as	the	key	entrusted	device	to	the	guide	the	
transformation	of	sustainability	into	the	design	architectural	practices.	In	1998	the	then	
new	version,	BREEAM	98,	had	been	updated	to	“ensure	a	broader	coverage	of	
sustainability	and	environmental	issues”	(BRE,	1998,	p.	5).	The	BREEAM	choice	seemed	to	
have	been	co-shaped	by	the	Labour	party’s	commitment	to	work	within	previous	
governments’	overall	spending	commitments,	since	the	design	target	needed	to	be	
achievable	in	alliance	with	a	developer	through	a	lease	deal	agreement.	BREEAM	then	just	
began	to	“kick	off	[…]	as	a	performance	tool”	(Interview	Spring,	2010)	and	was	compatible	
with	developer	activities.	The	displacement	through	BREEAM	was	a	strategically	key,	since	
the	commitment	to	the	concept	of	sustainability	in	the	context	of	GLA	design	practices	is	
clearly	not	equivalent	to	a	commitment	to	any	BREEAM	assessment	of	these	practices.	
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BREEAM	98	transformed	sustainability	into	nine	assessment	areas,	53	distinct	design	
issues	and	a	maximum	of	87	achievable	credits.	Farmer	and	Guy	argue	that	BREEAM	tends	
“to	compress	the	meaning	of	sustainability	to	a	relatively	narrow	band	of	pre-defined	
issues”	(2005,	p.	22).	The	concept’s	intent	to	address	“implications	for	social	justice	and	
perspectives	and	priorities	of	poorer	and	marginalized	groups”	(Leach	et	al.,	2010,	p.	166)	
were	largely	lost	in	translation.	The	GOL	did	not	attempt	to	tackle	the	contested	nature	of	
how	to	give	meaning	to	sustainability	in	practices.	“All	these	goals	of	sustainability	are	
context-specific	and	inevitably	contested.	This	makes	it	essential	to	recognize	the	roles	of	
public	deliberation	and	negotiation”	(Leach	et	al.,	2010,	p.	5).	There	are	still	many	
unanswered	questions	on	how	the	GLA	headquarters	in	particular	and	building	design	
practices	more	widely	impact	on	environment,	on	the	well-being	of	people	in	the	
neighbourhood,	in	London	and	the	planet,	in	the	short	and	long	run.	The	incomplete	
knowledge	and	contestation	indicates	that	a	more	comprehensive	shift	might	be	required	
in	order	to	specify	more	clearly	for	the	design	practices	of	the	GLA	headquarters	“what	is	
to	be	sustained	for	whom,	and	who	will	gain	or	lose	in	the	process”	(Leach	et	al.,	2010,	p.	
171),	especially	beyond	the	scale	of	the	building	itself.	
In	my	view,	the	BREEAM	device	-	deployed	as	a	central	environmental	design	target	-	
seemed	to	contribute	to	a	partial	de-politicisation	of	City	Hall’s	design	process.	This	can	be	
said	to	be	the	case	in	the	sense	that	in	the	transformation	from	sustainability	to	BREEAM,	
a	much	wider	problem	scope	became	disassociated	through	narrow	framing.	Furthermore,	
‘actual’	problems	were	displaced	from	the	association	within	the	design	practices	through	
awarding	credits	-	for	instance,	the	problem	of	climate	change;	while	“Operational	energy	
&	CO2	issues”	(IBSEC,	2002)	is	one	of	nine	assessment	areas	of	BREEAM	that	is	important	
to	limit	climate	change,	the	attribution	of	credits	seems	to	take	away	the	threat	that	
“[n]aked	survival”	(Droege,	2012,	p.	590)	is	at	stake.	Architects	and	engineers	were	
concerned	with	energy	consumption	during	later	design	practices.	It	was	treated	as	a	
seemingly	local	issue,	measured	in	kWh/m2/a,	but	crucially	I	did	not	see	any	design	
statement	or	other	document	explaining	why	reducing	energy	consumption	was	an	
important	task.		
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The	notion	of	an	exemplar	project	suggests	a	model	or	practices	to	be	copied	and	adopted.	
The	GOL’s	translation	of	sustainability	was,	relatively	speaking,	narrowly	framed.	The	GOL	
neglected	to	add	more	comprehensive	criteria	and	to	initiate	a	debate	about	what	
sustainability	could	mean	for	the	GLA	design	practices.	From	this	perspective,	the	GOL’	s	
environmental	design	targets	and	transformations	were	not	exemplary.		
8.3.2 Constructing	design	strategies	between	architects	and	engineers	
In	the	following	I	recollect	key	findings	from	Chapters	5	and	6.	In	these	chapters	I	explored	
how	the	team	of	CIT,	Foster+Partners	and	Arup	translated	the	BREEAM	target,	the	request	
to	give	“‘Green’	issues	[…]	proper	consideration”	(TTPM,	1998a)	and	the	many	other	
design	requirements	of	the	design	briefing	into	design	strategies	and	building	technologies.		
The	multiple	requirements	made	mandatory	in	the	design	briefing	then	needed	further	
transformation	through	a	particular	building	site,	the	alignment	of	new	actors,	the	
accumulation	of	design	knowledge	and	the	development	(construction)	of	design	
strategies	and	technological	choices.	It	was	the	GOL	as	representative	(as	quasi	client)	of	
the	later	long-term	occupier	–	the	GLA	-	that	largely	defined	the	environmental	design	
agenda.	In	principle,	the	architects,	engineers	and/or	the	client	could	have	deviated	from	
their	envisaged	roles	to	enact	the	design	briefing,	or	redefined	their	roles	by	focussing	on	
what	sustainability	could	mean	for	the	design	development	of	City	Hall,	thus	taking	more	
responsibility	for	the	building	they	were	co-producing	(see	section	above).		
The	first	transient	design	proposal,	the	“box”	scheme,	assembled	in	only	six	weeks	by	the	
CIT	team	and	presented	to	Raynsford	and	his	advisors,	failed	to	include	a	substantial	
commitment	to	environmental	design	strategies	(beyond	standard	office	building	
specification).	The	scheme	was	criticised	by	the	GOL	for	its	lack	of	distinctive	appearance,	
but	was	not	eliminated	from	the	selection	process.	Reasons	seemed	to	include,	among	
other	factors,	the	prominent	location	on	the	Southbank	and	an	attractive	lease	deal	that	
CIT	could	offer	the	GOL	-	in	comparison	to	other	competitors,	they	had	the	strategic	
advantage	of	wanting	to	kick-start	a	much	larger	development	(Interview	Shuttleworth,	
2010).	Through	consultation	and	the	first	presentation	to	Raynsford,	the	initial	design	
briefing	(in	reciprocity)	gradually	developed	and	accumulated	additional	design	
requirements	including	an	operational	CO2	target	and	passive	air-conditioning	system.	
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The	CIT	team	then	expanded	their	ambition	to	win	the	design	competition.	They	
interpreted	and	transformed	the	design	challenge	to	predominantly	mean	energy	
efficiency	(F+P,	1999a,	p.	23)	and	low	energy	design	(Interview	Thonger,	2011),	thus	
further	compressing	the	already	narrowly	defined	scope	of	the	BREEAM	goal.	The	team	
realised	that	a	more	distinct	building	form	that	could	be	perceived	as	a	landmark	was	a	
crucial	“detour”	(Callon,	1986)	in	their	translations	of	energy	efficiency	to	design	
materialisation	in	order	to	win	the	competition.	Additional	design	knowledge	was	
incorporated,	adapted	and	produced.	The	ECON	19	benchmarking	framework	and	the	
“Triangular	Approach”	were	chosen	as	important	devices	to	develop,	guide	and	align	
further	design	practices.	By	drawing	on	these	two	devices	out	of	a	vast	array	of	possible	
design	trajectories,	Foster+Partners	chose	to	maximise	the	use	of	“building	form	and	
orientation”	as	their	fundamental	basis	of	low	energy	design.	Addressing	the	issues	of	heat	
losses	and	solar	gains,	Foster+Partners,	in	consultation	with	the	engineers,	developed	
three	building	form	strategies:	compacting,	tilting	and	stepping.	In	parallel,	Arup	produced	
a	low	energy	cooling	strategy	that	was	based	on	borehole	cooling,	chilled	beams	and	
natural	ventilation.	The	CIT	team	assembled	the	diverse	strategies	in	the	“mask”	scheme	
that,	together	with	heterogeneous	submission	package	and	the	offer	to	achieve	a	BREEAM	
“very	good”	rating,	was	selected	by	Raynsford	and	his	advisors	as	the	winning	scheme	to	
house	the	GLA.			
In	Chapter	6	I	explored	how	the	previous	hypotheses	and	strategies	were	further	
transformed,	expanded,	redesigned,	adjusted	through	diverse	tests,	simulations,	
renegotiations	and	choices	in	the	quest	to	make	them	perform	as	predicted.	Following	
successful	selection,	Foster+Partners	significantly	redesigned	and	modified	the	building	
form	and	orientation	in	the	Planning	Application	scheme.	Against	initial	resistance	from	
the	GOL,	they	managed	to	push	through	this	design	move	to	achieve	a	more	unified	and	
fluid	building	form.	This	was	a	significant	transformation	that	accepted	higher	solar	
irradiance	and	the	dilution	of	the	self-shading	strategy	(tilting	and	stepping)	that	they	had	
developed	and	agreed	upon	with	Arup.	I	demonstrated	the	power	of	visuals	–	sketches,	
diagrams,	drawings	and	renderings	-	in	the	translation	processes,	for	instance	in	
Foster+Partners	deployment	of	building	form	design	logic	diagrams	as	devices	to	render	
their	building	form	modification	more	credible	and	to	further	stabilise	it.	
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I	then	focused	on	the	expansion	of	the	facade	design	that	(in	contrast	to	the	view	of	the	
architects)	Arup	considered	more	significant.	With	the	geometrical	rationalisation	enabled	
through	3D	CAD	advancements,	the	facade	design	was	expanded,	tested,	modified	and	
rearranged	towards	tendering	and	construction.	The	limited	cooling	capacity	of	the	chilled	
beam	and	borehole	strategy,	in	combination	with	the	partially	diluted	building	form	self-
shading	strategy,	triggered	a	long	battle	between	architects	and	engineers	over	
Foster+Partners’	desire	to	have	a	‘fully	glazed’	office	facade.	Via	experimental	moves	back	
and	forth,	transformations	and	renegotiations,	the	architects	changed	their	preferences	
and	adopted	Arup’s	design	arguments	to	make	the	facade	more	solid	and	thus	let	go	of	
their	dream	of	floor-to-ceiling	glazing.	
The	design	team’s	translation	of	their	primary	design	objective	of	energy	efficiency	lost	
sight	of	the	role	of	embodied	energy,	which	gains	significance	especially	in	the	low	energy	
objective.	In	the	contingent	translation	processes	of	GOL	design	briefing	to	design	
materialisation	a	vast	number	of	heterogeneous	elements	were	associated,	re-ordered,	
eliminated,	tested,	simulated	and	modified	in	order	to	arrive	at	the	actual	set	of	design	
strategies	that	make	up	City	Hall.	The	design	team	managed	to	assemble	a	set	of	
substantial	passive	design	strategies	that	are	normally	not	found	in	most	office	designs.	
One	central	design	target	of	the	environmental	design	briefing	was	the	BREEAM	
assessment	following	building	completion.	This	target	was	successfully	translated	into	the	
design	practices,	since	City	Hall	was	actually	assessed	as	“excellent”.	I	pointed	out	that	this	
achievement	in	part	depended	on	the	GLA’s	commitment	to	purchasing	renewable	energy,	
a	responsibility	beyond	the	influence	of	the	More	London	design	team.	
In	Chapters	5	and	6	I	highlighted	how	the	translation	framework	can	help	analyse	the	ways	
in	which	design	strategies	are	constructed	between	architects	and	engineers.	The	process	
of	translation	is	enabled	though	the	“simultaneous	production	of	knowledge	and	
construction	of	a	network	of	relationships”	(Callon,	1986,	p.	203).	Here	I	highlighted	the	
importance	of	architects	and	engineers	as	translators.	In	order	to	advance	the	processes	of	
translation	from	design	briefing	to	design	materialisation,	and	to	enable	them	to	succeed,	
the	architects	and	engineers	had	to	construct	design	strategies	that	extended	particular	
hypotheses	(about	the	world	of	design)	towards	materialisation.	The	major	findings	from	
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both	chapters	were	that	the	alliance	of	architects	and	engineers	was	conflictual:	
Consensus	was	not	achieved	over	the	role	of	building	form	in	their	joint	low-energy	
strategy	(Chapter	5),	not	over	Foster+Partners’	modification	of	building	form	and	
orientation	that	accompanied	the	Planning	Application	scheme	(Chapter6),	not	over	the	
ways	in	which	to	frame	and	predict	City	Hall’s	projected	energy	consumption,	and	initially	
not	over	the	glazing	ratio	within	City	Hall’s	emerging	office	facade	design.		
In	order	to	address	the	heterogeneous	complexity	of	design,	the	two	inseparable	
mechanisms	of	“production	of	[design]	knowledge	and	construction	of	a	network	of	
relationships”	(Callon,	1986,	p.	203)	were	important	in	the	design	studios	and	offices.	The	
design	practitioners	had	no	choice	other	than	to	break	down	the	projected	and	actual	
intricacy	into	alternating,	small	and	workable	design	complexes	and	interdependencies	
(e.g.	facade	build-up,	heat	losses,	solar	gains	and	air	movements).	Constructing	design	
strategies	thus	entailed	a	huge	responsibility,	since	hypothetical	design	strategies,	if	
materialised,	impact	on	and	co-constitute	actual	design	(and	in	part	the	world).	Are	the	
chosen	and	alternating	–	switching	back	and	forth	between	e.g.	building	form	and	facade	
design	–	design	issue	complexes	(sets	of	design-issue-dependencies)	sufficient	to	predict	
and	intervene	in	the	complexity	of	actual	operation?	
While	conflicts	between	practitioners	and	elements	during	the	heterogeneous	and	
complex	design	practices	should	be	seen	as	a	matter	of	course	that	cannot	all	be	
reconciled,	I	argue	that	it	is	important	to	explore	how	these	conflicts	between	architects	
and	engineers	occur	and	how	they	are	eventually	reconciled	and	negotiated	(cf.	Beveridge	
&	Guy,	2009;	Bucciarelli,	1994;	Feenberg,	1999).	The	emergence	of	conflicting	design	
priorities	must	be	seen	as	a	central	mechanism	of	translation	processes,	since	multiple	
heterogeneous	issues	are	built	into	conflictual	relations	that	shape	each	other.	The	
translation	framework	is	thereby	helpful	to	avoid	locking	architects	and	engineers	in	fixed	
roles	and	values	systems,	since	it	conceives	those	roles	as	being	reciprocally	shaped	and	
adjusted	to	other	entities	during	this	fluctuating	process.	This	does	not	exclude	previous	
educations,	experiences	or	expertise,	which	are	all	part	of	the	process.		
For	instance,	City	Hall’s	facade	design	has	been	a	complex	architectural	challenge	involving	
heterogeneous	elements	and	diverse	functions,	and	has	played	a	crucial	role	in	perception	
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processes	through	its	exposure.	Foster+Partners	and	Arup	approached	the	complexity	of	
facade	design	in	different	ways.	Through	the	exploration	of	City	Hall’s	expansion	of	the	
facade	design	(Chapter	6),	especially	within	the	Scheme	Design	Reports	(Arup,	1999;	F+P,	
1999e),	I	demonstrated	the	different	ontological	perspectives	between	Foster+Partners	
and	Arup	in	understanding	the	(world	of)	facade	design.	While	they	were	part	of	the	same	
City	Hall	design	project,	it	seemed	as	if	there	were	two	different	facade	designs	in	
development.	One	facade	was	constructed	through	materialities,	material	characteristics,	
forms,	geometrical	positions	and	perceptions,	while	the	other	was	defined	through	
thermal	insulation	and	solar	gain	factors.	This	shows	that	the	facade	design	is	not	in	
principle	singular.	But	these	two	partial	perspectives	did	not	produce	a	fully	
comprehensive	understanding	(that	would	not	be	possible),	since	they	both	missed	
elements	that	in	actual	operation	became	important	factors	(Chapter	7).		
It	seems	crucial	to	understand	that	(the	facade)	design	is	multi-dimensional	and	that	there	
is	no	other	choice	than	to	take	partial	perspectives	into	consideration.	Law,	in	reference	to	
Donna	Haraway,	argues	to	take	“responsibility	[…]	for	the	recognition	that	we	are	located	
in	and	produced	by	sets	of	partial	connections”	(Law,	2004,	p.	69).	The	architects	and	
designers	enacted	particular	partial	perspectives.	The	decisive	question	for	environmental	
design	then	becomes	which	of	these	partial	worlds	is	more	desirable	and	less	destructive	
than	others.	Since	different	partial	perspectives	cannot	always	be	reconciled,	it	is	
necessary	to	pay	careful	attention	to	the	trade-offs	and	consequences	involved.	Both	
architects	and	engineers	should	thereby	take	full	advantage	of	the	mutual	exchange	in	
which	engineers	“learn	about	the	architectural	assumptions,	and	in	exchange	the	
architects	learn	from	these”	engineers	(Yaneva,	2009,	p.	152)	in	order	to	make	well-
informed	decisions	and	to	achieve	the	best	design	possible	in	response	to	a	particular	
environmental	design	challenge.	
Further	expertise	and	(accepted)	responsibilities	played	a	crucial	role	in	shaping	the	design	
development.	Although	part	of	a	design	team,	Foster+Partners	were	the	experts	
responsible	for	assembling	landmark	building.	Arup’s	contribution	to	the	assemblage	was	
to	make	sure	the	building	services	would	perform	in	accordance	with	the	design	briefing.	
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Questions	of	power	played	a	crucial	role	in	trade-offs,	and	it	seemed	that	Foster+Partners	
were	able	to	push	their	(fluctuating)	preferences	more	strongly	than	Arup.	
The	frame	of	translation	becomes	a	crucial	political	dimension	since	it	foregrounds	how	
particular	design	strategies	were	constructed	in	order	to	make	a	sensible	proposal	into	
architecture	(and	the	shared	world).		
8.3.3 Supposed	equivalences	between	projected	design	and	actual	design	
In	Chapter	7	I	explored	City	Hall	in	operation	from	2002-03	to	2010-11.	Below	I	recollect	
key	findings	from	this	chapter.	In	May	2002	the	GOL’s	initial	plan	to	find,	design	and	build	
a	domicile	for	the	GLA	that	was	associated	with	an	ambitious	environmental	design	
agenda	had	been	completed.	The	design	team	had	in	principle	fulfilled	their	tasks.	The	
evolving	design	briefings	were	largely	translated	into	hypotheses,	design	strategies,	
building	forms,	technological	choices	and	materialisations.	These	translations	were	then	
put	on	trial	in	actual	operation.	Would	design	intentions	perform	and	last	as	predicted?	
Relating	operation	practices	back	to	design	and	environmental	performance	predictions	
required	an	understanding	of	the	elements	that	co-shaped	actual	performance.	I	argued	
that	understanding	actual	operational	performance	was	contingent	upon	GLA	occupancy,	
management	and	methods	of	metering	through	the	facility	management	(FM)	team.	
Essentially,	the	FM	team’s	understanding	of	City	Hall’s	environmental	performance	
depended	on	the	scope	of	material	transformation	that	the	team	recorded	and	re-
represented	(e.g.	emissions	of	nitrogen	oxides	and	sulphur	dioxides	were	not	monitored)	-	
in	other	words,	how	the	GLA	created	knowledge	about	their	material	transformations	and	
what	the	GLA	omitted	in	this	process.	
While	City	Hall	was	largely	‘stabilised’	through	its	materialisation,	the	GLA’s	FM	team	
undertook	several	adaptations	and	updates	in	their	central	objective	to	wrestle	down	
electricity	consumption.	I	explained	four	key	updates.	One	crucial	finding	was	that	the	
cost-intensive	PV	modules	update,	deployed	as	a	demonstration	project	on	City	Hall’s	roof,	
in	actual	operation	only	produced	1%	of	the	building’s	electricity	consumption.	
Surprisingly,	voltage	optimisation,	a	much	cheaper	and	rather	minor	intervention	that	was	
not	perceivable	by	GLA	members	and	visitors,	brought	a	significantly	higher	electricity	
consumption	reduction	of	8-14%.		
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I	then	tied	City	Hall’s	operations	back	to	its	design	practices	in	order	evaluate	how	
successful	the	More	London	design	team’s	translations	of	environmental	design	briefing	to	
design	materialisation	were.	Following	the	successful	BREEAM	assessment,	only	three	
projected	environmental	performance	targets,	which	had	been	defined	during	design	
development,	could	be	evaluated	in	actual	operation.	
Key	findings	included	the	fact	that	the	GOL’s	required	CO2	emissions	target	of	70kg/m2/a,	
on	the	basis	of	recorded	measurements	(and	calculations)	for	2010-11	was	missed	by	
approximately	25%.	Foster+Partners’	prediction	that	the	GLA	headquarters’	actual	energy	
consumption	would	only	be	only	a	quarter	of	a	typical	ECON	19	office	building	was,	in	
actual	operation,	not	achieved.	Instead,	the	recorded	energy	consumption	in	2010-11	was	
more	than	double	-	about	135%	more.	Arup’s	key	performance	goal	predicted	that	the	
mechanical	services	(heating,	cooling	and	ventilation)	would	consume	only	25%	energy	of	
the	same	services	of	a	typical	ECON	19	reference.	Whether	this	goal	was	successfully	
translated	into	City	Hall’s	design	remains	unclear,	since	no	effective	sub-metering	has	been	
put	in	place	to	date.		
The	failure	of	City	Hall’s	performance	predictions	cannot	be	explained	unambiguously	as	
performance	was	co-shaped	by	several	elements	and	practices.	I	explained	three	elements	
that	played	a	significant	role:	Firstly,	I	argued	that	the	ECON	19	comparison,	chosen	by	
Foster+Partners	and	Arup	in	its	setup,	was	already	problematic	given	the	fact	that	City	Hall	
contained	many	additional	functions	not	contained	in	a	typical	prestige	office	building.	
Secondly,	the	design	team	made	huge	efforts	to	lay	the	foundations	of	low	energy	and	
passive	design	in	design	practices.	While	the	mechanical	services	seemed	to	perform	
almost	as	predicted,	City	Hall’s	FM	team	contend	that	a	different	design	issue	(beyond	
heating,	cooling	and	ventilation)	became	a	major	force	in	co-shaping	electricity	
consumption.	Based	on	the	FM	team’s	estimated	electricity	breakdown	(lighting	42%,	IT	21%	
and	kitchen	15%),	electrical	lighting	was	by	far	the	biggest	share	of	electricity	consumption.	
This	was	a	design	issue	not	(sufficiently)	raised	and	largely	neglected	in	design	strategies.	
The	FM	team	considered	parts	of	the	lighting	design	to	be	insufficient	and	this	contributed	
to	higher	electricity	consumption.	It	was	likely	within	Arup’s	agreed	responsibilities	to	
oversee	and	sign-off	on	the	lighting	design.	Thirdly,	the	GLA’s	actual	operational	
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requirements	deviated	significantly	from	the	predictions	outlined	in	the	design	briefing	
process.	Instead	of	400	GLA	staff,	City	Hall	was	occupied	by	more	than	650	staff,	
consequently	contributing	to	higher	consumption	levels.	
One	analytical	contribution	that	translation	can	make	for	design	research	and	design	
practices	is	to	highlight	how	supposed	equivalences	are	put	in	place	between	the	
projected	design	and	actual	design.	Translation	foregrounds	the	hypothetical	dimension	of	
the	shared	action	plan:	“In	conclusion	it	is	noted	that	translation	is	a	process,	never	a	
completed	accomplishment,	and	it	may	[…]	fail”	(Callon,	1986,	p.	196).	Within	translation	
processes		
a	series	of	intermediaries	and	equivalences	are	put	into	place	[…	practitioners]	
show	graphic	representations	and	[…]	mathematical	analyses	[…]	The	choice	of	
each	new	intermediary,	of	each	new	representative	must	also	meet	a	double	
requirement:	it	renders	each	new	displacement	easier	and	it	establishes	
equivalences	(Callon,	1986,	pp.	216-218).	
There	were	many	instances	within	City	Hall’s	design	practices	in	which	designers	sought	to	
render	their	chosen	design	strategies	more	plausible	by	suppressing	the	hypothetical	
dimension	of	their	activities.	In	Chapter	6	I	discussed	the	power	of	visual	representations:	
Foster+Partners’	deployment	of	many	“Design	Logic	Diagrams	-	Building	Form”	(F+P,	
1999b)	were	crucial	visual	devices	in	their	attempt	to	render	their	building	form	
modification	more	credible	and	to	further	stabilise	it.	These	diagrams	represented	specific	
design	complexes	(sets	of	design-issue	dependencies)	that	were	constructed	within	the	
design	practices.	They	seem	to	summarise	the	actual	entanglements	of	building	form	and	
orientation	that	affect	Foster+Partners	primary	objective	of	low-energy	design.	The	
diagrams	sought	to	suggest	that	the	actual	world	is	in	its	key	(energy	consumption	
influencing)	factors	equivalent	to	the	represented	world.	
The	notion	of	(supposed)	equivalences	is	helpful	to	emphasise	that	the	projected	design	
and	materialised	design	are	not	the	same.	Madeleine	Akrich	similarly	emphasised	the	
importance	“between	the	designer	and	the	user,	between	the	designer's	projected	user	
and	the	real	user,	between	the	world	inscribed	in	the	object	and	the	world	described	by	its	
displacement”	(Akrich,	1992,	pp.	208-209).	This	links	back	to	the	construction	of	design	
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strategies	and	the	related	sets	of	design-issue	dependencies	envisaged.	In	Chapter	7	I	
demonstrated	that	the	prediction	of	actual	operation	is	a	risky	mission,	since	largely	
unpredictable	elements	co-shape	actual	performance,	and	design	briefing	requirements	
might	be	violated	by	occupant	needs.		
It	can	be	argued	that	Foster+Partners’	strategy	of	compact	building	form	–	deployed	with	
the	aim	to	minimise	heat	losses	-	has	supported	the	demand	for	more	lighting	precisely	
through	its	compact	form	and	deep	floor	areas.	The	design	issue	of	day	and	electrical	
lighting	had	not	been	mentioned	in,	for	instance,	the	building	form	design	logic	diagrams,	
despite	its	significant	impact	and	role	on	electricity	consumption	of	lighting.	The	issue	was	
omitted	in	the	alternating	sets	of	constructed	design-issue	dependencies.	According	to	
GLA	data,	lighting	electricity	accounted	for	42%	of	total	electricity	use	–	a	constitutive	
force	largely	absent	in	intensive	activities	of	low-energy	design.	Attention	has	to	be	shifted	
to	the	supposed	equivalences,	to	their	limitations	and	their	related	consequences	on	the	
environment	and	human	well-being.	
8.4 Lessons	for	future	research	and	practice	
In	conclusion,	the	ways	in	which	Foster+Partners	and	many	other	architects	promote	their	
architectural	projects	is	characterised	by	a	rhetoric	of	consensus,	predictability	and	
feasibility.	Controversy,	unpredictability	and	ongoing	debates	are	rendered	inexistent.	The	
adjective	“sustainable”	in	connection	with	the	materialised	building	seeks	to	assign	a	
particular	status	quo,	a	form	of	black-boxing:	Sustainability	‘achieved’	and	‘materialised’.	
These	attributes	have	to	be	seen	within	a	wider	legitimisation	and	marketing	strategy	in	
Foster+Partners’	attempt	to	position	themselves	as	credible	leaders	within	environmental	
design	practices.	
As	indicated	previously	in	this	chapter,	I	argue	that	architectural	practices	should	actively	
engage	in	debates	concerning	how	(and	in	how	far)	sustainability	can	be	translated	into	
particular	design	tasks	and	settings.	I	suggest	to	step	back,	to	eliminate	the	adjective	
‘sustainable’	attached	to	practices	and	artefacts,	and	instead	to	engage	in	ways	the	
concept	is	given	meaning	–	how	it	is	enacted	-	in	design	practice.	To	face	the	controversies	
over	how	to	enact	sustainability	seems	a	more	promising	approach	than	to	pretend	that	
	297	
there	is	no	contestation.	In	doing	so,	I	see	the	concept	of	translation	as	a	useful	tool	to	
unpack	particular	claims,	to	make	them	more	accountable,	thereby	supporting	the	larger	
project	of	sustainability	that	sometimes	seems	to	suffer	from	a	certain	fatigue	as	practices	
that	associate	with	the	concept	fail	to	bring	about	the	necessary	reordering	in	their	
processes.		
These	processes	are	crucially	formed	along	complex	chains	of	translations.	The	focus	on	
translation	allows	one	to	shift	attention	to	crucial	moments	when,	for	instance,	
environmental	design	goals	are	constructed	to	align	involved	actors,	or	when	these	goals	
become	(re-)	translated	into	design	strategies,	and	when	important	strategic	
transformations	and	displacements	are	enacted.	Exploring	the	occurrence	of	controversies	
and	their	settlements	around	these	moments	has	the	potential	to	lead	to	significant	
innovation	in	architectural	research	and	design	practice.		
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Appendix	1:	Schedule	of	interviews	(2009-2012)	
Case	Study:	City	Hall	
Organisation	and	Role	 	 	 	 Name		 	 	 	 Interviewed	
	
CIT	/	More	London	
1. Development	Director		 	 	 Liam	Bond	 	 	 27.07.11	
	
GOL	
2. Minister	for	London	 	 	 	 Nick	Raynsford	 	 	 08.09.10	
3. Project	Sponsor	 	 	 	 Anne	Griffith	 	 	 02.02.10	
	
GLA	
4. Building	Infrastructure	Manager	 	 Rennie	Kraus	 	 	 25.08.09	
5. Building	Infrastructure	Manager	 	 Rennie	Kraus	 	 	 23.11.11	
6. Building	Infrastructure	Manager	 	 Rennie	Kraus	 	 	 26.10.12	
	
Foster+Partners	
7. Partner	in	Charge	 	 	 	 Ken	Shuttleworth	 	 10.11.11	
8. Project	Architect	 	 	 	 Sean	Affleck	 	 	 25.10.11	
9. Project	Architect	 	 	 	 Richard	Hyams	 	 	 29.07.11	
10. Architect	 	 	 	 	 David	Kong	 	 	 09.08.10	
11. Architect	 	 	 	 	 David	Kong	 	 	 07.09.11	
	
Arup	
12. Engineering	Project	Manager	and	Lead		
Building	Services	Engineer			 	 	 James	Thonger	 	 	 27.10.09	
13. Engineering	Project	Manager	and	Lead		
Building	Services	Engineer			 	 	 James	Thonger	 	 	 08.08.11	
14. Lead	Electrical	Engineer	 	 	 Mike	Summers	 	 	 12.08.11	
	
Turner	&	Townsend	
15. Architect	 	 	 	 	 Gordon	Rautenbach	 	 29.03.10	
16. Mechanical	and	Electrical	Engineer	 	 Jon	Spring	 	 	 19.11.10	
	
	
Case	Study:	7	More	London	Riverside	
Organisation	and	Role	 	 	 	 Name		 	 	 	 Interviewed	
	
CIT	/	More	London	
17. Development	Director		 	 	 Liam	Bond	 	 	 27.07.11	
	
PricewaterhouseCoopers	
18. Senior	Programme	Manager	 	 	 Michael	Hayes	 	 	 02.11.11	
19. Real	Estate	Director		 	 	 	 Paul	C.	Harrington	 	 02.08.11	
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Foster+Partners	
20. Partner	in	Charge	 	 	 	 Mikle	Jelliffe	 	 	 28.01.11	
21. Project	Architect	 	 	 	 Robert	Hall	 	 	 12.09.11	
22. Architect	 	 	 	 	 Consuelo	Manna	 	 	 04.08.11	
	
Roger	Preston	&	Partners	
23. Director	of	Environmental	Engineering		 Matthew	Thurston	 	 29.09.11	
24. Building	Service	Engineer	 	 	 Peter	Hale	 	 	 21.07.11	
	
Building	Design	Partnership	
25. Project	Mechanical	Engineer	 	 	 Peter	Brickell	 	 	 25.10.11	
	
MACE	
26. Construction	Manager	 	 	 Thomas	Marsterson	 	 14.10.11	
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Appendix	2:	Calculations	of	the	surface	to	volume	ratio	of	cube	and	
sphere		
Below	I	calculate	and	compare	the	surface	to	volume	ratio	of	a	cube	and	sphere	of	the	
same	volume.	The	aim	of	this	calculation	is	to	question	Foster+Partners’	claim	that	“a	
sphere	has	25%	less	surface	area	than	a	cube	of	the	same	volume”	(F+P,	1999a,	p.	23).		
	
Cube		 	 Acube=	6	∙ 𝑎! 	 	 Vcube=	𝑎3 	
Sphere	 	 Asphere	=	4 ∙  𝜋 ∙ 𝑟!	 	 Vsphere	= !!  ∙  𝜋 ∙  𝑟!	
	
Vcube	=	Vsphere	
	
𝑎!	=	!!  ∙  𝜋 ∙  𝑟!	
a	=	 !!  ∙ 𝜋! ∙ 𝑟	
r	=	 !!  ∙ !!! ∙ 𝑎	
r	≈ 0.62035	
d	≈ 1.24070	
	
Q	=	!!	
Qcube	=	
!"#$%!"#$%	=	! ∙!!!! 	=	!!	
Qsphere	=	
!"#!!"!!"#!!"!		
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Qsphere	=	
! ∙ ! ∙!!!! ∙ ! ∙ !!		
Qsphere	= 3 ∙  !!					 insert	r	=	 !!  ∙ !!! ∙ 𝑎	
Qsphere	= 3 ∙ !!! ∙!!! ∙!		
Qsphere	= 3 ∙ !!  ∙ 𝜋! ∙	!!	
Qsphere	≈	4.83598	∙  !!	
	
Qcube		 =	100	%	
Qsphere		 =	x	%	
x	=	!""% ∙ !"#$%&%!!"#$ 	
x	=	
!""% ∙ !∙ !! ∙!! ∙ !!!! 	
x	=	
!""% ∙ !∙ !! ∙!!! 	
x	=	
!""% ∙ !! ∙!!! 	
x	=	50%	∙	 !!  ∙ 𝜋! 	
x	≈	80.60%	
A	sphere	has	≈ 19.40	%	less	surface	area	than	a	cube	of	the	same	volume!	
